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Professor Robert Rennie
Preface
Professor Robert Rennie held the Chair of Conveyancing at the University 
of Glasgow for 20 years prior to his retirement in July 2014. This collection of 
essays is a celebration of his extraordinary contribution to the development 
of Scots private law during that period. His many publications on the 
principles of property and professional negligence played an important 
role in shaping the rapid evolution of these areas of law over the past few 
decades, whilst simultaneously guiding practitioners through the new 
legal landscape which has resulted from those changes. In addition, his 
commitment and generosity as an educator has inspired generations of 
students, researchers and fellow academics. 
The essays in the collection have been written by Robert’s peers in 
the judiciary, academia and legal practice. We are delighted – though 
not surprised – that so many prestigious authors have been willing to 
honour Robert by sharing their own perspective on the legal issues which 
formed the focus of his work. We offer our thanks to all the contributors, 
particularly to Robert’s lifelong colleague and friend, Lord Bonomy, for his 
warm-hearted retrospective of Robert’s career to date. 
A special word of gratitude must also be extended to the Clark Foundation, 
whose generous support has made it possible for this volume to be published 
online. Robert has always been a strong proponent of the enhancement 
of legal practice through the use of new technology, and is committed to 
excellence in education. It seems most fitting, then, for this collection to 
benefit from the innovative open access publishing model which makes the 
research freely available to every student and practitioner of Scots law.
Frankie McCarthy, James Chalmers and Stephen Bogle
Note
The Clark Foundation for Legal Education offers grants and scholarships 
to persons practising law in Scotland, whether as solicitors or advocates, 
and to persons studying at Scottish Universities or other institutions of 
higher education based in Scotland. 
The purpose of the Foundation is to promote and advance the legal 
and business education and training of Scots lawyers and students of 
Scots Law. Award holders can undertake (a) courses of study in Scots 
Law or comparative legal systems or the law of the European Community 
or foreign languages or business management or (b) the writing of legal 
textbooks. Alternatively they can undertake research in any one or more 
aspects of Scots Law and/or its relationship with other legal systems or the 
institutions of the European Community.
For further information, contact clarkfoundation@shepwedd.co.uk
1. Robert Rennie – A Career 
Retrospective
Lord Bonomy
I don’t think that it is just with the benefit of hindsight that I see the course of 
Robert’s career as having been plotted by the time he first graduated, still not 
yet twenty years of age. Like so many of his contemporaries from a modest or 
working class background, determined to make the most of the educational 
opportunities of the mid-1960s, he thrived in a student environment that in 
many ways resembled the school classroom. In his final undergraduate year, 
almost alone among his colleagues, he positively wallowed in conveyancing. 
It was a demanding class with five 9am lectures every week of each of the 
three terms. Every Friday of the first two terms Robert faced what for him 
was a challenging choice between indulging himself in another Jack Halliday 
master class or assuming his place between the posts as our football five-a-
side goalkeeper. At the end of that year his rewards for making the correct 
choice and for his application to the study of conveyancing and its quirks 
and twists (he was even then its champion) were the McConnachie Bursary 
worth a staggering £300, the most valuable prize in the Law Faculty, an 
apprenticeship with Bishop, Milne, Boyd & Co., Jack Halliday’s firm, and a 
place as a doctoral student where he produced his thesis, “Floating Charges 
– a Treatise from the Standpoint of Scots Law.” Never judge a book by its 
cover, or indeed its title. Although that somewhat less than racy title would 
ensure that Robert’s learned and worthy efforts would never be debased by 
the hollow fame and fortune of a best-seller list, the work that the thesis 
reflected was fairly innovative in its time.
© Lord Bonomy, CC BY 4.0 http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0056.01
2 Essays in Conveyancing and Property Law
His credentials were thus established from an early stage in his career. 
The gravitas that will feature later in this account was also in evidence 
even then, leavened of course as it is to this day, by a mischievous sense of 
satirical humour. As apprentices, four or five of us met from time to time 
to share recent experiences, usually starting the evening at the office of an 
apprentice colleague where Robert took the lead in sitting in the sacrosanct 
office chairs of each of the revered senior partners, mimicking them and 
dissecting their foibles along the lines of Mike Yarwood’s impersonations 
of Harold Wilson and Edward Heath. On one such occasion the sudden 
unexpected return to the office of one of those Gods, whose first names 
were known only where they appeared on the firm’s headed notepaper, 
was a close call. The relationship at that time between senior partners and 
young apprentices and assistants is neatly encapsulated in the practice of 
one of the senior partners at Bishop, Milne, Boyd & Co referring to the 
apprentices Robert, Ewan Kennedy and John Armit as “Mr Rennedy” and 
“Mr Remit.”
In his four years or so with Bishop, Milne, Boyd & Co, as apprentice 
and then assistant, Robert worked mainly for the partner with the 
biggest footprint in the firm, James Reid, who headed a conveyancing 
team consisting of an assistant (Robert), an apprentice, four typists and 
four Adler typewriters. This was a busy and productive unit of which 
Robert was a valued member; not only did his knowledge and experience 
of the complexities of conveyancing theory and practice expand, but his 
own particular aptitude and expertise came to be recognised by others 
in the firm who regarded him as one to turn to for advice in the absence 
of Professor Halliday. It was, therefore, a surprise to many when in 1972 
Robert left Bishop, Milne, Boyd & Co. and headed for the heart of industrial 
Lanarkshire and the rapidly expanding firm of Ballantyne & Copland. That 
was the first of two occasions in his career when he would be head-hunted. 
Ballantyne & Copland was a domestic conveyancing powerhouse where 
the senior partner, Ian Livingstone, generated a high and growing volume 
of transactions which his long-standing partner, Hugh Warden, strove 
manfully to handle and complete. An assistant, John Watson, who was later 
to qualify as a solicitor and become a partner, handled wills and executries 
and some miscellaneous business, and I had arrived 18 months before to 
deal principally with the spin-off business of conveyancing clients, e.g. 
prosecutions, litigation in general and family problems, in order to provide 
an all-round service. But assistance was urgently required at the core of the 
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firm’s business, to handle the rapidly increasing volume of conveyancing 
transactions. Robert answered my call, and joined the firm in April of that 
year, before being assumed as a partner the following year. I remain of the 
view that acquisition compares favourably with the acquisition of Kenny 
Dalglish by Liverpool from Celtic. Robert would be a mainstay, ultimately 
the mainstay, of the firm for almost thirty years.
Those were the heady days of scale fees and little competition. The 
five fee earners worked long and intense hours which brought generous 
rewards to all. Although the routine Wimpey or Barratt house purchase 
or sale may not have provided the conveyancing challenge Robert had 
experienced in Glasgow, the tenements of Bellshill and the occasional rash 
undertaking given by others in the firm meant that his workload was rich 
in complexities, and he was often called upon as trouble-shooter, not to say 
fire-fighter.
The wicked sense of humour was never far away, even during arduous 
periods, of which there were many. It was the nature of a business like 
Ballantyne & Copland that some clients, both the rich and those of modest 
means, required the services of more than one solicitor. So it was that 
Miss W, Robert’s conveyancing client, brought her Alsatian to the office 
to demonstrate to me that it had been wrongly identified as the dog which 
had bitten a child in a play park. Robert and I occupied adjacent offices 
separated by a wooden partition, topped at a height of about twelve feet 
by glass. As the client persisted, in increasingly strident tones, with her 
contention that an Alsatian identification parade was the only fair way 
forward, Robert’s face, framed by hands flapping like pointed ears and 
with tongue out and panting, appeared at the glass atop the partition. 
Completing that consultation required reserves of concentration and 
determination that I did not believe I could summon.
The firm continued to grow rapidly. Soon there were seven partners 
with the addition of Jock Brown, who completed his apprenticeship with 
the firm and went on to be assistant and partner while pursuing a parallel 
career as a football broadcaster, and Tony Ireland who arrived as an 
assistant and was later assumed. Those two are, like Robert, still in practice. 
In the early 1980’s it was a formidable unit. At that time and in subsequent 
years there were other assistants, some of whom became partners. One 
assistant who went to the Bar is now a Senator of the College of Justice, 
Lady Stacey. Ballantyne & Copland was professional home to a number of 
talented and extremely hard-working individuals, all interesting characters 
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with wide-ranging interests. By 1982 there were eight offices. From every 
single one there were regular calls for advice to Robert as the fount of 
knowledge of conveyancing, and increasingly of inventive, practical and 
effective solutions to the novel problems that the transactions and title 
deeds of West Central Scotland contrived to throw up.
Then from 1983 onwards a combination of factors including the abolition 
of scale fees, the encouragement of advertisement and open competition 
among solicitors, and personal career choices led to some personnel 
changes and a reduction in the number of offices, including the hiving-
off of the firm’s Hamilton office to two of the partners. Throughout these 
changes, and indeed throughout the remainder of his time at Ballantyne & 
Copland, Robert was the linchpin that secured the firm’s stability. He did 
that in a number of ways, including his ready availability and willingness 
to patiently and calmly consider and advise on the problems others in the 
firm had encountered, and his management of the financial affairs and 
business of the firm. He took on responsibilities that others were seen to 
avoid, largely, it has to be said, because they knew that he would handle 
them better. A good example is the role of partner responsible for staffing 
matters, which should have been shared around, but which he held more 
often than not, because not only did the staff warm to his personality, but 
he is also a good listener who treated and treats all with equal respect.
One role which he, surprisingly, was slow to master was that of 
advocate, by which I mean in-court litigator. Any who have enjoyed the 
privilege of observing his performance at student seminars, or experienced 
his wicked mimicry of the pompous, can be forgiven for viewing him as 
a frustrated actor, usually a reliable pointer to a natural aptitude for court 
advocacy. It is probably to the great benefit of Scots Law that Robert chose 
a different course. Having said that, it is only right to acknowledge that, on 
those occasions when he was summoned to action in court he willingly did 
his bit and did enjoy some major triumphs. His first recorded successful 
reparation outcome was on behalf of a second-year apprentice colleague 
at Bishop, Milne, Boyd & Co., Hector Cameron, who sustained a laceration 
through contact with the sharp ornamental spike of a wall lantern jutting 
out over the stairway from the Alpha Restaurant where they had enjoyed a 
good lunch. Robert led the case against the Stakis Organisation, owners of 
the restaurant, netting his colleague £50, which was just under 10% of the 
then second-year apprentice salary. To the great credit of the pursuer, his 
largesse briefly knew no bounds, and the damages were rapidly returned 
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whence they came, but exclusively at the bar, the following Friday with 
the assistance of apprentices and assistants from far and wide, who had 
somehow got wind of the windfall. 
Robert occasionally appeared before licensing boards on behalf of a 
variety of clients, from the enterprising Asian off-sales proprietor (remember 
that it was in Motherwell that cut-price alcohol was first introduced to the 
public by AA Brothers) to the Coral Organisation, for whom Ballantyne 
& Copland acted, from the days when Joe Coral himself and his sons 
Bernard and Nicholas managed a tightly run betting shop business and 
personally attended all the hearings until they grew to be a multi-million 
pound gambling empire extending to hundreds of shops and a number of 
casinos. However, his principal involvement with those clients remained 
the associated property acquisitions. Commercial transactions brought a 
welcome change from the principal diet of domestic conveyancing, and 
also the occasional invitation to a corporate entertainment event. The Coral 
Organisation held membership of the St Andrews Sporting Club (the sport 
then and to this day being boxing). The late 1970s were a golden age for 
Scottish boxing. Robert had the good fortune to be Coral’s guest on the 
night in January 1973 when Jim Watt met Ken Buchanan, two Scottish 
legends of the ring, to contest the British Lightweight Championship. 
The party had ring-side seats. As the boxers made their way into the ring, 
Robert remarked to Jim Clinton of Corals that Ken Buchanan did not look 
very tough to him, only to hear Clinton, who was by then fairly relaxed, 
call out to Ken Buchanan: “Hey, Ken. He (pointing to Robert) thinks you’re 
no’ very tough.” The trait of speaking his mind frankly and saying what 
he thinks, which has led to praise in Robert’s expert opinion practice, 
produced one of those anxious moments when time seemed to stand still. 
It was not clear whether Ken had heard anything over the general hubbub. 
As it was, Buchanan defeated Watt to take the title. As he left the ring, he 
smiled and waved a glove in the direction of the Coral party, bringing an 
end to a memorable, if latterly rather subdued, evening. Perhaps another 
close call.
Robert’s major adversarial triumph undoubtedly came in the protracted 
and convoluted battle (“war” is probably the more appropriate expression) 
in 1977 to secure the election of Jack Gillespie to the board of Glasgow 
Rangers FC. Following the failure to secure a position on the Board by 
negotiation, on two separate occasions a major assault was mounted at the 
Club AGM to persuade the undecided few shareholders necessary to tip 
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the balance in Gillespie’s favour to vote for him. The second attempt was 
a pure forensic triumph. At a number of earlier stages it had appeared that 
the necessary majority had committed themselves to supporting Gillespie 
only for some of those commitments to later turn out to be hollow. You can 
talk all you like before the game (and almost everyone with an interest in 
the sport seems to do so) but all that really matters is how the team play on 
the day, and how the shareholders actually vote at the meeting. Realising 
that, Robert advised his client that he would have to win the fight on the 
field of play, persuade the waverers on the floor of the AGM. So it was that 
a token number of shares in Rangers were somehow acquired by Robert 
for himself and one of Scotland’s premier senior counsel of the day, Philip 
Caplan QC. Both spoke at the meeting and both harnessed the inevitable 
emotional tension of the occasion. There was nevertheless something 
surreal about Philip Caplan’s final oratorical flourish commending Jack 
Gillespie’s election to provide a driving force to restore Rangers to “the 
place where they belong – among the elite of Europe.” The victory was 
secured. It was a far cry from the occasion some years earlier when he had 
been called into action unexpectedly as a late substitute for one of the court 
assistants. He strove manfully to persuade Sheriff Dickson to a point of 
view that the Sheriff did not find attractive. As matters went from bad to 
worse to terminal decline, the assistant suddenly appeared through the 
court door to the obvious gratitude of Robert, and also of the Sheriff who, 
addressing the assistant with a sigh of relief, said: “Your procurator seems 
to be in some difficulty.”
Over his years of teaching, no doubt with the benefit of having had 
his expert opinion challenged from time to time, he developed court-room 
skills to demonstrate to students in his professional negligence class the 
elements of negligence and the issues to be addressed by the professional 
witness. He became quite good and latterly seemed to take a particular 
pleasure in putting colleague expert witnesses like Donald Reid, who 
“guested” at his seminars, to the sword. Although it was no coincidence 
that the guest was occasionally one who had been of a different opinion 
in a recent case, the cross-examination was always conducted in the best 
possible taste.
Through the many changes of the 1980’s and the 1990’s when some 
partners and assistants moved on, assistants became partners, new blood 
was recruited and the senior partners retired, Robert remained steadfastly 
on the bridge – and in the engine-room – providing stability and maintaining 
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the firm’s prominent place in Lanarkshire legal and community affairs. For 
twenty-five years he served in a very active capacity as Chair of the Board 
of the Lanarkshire Spastics Association, later incorporated into the Scottish 
Spastics Association and now part of Capability Scotland. Lanarkshire 
Spastics established and ran the Alexander Anderson Home and Braidwood 
House, two major undertakings. Over many years he contributed to the 
work of the local Hamilton Society of Solicitors by giving talks on subjects 
of current interest, and to the work of the Law Society of Scotland where 
he served as Convener of the Conveyancing Committee, part of the time as 
Chairman, on the Journal Committee and on a Complaints Committee and 
several other Sub-committees and Working Groups. At the Law Society his 
easy-going attitude made him a favourite of the staff.
His reputation as a conveyancer and chamber practitioner grew. He 
came to be held in the highest regard by the profession in general. His 
expositions of the law were accorded the greatest of respect by colleagues 
with whom he transacted business. His good humour and straightforward, 
open and relaxed approach to his dealings with professional colleagues 
have made for warm relationships and frank exchanges. Solicitors dealing 
with Robert have always felt able to make comments to him they would 
never dream of making to their more straight-laced colleagues. In one 
transaction where the potential seller was represented by a highly regarded 
Wishaw solicitor with a prominent position in the Church of Scotland 
and the Boys Brigade, and there had been negotiations over a small area 
required for access to land for a housing development, Robert’s client took 
route one, bypassing both solicitors, and struck a deal with the elderly and 
very frail seller. When her solicitor heard, he could not contain his outrage, 
phoning Robert instantly to recount the tale. As it happened the Ballantyne 
& Copland client had a prominent role in a different church, which led a 
rather defensive and off-guard Robert to assert that his client would not 
have done anything underhand because of his principles as a Christian. 
That provoked the instant, frank and withering retort: “Aye, a Christian 
of the worst sort – their text is St Matthew 25.35 – I was a stranger and ye 
took me in.”
Just how his stock had grown, in tandem with his experience gained 
from handling the myriad of intricate practical conveyancing problems that 
Lanarkshire spawns, was clearly demonstrated in 1994 by his appointment 
to the Chair of Conveyancing at the University of Glasgow once held by his 
mentor, Jack Halliday. To be appointed to that distinguished Chair from 
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practice in a provincial firm was a striking personal achievement. From an 
early stage in his new professional/academic career he took an increasing 
interest in professional negligence and developed honours courses in both 
commercial missives and professional negligence. However, more of his 
academic career later.
The University of Glasgow Chair was a part-time appointment which 
Robert combined with his practice at Ballantyne & Copland. Although 
the combination of study, research, teaching, and professional practice 
imposed a heavy load, Robert’s dedication to the business of Ballantyne 
& Copland never wavered. He did not seriously consider moving from 
Motherwell until in 2002 he was head-hunted for the second time.
A former partner of Ballantyne & Copland, Jock Brown, had spent some 
time as a consultant at Harper Macleod before changing his career path to 
become General Manager of Fergus McCann’s Celtic FC. He was aware 
that Harper MacLeod, as a fairly young, expanding firm, were keen to 
recruit an experienced practitioner to their team, and I suspect add gravitas 
to their line-up. Contact between the firm and universities was also seen 
as an important element of the business going forward. Jock acted as 
go-between. His suggestion to Lorne Crerar, Chair of Harper Macleod, that 
Robert would be the perfect fit was readily accepted. Ultimately Robert 
made the move, but not without a lot of heart-searching. He had literally 
given thirty years of service to Ballantyne & Copland. While there had been 
significant low moments, these had been vastly outnumbered by the many 
highs, and over time he had derived an enormous amount of pleasure 
from his interaction with clients, colleagues and staff. A substantial part of 
the prime of his professional career had been spent there. It had been his 
professional life. But the remarkable changes in the nature of the commercial 
and property transactions handled by solicitors over those thirty years had 
largely passed Lanarkshire by. The work of a medium-sized Glasgow firm 
presented a greater challenge worthy of Robert’s expertise and experience 
and more in keeping with the then current face of business in Scotland.
It was not lost on Harper Macleod that, in spite of raising the average 
age of partners by several points, Robert’s personality would enliven daily 
office life. In both his family life, enriched by a number of children and 
even more grandchildren, and in his academic life, Robert has always 
found great pleasure in the company of young people who warm to his 
youthful, almost childish, personality. He would inevitably fit in well with 
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the younger partners he was to join, and they would find him approachable 
and good-humoured.
The balance between Robert’s practice and his University work 
remained much as it had been latterly at Ballantyne & Copland, mornings 
at the University and afternoons in the office. The big change was in his 
office role. No longer was he part of a practice where the lawyers were 
generalists. No longer was he the core of the business, the senior partner, 
the partner most clients knew to be the main man and the one they 
wanted to see. He was one of a number of specialists with varying levels 
of experience, all, including Robert, handling transactions of the type in 
which they were very experienced. However, the path to his office door 
was soon well trodden, because all knew that there is no one better placed 
to advise on a property issue or an issue over professional practice or ethics, 
and that he would provide quick, open, honest and straight advice. It is 
precisely these qualities that have made him such a popular port of call 
for others in the profession facing professional or ethical dilemmas, and 
for conveyancers trying to unravel a legal fankle that has arisen in the 
midst of a transaction, occasionally a fankle for which the conveyancer is 
at least partly responsible. What they got, and continue to this day to get, 
is a non-judgmental reception, commercially pragmatic, fair and balanced 
advice, and a feeling of confidence in the solution provided. For those who 
may have erred, there is a sense of being made to feel at ease and being 
assisted through their period of anxiety and difficulty. What he provides 
is not simply the product of learning and experience; it also requires great 
wisdom and a pleasant personality.
In Harper Macleod, as at Ballantyne & Copland, significant intrusion 
into his time by those in the office seeking advice is such that he is conscious 
of its impact on his workload. Yet he readily makes himself available, 
particularly to younger colleagues, without outward sign of irritation. I 
suspect that he secretly enjoys being the one to whom they turn and being 
able to provide the advice they seek. His role as agony uncle led to his 
having responsibility for compliance added to his load at both firms. It 
is likely that Harper Macleod’s recent successful bid for appointment as 
one of the firms handling the business of the Scottish Legal Complaints 
Commission owes a lot to his inclusion in the team that would deal with 
the work.
For all the gravitas he has undoubtedly brought to Harper Macleod, 
there has never been a risk of Robert taking himself too seriously. He 
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would be the first to recognise his limitations, although that recognition 
has presented no barrier to his diverting occasionally into areas of work 
he does not generally handle. He was recently tempted into drafting a will 
for a client, but at least retained the good sense to pass it to the executry 
department to be checked. It perhaps sums up his place at Harper Macleod 
that the associate tasked with checking it felt no qualms about giving quick, 
open, honest, straight, fair and balanced advice that the best thing he could 
do was to shred it and redirect the client to the relevant department, advice 
he readily, if rather sheepishly, accepted.
The interface between Robert’s academic work and his professional 
practice is possibly best captured in the person of “Mrs McGlumpha” 
and occasionally her long-suffering spouse. Mrs McGlumpha is Robert’s 
fictional client deployed to add humanity to the arid scenarios that tend to 
feature in the average legal problem. She plays a similar role when Robert 
replies to the requests of colleagues for advice and guidance. Through 
reference to her he reminds practitioner and student alike that the problems 
addressed are not purely academic hypotheses but arise in the context of 
relations between and among people. For all his interest in property and 
conveyancing law theory, his thoughts and advice are always directed to, 
and illustrated by, the practical application of the law. A classic example 
can be found in his opinion on the question whether, where the title 
conditions required a thirteenth-floor two-bedroom flat to be used only as 
a family home, a real burden limiting the number of pets that might cause a 
nuisance which might be kept in the flat was enforceable. In particular could 
it be enforced to preclude the keeping of two dogs? After fifteen pages of 
closely reasoned discussion, riddled with widely sourced authority, Robert 
reached the conclusion that the dogs were part of the family. The keeping 
of two dogs in this case afforded company to the occupier. 
A notable feature of Robert’s tenure at the University was the annual 
end-of-year dinners for honours students to which he invited a select 
band whom he dubbed “senior members of the profession.” Among the 
“senior members” were the Lord President, judges, sheriffs, senior partners 
of prominent firms, and a handful of professional indemnity insurers. I 
suspect that over the piece the “senior members” derived even more from 
these occasions than the students, but both groups left with a much better 
and more sympathetic appreciation of the other. The students saw the 
human side of those they might seek to emulate, while the senior members, 
who were not routinely involved in teaching, were able to enjoy rare contact 
with those about to embark on a career thirty or forty years on from their 
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own first tentative steps. All were able to discuss the concerns of graduates 
today about the future and the way ahead for them. As always the “Little 
Professor” deployed his talents as mimic and raconteur to embarrass each 
senior guest in an introduction highlighting notorious aspects of their lives 
and careers. Even the Lord President was not exempt.
For all that there is a forty-year long trail of very satisfied clients and a 
twenty-year long trail of admiring and very appreciative students, I think 
that Robert’s impact on our legal system will ultimately be defined by 
his writing and his contribution to law reform. I am not thinking of the 
volume and extent of his writing, which are in themselves remarkable, but 
the content. It falls broadly into two categories, textbooks and articles on 
the one hand, and expert opinions on the other. Inevitably the opinions 
are much more fact-specific than the textbooks, but both combine an 
outline of technical theory with advice (sometimes very inventive) on 
its practical application, in plain language that provides greater insight 
and understanding of the law for the practitioner and a clear answer 
to the problem posed (not always the one hoped for) for the client. The 
combination of the depth of his knowledge of the law with the width of 
his practical experience has led to his being invited to participate in many 
reviews and working parties on reform of various aspects of the law and 
characterised his contributions to law reform over the years. He was an 
obvious choice for inclusion on the various advisory committees formed by 
the Scottish Law Commission to address aspects of the abolition of feudal 
tenure in 2004 and its colossal impact on conveyancing and property law, 
including land registration, title conditions, tenements, long leases and the 
law relating to the seabed and foreshore. It was a source of some satisfaction 
to see his input translated into law. 
In an article in The Journal of the Law Society of Scotland on 1 May 2003, 
“A Matter of Opinion”1 in which he reflected upon almost 2000 opinions 
written during the first ten years of his tenure of the Chair of Conveyancing 
and highlighted recurring issues, he illustrated those features of his writing 
so well. After an introduction explaining changes in the nature of opinions 
sought since the days of Professor Halliday and the relentless increase in 
the demand for opinions on solicitor’s negligence, he addressed in a fairly 
general way the problems that tended to arise in three areas of law and 
practice by pointing to important but often misunderstood or misapplied 
legal rules, and drawing on his experience of practice and significant 
1  R Rennie “A Matter of Opinion” (2003) 48(5) JLSS 32.
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changes in practice over many years. This and countless articles in various 
journals are peppered with tips for practitioners born of the unfortunate 
experiences of their colleagues.
In addition to solo works, Robert has collaborated with others in the 
writing and editing of a number of publications. With his open personality 
and willingness to engage in debate, his involvement in any literary 
venture brings the best out in his collaborators. Those with whom he has 
worked regard his willingness to work with them as a compliment. Robert 
regards collaboration as a valuable stimulus to fresh thought and a good 
sounding-board for refining and fine-tuning his own contributions. Rather 
irreverently I have a picture in my mind of a meeting of Robert and other 
collaborators as resembling a session of a comedy script-writing team, 
with humour never far from the surface. He claims that, in spite of having 
collaborated successfully with Professors Douglas Cusine and Roddy 
Paisley of Aberdeen separately, he had declined a publisher’s invitation 
to work with them as a trio, because he could not remove from his mind 
the vision of the unfortunate acronym that would be attributed to work by 
Cusine, Rennie and Paisley. And he readily saw the funny side when the 
course which he devised for honours students and of which he was most 
proud, “Advanced Negligence," was nicknamed “Complete Incompetence.” 
For one who throughout his career has had to face the daily demands 
of his practice clients, and over the last twenty years has undertaken a 
quite distinct, constant commitment to the academic responsibilities of 
the Professor of Conveyancing, Robert’s literary output in the form of 
textbooks is remarkable. With Professor Douglas Cusine he produced a 
volume on Missives shortly before his appointment to the University. Other 
collaborations with Cusine have followed, on The Requirements of Writing in 
1995 and on Standard Securities in 2002.
When Iain Talman was invited by the Scottish Universities Law 
Institute in the mid-1990’s to edit a second edition of Professor Halliday’s 
Conveyancing Law and Practice, Robert and Professor George Gretton of the 
University of Edinburgh were appointed supervising editors. In a generous 
acknowledgment of their help and support, Talman gave them particular 
thanks “for their patient and good-humoured industry in reading and 
making many useful comments on the entire text," and went on to say that 
without their help he would not have felt able to publish the work. 
With Donald G Rennie in 1998 Robert compiled the loose-leaf volume 
of Scottish Conveyancing Legislation, and in 2001 (edited and updated in 
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2011) with Alan K. Simpson a work that may turn out to be of increasing 
importance, Minerals and the Law of Scotland. A clear pointer to his versatility 
was his production with Professor Stewart Brymer in 2008 of Conveyancing 
in the Electronic Age. Those for which he must assume full responsibility 
are Solicitors’ Negligence (1997), Land Tenure Reform (2003), Land Tenure in 
Scotland (2004), Land Tenure and Tenements Legislation (2005, 3rd edition 
2009), a volume of Opinions on Professional Negligence in Conveyancing 
(2004) and a collection of essays entitled The Promised Land (2008). There 
are also countless articles on a wide variety of issues in the property and 
professional negligence fields. However, this is a list that I suspect is far 
from complete. A new work on Leases in collaboration with a number of 
colleagues has recently been published,2 and in the absence of his academic 
commitment, which he will miss greatly, an outlet for the product of his 
fertile mind will have to be found. I am not alone in hoping that he will take 
on further academic writing.
Besides Robert’s academic works, there is unlikely to be any downturn 
in demand for his “short stories” or opinions, or his willingness to produce 
them, at least as long as he remains in practice. Since his appointment to the 
Chair of Conveyancing he has written a staggering 4000 opinions. He has 
always regarded being actively in practice as an important feature of his 
opinion practice. The changes in conveyancing and property law since he 
qualified in 1969 are extraordinary. Registration of title alone would make 
today’s practice unrecognisable to the 1969 practitioner. Add to that all the 
changes associated with the sweeping away of the feudal system as well as 
current developments, such as the move towards fully electronic processes 
for the transfer of land, and it can be seen why Robert’s career has been 
described as spanning the gap between two different worlds of practice. As 
a result the expert who is not currently in practice is exposed to challenges 
to the relevance of his experience and even to his expertise which are at 
the very least a distraction and can undermine his opinion. It is a tribute to 
Robert’s adaptability and resilience that he has not only taken it all in his 
stride but he also still retains his initial enthusiasm for his subject. 
When I asked him to pick out a highlight of his career, it took little more 
than a moment or two of reflection to alight on Sharp v Thomson 1997 SC 
(HL) 66 in which his opinion that the delivery of a disposition of the flat 
effectively removed it from the “property and undertaking” subject to a 
2  Robert Rennie, Stewart Brymer, Tom Mullen, Mike Blair, and Frankie McCarthy, Leases 
SULI (2015).
14 Essays in Conveyancing and Property Law
floating charge granted by the company selling the flat was vindicated in 
the House of Lords after having found no support in the Court of Session. 
That vindication gave him particular satisfaction because floating charges 
were after all something of a speciality for Robert, being the subject of his 
PhD thesis, and because his had been a solitary voice and his opinion had 
been the subject of some fairly fierce criticism by academic colleagues.
For a court faced with competing persuasive expert opinions a central 
issue may be the degree of confidence engendered by the respective 
witnesses. Robert is now a fairly familiar face in our courts, especially the 
Court of Session, where his opinions tend to be highly regarded. So much 
so that in the reclaiming motion in Compugraphics International Limited v 
Nikolic 2011 SLT 955, which did not involve any expert but raised the issue 
of servitudes of support and overhang working in tandem to secure to a 
factory owner rights over pipework extending from the ground within his 
title onto that of his neighbour, Lady Paton presiding asked counsel at the 
outset: “Is this not a case for Professor Rennie?” Senior counsel on both 
sides did not disagree, but felt it was too late to change course. I hope that 
Robert, and his professional colleagues with an interest in this field, are 
not unhappy with the result. It is an area of our law that continues to give 
rise to problems that the experts are called upon to solve – see the article in 
The Journal of the Law Society of Scotland of 2 May 2003 referred to earlier.3 It 
seems that there will always be a demand for expert opinions on problems 
arising in connection with the transfer of title to heritable property and the 
conduct of transactions by solicitors. 
Among the academic community in Glasgow and throughout the rest of 
Scotland Robert is held in high regard and indeed affection. That is shown 
by the award to him of the title “Emeritus Professor” which ensures that, 
in spite of retirement from his teaching responsibilities, he remains the 
only surviving Professor of Conveyancing in Scotland. He will be greatly 
missed by the University staff from whom I have received many tributes, 
and unwittingly by future students who will never know the Professor 
widely described by those he taught as “Legend.” He can reflect with pride 
on the contribution he has made to the law of conveyancing, property 
and professional negligence. But he can also look forward to a continuing 
steady demand for those opinions full of learning, wisdom and practicality. 
3  R Rennie, “A Matter of Opinion” (n 1).
2. “Tell Me Don’t Show Me” 
and the Fall and Rise of the 
Conveyancer
Professor Kenneth G C Reid
A.  Conveyancers: From Emasculation to Emancipation
Property law, observed Robert Rennie in 2010, has come to be marginalised 
by registration practice.1 With the move from a system of registration of 
deeds to one of registration of title, the rights of parties were determined by 
what, on first registration, the Keeper was prepared to allow on to the Land 
Register. No doubt, in making such decisions the Keeper had regard to the 
law of property. But the Keeper’s property law might not be the same as 
the property law of the applicant’s solicitor – or indeed, that solicitor might 
contend, as the property law of Scotland.2 No matter. What counted was 
not the law but the Keeper’s views, and unless an applicant was willing to 
challenge those views in the courts – and few were – it was the Keeper’s views 
that were determinative. As for conveyancers, their role was in danger of 
being reduced to that of a clerk, filling in forms, collecting documents, and 
awaiting with anxiety the verdict from Meadowbank House. In concluding 
his article, Robert drew on his own long professional experience to contrast 
1  R Rennie, “Land Registration and the Decline of Property Law” (2010) 14 EdinLR 62.
2  Rennie (n 1) at 64: sometimes there is “a conflict between the policy adopted at the Land 
Register and the law of property itself."
© Kenneth G C Reid, CC BY 4.0 http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0056.02
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the position of Sasine conveyancing with conveyancing under the Land 
Register:3
Those who practice conveyancing today take decisions based on what 
they think the Keeper will or will not do rather than having regard to the 
principles of property law. When, many years ago, I was an apprentice 
and then an assistant in the Glasgow firm of solicitors of which Professor 
Halliday was senior partner, all of the partners (not just Professor Halliday) 
were prepared to take a view on the sufficiency or marketability of a title 
based on their own knowledge of the principles of property law and the 
practice of conveyancing. How many solicitors today would risk taking 
a view on a servitude or be prepared to argue that the principles of law 
relating to the interpretation of a Sasine description supported a larger area 
than the Keeper was prepared to include in a title plan and so advise a client 
to accept the title? It does seem a pity that these skills have been lost and 
with it, I would suggest, some of our property law.4
If, for conveyancers, there was frustration in the position as depicted by 
Robert, there was also, one must admit, a degree of comfort, for in the 
perilous enterprise of conveying property they were no longer alone. On 
the contrary, almost everything that could be checked was checked by the 
Keeper’s staff, and mistakes eliminated accordingly. And even if mistakes 
went undetected, as inevitably some must, the fact that the title was 
accepted by the Keeper made future challenge unlikely. The name of the 
game was to “get the title past the Keeper”; that done, there was little to 
worry about either for solicitors or for their clients. 
It is true that the law was less accommodating than the view just 
outlined might suggest. Under the Land Registration (Scotland) Act 1979, 
a title made good by registration could still be removed from the Register 
if fundamentally bad;5 and not even possession, a standard safeguard 
against rectification, could protect the registered proprietor where his 
3  Rennie (n 1) at 78-79. In similar vein, see the interview with Robert Rennie (“A Tale of 
Two Systems”) (2014) 59 JLSS Nov/13 at 14.
4  The extent to which conveyancers really were prepared to “take a view” without 
the comfort, which the 1979 Act introduced, of the Keeper’s protection may be open 
to question. Certainly the Reid Committee thought that “in the present system of 
conveyancing there is an undue insistence on the rectification of minor technical 
defects and ... there is an understandable reluctance on the part of the solicitor acting 
for a purchaser to overlook the technical defects because, when the property comes 
to be sold, the solicitor acting for the next purchaser might insist on rectification." See 
Registration of Title to Land in Scotland (Cmnd 2032: 1963; hereinafter the “Reid Report”) 
para 150.
5  Land Registration (Scotland) Act 1979 (hereinafter the “1979 Act”) s 9(1). 
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or her solicitor had been “careless” in the conduct of the conveyancing.6 
Indeed, through such carelessness proprietors could both lose the property 
and also be disqualified from claiming indemnity from the Keeper, leaving 
only a claim in professional negligence against the offending solicitor.7 
Yet cases like this were hardly common enough for much sleep to be lost 
on their account. By and large, the Keeper’s quality control ensured titles 
which were good or at any rate unchallenged in practice. If the price was 
a loss of autonomy, then that was a price which conveyancers were often 
willing to pay. 
Back in 2010 Robert Rennie could hardly have imagined that, within 
a mere four years of writing, the emasculation of conveyancers of which 
he complained would have given way to a sudden and unexpected 
emancipation. With the coming into force of the Land Registration etc 
(Scotland) Act 2012, on 8 December 2014, the Keeper has abandoned 
many of her previous checks on applications for registration. True, the 
application form is scrutinised, as before, and the deed itself is checked for 
obvious error. On first registrations, the property boundaries continue to 
be plotted on what is now called the cadastral map. But for much of the rest 
the Keeper relies on the judgment of the applicant’s solicitor. “Tell me don’t 
show me” has become the new mantra at Meadowbank House.
In this chapter I consider this dramatic change of policy and the reasons 
for its introduction. I also explore some of the implications for conveyancers, 
for titles to land, and for the public at large.
B.  “Tell Me Don’t Show Me”
(1) Introduction
“Tell me don’t show me” was not unknown before 2014. The mechanised 
nature of automated registration of title to land (ARTL) meant that 
transactions which proceeded under that system – not very many, as it 
happened – relied to a considerable extent on the word of the applicant’s 
solicitor. In non-ARTL transactions too, a role for “tell me don’t show me” 
had evolved. This can be seen from part B of the old (application) forms 
1-3, where a number of the questions sought to elicit information without 
6  1979 Act s 9(3)(a)(iii).
7  Ibid ss 12(3)(n) 13(4).
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independent verification by the Keeper. That was true, for example, of 
the inquiry as to whether a third party was in adverse possession, or in 
respect of the detailed questions about the legal capacity of the parties, the 
possible appointment of liquidators and the like, and compliance with the 
statutory procedures where property was being sold by a heritable creditor. 
Nonetheless, for important matters the policy was still one of “tell me and 
show me”: in the interests of maintaining an accurate Register, the staff 
at Registers of Scotland invested much time and effort in checking that 
all was in order. That policy has now changed. “Tell me don’t show” has 
spread to many of the central areas of registration practice and to the most 
crucial registration event of all: the first registration of a Sasine title in the 
Land Register.
(2) Examination of title
That only valid deeds should be accepted for registration seems a 
proposition too obvious to require defending; and indeed the 2012 Act, 
unlike its predecessor, makes validity a formal requirement of registration.8 
Now, in order for a deed to be valid, two things must be true. First, the deed 
must be granted by someone with the title and capacity to do so – which 
in practice usually means by the person who is the owner of the land; and 
secondly, the deed itself must be valid in respect to both content and mode 
of execution. The last of these the Keeper’s staff continue to check insofar 
as they are able to do so, i.e. by an inspection of the deed itself. The first, 
however, they have wholly abandoned. Even for first registrations, where 
the granter’s title depends on what may be an intricate progress of Sasine 
writs, examination of title is no longer undertaken. Instead there is reliance 
on the word of the applicant, or in practice on that of the applicant’s solicitor. 
The full position emerges only from a close reading of two interlinking 
sections in the (new) application form for registration.9 Under the innocuous 
heading of “certification in relation to links in title” there appears the 
statement that: “By signing this application form you10 are certifying to the 
Keeper that appropriate links in title are in place and that the granter has 
8  Land Registration etc (Scotland) Act 2012 (hereinafter the “2012 Act”) ss 23(1)(b), 25(1)
(a), 26(1)(a). A definition of “valid” is given in s 113(2). Exceptionally, however, the 
registration of a non domino dispositions is allowed: see 2012 Act ss 43-45.
9  Land Registration Rules etc (Scotland) Regulations 2014, SSI 2014/150, reg 7 Sch 1 part 
4. The relevant sections are on p 5.
10  By which is presumably meant the applicant.
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the legal right to grant the deed.” The sting, of course, is in the tail: links in 
title are usually an irrelevance, and not all readers may bother to continue 
past the opening words to the apparently unconditional certification or 
warranty of title at the end. This certification is linked to the previous 
section of the form where the applicant is asked whether there has been 
“any limitation or restriction on the examination of title.” But even if the 
answer to that question is “yes” – for example, because the transaction is 
an inter vivos donation or a transfer by an executor – there is no escaping 
the certification of title which follows. Indeed the certification could be 
avoided only by declining to sign the form at all, a move which would 
invalidate the whole application. It follows that, in applying for registration, 
the applicant is certifying the title of the granter to make the grant; the 
one cannot be done without the other. And as Registers of Scotland have 
explained, that certification will be relied on:11
The Keeper will rely on this certification and will carry out no further 
investigation in this regard. This means the Keeper will not need sight 
of much of the supporting documentation that would previously have 
accompanied an application for registration. For example, rather than 
submitting links in title for examination, or producing the prescriptive 
progress of title, applicants will certify that valid links in title exist and that 
there has been an examination of title.
The certification is by the applicant, not by the applicant’s solicitor;12 but 
the judgment to be made here is that of the solicitor.
(3) Real burdens
A significant task on first registration is to populate the D section of the 
new title sheet with the real burdens affecting the property. The relevant 
writs can usually be identified easily enough, by consulting the lists of 
burdens in prior dispositions. Determining whether particular burdens 
are still enforceable in the light of the abolition of the feudal system and 
11  Registers of Scotland, General Guidance on the One-Shot Rule (30 Oct 2014) 4. The passage 
continues, rather ominously: “This approach is underpinned by the duty of care and 
offence provisions under sections 111 and 112, respectively. In respect of applications 
for registration, both applicants and granters (and their solicitors) are under a duty 
to take reasonable care to ensure that the Keeper does not inadvertently make the 
register accurate. It is an offence to knowingly or recklessly make a materially false 
or misleading statement in relation to an application for registration." For liability, see 
D(2) below.
12  Of course the form is invariably signed by the solicitor, but on behalf of the applicant.
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the dismantling, followed by partial replacement, of the pre-2004 rules 
of implied enforcement rights is another matter altogether, and requires 
a sound knowledge of some tricky law as well as good judgment and a 
steady nerve. Hitherto all questions as to real burdens have been questions 
for Registers of Scotland, albeit assisted by the schedule of burdens which 
formed part of the application form.13 Since the end of 2014, these questions 
too have become subject to “tell me don’t show me.” It is now for the 
applicant to list the burdens writs, and for the applicant to decide which 
burdens, if any, are unenforceable and so should be excluded from the title 
sheet.14 None of this, it appears, will normally be checked by the Keeper, so 
that if the applicant declares, for good reasons or bad, that certain burdens 
are spent, this will be accepted without inquiry and the title sheet made up 
accordingly.15
In his 2010 article Robert Rennie had complained of the Keeper’s 
“cautious approach to cleansing the Land Register of dead burdens” and 
worried that burdens left on the Register “will be presumed by solicitors to 
be valid and enforceable.”16 He continued:17
On the one hand, many burdens would have been extinguished; on the 
other hand, due to a cautious policy on the part of the Keeper, those very 
burdens would appear enforceable because they remain on the title sheets. 
It is to be hoped that this does not occur, but if it does property law will 
again have been marginalised by registration practice. 
With “tell me don’t show me” the decision as to which burdens have and 
have not survived passes from the Keeper to conveyancers. Whether the 
13  See form 1 question 5(b).
14  See p 6 of the application form. Section 9(1)(a) of the 2012 Act provides that the D section 
of a title sheet should only contain title conditions which encumber the property.
15  General Guidance on the One-Shot Rule (n 11) 2: “When submitting an application over an 
unregistered plot, the applicant will be asked to identify deeds in which burdens are 
contained, and to highlight any burdens that he or she considers to be extinguished. 
The Keeper will rely on the information provided and will not search for other deeds 
that may affect [sic]. However, if the plot is in a research area where the Keeper has 
already carried out preparatory work and other deeds that contain burdens have 
been identified, the Keeper will continue to disclose these burdens in the title sheet 
notwithstanding that the applicant has not included them.”
16  Rennie (n 1) at 68-69.
17  Ibid at 69. Of interest in this context is the view of the Reid Committee: “It was 
suggested in evidence that the Keeper should have the power to omit burdens which 
were clearly invalid or administratively undesirable to have on the Register. We think 
that this might give rise to difficulties and disputes and we do not think the Keeper 
should have any discretion to omit a burden.” See Reid Report (n 4) para 108.
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latter will be any less cautious than the former is a matter to which we will 
need to return.18
(4) Prescriptive servitudes
Once upon a time the Keeper was open to persuasion that a servitude had 
been constituted by positive prescription and, if persuaded, would enter 
the servitude on the A section of the title sheet of the benefited property. 
The practice was abandoned in 1997, after which prescriptive servitudes 
were not allowed on the Register unless their constitution was vouched for 
by court decree.19 The reason for the change, predictably enough, was the 
potential partiality and unreliability of affidavit and other evidence:20
Affidavit evidence submitted to the Keeper with respect to a dominant 
tenement represents a one sided version of events. There is little or no 
risk for deponents by either being selective or exaggerating the position. 
There is also scope for more innocent misrepresentation by the deponent 
of the position on ground. On numerous occasions the Keeper has been 
the recipient of subsequent contrary evidence from proprietors of putative 
servient tenements to the effect that no servitude had ever been constituted. 
The Keeper would then find himself in the middle of a dispute that he had 
no power to resolve. In addition his indemnity could be at risk should it 
transpire the affidavit evidence was less than accurate.
But if the new policy was understandable, its results were unfortunate, as 
Robert Rennie pointed out in his 2010 article. A “purchaser’s solicitor will 
argue that, if the affidavit evidence is not enough for the Keeper, then the 
title is not safe. Thus the effect of the Keeper’s policy, in practical terms 
at least, is to restrict the methods of creation of servitudes to creation in a 
deed or an Act of Parliament.”21 
It is not necessary to accept quite such an apocalyptic assessment of the 
position to see that the Keeper’s practice gave rise to certain difficulties. 
With the introduction of “tell me don’t show me," however, that practice has 
been quietly abandoned. To general surprise,22 applicants for registration 
18  See D below.
19  For the implications for claims against solicitors for professional negligence, see Rennie 
(n 1) at 76-78.
20  I David and A Rennie (eds), Registration of Title Practice Book, 2nd edn (2000) para 6.55.
21  Rennie (n 1) at 67.
22  The Scottish Law Commission had endorsed the Keeper’s existing practice and given 
its reasons for so doing at some length: see Report on Land Registration (Scot Law Com 
No 222, 2010) paras 10.7-10.18.
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are now invited to state whether a prescriptive servitude exists.23 If they 
answer in the affirmative, they are asked for particulars of the servitude 
and, where possible, its route.24 No affidavit or other evidence is to be 
submitted: the distinctly tricky decision as to whether the servitude was 
properly constituted has been passed from Keeper to applicant, or in 
practice to the applicant’s solicitor.25 If applicants claim a servitude, then it 
seems that the Keeper will believe them and enter the servitude on the title 
sheet accordingly.
C.  Some Reasons Why
(1) The 2012 Act
Insofar as Registers of Scotland have sought to justify the change of policy 
they have done so by reference to the 2012 Act.26 Yet they are mistaken if 
by this they mean that the change was required or even implied by the Act. 
Rather the opposite, indeed, is the case. 
Under the 1979 Act the Keeper was given a great deal of discretion as 
to what might and might not be accepted for registration. A small number 
of things were forbidden, such as applications which omitted the fee or 
title number or where the land was insufficiently described; otherwise the 
Keeper could accept any application if “accompanied by such documents 
and other evidence as he may require.”27 The 2012 Act, in this as in other 
matters, is much more prescriptive. Section 21 provides that the Keeper 
must accept an application “to the extent that the applicant satisfies the 
Keeper” that the “application conditions” are met; if, conversely, the 
23  Application form p 5. This is a first-registration question only, but a prescriptive 
servitude can equally be claimed where the application relates to registered property 
although the details will then have to be given in the further information sheets at the 
end of the form: see Registers of Scotland, Guidance Notes on Application for Registration 
Form (18 Nov 2014) 12.
24  Application form p 5. The form requires that the route of the servitude be delineated, 
but I understand that the Keeper overlooks this requirement in the case of underground 
pipes and, it may be, in other cases where the route in unclear.
25  As the Guidance Notes (n 23) 12 observe laconically: “The applicant should satisfy 
themselves that the servitude has been created by prescription and the right is exempt 
from challenge."
26  That was the line taken in the series of (excellent) road shows on the new Act given in 
October and November 2014 and captured on video at www.ros.gov.uk/2012act/. 
27  1979 Act s 4(1), (2).
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Keeper is not satisfied as to the conditions the application must be rejected. 
The conditions in question are both general conditions which apply to all 
applications and also particular conditions which apply only to the type of 
application in question. 
Now it is true that the Act does not specify exactly how the Keeper is to 
be satisfied as to fulfilment of the application conditions; that much, at least, 
is left to her discretion. But since the difference between being satisfied or 
not satisfied is the difference between acceptance of an application or its 
rejection, it must be assumed that the Keeper was expected to do more 
than simply take the applicant’s word for it.28 Yet in relation to a number 
of important matters, as we have seen, that is exactly what the Keeper now 
does.
While, however, the 2012 Act neither requires nor even implies the 
use of “tell me don’t show me," it does at least provide some shelter from 
the effects of the increase in errors which can be expected to result.29 For 
on the one hand, an error on the Register is less serious, and more easily 
corrected, than under the 1979 Act, where the “Midas touch” gave it 
immediate legal effect.30 And on the other, if things go wrong and rights 
are lost, the Act assists in the transfer of liability from the Keeper to the 
applicant’s solicitor through the solicitor’s duty, in section 111, to ensure 
that the Keeper does not inadvertently make the Register inaccurate.31 
The Keeper’s vigilance under the 1979 Act regime, Robert Rennie wrote, 
reflected “a desire to restrict claims for indemnity;”32 and if these claims can 
be deflected elsewhere, the need for vigilance is correspondingly reduced. 
It is important, however, not to claim too much for the Act in this regard. 
If the Midas touch has gone it has been replaced with a set of rules which, 
as we will see, can make the correction of errors even harder than before.33 
And while section 111 certainly assists in the deflection of liability, such 
28  No doubt it is for this reason that the Keeper is so careful in inspecting the documentation 
which must accompany applications in respect of an a non domino disposition: see 
Registers of Scotland, General Guidance on Prescriptive Claimants (15 Sept 2014). 
29  See E below.
30  1979 Act 3(1)(a). For an account of the Midas touch, see Scottish Law Commission, 
Discussion Paper on Land Registration: Void and Voidable Titles (Scot Law Com DP No 
125, 2004) paras 5.34-5.39.
31  For s 111, see D(2) below.
32  Rennie (n 1) at 78.
33  See D(1) below.
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deflection was often possible under the 1979 Act through its sanctions for 
the “careless” solicitor.34
(2) Other reasons
Nothing said so far explains why so radical a change of policy should have 
occurred. Two other factors, at least, seem likely to have been important. 
One is resources. In a development which no one could have foreseen, the 
Keeper was “invited” in May 2014 to complete the transfer of all land from 
the Sasine to the Land Register within the startlingly short period of ten 
years.35 If resources can be freed up from the processing of applications, 
this will make that formidable target just a little bit more manageable.36 
But the change cannot be explained by resources alone. It is not due 
to resources, for example, that the practice of “tell me don’t show me” 
has been extended to prescriptive servitudes, for they were previously 
excluded from the Register altogether. To resources must be added 
attitudinal change. Just as the high level of intervention of the former regime, 
amounting almost to a nationalisation of conveyancing, was a product of 
the political and governmental culture of the 1970s,37 so the withdrawal of 
state scrutiny is in line with the retreat of government which has been seen 
across a number of spheres in the recent past. That the Registers should 
concentrate on registration and leave conveyancers to do the conveyancing 
is a seductively powerful idea. For if judgments are to be made about titles, 
why should this not be left to those who, by profession and experience, 
are best equipped for the task? Freed, then, from the burden of decision-
making, the Keeper’s staff can concentrate on the efficient registration of 
the result. 
34  1979 Act ss 9(3)(a)(iii) 12(3)(n) 13(4). The role of “carelessness” was mentioned briefly at 
A. above.
35  For the background, see Registers of Scotland, Completion of the Land Register: Public 
Consultation (July 2014). The paper begins with the bland statement that: “The Keeper 
of the Registers of Scotland has been invited by Scottish Ministers to complete the Land 
Register over the next ten years."
36  Andy Wightman’s assessment is that: “The changes appear to be in response to the 
Scottish Government’s request to meet the ten year target”: see “Rethink required 
on ten year land registration goal” (1 Aug 2014, available at www.andywightman.
com/?cat=33).
37  “We are not impressed," wrote the Reid Committee, “by the suggestion that the 
introduction of a scheme of registration of title is likely to lead to rigidity or bureaucratic 
control”: see Reid Report (n 4) para 150. Yet that was exactly what took place.
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D.  Implications for Conveyancers
With emancipation comes opportunity for conveyancers, but also 
responsibility and, potentially, liability. Far more than in the past, the 
content of title sheets will be determined by the decisions of solicitors. I now 
consider the constraints within which these decisions are likely to be made.
(1) Responsibility
An error made on registration must be undone, if indeed it can be undone 
at all, by rectification. These two gateways to the Register, however, are no 
longer policed with equal vigilance; for whereas rectification remains the 
sole province of the Keeper, as before, many decisions as to registration 
are now delegated to conveyancers. In practice this will often mean that 
registration is easy and rectification hard, a structural imbalance which 
makes it difficult to correct mistakes made at the time of registration. That 
is something of which all conveyancers will need to be aware. 
Take the case, mentioned above,38 of prescriptive servitudes. Suppose 
that, on the basis of affidavits as to possession and assurances from the 
seller, the benefit of a prescriptive servitude is claimed in the application 
for registration of the buyer’s title. Suppose further that in accepting the 
application, the Keeper enters the servitude on the A section of the title 
sheet, and makes a matching entry on the D section of the title sheet of the 
burdened property, informing its owner at the same time.39 If the latter 
agrees that the servitude exists, then well and good. But if he disputes the 
point, his position is both difficult and unfair. Without either his consent 
or, initially, even his knowledge, the burden of a servitude has been 
added to his title sheet. Yet in order to have it removed, he must persuade 
the Keeper to rectify, and that can only occur, under the 2012 Act, if the 
alleged inaccuracy is “manifest,"40 or in other words “perfectly clear, or 
38  See B(4) above.
39  My understanding is that the Keeper will indeed normally make a matching entry 
in the title sheet of the burdened property (if there is one), though whether this is 
regarded as registration or as rectification is unclear. In relation to the former, there are 
broad powers to make such changes “as are necessary or expedient” to the title sheet 
record (i.e. to other title sheets): see 2012 Act s 31(2)(b). In relation to the latter, there is 
the potential difficulty that rectification is only permissible where the inaccuracy (i.e. 
the failure of the servitude to appear on the burdened title sheet) is “manifest” (i.e. the 
claimed servitude plainly exists): see 2012 Act s 80(1).
40  2012 Act s 80(1).
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not reasonably disputable.”41 A servitude which is claimed by one party 
and denied by the other is unlikely to meet this high standard. Faced with 
competing assertions the Keeper will, quite properly, refuse to rectify. The 
burdened proprietor must then either put up with the servitude or resort 
to litigation to prove (if he can) its non-existence. 
The position is much the same if the mistake, or alleged mistake, is 
the omission of a real burden on first registration. In order to have the 
burden restored, the benefited proprietor must satisfy the Keeper that its 
existence and enforceability are indisputable and hence that the inaccuracy 
(i.e. the burden’s omission from the title sheet of the burdened property) is 
manifest. He is not likely to succeed.
What is more, with the passage of time, even this slim prospect of 
correction will often disappear. This is because, under the 2012 Act, 
mistakes made on the Register (so-called “Register errors”)42 are typically 
cured on the property being disponed to an acquirer in good faith; and 
unlike the Midas touch of the 1979 Act,43 the cure is for good, so that the 
Register ceases to be inaccurate and cannot thereafter be rectified. So, for 
example, a real burden omitted by an applicant for first registration would 
be extinguished as soon as the property is transferred to someone else, 
leaving the benefited proprietor with a claim for compensation against the 
Keeper but no claim of any sort against the transferee.44 More seriously, if 
the mistake was as to the proprietor’s actual title – if, in other words, the 
certification of title on the application form was incorrect,45 so that neither 
the granter of the disposition nor therefore the grantee, now registered 
as proprietor, was owner of the property – that mistake too is cured by 
transmission to a good-faith acquirer provided that the disponer-proprietor 
had possessed the property for a year.46 Of the examples given earlier, it is 
only prescriptive servitudes which would not be cured but would remain 
as an inaccuracy on the Register.47
41  Scottish Law Commission, Report on Land Registration (n 22) para 18.17.
42  For “Register errors," see Scottish Law Commission, Report on Land Registration (n 22) 
paras 17.28-17.32. 
43  1979 Act s 3(1)(a). For the use of the term “Midas touch," see Scottish Law Commission, 
Report on Land Registration (n 22) para 3.11.
44  2012 Act ss 91, 94.
45  See, for this certification of title, B(2) above.
46  2012 Act s 86.
47  Scottish Law Commission, Report on Land Registration (n 22) para 23.33. The validity of 
the servitude would, however, be covered by the Keeper’s warranty under s 73.
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(2) Liability
As well as the consequences of mistake for the title, conveyancers are likely 
to be mindful of the possible consequences for themselves. To responsibility, 
therefore, must be added liability.
Section 111 of the 2012 Act provides that, in making an application for 
registration on a client’s behalf, a solicitor “must take reasonable care to 
ensure that the Keeper does not inadvertently make the register inaccurate 
as a result of a change made in consequence of the application.”48 In other 
words, conveyancers must watch what they say in an application for 
registration. Liability, however, is not strict; the duty is one of reasonable 
care. Nor will a conveyancer be judged by the standards of best practice, 
section 111 not being intended to “raise the standard of what is required 
of a conveyancer.”49 But if a conveyancer falls short of normal professional 
standards, if this causes an inaccuracy on the Register, and if the Keeper 
suffers loss as a result, there is liability to the Keeper in damages.50 The 
Keeper would suffer loss only if she had to make a compensatory payment, 
and this could occur either because the inaccuracy came to be rectified 
(payment being due to the affected proprietor)51 or because, due to the 
provisions protecting good-faith acquirers,52 the error had ceased to be an 
inaccuracy (payment being due to the former right-holder).53
There can also be liability to the conveyancer’s client. As section 111 
imposes a duty of care on the applicant as well as on the applicant’s 
solicitor, the Keeper might chose to pursue the applicant, leaving the 
applicant to make a claim in professional negligence against the solicitor54. 
The same might happen in respect of the various warranties which the 
applicant grants by the mere act of applying for registration. As well as the 
certification of title, already mentioned,55 the applicant is required to certify 
both “that this application complies with the general application conditions 
in section 22, and the particular application conditions mentioned in section 
48  2012 Act s 111(3), (4).
49  Scottish Law Commission, Report on Land Registration (n 22) para 12.103.
50  For details, see 2012 Act s 111(5), (6).
51  Ibid s 73. This is the Keeper’s warranty as to title.
52 Ibid ss 86 and 91, discussed at D(1) above.
53 Ibid ss 94, 95. 
54  The leading expert in this field is of course none other than Robert Rennie himself. 
Apart from countless opinions on the subject and many court appearances as an expert 
witness, he is also author of Opinions on Professional Negligence in Conveyancing (2004). 
55  At B(2) above.
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21(2)," and also “that the information given in this form and the answers to 
the above questions are complete and correct to the best of my knowledge 
and belief.”56 If, as seems possible from the wording, the first two of these 
warranties are absolute in nature, the duty of the applicant to the Keeper 
is more extensive than the duty of the solicitor to the applicant, which 
exonerates the solicitor in some cases but leaves the applicant exposed. 
Finally, a breach of section 111 blocks a claim for compensation under the 
Keeper’s warranty,57 so that the client’s loss might be a failure of recovery 
from the Keeper rather than a requirement to pay the Keeper damages; 
here again, the loss is likely to be recoverable from the conveyancer on the 
ground of professional negligence.
The risks should not, however, be exaggerated. Mistakes in respect 
of the application will be relatively uncommon, negligent mistakes less 
common still. A conveyancer who, in the exercise of sound professional 
judgment in the light of the law and the evidence, concludes that, say, a 
prescriptive servitude exists or a real burden is extinguished is not liable 
merely because a court later decides that he was wrong. Further, the inertia 
of the Register means that mistakes once entered there are unlikely to be 
picked up later, far less corrected. In short, completion of an application 
form for registration is not an especially hazardous activity. The liability, in 
any event, is not new. A common-law equivalent of section 111 may already 
have existed,58 while “carelessness” in carrying out the conveyancing 
blocked a claim for 1979 Act indemnity.59 What is new, however, is the 
reduced scrutiny by the Keeper and hence the greater opportunity for 
things to go wrong; and where they do the very presence of section 111 
may make an attempt at recovery more likely.
(3) Opportunity
Conveyancers, no doubt, are well aware both of the responsibility involved 
in preparing applications for registration and also of their potential 
liability. Neither, it is to be hoped, will prevent them from making use of 
their new-found freedoms. For, whatever one thinks of “tell me don’t show 
me” – and there are strong reasons for questioning its use, as I explain 
56  Application form p 7.
57  2012 Act s 78(c).
58  Scottish Law Commission, Report on Land Registration (n 22) para 12.102. Not everyone 
would agree with this assessment.
59  1979 Act ss 12(3)(n) 13(4).
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below60 – it presents conveyancers with the opportunity to reclaim the very 
role that Robert Rennie feared had been lost for ever. After several decades 
of the nanny state, nanny has packed her bags and gone home. It is now for 
conveyancers to ply their trade once more, to “take a view” on titles, and 
to apply with a cool eye and a keen judgment the principles of the law of 
property. It will be a pity if they turn out to be as cautious and risk-averse 
as the officials at Meadowbank House.
E.  The Public Interest
In his magisterial survey of Registration of Title to Land throughout the 
Empire, published in 1920, James Hogg gave the following account of how 
applications for first registration are handled:61
The application having been formally made, the first stage in the procedure 
is for the registry to check the description of the property and investigate 
the title offered by the applicant … The examination of the application in the 
registry is conducted on the principles and according to the rules governing 
the examination of the vendor’s title on behalf of the purchaser of land.
The Scottish version of registration of title, needless to say, was conceived 
along precisely the same lines. Here, for example, is the original Registration 
of Title Practice Book, explaining to practitioners how the new system 
introduced by the 1979 Act was to work:62
Where a transaction induces First Registration a prescriptive progress 
of titles, including all burdens writs and links in title will require to be 
examined as under the present Sasine procedure and the usual enquiries 
on title raised … It should be remembered that as part of the process of 
registration the Keeper will re-examine all the title deeds and, therefore, the 
purchaser’s solicitors work will be subject to detailed scrutiny.63
60  See E below.
61  J E Hogg, Registration of Title to Land throughout the Empire (1920) 53.
62  Registration of Title Practice Book (1981) para G.2.14. In Part II of the Henry Report, which 
contains the projected Land Registration Rules, r 14(1) provides that: “The Keeper shall 
examine each title for which he shall receive an application for registration." Rule 15 
indicates that the examination is to be “in detail," although a detailed examination 
may be dispensed with in respect of lands below a value of £5,000. See Scheme for the 
Introduction and Operation of Registration of Title to Land in Scotland (Cmnd 4137: 1969) 
73-74. In the event, the reduced scrutiny for low-value properties was not proceeded 
with, although it was, and still is, employed to some extent in England and Wales.
63  The passage continues: “It is, however, expected that in his examination the Keeper 
will feel able to discount small conveyancing errors which may be found from time to 
30 Acquiring Property 
As to that “detailed scrutiny," a contemporary account explained that: “the 
Keeper will carry out the definitive examination of title and, if satisfied, 
will issue a land certificate … Once the proprietary interest is registered, 
the title deeds need never be pored over by rheumy conveyancers’ eyes 
again.”64
The purpose of the Keeper’s examination of title – “the definitive 
examination” – need hardly be explained. If titles in the Land Register 
are to be guaranteed,65 if rheumy conveyancers’ eyes are to be spared, if 
injustice to existing right-holders, at risk from bona fide acquirers,66 is to be 
minimised, if, in short, the Register is to be an “authoritative record”67 of the 
title, it is essential that it be as accurate as human (and machine) fallibility 
allows. Otherwise the entire basis of registration of title is undermined. For 
if the Register is prone to error, there can be no policy basis for allowing 
third parties to rely on it. 
Unhappily, the increased reliance on “tell me don’t show me” carries 
grave risks for the accuracy of the Land Register. It is not merely that two 
sets of eyes were better than one, though undoubtedly they were. Nor is 
it that the Keeper’s re-examination of title impelled conveyancers to be 
careful with their own examination, though undoubtedly it did. Rather the 
difficulty is that solicitors represent their clients and not the public interest, 
and will examine title, and complete the application form, accordingly. 
That private individuals and not public officials should have so large a say 
in determining the content of the Register is a disquieting prospect. The 
inevitable result68 will be a higher incidence of error and even of fraud.69
time. For example, the Keeper will probably feel able to ignore an error in a recording 
date, or a blundered clause of Deduction of Title, providing in the latter case that the 
warrants are in order.” To what extent these hopes were realised is unclear.
64  “Aspect” (1979) 24 JLSS 87. This unsigned contribution was probably by the then editor 
of the Journal of the Law Society (and notable conveyancer), A I Phillips.
65  A J McDonald, Registration of Title Manual (1986) para 3.5 (“the Keeper of the Land 
Register has a much more positive and active role than in the Register of Sasines 
because, in Registration of Title, the Keeper has the responsibility of warranting the 
validity of the individual registered title”).
66  Originally this was by means of the Midas touch (i.e. s 3(1)(a) of the 1979 Act). Today 
the risk comes from ss 86 and 91 of the 2012 Act.
67  S R Simpson, Land Law and Registration (1976) 15.
68  A result, it is to be feared, which may also be contributed to by Keeper-induced 
registration under s 29 of the 2012 Act, which likewise involves only a single examination 
of title (albeit by the Keeper’s staff). Conceived by the Scottish Law Commission as a 
device of last resort (see Report on Land Registration (n 22) paras 33.47-33.58), Keeper-
induced registration will need to be used aggressively and, depending on resources, 
perhaps with insufficient scrutiny if the ten-year target for completing the Land 
Register is to be met.
69  In the absence of scrutiny at Meadowbank House, some frauds will be much easier 
 “Tell Me Don’t Show Me” and the Fall and Rise of the Conveyancer 31
Probably the ideal method of processing applications of registration lies 
somewhere between what we had and what we have. Under the former 
arrangements, as Robert Rennie noted, staff at the Register took too little 
notice of the views of conveyancers; now they take too much. What seems 
to be required is a more nuanced regime in which the Keeper, while making 
the final decisions, works closely and in a spirit of co-operation with the 
conveyancer responsible for the application. But even if such a system 
could be devised, it could not be implemented without a change of mind-
set and a substantial increase in public resources. Neither, unfortunately, 
seems likely to occur in the near future. 
F.  On a Personal Note
I would like to finish by saying just a little about Robert Rennie, for whom 
this volume is written. Robert is widely known and admired as a legal 
practitioner, a scholar, an expert witness, a writer of opinions, and as a 
lecturer whose wit and wisdom have delighted countless audiences of 
students and professionals. Less well-known, perhaps, but hardly less 
important are his many acts of public service. Only one can be mentioned 
here. Robert was a key figure in the series of legislative reforms which, over 
the last decade or so, have transformed the law of property in Scotland. 
As a member of successive advisory committees of the Scottish Law 
Commission he contributed to the development of policy; as the senior 
professor of conveyancing70 in Scotland he then defended and explained 
the legislative results to many different types of audience. In my role as a 
Scottish Law Commissioner between 1995 and 2005 I had many occasions 
to be grateful to Robert for his support, encouragement, and unfailing 
collegiality. 
Of Robert’s many important interventions I recall one in particular. 
When the Bill to abolish the feudal system was going through the new 
Scottish Parliament in the winter of 1999-2000, it came close to being 
hijacked by those who argued, inexplicably and incoherently, that the 
public interest in land was represented by the Crown and that, accordingly, 
to bring off than before. For example, now that death certificates are no longer to be 
sent to the Register, a husband could assert that his wife was dead and proceed to 
sell the matrimonial home. A compliant or careless solicitor might be all too willing to 
accept that the survivorship clause in the title had been triggered. Also on this point, 
see Wightman (n 36).
70  Or property law. As Robert has been given to lament, he had become the last professor 
of “conveyancing” in Scotland.
32 Acquiring Property 
the feudal link to the Crown must be preserved. Extraordinary as this 
view was, it gained the support of a number of MSPs on the parliamentary 
committee, the Justice and Home Affairs Committee, which was charged 
with considering the Bill. Robert was called by the Committee to give oral 
evidence. What happened next is captured in the following extract from 
the Official Report for the morning of Tuesday 9 November 1999:71
Pauline McNeill: I presume that you heard the discussion before you came 
to the table. It was suggested that we spell out the rights that the Crown 
would retain, particularly in relation to public interest. Do you have a view 
on that?
Professor Rennie: Yes. We are dealing with a bill to abolish – I emphasise that 
word – the feudal system. It makes no sense to abolish the feudal structure 
and retain the paramount superiority of the Crown. If that happens, we 
will not have abolished the feudal system. The bill will have to be radically 
altered if that is the case … At the moment, the Crown cannot intervene in a 
feudal dispute between a vassal and a superior in Bishopbriggs. One cannot 
appeal to the Crown, as it has no role to play in the current feudal system. As 
I understood the discussion – I have to say that I might not have understood 
it all – a new and enhanced role for the Crown was proposed. That role 
would still be tied to some form of paramount feudal superiority.
Pauline McNeill: So you are not interested in retaining any aspect of public 
interest? Who would represent the public interest in land issues?
Professor Rennie: Currently, as feudal superior, the Crown does not 
represent the public interest.
The Convener (Roseanna Cunningham): Are you saying that currently, 
there is no public interest, in that sense?
Professor Rennie: Not in the feudal system. The Crown exercises the public 
interest through the Government.
Maureen Macmillan: Can you see any practical benefits in Robin Callander’s 
proposals?
Professor Rennie: Frankly, I cannot see any benefits.
This trenchant defence convinced the doubters. No one could have done it 
better. When the Committee came to report a month later, it summarised 
Robert’s evidence and added that, while “some members believe that 
71  Scottish Parliament, Official Report, Justice and Home Affairs Committee, 9 Nov 1999, 
cols 365-66.
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there is – or should be – some sort of public interest in land ... we all 
agree that retaining the Crown as paramount superior is not the way to 
address that issue.”72 And so in this way the full abolition of the feudal 
system – the basis of all the property-law reforms that were to follow – 
was secured. It was, I fancy, Robert’s reference to Bishopbriggs that made 
the difference.
72  Justice and Home Affairs Committee, Stage 1 Report on the Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc 
(Scotland) Bill (SP Paper 44, 1999) vol 1 para 17.

3. A Puzzling Case about 
Possession
Lord Hope of Craighead
One of Robert Rennie’s skills as an academic commentator was to identify 
cases that were worth drawing attention to because he thought that 
something might have gone wrong. Not infrequently he did this by means 
of an article in the Scots Law Times. One such case which was the subject of 
an article which he wrote in 1994 is Hamilton v McIntosh Donald Ltd.1 It was 
a case about an area of rough peat moss in Aberdeenshire known as the 
Moss of Balqhuarn, part of a larger area known as Portlethen Moss. There 
were no buildings on it, and it was not in use for any kind of agriculture. 
It was just scrub land, which one might have thought was of no real value 
to anybody. It was also not fenced off, so anyone who wanted to could get 
access to it. As so often in cases of this kind, nobody paid much attention 
to what, if anything, was going on there or to whom the land belonged. 
The landowner was doing nothing to show to anyone who might have had 
a competing title that the land belonged to him. As far as the defenders 
who did have a competing title were concerned, there was no reason to 
think that objection would be taken if they were to make use of the land for 
their own purposes. That was the situation which, after the expiry of the 
prescriptive period, gave rise to a dispute about its ownership. On the one 
hand there was Mr Hamilton, who had a recorded title to the area of land 
but was making no use of it. On the other were the defenders, whose titles 
1  1994 SC 304. Professor Rennie’s article, “Possession: Nine Tenths of the Law,” was 
published in 1994 SLT (News) 261.
© Lord Hope of Craighead, CC BY 4.0 http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0056.03
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were derived from a disposition which had been granted in favour of one of 
their predecessors a non domino. It was habile to include the dominium utile 
of the disputed area. But the defenders needed to rely on the operation of 
prescriptive possession under section 1 of the Prescription and Limitation 
(Scotland) Act 1973 if they were to defeat the claim to ownership of Mr 
Hamilton. 
The defenders succeeded in persuading the Lord Ordinary, Lord 
Prosser,2 that various activities which had taken place over the area on their 
behalf or with their authority during the relevant period were enough to 
establish that they had a right of ownership. They were also successful in 
the Inner House, where the Second Division, by a majority (Lord Murray 
dissenting) held that there was just sufficient evidence of the necessary 
prescriptive possession to entitle the defenders to succeed, in the absence 
of any challenge by the pursuer or any adverse possession by him during 
that period. But, on any view, it was a narrow case. It might have gone 
either way. Both Lord Justice Clerk Ross and Lord Wylie, who constituted 
the majority, expressed hesitation in coming to the opinion that the Lord 
Ordinary had reached the correct conclusion on the evidence that was 
before him.3 Lord Murray agreed that the case was a very narrow one. But 
in his view there was insufficient evidence to enable the necessary inference 
to be drawn.4 
There were two features about the case that attracted Professor Rennie’s 
attention. The first was the fact that the evidence about possession which 
the judges other than Lord Murray accepted was, as he put it,5 “absolutely 
minimal.” It amounted to little more than some seasonal rough shooting 
which took place mainly on Saturdays, and some dumping of rubbish 
which took place on and off throughout the year and on only a small part 
of the disputed area. Other actions such as three weeks’ peat cutting and 
the carrying out of ground investigation work in relation to proposed road 
works were not in themselves sufficient because they were localised and 
transient. But they were held by the majority to point in the same direction 
as an assertion of ownership rights by the defenders. The second was a 
point of more general interest. It was about the risks to which the owner 
of a piece of scrub land of this kind was exposed by a party claiming 
2  1994 SLT 212.
3  1994 SC 304 at 329H per the Lord Justice Clerk and at 334A per Lord Wylie. 
4  Ibid at 333G.
5  1994 SLT (News) 261 at 264.
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prescriptive possession of it on the basis of a disposition that was granted 
a non domino, if all that was needed to make good that claim were acts of 
the kind that were regarded as sufficient in this case. Of course, the owner 
of an estate extending to thousands of acres could not be expected to pace 
round the estate every week or month looking for evidence of possession 
by other parties. But the implication of this decision was that a failure to 
keep an eye on what was going on there, however minimal, could have 
unfortunate consequences. As Robert Rennie put it at the end of his article, 
with a characteristic turn of phrase, landowners needed to be vigilant “lest 
there be a land rush based on all manner of queer goings on in the middle 
of the night designed to establish possession.”6 He did not, one gathers, 
approve of the decision. 
I was attracted to his article by one other comment that appears at the 
end of it. There had, it seems, been a suggestion that the case might go to 
the House of Lords. “If so,” said Professor Rennie, “it will be interesting 
to see what their Lordships will make of it.”7 Remarks of that kind always 
excite interest. As it happened, the case did not go to the House of Lords 
after all. So their Lordships never had a chance to deal with the case. There 
was no further appeal. But the question, what their Lordships would have 
made of the case, is still worth a second look, even after an interval of more 
than twenty years. 
There are two preliminary points that need to be made before one looks 
at the substance. The first is that the issue between the parties was, at least 
at first sight, an issue of fact rather than one of law. As Professor Rennie 
himself recognised,8 in such cases there is always a natural reluctance on 
the part of the appellate court to interfere with a view which has been 
formed on the evidence by the judge who has heard it. In this case that 
point is strengthened by the fact that there were concurrent findings of fact 
both at first instance and in the Inner House. This means that the hurdle 
that would have had to have been overcome in the House of Lords was that 
much greater. This leads to the second point. As the decision was always 
bound to turn on the particular facts and circumstances, it would appear 
that there was no real principle of law flowing from the decision. In 1994 
an appeal to the House of Lords (and now, to the Supreme Court) was 
available as of right. It would not have been necessary to obtain permission, 
6  Ibid at 265.
7  Ibid at 265.
8  Ibid at 264.
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as will be required when section 117 of the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 
2014 is brought into force.9 The test for permission is whether the case raises 
a question of general public importance which is appropriate for further 
consideration on appeal. Given these two preliminary points it seems to 
me to be most unlikely that permission would have been given either by 
the Inner House or the House of Lords, had it been necessary at that time. 
But, writing as he was in 1994, Robert Rennie did not have to trouble with 
that point. So the question what their Lordships would have made of the 
case was not an idle one. There would have been no procedural obstacle in 
the way of an appeal.
Of course, these two preliminary points would not have disappeared just 
because the appeal would have to proceed as an appeal as of right. There is 
no shortage of cases where, both in the House of Lords and in the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom, their Lordships have made it clear that it 
would be a misuse of the right of appeal to bring cases there which turned 
purely on their own facts and raised no issue of general public importance 
at all.10 But from time to time cases which at first sight seemed to have 
nothing to be said for them at all have turned out, on further examination, 
to raise points of real interest.11 As this was a Scottish case, everything 
would be likely to have depended on whether the two Scottish Law Lords 
found something in the appeal that caught their interest. That is especially 
so as the issue was one about property law, as to which the laws on either 
side of the border are so different. That having been said, cases about loss 
of title to land to acts of competing possession through inadvertence are 
not unknown in the English courts. So, if they had been interested in the 
case, the Scottish Law Lords would not have found it difficult to carry their 
colleagues with them to the point of at least listening to the argument and 
then trying to make something of the case when it come to the point of 
writing a judgment.
The two Scots Law Lords who were sitting on the Appellate Committee 
of the House of Lords in 1994 were Lord Keith of Kinkel and Lord Jauncey 
of Tullichettle. I had not yet reached the House of Lords, so I do not have 
much of a feeling for what they would have made of the case if they had had 
to deal with it. It is possible that counsel would have been able to persuade 
9  Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014, section 117. 
10  See, e.g., Wilson v Jaymarke Estates Ltd [2007] UKHL 29, 2007 SC (HL) 135; Uprichard v 
Scottish Ministers [2013] UKSC 21, 2013 SC (UKSC) 219.
11  See, e.g., Ritchie v Lloyd [2007] UKHL 9, 2007 SC (HL) 89. 
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them that it did raise an issue that was worth further consideration. On 
the other hand, they might well have felt that there were no grounds on 
which they could properly interfere with the decision of the Inner House. 
In that event their judgment would not have added anything of interest 
to what had already been said by the judges in the Court of Session. It 
can be assumed that their attention would have been drawn to Professor 
Rennie’s article. But I think that is unlikely that his name would have 
meant anything to either Lord Keith or Lord Jauncey. They came from a 
generation of judges who paid little attention to the views of the academic 
branch of the profession, and it can be assumed that they would have 
adopted that approach in this case too. Speculation as to what they would 
have made of his comments is, for this reason, a rather sterile exercise. But 
my impression, much as I admired and respected both of them, is that they 
were not inclined to push out the frontiers of the law beyond its established 
boundaries. So I think that the chances of their reversing the decision of the 
Inner House must be regarded as rather slim. In that situation Mr Hamilton 
was probably wise not to take the case any further. 
So I would prefer to assume that I would have been sitting on the 
Appellate Committee when the appeal reached the House, and that my 
colleague from Scotland on the committee would have been Lord Rodger 
of Earlsferry. There are several reasons for thinking that this is a happier 
assumption to make. Like Alan Rodger, I welcomed the opportunity to 
explore issues of Scottish private law whenever they came our way when 
we were sitting in London. In our experience, there was not infrequently 
something in those cases which had not been spotted before, or at least 
something new about them that was worth saying. For us, the fact that 
Robert Rennie had thought it worth commenting on the case would at least 
have attracted our interest. It would also have presented a challenge too, as 
we would have felt that we could not ignore his comments when we were 
writing our judgments.
One of the advantages of sitting in London is the opportunity that it 
gives for comparing the Scots approach to a problem with that which is 
adopted in similar circumstances in England. As it happens, an appeal 
which presented a problem not all that distant from that raised by Hamilton 
v McIntosh Donald came before the House of Lords in March 2002. I had been 
sitting as a member of the Appellate Committee for over five years by then. 
I had recently been joined by Lord Rodger, although he was not asked to sit 
with me on this occasion. The appeal was in the case of J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd 
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v Graham.12 It was an English appeal which, like the Hamilton case, raised 
an issue about adverse possession. The landowner, Pye, sought to recover 
possession of the land, to which it held a paper title, from the defendants 
who had been using it for over twenty years. The defendants’ argument 
was that inaction of the kind that caused the problem for the landowner 
in Hamilton had resulted in the loss of the right to recover possession by 
the operation of the Limitation Act 1980. This was because they had been 
in “adverse possession” of the land within the meaning of paragraph 11 of 
Schedule 6 to the 1980 Act. The acts which were said to have amounted to 
adverse possession consisted, to begin with, of using the land for grazing 
and cutting hay. But as time went on the defendants carried out various 
other operations such as harrowing and spreading dung on the land to 
ensure its fitness for grazing in the following season, and later on changed 
their use of the land to arable. Various witnesses who had observed these 
activities said that they thought that the defendants were the owners, while 
it was clear that Pye showed no interest in its agricultural management. 
The case really turned on what was meant by the expression “adverse 
possession,” not on the extent or quality of the defendants’ use of the land. 
Their use of it was, of course, more than enough to establish a right of 
ownership by the operation of prescriptive possession if the land had been 
in Scotland and if they had had a title to it which was habile to include the 
dominium utile. They had been conducting their farming operations there 
openly, peaceable and without any judicial interruption for more than the 
prescriptive period. But was this “adverse possession” within the meaning 
of the English statute?
That was not an uninteresting question. As Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
observed,13 the apparently straightforward provisions of the Limitation 
Act 1980 had given rise to considerable difficulties. The problem was that 
the expression “adverse possession” had become linked to the idea that a 
squatter’s use of the land had to conflict with the intentions of the paper 
title owner as to his present or future use of the land. He had to be shown 
to have acted adversely to the paper title owner, in the sense that his use of 
the land was inconsistent with any use, present or future, of it by the true 
owner. The Court of Appeal had found that the problem for the defendants, 
on this approach, was that they had been using the land in exactly the 
same fashion as Pye had agreed to their using it under a grazing let in 
12  [2002] UKHL 30, [2003] 1 AC 419.
13  Ibid at para 31.
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the past in the hope that, should this be necessary, they would be able 
to obtain Pye’s agreement to its being used in the future.14 This analysis 
of the facts was found not to be entirely sound. The better analysis was 
that of the trial judge, Neuberger J,15 who held that the defendants had 
established title by possession because they had treated the land as their 
own for the necessary period. So the defendants succeeded in their appeal, 
and Pye were deprived of their title to it by the operation of the statute. Pye 
complained that this result was incompatible with their rights under article 
1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, but it 
was held by a Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg Court that the fair balance 
required by A1P1 was not upset.16
I took the opportunity in my speech in that case to comment on the 
concept of adverse possession and the apparent injustice of the result.17 It 
seemed to me that the concept of possession required both an intention 
to take or occupy the land (animus) and some act of the body (corpus) 
which gives effect to that intention. As for the intention, I said that the 
animus which was required was the intent to exercise exclusive control 
over the subjects for oneself.18 It was not necessary to show that there was a 
deliberate intention to exclude the paper owner or the registered proprietor. 
The word “adverse” as used by the statute did not carry that implication. 
The only intention that had to be demonstrated was an intention to occupy 
and use the land as one’s own. It is worth quoting the way I linked this 
approach to that taken in Scots law:19
This is a concept which Rankine, The Law of Land-Ownership in Scotland, 
4th edn (1909), p 4, captured in his use of the Latin phrase cum animo 
rem sibi habendi (see his reference in footnote 1 to Savingy, Das Recht des 
Besitzes, translated by Perry (1848), paras 1-11). It is similar to that which 
was introduced into the law of Scotland by the Prescription Act 1617, c 12 
relating to the acquisition of an interest in land by the operation of positive 
prescription. The possession that is required for this purpose is possession 
“openly, peaceably and without any judicial interruption” on a competing 
title for the requisite period: Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, 
section 1(1)(a). So I would hold that, if the evidence shows that the person 
14  [2001] EWCA Civ 107, [2001] Ch 804.
15  [2000] Ch 676.
16  (2008) 46 EHRR 45.
17  J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] AC 419 at paras 67ff.
18  See Henry Bond, “Possession in the Roman Law” (1890) 6 LQR 259, at p 270. 
19  J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham (n 17) at para 71.
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was using the land in a way that one would expect him to use it if he were 
the true owner, that is enough.
I agreed with my colleagues on the Appellate Committee that the only 
conclusion that could reasonably be drawn from the evidence was that the 
defendants had occupied and used the disputed land as their own for the 
necessary period before the action to remove them was brought. I noted 
that the unfairness in the system laid down by the Limitation Act 1980 lay 
in the lack of safeguards against oversight or inadvertence on the part of 
the registered proprietor.
A feature of our system of case law, at least at the appellate level where 
there is room for the law’s development, is that one case tends to feed off 
another. Pye v Graham was an English case which dealt with a different 
statute. But the examination of the concept of adverse possession in that 
case might be thought to have some bearing on the points that Robert 
Rennie was making in his article about the Hamilton case. Did the judges in 
the Court of Session pay sufficient attention to the nature and quality of the 
possession that was required? As he noted,20 in Montgomerie Bell’s view it 
had to be of the highest description of which the subject is capable.21 Neither 
the Lord Ordinary nor the Judges in the Inner House make any reference to 
this test. Lord Justice Clerk Ross did, when he was setting out the principles 
to be applied, say that whether particular acts constitute possession for the 
purposes of prescription depends upon the nature of the subjects claimed.22 
But two of the authorities to which he referred might have justified a 
formulation that was closer to that suggested by Montgomerie Bell. In 
Buchanan and Geils v Lord Advocate Lord Mure said that the foreshore was 
in the occupation of the pursuer “in every way that a foreshore admits of 
being used.”23 In Young v North British Railway Co Lord Watson said that 
test would be satisfied if the pursuer “has had all the beneficial uses” of the 
foreshore that a grantee of the Crown would naturally enjoy.24 In Aitken’s 
Trustees v The Caledonian Railway and the Lord Advocate Lord Moncrieff put 
the matter in much the same way as the Lord Justice Clerk when he said 
that, when judging the sufficiency of the possession, regard must be had 
20  1994 SLT (News) 261, 264.
21  G J Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing, 3rd edn (1882) 707. 
22  1994 SC 303 at 332B per Lord Justice Clerk Ross.
23  (1882) 9 R 1218 at 1230.
24  (1887) 14 R (HL) 53 at 54.
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to the nature of the subject and the uses to which it can be put.”25 But only 
a few sentences earlier he had quoted the same words from Lord Watson’s 
speech in Young, and the point in Aitken was that the possession that had 
been established by the evidence was of a small portion only of the part of 
the foreshore over which a right of ownership was being claimed. That was 
held to be insufficient to establish a prescriptive right to the whole of it. In 
such a narrow case as Hamilton plainly was, small differences matter when 
the test to be applied is being formulated. Would it have made a difference 
to the result if the judges had had in the forefront of their minds the test 
that Montgomerie Bell had suggested instead of the somewhat weaker way 
of expressing it which, following Lord Moncreiff in Aitken, was adopted by 
the Lord Justice Clerk? Would it have made a difference if reference had 
been made to my way of putting the point in Pye, when I said the question 
was whether the person was using the land in a way that one would expect 
him to use it if he were the true owner?
One has, of course, to twist the chronology a bit to bring the speeches in 
Pye, which were delivered in March 2002, into the argument in a supposed 
appeal to the House of Lords in Hamilton. But that would be necessary 
anyway if one is to assume that Lord Rodger had been sitting with me 
in the appeal, as he did not become a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary until 
October 2001. Supposing then that Lord Rodger had been sitting with 
me sometime after March 2002, one has to ask whether he would have 
been interested in pursuing the questions which I posed at the end of 
the preceding paragraph. Would he have thought that something might 
be gained from looking at an English case which was concerned with a 
different issue under a different statute when addressing an issue of Scots 
law in an appeal from Scotland? Without his support I would have been 
unlikely to have made much progress in persuading my English colleagues 
that there was something in the point that was worth thinking about. With 
his support there would have been every chance that I would have been 
able to do so.
I must move the calendar on quite a bit more to get a feel for what 
Lord Rodger would have thought of the point if he had been given the 
opportunity. The answer can be found in a judgment which he delivered 
in March 2010 in an appeal to the UK Supreme Court on which we both 
sat. It raised an issue, which has given rise to much litigation in England 
25  (1906) 6 F 465 at 470. 
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in recent years, about the test to be applied in determining whether land 
is appropriate for registration as a town or village green under section 15 
of the Commons Act 2006.26 This was the case of R (Lewis) v Redcar and 
Cleveland Borough Council.27 The question was whether the local inhabitants 
had done enough to show that they had made use of the area in question 
“as of right” for a period of at least 20 years. One has only to mention this 
test to appreciate that the questions that are likely to arise on the evidence 
are not dissimilar to those that have to be addressed where a claim to 
ownership by the operation of prescription is made under the 1980 Act. In 
the Redcar case the land in question had been used for many years as a golf 
course. The local inhabitants had been using it too, regularly and in large 
numbers, for a variety of sports and pastimes including jogging, children’s 
play and dog-walking which was tolerated and not objected to by those 
playing golf on the golf course. The question was whether the inhabitants 
were doing these things as of right.
Lord Rodger was sufficiently interested in this issue to add a judgment 
of his own based on his own researches,28 although he agreed with the 
leading judgment which was given by Lord Walker. He referred to the 
Digest29 when he was exploring the meaning of the phrase “as of right,” in 
the light of Lord Hoffmann’s observation in an earlier Commons case30 that 
it was to be construed as meaning nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. His point 
was that it would be wrong to suppose that the Latin word vi meant that 
some kind of physical force was required. He referred, by way of further 
support, to Lord Jauncey’s observation in a case about a claim to a public 
right of way in Scotland31 that there is no principle of law which requires 
there to be conflict between the interests of users and those of the proprietor, 
and to an observation by Lord Sands in another public right of way case 
in Scotland32 in order to make the point that most people who walk their 
dogs or play with their children on the disputed land know nothing about 
the legal character of their right to do so. The way in which he slipped so 
26  See R (Barkas) v North Yorkshire County Council [2014] UKSC 31 for the most recent in 
this series.
27  R (Lewis) v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council (No 2) [2010] UKSC 11, [2010] 2 AC 70.
28  See ibid (n 27) at paras 79 ff.
29  D 43.24.1.5-9, Ulpian ad edictum.
30  R v Oxfordshire County Council, Ex p Sunningwell Parish Council [2000] 1 AC 335. 
31  Cumbernauld and Kilsyth District Council v Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) Ltd 1993 SC (HL) 44 
at 47 per Lord Jauncey.
32  Rhins District Committee of Wigtownshire County Council v Cuninghame 1917 2 SLT 169 at 
172 per Lord Sands. 
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easily to and fro across the border in his use of these authorities suggests 
quite strongly that he would have been quite happy to do the same if he 
had been hearing the appeal in Hamilton. So it is not an unreasonable 
assumption that he, like me, would have wanted to look quite closely at 
the question whether the Inner House really did direct their minds to the 
correct test as to the nature and quality of the possession that had to be 
shown to establish the defenders’ case when they refused Mr Hamilton’s 
reclaiming motion. If we had been satisfied that this was not so, this would 
have enabled us to form our own view as to whether the test was satisfied 
by the evidence.
There, however, my reaction to Robert Rennie’s article must stop. There 
was no appeal, and it would not be fair for me to express a concluded view 
as to what would have happened if there had been and if, on my rather 
extended hypothesis, Lord Rodger and I had had the pleasure of hearing 
it. What I can properly say, however, is that Robert’s article did raise a 
very interesting issue which, although perhaps slightly ahead of its time, 
focused on a point that was very much in need of attention. The balance 
between the interests of the landowner and those of the party claiming 
prescriptive possession needs to be struck in the right place. One is left 
with an uneasy feeling that in Mr Hamilton’s case that was not so. I think 
that Robert Rennie was quite right to draw attention to this point in the way 
he did in his article. I confess to a feeling of some regret that I was not given 
an opportunity to respond to it. 

4. “It’s in the Post”: Distance 
Contracting in Scotland 
1681-1855
Professor Hector L MacQueen
In 1684 the Duke of Gordon engaged Robert Smith to serve him and his 
family “in chirurgery and physic, and also to supervise his buildings and 
architecture” – an interesting combination of medical and property services. 
Smith’s salary was to be 200 merks a year plus board when the Duke was 
at home and a daily subsistence allowance otherwise. Smith and the Duke 
each signed a copy of their agreement, then exchanged these copies. Some 
seventeen years later, in 1701, Smith obtained decree from the Sheriff at 
Edinburgh against the Duke for non-payment of 2,823 pounds Scots due 
under the contract, representing “so many years board wages, during 
the years the Duke did not live at home, at the rate of 12 pence per day." 
Smith’s claim suggests that the Duke did not spend much time at home.1 
The Duke sought to suspend the sheriff’s decree in the Court of Session 
in Edinburgh, on the basis that “by the contract produced by the charger 
himself [i.e. Smith], it appears, the clause pursued on is a marginal note, and 
which, not being subscribed by the Duke, but only by Smith himself, can 
never oblige the Duke.” The court held, however, “that mutual contracts 
having two doubles need not be subscribed by both parties-contracters, but 
1  A merk was worth 2/3 of a pound Scots, itself valued in 1707 at one-twelfth of a pound 
sterling. One shilling Scots exchanged for one penny sterling in 1707, i.e. one penny 
Scots was 1/12th of a penny sterling. 
© Hector L MacQueen, CC BY 4.0 http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0056.04
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it was sufficient in law if the Duke’s principal was signed by Smith and his 
counterpart by the Duke.” An earlier decision said to be to the same effect, 
Sinclair of Ossory in Caithness,2 was referred to by the court as having settled 
the question. Smith argued that “there remain some dark vestiges of a 
subscription [to the marginal note on his double], though by the badness of the 
ink and the wearing of the paper, it is not so legible now.” Although this 
explanation is not implausible, bearing in mind that the documents had 
been executed seventeen years before the case came into court, the Court 
of Session seems to have preferred the Duke’s claim that “no subscription 
appeared, nor the least character of letters.” But the court “sustained the 
marginal note, though not signed by the Duke, seeing it was contained 
in his own double uncancelled.” The report summarises the effect of the 
decision as being that “if a mutual contract is executed by two counterparts, 
it is sufficient if each party subscribes the paper containing what is prestable 
on himself.”3 The court thus took a fairly liberal approach to the effect of 
the Duke’s undoubted subscription of the double in Smith’s possession as 
embracing the unsigned marginal note thereon, with perhaps some sort of 
personal bar arising from the fact that he had not struck out the note in his 
own double even though that document had indeed been subscribed by 
Smith. It should however be observed that the court noticed that the clause 
in the marginal note “seemed materially to differ” in the two copies, and 
remitted the case for further inquiry on this point before the ordinary judge 
(presumably the sheriff in Edinburgh). 
Smith v Duke of Gordon is a decision which passed virtually unnoticed in 
cases and legal texts for the next 300 years, apart from a reference in Lord 
Bankton’s Institute of the Laws of Scotland, published between 1751 and 1753,4 
and one citation in 1957 in the sheriff court case of Wilson v Fenton Bros 
(Glasgow) Ltd.5 That case involved the exchange by parties of duplicates of 
a patent licence agreement, each party signing one copy and then handing 
that copy over to the other. The sheriff-substitute (J C E Hay) held that the 
2  No report of this case has been traced. 
3  Smith v Duke of Gordon (1701) Mor 16987. The case of Cubbison v Cubbison (1716) Mor 
16988 also involves “doubles of a writ,” and in that case there were three such “doubles.”
4  Andrew McDouall, Lord Bankton, An Institute of the Laws of Scotland in Civil Rights with 
observations upon the agreement or diversity between them and the laws of England, 2 vols 
(Edinburgh, 1751-52) 1.11.36 (also available in a reprint as vols 41-43 in the Stair Society 
series, edited with an introduction by W M Gordon). Note too Bankton’s observation 
on the English law, at 1.11 (Observations on the Laws of England) 17. 
5  1957 SLT (Sh Ct) 3. Note also G Lubbe, “Formation of Contract” in K Reid and R 
Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland vol 2 (2000) 41-42. 
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licence agreement had been validly executed, and said: “In my view, the 
documents produced and to which I have referred, establish the fact of a 
completed agreement between the pursuers and the defenders.” He went 
on to observe:6 
The form of the agreement is not a usual one in Scotland, but, as all the 
negotiations were conducted in England, the method of having two copies, 
of which one copy is signed by each party and delivered to the other party, 
was adopted in conformity, as I am informed, with a common practice in 
England.
This comment encapsulates why the Duke of Gordon case is so surprising 
at first sight: the mode of contract formation there recognised is one that 
more recent Scots lawyers, certainly those of the twentieth century, have 
associated exclusively with English practice, especially conveyancing 
practice; so much so, in fact, that when English commercial lawyers took it 
up as a way of concluding written deals between remote parties, plenty of 
Scots lawyers thought such a thing not legally possible in Scotland.7
One reason for these difficulties was that for two centuries lawyers 
had been taught that a contract was created by an offer by one party met 
by an acceptance by the other. The model was a familiar one in standard 
transactions: notably house purchases, but also other sales or leases of 
land. The offer and acceptance were usually known as the “missives,” 
and together these documents, when executed and subscribed by the 
appropriate party in the form required by law, made a contract. Robert 
Rennie has written much on this subject in modern law.8
But the doctrines associated with offer and acceptance, painfully 
learned by generations of law students and applied with variable degrees 
of success in tackling tutorial and examination problems, do not appear 
to have been in the forefront of the Scots law on contract formation in 
general before 1800. Before then, offer and acceptance was certainly a way 
in which contracts might be formed but equally certainly not the only one. 
The key requirement was, in the language of Stair, the exercise of free will 
by parties to engage with each other “of purpose to oblige."9 Engagement 
6  1957 SLT (Sh Ct) at 5. The pursuers were resident in New York.
7  See Scottish Law Commission, Review of Contract Law. Report on Formation of 
Contract: Execution in Counterpart (Scot Law Com No 231, April 2013) paras 1.2-1.3. 
8  See especially D J Cusine and Robert Rennie, Missives, 2nd edn (1999).
9  James Dalrymple, Viscount Stair, Institutions of the Law of Scotland, 2nd edn (Edinburgh, 
1693) 1.10.13. I have used the tercentenary edition (a reprint of the 2nd) published 
under the editorship of D M Walker by Edinburgh University Press in 1981. 
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was to be distinguished from, first, desire, “a tendency or inclination of the 
will towards its object,”10 which was insufficient to create a right. Similarly 
with resolution, “a determinate purpose to do that which is desired”11 but 
still no more than “an act of the will with itself.”12 “The only act of the will 
which is efficacious,” wrote Stair, “is that whereby the will conferreth or 
stateth a power of exaction in another, and thereby becomes engaged to 
that other to perform.”13 Engagement might be by one party alone, and was 
not necessarily a two-or-more-person process: hence the enforceability of a 
unilateral promise in Scots law, and also the possibility of third-party rights 
in a contract. A pactum or paction “is the consent of two or more parties, to 
some things to be performed by either of them; for it is not a consent in their 
opinions, but a consent in their wills, to oblige any of them; and it is much 
to be considered, whether the consent be given animo obligandi, to oblige or 
not.”14 It was this understanding of the basis of conventional or voluntary 
obligations that made it relatively unproblematic, I would suggest, for the 
Scottish courts at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to 
see an exchange by parties of duplicate documents, each subscribed only 
by the other, as simply one of the ways in which such obligations might 
come into existence. 
Stair is not altogether without rules on offer and acceptance, but they 
flow from his understanding of when voluntary or conventional obligations 
arise. An offer being conditional upon the acceptance of the offeree was not 
an engagement until acceptance was made: “[s]o then, an offer accepted is a 
contract, because it is the deed of two, the offeror and accepter.”15 This idea 
of the offer’s non-obligatory quality before acceptance also underpinned 
Stair’s only other substantive comment on the topic:16
If the promise be pendent upon acceptation, and no more than an offer, it is 
imperfect and ambulatory, and in the power of the offeror, till acceptance; 
and if he die before acceptance, it is revoked as a commission or mandate, 




14  Stair, Inst 1.10.6.
15  Ibid 1.10.3.
16  Ibid 1.10.6. Crucially Stair had earlier in the chapter (ibid, 1.10.5) recognised that a third 
party could without acceptance acquire an irrevocable right under a contract between 
two others where the contract contained a promise to benefit that third party. For 
background in medieval and late scholastic juristic thought see J Gordley, Philosophical 
Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine (1991) 45-49, 79-82.
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which necessarily imports acceptance, and expires by the mandator’s death, 
morte mandatoris perit mandatum; so acceptance cannot be by any third party, 
unless he have warrant for the effect; and so if a promise be made by one 
to another in favours of a third, importing the acceptance of that third, it is 
pendent and revocable by these contractors, till the third accept. 
Most of the major eighteenth-century writers on contract law also saw 
the parties’ consent and engagement as the key to when conventional 
obligations arose.17 For all of them, offer and acceptance was but one way 
of showing the necessary engagement of all the relevant parties, resting 
upon the exercise of their concurrent free will. The issue did not need 
more detailed discussion than Stair had provided: the offeror was free 
to withdraw the offer until acceptance, and the offer lapsed if the offeror 
died before acceptance.18 The non-obligatory nature of an offer meant that 
distinguishing it from the obligatory promise was critical, however. The 
test was the existence or not of the party’s “purpose to oblige” or “animus 
obligandi,” and it seems that, for Stair at least, this was a matter to be tested 
objectively. Inward desire and resolution were not enough. The party’s 
engagement had to be manifest in what was said, written or done.19 But Stair 
was silent on whether this also entailed communication to the other party. If 
necessary a party could be put upon his oath of verity to admit or deny the 
making of a potentially obligatory statement.20 External manifestation of 
intention seems to have been also the explanation of another rule applying 
where obligations were stated in writing: delivery of the document to its 
creditor was necessary to make it binding, and the mere fact that the debtor 
had subscribed the document was insufficient. Bankton noted that each 
of the “doubles” involved in an exchange of contracts like that in Smith 
v Duke of Gordon required delivery to the other party in this sense for the 
transaction to become binding.21 But the delivery of an obligatory document 
had to be with the requisite intention to bind; so a mere transfer into a third 
17  For what follows see W Forbes, Institutes of the Law of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1722-1730) 
(reprinted Edinburgh, 2012) vol II, 3.1.3; vol II, 3.1.6; Bankton, Institute 1.11.1-6; J 
Erskine, Institute of the Law of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1773) (reprinted Edinburgh, 2014) 
(7th edn 1870 reprinted 1990), 3.1.16; J Erskine, Principles of the Law of Scotland, in the 
Order of Sir George Mackenzie’s Institutions of that Law, 1st edn (Edinburgh, 1754) (several 
further edns to 1793) 3.1-4. 
18  See e.g. Forbes, Institutes 2.3.1, 6(3); Bankton, Institute 1.11.4-5; Erskine, Institute 3.288; 
Erskine, Principles 3.2.1. 
19  Stair, Inst 1.10.2 and 6; Lubbe, “Formation of Contract” (n 4) 16-18.
20  Stair, Inst 4.44.7. 
21  Bankton, Institute 1.11.36. 
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person’s custody without more – say, for safekeeping – was not enough.22 
Stair however also gave an account of the action of exhibition and delivery 
whereby a party holding a document which should have been delivered to 
another could be made to yield it up for purposes of proof;23 thus it again 
seems that direct communication between the parties was not essential to 
the existence of an obligation.
Eighteenth-century writers wrestled more than Stair with the extent 
to which Scots law was still governed by the Roman law structure of 
contracts: verbal, written, real and consensual; nominate and innominate.24 
As I have shown elsewhere, they were as a result much less clear than Stair 
himself whether or not there was a general law of contract applying to all 
contracts. So perhaps they felt less need to give general doctrine on when a 
contract was formed.25 For example, David Hume, Professor of Scots Law 
at Edinburgh University 1786-1822, said virtually nothing in his lectures 
about contract law in general, focusing instead on particular contracts such 
as sale and location (hire). It is noteworthy that Hume’s only relatively 
detailed discussion of offer and acceptance comes in his treatment of sale, 
and there primarily in connection with the sale of land, where already the 
use of missives seems well established in legal practice.26 For the sale of 
moveables, his emphasis was on the lack of formality and the interests 
of commerce, although he did note that “among traders and mercantile 
dealers, when goods are offered to sale by letter, whether sent by post or 
otherwise, this offer is binding on the seller for a reasonable time only, and 
falls if not duly accepted on the other part.” This was because “otherwise 
the seller is embarrassed and might suffer by the delay.”27 Mungo Ponton 
Brown’s treatise on sale, published in 1821, discussed offer and acceptance 
in the context of the sale of land only.28
22  Stair, Inst 1.7.14; 1.10.9. See also Forbes, Institutes 2 3.2 6(11); Bankton 1.11.23, 48-50; 
Erskine, Institute, 3.2 43-44; Erskine, Principles 3.2.20. 
23  Stair, Inst 1.7.14. See further Forbes, Institutes 2.3.1 9(4); 4.1.2 (3); Bankton, Institute, 3.8 
41-43; Erskine, Institute 4.1 52.
24  Forbes, Institutes 3.1; Bankton, Institute 1.11 18-23, 63-66; Erskine, Institute 3.1-3. 
25  H L MacQueen, “The Law of Obligations in Scots Law” in R Schulze and F Zoll (eds), 
The Law of Obligations in Europe: A New Wave of Codifications (2013), 213-43. See also 
H L MacQueen, “Pragmatism, Precepts and Precedents: Commercial Law and Legal 
History” in A R C Simpson, S C Styles and A Wilson (eds), Continuity, Change and 
Pragmatism in the Law: Essays in Honour of Professor Angelo Forte, forthcoming.
26  G C H Paton (ed), Baron David Hume’s Lectures 1786-1822, 6 vols, The Stair Society (1939-
58) (henceforth Hume, Lectures), vol 2, 20-23. See previously Erskine, Institute, 3.2.2. 
27  Hume, Lectures, vol 2, 6, 18-20.
28  M P Brown, Treatise on the Law of Sale (Edinburgh, 1821), 55. 
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The first Scottish writer to provide us with something like general 
doctrine on offer and acceptance, in the third (1816-1819) edition of his 
Commentaries on the Law of Scotland, was George Joseph Bell, Hume’s 
successor in the Scots Law Chair at Edinburgh 1822-1839. Perhaps in 
contrast with Hume and Brown, he introduced the subject in the context of 
mercantile transactions, as examples of where the formalities of the rules 
on writing were relaxed:29
Contracts in mercantile dealings are not so frequently formed by solemn 
deeds, as by letters or correspondence. One merchant gives an order to 
another at a distance by letter, which that other agrees to perform, or he 
makes an offer which the other accepts. And although the parties are in the 
same place, mercantile contracts are most commonly formed in this way. … 
From this point Bell moves into almost two pages on the law of offer 
and acceptance. In the fifth edition of the Commentaries (1826), the last 
published in his lifetime, he supplemented the passage quoted above with 
the following:30
It is dangerous to rely on a long correspondence from which to collect the 
terms of a contract. The engagement should be so distinct and specific, that 
the party may be enabled at once to put his finger on it and say, “Here is my 
agreement.” And in courts of law nothing short of this can be relied on as 
the ground of an action.
Bell thus saw the offer-acceptance doctrine as especially conducive to the 
practice of merchants, helping them to focus on stating their contracts with 
the minimum of documentation, and also narrowing the field of inquiry 
for the courts when disputes about the existence of contracts came before 
them. Two documents were all that was needed: one stating the terms of 
the bargain, the other acceding to it. Bell distinguished the case of orders 
in trade:31
If a merchant has sent, not an offer to purchase, but an order for goods, it 
is so far of the nature of an offer, that it may be rejected; but the person 
to whom it is addressed binds the bargain, by proceeding with all due 
diligence to execute the order. Nor is it necessary for him to accept it in order 
29  G J Bell, Commentaries on the Mercantile Jurisprudence of Scotland, 3rd edn (Edinburgh, 
1816-19), vol 2, 281. Unless otherwise indicated, as here, references to Bell’s Commentaries 
in this paper are to the 5th edition of 1826, the last published in Bell’s lifetime (which 
is also almost entirely reproduced in the 7th and final edition of 1870). The passage 
quoted above is at vol 1, 325 of the 5th edition.
30  Bell, Commentaries, 5th edn vol 1, 326. 
31  Ibid, 327.
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to bind the bargain. It is an equitable part of this rule, however, that if he do 
not mean to execute the order, he must instantly communicate his refusal; 
and should he neglect to do so, he will be held to have engaged himself to 
the performance of it. 
Bell was, however, a little less context-specific in his approach to the subject 
in the later but more elementary Principles of the Law of Scotland (essentially 
his student lecture notes, first published in 1826). There he simply stated 
that “a mutual contract, consensus in idem placitum, commences by offer 
and is completed by acceptance.”32 But the detailed discussion occurs 
almost at the end of his treatment of general contract law, which starts 
instead with Stair’s concept of the conventional obligation which springs 
from the engagement, or the deliberate and voluntary consent with purpose 
to engage, of a party. Offer and acceptance is thus still almost a subsidiary 
topic in this setting rather than the pre-eminent example of formation of 
contract.
In both Commentaries and Principles Bell’s earliest treatments relied 
almost entirely on Scottish case authorities. Only in later editions of the 
Principles did much the same text came to be adorned with references to 
Pothier’s treatise on sale, plus the work of Charles Toullier33 and Jean-
Marie Pardessus34 on French law as well as some English cases.35 But this 
does not preclude the possibility that French or English influences were at 
play in Bell’s thinking from his first writings on offer and acceptance. He 
is known to have been influenced generally by his reading in both systems, 
in particular by the writings of Pothier, who had been the first fully to 
articulate offer-acceptance doctrine on the Continent.36 On the other hand, 
32  G J Bell, Principles of the Law of Scotland, 1st edn (Edinburgh, 1829); 10th edn (Edinburgh, 
1899) § 72. Note also §§ 8-9. Unless otherwise indicated, references to Bell’s Principles in 
what follows are to the 4th edition of 1838, the last published in his lifetime (reprinted 
Edinburgh, 2010); the texts under discussion in this paper show virtually no change 
from 1st to 4th edition. 
33  Most probably Droit civil français suivant l’ordre du Code Napoléon, ouvrage dans lequel on 
a tâché de réunir la théorie à la pratique, published in 14 volumes between 1811 and 1831. 
The Advocates Library in Edinburgh holds the 5th edition, published in 15 volumes 
between 1830 and 1836. Toullier (1752-1835) was Professor of French Law at Rennes 
from 1778. 
34  The references appear to be to multi-volume works and may therefore be to either 
Traité du contrat et des lettres de change, 2 vols (1809) or Cours de droit commercial, 4 vols 
(1813-1817). Both works appear in the catalogue of the Advocates Library. Pardessus 
(1772-1853) was Professor of Commercial Law at Paris from 1810. 
35  Bell, Principles, 4th edn 1839, §§ 72-79. 
36  R J Pothier, Traité des obligations (first published 1761) [4]; idem, Traité du contrat de vente 
(first published 1762), 31-33; R Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations 
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Pothier also enjoyed considerable influence on the development of offer-
acceptance doctrine in nineteenth-century England.37 The probability is 
that various streams of influence merged in Bell.
A final point is that Bell’s formulations of the rules took shape in a 
world where the developing postal system provided the only means of 
communication between distant parties, especially merchants.38 In the 
third edition of the Commentaries he wrote:39
It would appear that the act of acceptance binds the bargain; it not being 
necessary that the acceptance shall have reached the person who makes the offer 
[emphasis supplied]. The offer is a consent provisionally to a bargain, if 
accepted within a certain time fixed by the offer, or by the law; until the 
expiration of which time, this consent to a sale is held to subsist on the part 
of the offeror, provided he continues alive and capable of consent; and from 
the moment of acceptance there is between the parties “in idem placitum 
concursus et conventio,” which constitutes the contract of sale. 
Thus it appears that Bell, like Pothier, saw offer and acceptance as two 
concurrent declarations of the parties’ wills with the acceptor not having 
to communicate acceptance to the offeror to make the contract binding. In 
his fifth edition Bell added to the above passage that “in the common case” 
it was not necessary for the acceptance to reach the offeror.40 Further, an 
offer which stated a limited time for acceptance fell when that time had 
expired; in mercantile cases, however, the time for which an offer was open 
was presumed to be return of post. But the offeror could protect himself by 
requiring that the acceptance reach him before it became effective.41 If an 
acceptance was delayed beyond either the express or implied time limit, as 
of the Civilian Tradition (1990) 567. For Pothier’s influence on Bell, see K G C Reid, “From 
Text-Book to Book of Authority: The Principles of George Joseph Bell” (2011) 15 EdinLR 
6, 24-26.
37  Zimmermann, Obligations (n 36) 571; D J Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of 
Obligations (1999), 222-23; J M Perillo, “Robert J Pothier’s Influence on the Common Law 
of Contract” (2004-05) 11 Texas Wesleyan LR 267; M Lobban, “Introduction [Contract],” 
in William Cornish and others, The Oxford History of the Laws of England volume XII 
(2010) 301-04. See also Gordley, Philosophical Origins (n 16) 139-40; Lubbe, “Formation 
of Contract” (n 5) 44. 
38  On the development of the postal system in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries in Scotland, see A R B Haldane, Three Centuries of Scottish Posts: An Historical 
Survey to 1836 (1971). For the wider British context see D Campbell-Smith, Masters of the 
Post: The Authorized History of the Royal Mail (2011), chapter 3. 
39  Bell, Commentaries, 3rd edn vol 2, 282. 
40  Bell, Commentaries, vol 1, 326-27 (7th edn, vol 1, 344). 
41  Bell, Commentaries, 3rd edn, vol 2, 282; 4th edn vol 1, 249; vol 1, 327 (7th edn vol 1, 344).
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for example the result of a wrong address of the offer, the mere expiry of that 
limit did not discharge the offer.42 For this last, Bell cited the English case 
of Adams v Lindsell, which did indeed focus on facts where the initial offer 
was misaddressed, so delaying the offeree’s response.43 On Bell’s doctrine 
of acceptance, however, there was no need for the special postal acceptance 
rule for which Adams was also coming to stand in English law (perhaps as 
a result of the introduction of the penny post across Great Britain in 1840).44 
Bell’s approach was rather that the offer committed the offeror for the 
period stated in it or implied by law, and that an act of acceptance within 
that period by the offeree produced the consensus needed for a contract 
regardless of whether the offeror actually knew anything about it. 
Now, in this Bell was departing somewhat from, or at least modifying, 
the doctrine as it had stood since the time of Stair, under which an offer 
could be withdrawn or revoked since it gave rise in itself to no obligation. 
The way in which Bell stated the matter was in terms of the time-limited 
offer lapsing rather than the offeror not being able to withdraw; but 
nonetheless there was at least the implication that the offeror was legally 
committed and that the offeree’s acceptance within the time limit would 
create a contract, no matter what the offeror did during the intervening 
period. For other offers, Bell’s view seems to have been that offers were 
“always and in terminis conditional” and thus not obligatory unless the 
condition of acceptance was fulfilled.45 Bell was however probably in line 
with Stair in his view that in principle the acceptance was binding from the 
moment it was made, regardless of whether or not it had reached, or been 
communicated to, the offeror.
Bell’s positions on these matters failed to last as the law of Scotland, 
however. They began to run into difficulties in his lifetime, in the 1830 
case of Countess of Dunmore v Alexander.46 In that celebrated decision Betty 
42  Bell, Principles, 2nd edn §82; 4th edn §79.
43  Adams v Lindsell (1818) 1 B & Ald 681. 
44  See S Gardner, “Trashing with Trollope: A Deconstruction of the Postal Rules in 
Contract” (1992) 12 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 170, 172-75, 178-84; M Lobban, “The 
Formation of Contracts: Offer and Acceptance” in W Cornish et al, The Oxford History of 
the Laws of England volume XII (2010) 329, 336-37; Campbell-Smith, Masters of the Post (n 
38) chapter 4. It may be worth noting that all Bell’s writing on the subject was published 
before 1840 and that he died in 1843. 
45  Bell, Principles, § 9. 
46  (1830) 9 S 190. This case will be the subject of much more detailed analysis in a 
forthcoming paper by Ross Macdonald, to whom I am indebted for much helpful 
discussion.
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Alexander wished to leave the employment of Lady Agnew. This does not 
seem to have been because of any difficulties in their relationship; Lady 
Agnew sought to help her servant by writing to the Countess of Dunmore 
to ask if she had any need for a servant such as Betty. The Countess then 
sent a letter to Lady Agnew asking her to engage Betty for her, and Lady 
Agnew (who was away from home) forwarded that letter to Betty on 5th 
November. On 6th November Lady Agnew received another letter from 
the Countess withdrawing the previous one. Lady Agnew forwarded 
this letter on by express, with the result that Betty received both letters 
simultaneously. In an action that Betty brought against the Countess it was 
ultimately held that there was no contract. Bell’s doctrine was invoked on 
Betty’s behalf to argue that the Countess had accepted the servant’s offer 
when transmitting her first letter to Lady Agnew and that the second letter 
could therefore have no effect. But this was firmly rejected by a 3-1 majority 
in the Inner House of the Court of Session.
The basis of the decision is not completely clear. The majority clearly 
focused on Lady Agnew’s position – as they saw it, that of a mandatory 
whose authority had been withdrawn before either of the Countess’ letters 
reached its intended final recipient – rather than offer-acceptance doctrine 
as between the Countess and the servant. That issue was addressed much 
more fully in the Outer House by the Lord Ordinary, Lord Newton. He 
was concerned by what he obviously thought was the inappropriate 
possibility under Bell’s doctrine, that a party could be bound by what had 
been formed only in his or her mind, or by an acceptance written out but 
not actually sent. Although Stair is not quoted, the Institutions had certainly 
been cited in argument; and Lord Newton does here seem to be following 
Stair’s distinction between desire, resolution and binding engagement. 
Further, Lord Newton did not think that an expression of consent to an 
unconnected third party could be enough to bind either. He noted that 
the offeror could withdraw before acceptance, and asked why the acceptor 
should not also be able to withdraw. His conclusion was that “Each party 
may resile so long as his offer or acceptance has not been communicated 
to the other party.”47 Thus, while the Countess might have commenced 
a process of accepting Betty’s offer to be employed, that would not be 
complete until communication to Betty; and that interval of time could 
47  (1830) 9 S 193.
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be used by the acceptor to send an overtaking withdrawal of the earlier 
communication. If the two communications arrived at the same time, as in 
this case, then there could be no question of consensus between the parties. 
Several points may be noted about this decision apart from Lord 
Newton’s apparent qualification, or even rejection, of Bell’s doctrine on the 
requirements for an acceptance, and his emphasis on the importance of 
communication in the creation of voluntary obligations. One is that there 
is no question of this being an inevitable decision in favour of a member 
of the titled classes over a humble servant. Lord Newton indeed referred 
to his wish to protect persons in Betty’s position against any disadvantage 
that might arise in bringing an action against a social superior; and she 
actually won her case in the local sheriff court, the proceedings in the 
Court of Session being the Countess’s appeal against that decision. A 
second point which is touched upon in the Court of Session opinions is the 
doubt whether Lady Agnew’s letter for Betty was an offer; if not, then the 
Countess’ affirmative reply was an offer which, being without an express 
time limit for acceptance and not concerning a mercantile transaction, she 
could of course withdraw as she did. And finally, although the English 
cases on the matter were referred to in the pleadings for Alexander,48 there 
is not a word in any of the judgments of any postal acceptance rule whereby 
the Countess could be bound from the time she sent her first letter to Lady 
Agnew as some sort of agent for Betty Alexander. That is most probably 
because there was no such rule in Scots law at the time, whatever the 
position might be in England. What might have been thought to be taking 
place in Scotland as a result of Dunmore v Alexander was a move towards 
a requirement of communication between parties before statements of 
obligatory content could even begin to be considered binding or legally 
effective. 
The postal acceptance rule began to emerge in Scots law in Dunlop v 
Higgins, a case which reached the House of Lords in 1848.49 But it cannot 
be seen as a simple Anglicisation of the developing law. The facts were 
straightforward. D and H were respectively a Glasgow iron master and 
a Liverpool iron merchant. In January 1845 they were in correspondence 
48  The cases cited were Payne v Cave (1789) 3 Term Rep 148 (100 ER 502) and Adams v 
Lindsell (1818) 1 B & Ald 681 (106 ER 250). 
49  Higgins v Dunlop (1847) 9 D 1407 (CS); Dunlop v Higgins (1848) 1 HLC 381; 6 Bell App 195 
(HL).
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about a possible sale of iron by D to H. On the 28th D offered to sell the 
iron by letter, this being received by H on the 30th. On that day H posted 
an acceptance which by a slip was dated the 31st. Bad weather meant that 
H’s acceptance was not received by D in Glasgow until the early afternoon 
of 1st February. D immediately sent a reply stating that since their offer 
had not been accepted “in due course” they could not supply the iron 
requested. H wrote on 2nd February to say that their previous letter had 
been accidentally misdated, but D continued not to supply any iron. The 
context was, of course, one in which the price of iron as a commodity was 
rising rapidly. H brought an action of damages for breach of contract and 
D defended on the basis that there never had been a contract.
The Court of Session finding that there was a contract is thoroughly 
analysed by Professor Lubbe.50 For present purposes the significant 
points are the use of Adams v Lindsell as a precedent by the court without 
commitment to the view that a postal acceptance as such concluded a 
contract. The critical point in fact was the actually timeous commitment 
of the offeree together with the view that that party could not be held 
responsible for the risks inherent in postal transmission. But Lord Fullerton 
went further, rejecting the view that posting an acceptance was enough to 
conclude the contract as the effect of Adams v Lindsell. He argued that the 
offeror had to know the acceptance had been made before any contract 
was concluded; posting the acceptance merely barred the possibility of the 
offeror withdrawing the offer. 
The House of Lords affirmed the Court of Session in holding that there 
was a contract. The only speech came from the Lord Chancellor. The first 
major issue was the misdating of the acceptance by H, and whether that date 
or the real date of posting should be treated as the time of reply. The real 
date having been the answer to that question, the next one was whether the 
senders, having written in due time, were responsible for the “casualities’ 
in the Post Office, i.e. the slow delivery of H’s acceptance resulting from the 
bad weather. It was held that H having done all he could do to get the letter 
to D on time, he could not be responsible for misadventure in the post. The 
usage of trade required only an answer on the day the offer was received. 
Adams v Lindsell was said to be a case of this kind. Persons in the position 
of D “must be considered, in law, as making, during every instant of the 
50  Lubbe, “Formation of Contract” (n 5) 34-35.
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time their letter was travelling, the same identical offer to the [addressees], 
and then the contract is completed by the acceptance of it by the latter.”51 
“Common sense,” the Lord Chancellor continued:52
tells us that transactions cannot go on without such a rule, and these cases 
seem to be the leading cases on the subject; and we have heard no authority 
cited which in the least degree affects the principle on which they proceed. 
The law of Scotland appears to be the same as the law of England, for Mr 
Bell’s Commentary lays down the same rule as existing in Scotland, and 
nothing has been stated to us in contradiction of his opinion.
The Lord Chancellor must be referring to Bell’s view that in general 
communication of an acceptance to the offeror was not necessary; what 
mattered in a contract was the concurring consent of parties, and that arose 
in this case on 30th January. The general principle was not unseated by 
use of the Post Office and consequent misadventure with delivery of the 
acceptance. Moreover, the usage of trade in respect of offers was same 
day reply, limiting the offeror’s exposure to risk and uncertainty. But, as a 
matter of law, the offeror was committed to the offer for that period of risk.
Even though Dunlop v Higgins was a decision of the House of Lords, and 
affirmed the decision of the Court of Session below, just eight years later 
the First Division in Thomson v James took what proved the decisive step 
away from its underlying principles, in effect re-modelling the rules of offer 
and acceptance.53 Although the Division expressed some doubts about the 
soundness of Dunmore v Alexander, in truth it picked up the lines of thought 
on requirements of communication apparent in Lord Newton’s opinion 
in that case. Yet, at the very moment it overturned Bell’s approach and 
established communication as a general requirement, the Court entrenched 
an exception for postal acceptances. While relying heavily on Stair’s theory 
of contract, the Court moved away from any notion that contract was about 
the concurrent wills of the parties in holding that contract was formed 
even although the parties were probably never in fact exactly of the same 
mind on the matter at any point. It is a remarkable case, and the internal 
contradictions in each of the majority opinions mean that by far the most 
persuasive of all the judgments, at least in terms of its coherence in law and 
reasoning, is that of the dissentient Lord Curriehill.54 
51  (1848) 1 HLC 401.
52  Ibid. The fifth (1826) edition of Bell’s Commentaries was still the current version in 1847; 
the sixth edition, edited by Bell’s son-in-law Patrick Shaw, did not appear until 1858. 
53  Thomson v James (1855) 18 D 1.
54  As noted elsewhere: “The case was clearly seen by contemporaries as a major issue 
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The facts are extremely simple. On 26 November 1853 James James of 
Samieston, near Jedburgh, wrote to Alexander Thomson in Edinburgh 
offering to buy from him the neighbouring estate of Renniston. On 1st 
December Thomson posted his written acceptance of the offer. Both these 
letters were in the form required for the sale of land. On the same day 
James posted a written revocation of his offer. The evidence showed that 
Thomson’s acceptance must have been posted in Edinburgh between 2.30 
and 4.30 pm on 1st December, while James’s revocation was posted at 
Jedburgh at 3 pm on the same day. That suggests the almost simultaneous 
composition of the two letters. It was also established that Thomson’s letter 
would have been despatched from the Edinburgh General Post Office 
to Kelso at 7.15 am on 2 December, and would have required further 
carriage to Jedburgh (although James in fact picked it up in Kelso where he 
happened to be when Thomson’s acceptance arrived).
Alexander Thomson's letter to James James of Samieston of 1 December 
1853 (National Records of Scotland: CS 230/K/5/21)
of principle, and both arguments and judicial opinions are exceptionally lengthy by 
the standards of the time. … Note also the brief report at 17 D 1146, narrating that 
the “extreme length and importance of this case’ have led to the full report being held 
over to the next volume, since judicial revision of the text has not been completed.” (H 
L MacQueen, “Scots and English Law: the Case of Contract” (2001) 54 Current Legal 
Problems 205-29, 222 and note 62). The issue of postal revocation had not yet been 
addressed in England and would not be until Byrne & Co v Van Tienhoven & Co (1880) 5 
CPD 344: see further Gardner, “Trashing with Trollope” (n 44) 175-76.
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James James of Samieston's letter to Alexander Thomson of 1 December 
1853 (National Records of Scotland: CS 230/K/5/21)
James’ revocation letter arrived at the General Post Office in Edinburgh at 
8.19 pm on 1st December and was sent out for delivery to Thomson at 7 am 
on the 2nd. It is mildly ironic that the two letters must have spent the night 
of 1st/2nd December together in the Edinburgh GPO.55 The probability 
is that Thomson received James’ revocation before James picked up 
Thomson’s acceptance. The First Division decided, however, that there was 
a concluded contract from the moment Thomson posted his acceptance on 
1st December. James’s revocation, on the other hand, took effect only upon 
communication to Thomson on 2nd December, and so came too late to 
have any impact upon an already concluded contract.
55  A further irony is that they now rest together again, possibly in perpetuity, in the case 
process held in the National Records of Scotland, call number CS230/K/5/21.
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As Professor Lubbe remarks, the judgments in Thomson v James are “rich 
in principle and implication.”56 This reflects the even richer arguments 
put forward by counsel on each side, which referred to a wide range 
of authorities: not only the native Scots writings and cases, but also the 
Digest, the medieval glossator Accursius, the later medieval commentators 
Bartolus and Baldus, and the more modern natural lawyers such as Grotius, 
Pufendorf, Heineccius and Wolff.57 Above all perhaps the Court was 
referred to the French lawyers whom Bell had favoured – Pothier, Toullier 
and Pardessus.58 But it is significant that these references mostly stemmed 
from the side of James, the party arguing that there was no contract. At their 
root was the definition of a contract, stemming ultimately from Ulpian, as 
duorum pluriumve in idem placitum et consensus.59 On Thomson’s side the 
argument was dismissive of reliance on the older writers in particular:60
The principles laid down by civilians as necessary to the formation of a 
binding contract had no reference to the modern modes of communication 
by post, which did not then exist. That mode of transacting business being 
now universal, its conditions must be held to be imported into all such 
contracts taking place between parties living at a distance from each other. 
The work of later jurists, in particular Pothier, Toullier and Heineccius, 
was not so irrelevant because they drew on court decisions rather than 
metaphysical speculation as to the concurrence of remote parties’ wills, 
and were thus a better basis for practical law such as the court had now to 
decide. This is not a metaphysical question, but a question of Scotch law, to 
be decided … according to principles of equity and justice, although civil 
law considerations might aid in the solution of it. … Thus the question must 
be disposed of on principles of equity and justice. The best way to solve it 
would be to sacrifice the words of the definition, and make a rule applicable 
to the transaction, and thus do justice to both parties.61
Help was also to be obtained from the more modern writings and decisions 
from other countries, notably America and, of course, England, in which 
Adams v Lindsell was “a case of general doctrine.”62 It is however notable 
56  Lubbe, “Formation of Contract” (n 5) 36.
57  There are also references to the work of the 17th-century German jurist Johann 
Brunnemann (1608-1672), who was a professor at Frankfurt. Many of his works are to 
be found in the Advocates Library. 
58  Also cited is the contemporary German Pandectist, Leopold August Warnköenig (1794-
1866), several of whose books are to be found in the Advocates Library.
59  Digest of Justinian, 2.14.1.2.
60  (1855) 18 D 4. 
61  Ibid D 4-5. 
62  (1855) 18 D
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that the general doctrine was not, according to counsel, one by which 
postal acceptances created a contract. Instead it was one that Bell would 
have recognised, and indeed the Commentaries and the Principles were cited 
in its support:63
Where a party makes an offer limiting the time within which it shall be 
accepted, or when the offer is of such a nature that the law allows a certain 
time for its acceptance, the offeror is not entitled to resile or withdraw his 
offer within the time which he allows, or which the law gives the party for 
accepting it.
The essential point was thus, not that the acceptance bound from posting, 
but that the offeror was not entitled to withdraw the offer, at least until 
after a reasonable time had elapsed. An offeror had to reserve any further 
right to revoke expressly in the offer itself.
Against that, counsel for James (led by Dean of Faculty John Inglis, later, 
as Lord President of the Court of Session from 1867-1891, the most famous 
Scottish judge of the nineteenth century),64 did not just rely on the principle 
of consensus and concurrence of wills between the parties. Their arguments 
recognised that the law had to provide for parties negotiating a contract by 
correspondence or at a distance from each other. Pardessus’ Droit Commercial 
was cited for the general proposition that what was crucial was that each 
party knew of the other’s offer or acceptance, as the case might be, before 
either could have its legal effects. This, it was argued, was the position of 
the Natural lawyers and the modern civilians.65 The parties could contract 
to put themselves out of the rule, or a contrary principle might grow up 
out of commercial law, or by implication from circumstances or the usages 
of trade; but the present case did not fall within any of these categories, 
and there was no contrary Scottish authority. Indeed the Dunmore case 
63  Ibid D 5. As previously noted, the sixth edition of Bell’s Commentaries did not appear 
until 1858, so the current edition in 1855 was still the fifth of 1826. 
64  See G F Millar, “Inglis, John, Lord Glencorse (1810-1891)” Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography (2004), available at http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/14403; also J 
Crabb Watt, John Inglis, Lord Justice-General of Scotland (Edinburgh, W Green & Sons: 
1893). Inglis’ junior was George Pattison. His opponent, George Graham Bell (no 
relation of George Joseph Bell), was never appointed to the Scottish bench. His junior 
was Charles Baillie (later Lord Jerviswood). See for all these men S P Walker, The Faculty 
of Advocates 1800-1986: A Biographical Directory of Members Admitted from 1 January 1800 
to 31 December 1986 (Edinburgh, 1987). The agents were Thomson & Elder WS (the 
pursuer’s own firm) and James Neilson SSC. 
65  See further on this Gordley, Philosophical Origins (n 16) 175-80; also J Gordley, Foundations 
of Private Law: Property, Tort, Contract, Unjust Enrichment (2006) 383-85.
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supported it.66 There was also the principle of delivery, without which a 
writing was not binding. But handing a letter to the post office was not 
delivery to the addressee; even if the letter could not be reclaimed from the 
post office, that was a matter of public regulation only, and in any event 
various misadventures could befall the communication while it was in the 
post that would prevent delivery to the actual addressee. The argument 
from equity was also challenged:67
But it is said that, according to modern writers, the definition of strict law is 
to be sacrificed, and the principles of equity are to be introduced. That may be 
true as to the common law of England, but not so as to the law of any other 
civilised country in Europe. Besides, what is meant in this sense by principle 
of equity but consuetude making law? It is not that equity is to be allowed to 
control the law, and there is no ground for equity to be brought in here.
The basic rule was that the offeror had the right to retract until the acceptance 
was known to him. The fundamental differences between the two sides 
were thus about whether or not there was a right to revoke an offer once 
made, and about whether or not an acceptance had to be communicated to 
the offeror to conclude a contract between the parties. On the revocation 
point, Lord President M’Neill was clear that “a simple, unconditional 
offer may be recalled at any time before acceptance, and that it may be so 
recalled by a letter transmitted by post,” and cited Stair as authority on 
the point.68 On the communication point the Lord President said that “an 
offer is nothing until it is communicated to the party to whom it is made” 
and that “the recall or withdrawal of an offer that has been communicated 
can have no effect until the recall or withdrawal has been communicated, 
or may be assumed to have been communicated, to the party holding the 
offer.”69 But this principle of communication did not apply to an acceptance, 
which was different in nature from a revocation:70 
The one consists in effectually undoing something that the party himself 
already done, and which binds him, unless it is effectually undone; the other 
consists in merely acceding to a proposal made. 
66  Perhaps surprisingly the printed argument for James does not refer to Stair on the 
offerer’s power to withdraw the offer or on the general need for consent to be manifested 
by external signs. 
67  (1855) 18 D 8. 
68  Ibid D 10, 12.
69  Ibid D 10 (see also ibid, 11). 
70  Ibid D 11 (see also ibid, 13). 
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What the acceptor had to do varied according to the circumstances. Where, 
as in this case, writing was required, it was not enough to create the writing 
and then keep it; but personal delivery was also not necessary:71 
Where an offer is made by letter from a distance through the medium of 
the post, the offeror selecting that medium of transmission authorises and 
invites the offeree to communicate his acceptance through the same medium. 
… By putting the letter of acceptance into the post-office, the offeree did just 
what he was invited to do, and all that it was incumbent on him or possible 
for him to do by way of acceptance, by the mode of communication which 
he was authorised, if not invited by the offeror to adopt.
Hence, the Lord President reasoned, “the act of acceptance was completed 
by the putting of the letter into the post-office; and … a letter of recall, 
which did not arrive till after that act, cannot be held to have interrupted 
the completion of the contract.”72 He found this supported by the Scottish 
authorities of Bell’s Commentaries and Higgins v Dunlop. His position was 
also reinforced by his view that the requirement of delivery in relation to 
the formal writing was satisfied by putting the acceptance in the hands 
of the post office.73 At no point did he cite Adams v Lindsell or any other 
English or other authority. 
The second member of the majority in Thomson, Lord Ivory, agreed in 
substance with the Lord President’s view of the law and its application; but 
the third member, Lord Deas, while reaching the same result, did so more 
on the basis which had been actually argued by the pursuers, viz that the 
offer was binding if the act of acceptance was made within a reasonable 
time. An express stipulation to the contrary in the offer was needed to 
make the result otherwise. Accordingly:74
It is enough that the offeror has said, or is held to have said, that if the offer 
be accepted debito tempore, he shall be bound. This being the nature of his 
offer, whether expressly or by implication, he cannot resile from it if the 
party to whom it is addressed, having the offer, and nothing but the offer, 
before him, has, by duly posting his acceptance bona fide, done all in his 
power to comply with the only condition in the offer to make it absolutely 
binding on the offeror.
71  (1855) 18 D 11. 
72  Ibid. 
73  Ibid D 12-13. 
74 Ibid D 24. 
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Lord Deas also observed that in mercantile cases “a reasonable time would, 
by the usage of trade, have meant in course of post.”75 “It follows,” he added,76 
that, if posting the answer were not acceptance here, posting the answer, 
even in due course of post, never could be acceptance in any mercantile 
transaction. This would be a great impediment to mercantile dealings, 
where the party who receives an offer of goods, or for goods, and duly posts 
his acceptance, naturally goes into the market and deals with other persons 
upon the footing that this particular bargain has been concluded. 
The Deas view of the case was thus essentially the one that had been 
articulated first by Bell, justified by the perception that the commercial 
marketplace demanded both speed and certainty, and resting more on the 
irrevocability of offers than on the view that postal acceptances created a 
contract. He noted (but without committing to) Lord Fullerton’s view in 
Dunlop v Higgins that the posting of the acceptance only barred the offer’s 
revocation, while also reserving his opinion on the soundness of Dunmore v 
Alexander and its apparent ruling that a postal acceptance could be revoked 
by a further communication from the offeree catching up with or even 
over-taking the first letter. 
Lord Curriehill’s powerful dissent started from Stair’s statement that 
offers, being non-obligatory, could be withdrawn before acceptance. It was 
not necessary for the offer to state as much. On this point he was therefore 
in agreement with the Lord President and Lord Ivory. The question for 
him was, which of two powers was exercised first: the offeror’s power to 
revoke, or the offeree’s power to accept? In his view, the answer depended 
on which of the communications was first to be delivered to its addressee 
or a person acting for that addressee, and the evidence showed that it was 
the revocation. He could see no reason in either principle or authority for 
distinguishing between the communications as to when they took effect. 
Stair’s distinction between desire, resolution and engagement was again 
referred to in support of the argument that a communication had to be 
brought to the notice of the party whom it was intended to affect. That 
was reinforced by the requirement of delivery in relation to obligatory 
documents. Posting a letter was not to be treated as such delivery. The post-
office was not an agent or mandatory of either party, nor was it a common 
75  (1855) 18 D 24. 
76  Ibid. 
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carrier; the inability of a sender to recover a letter from the post-office was 
a matter of public regulation which equally prevented the addressee from 
demanding it until it reached its address. The writer of a letter might have 
lost control of the document but he had “no more lost his control over the 
act of his will which he therein expresses, than if that document were still 
in the hands of his own servant or messenger."77 This was the explanation 
of Dunmore v Alexander, the ground of the judgement being that stated by 
Lord Newton in the Outer House.78 Neither Dunlop v Higgins nor Adams v 
Lindsell had involved revocations, while both had proceeded upon what 
was held to be a usage of trade in such commercial cases. Neither could 
be authority in a case about the sale of land in Scotland which was not 
alleged to be subject to any such usage of trade. Bell’s statement that “in the 
common case it is not necessary that the acceptance shall have reached the 
person who makes the offer” was supported by no authority, had not been 
fully accepted in Higgins, and was only correct in certain cases, such as that 
of the unconditional promise or that of the order in trade.
What then could be said of the law of offer and acceptance after Thomson 
v James? First, it was now plainly a doctrine of the general law of contract. 
Even though all the judges emphasised the importance of the fact that this 
was a case about the sale of land, with its concomitant of formal writing 
requirements, there was little doubt of its bearing on other situations, above 
all commercial transactions. Second, three of the four judges were clear that 
offers could be freely revoked by the offeror prior to acceptance unless there 
was an express statement or implication to the contrary. Next, the same three 
were also clear that such revocation required communication to the offeree 
to be effective. The judges all further agreed that an offer also required 
communication before it could be accepted. But only Lord Curriehill was of 
the view that acceptance too needed communication, indeed, in the case of 
the written acceptance, delivery, to the offeror or his representative to take 
legal effect and conclude a contract. The majority view seems to have been 
that, not just postal acceptances, but acceptances in general did not need 
communication to have this effect. While more than a mental decision to 
accept, or the preparation of a written acceptance without sending it, was 
77  (1855) 18 D 21.
78  Lord Curriehill also commented: “[M]y confidence in the general principle, stated by 
Lord Newton as the ground of the judgment in the case of Lady Dunmore, is much 
strengthened by the circumstance that that eminent judge was for a considerable time 
professor of civil law in the University of Edinburgh.” ((1855) 18 D 23). As Alexander 
Irving, Lord Newton held the Edinburgh Civil Law Chair from 1800-1827. 
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required, use of the postal service was an example of what was needed, but 
perhaps not the only one. This perhaps allowed Bell’s statement of the law 
to remain unaltered in the seventh and final edition of the Commentaries 
(published in 1870), and for the “postal rule” to be applied to acceptance 
by telegram.79 While, finally, the majority in Thomson v James remained 
committed to the theory that contract was essentially about a concourse of 
wills, they also acknowledged that the actual decision on the facts of the 
case meant that they were finding a contract to exist where most probably 
there never had been such a concourse. The decision thus qualified, while 
not altogether removing, a subjectivist starting point for contract formation.
Bill McBryde rightly describes Thomson v James as “by a long way, our 
most important case on offer and acceptance.”80 It is the Scottish resolution 
of a debate which was actually taking place across Europe at the time. Over 
the remainder of the nineteenth century, offer and acceptance appeared as 
a rule of contract formation in general and the law increasingly adopted 
the objective approach for which the case stood.81 The rule on acceptances 
came to be, as stated by Gloag, that “an offer requires acceptance, 
communicated in some way to the offeror.”82 Cases that did not fit this 
model, such as orders in trade and postal acceptances, were presented as 
exceptions to the general proposition.83 A special postal acceptance rule 
79  So held in the English case of Bruner v Moore [1904] 1 Ch 220, seemingly accepted by 
Gloag, Contract, 1st edn (1914) 40 note 3; 2nd edn (1929), 33 note 7. Probably this was 
to be explained by the Post Office assuming monopoly control of the telegram from 
1869: see T Standage, The Victorian Internet: The Remarkable Story of the Telegraph and the 
Nineteenth Century’s Online Pioneers (1998) 161-62; Campbell-Smith, Masters of the Post 
(n 38) 175-83. 
80  W W McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland, 3rd edn (2007) para 6.12. Cusine and 
Rennie, Missives paras 3.14, 3.15, 3.17, cite the case without making any particular 
comment on its significance.
81  The doctrine of offer and acceptance emerges fully fledged as part of the general law of 
contract in the 1860 (13th) edition of Erskine’s Principles (edited by John Guthrie Smith), 
having appeared only in relation to contracts by word and writ in previous editions. 
Note also Andrew Mitchell, Advocate, “Offer and Acceptance” Green’s Encyclopaedia of 
the Laws of Scotland (1898), vol 9, 89-91.
82  W Gloag, The Law of Contract, 1st edn (1914), 29; W Gloag, The Law of Contract, 2nd edn 
(1929) 26.
83  Gloag, Contract, 1st edn (1914), 29; Gloag, Contract, 2nd edn (1929) 26-35. Gardner, 
“Trashing with Trollope” (n 44) 189-92, suggests that the exceptionality of the postal 
rule was increasingly underlined after the development of the telephone as a means of 
communication between distant parties from the late 1870s on. This was despite the Post 
Office also gaining a monopoly on telephone services in 1880 via the Telegraph Act 1869: 
see Attorney-General v Edison Telephone Co of London (1880) 6 QBD 244. Campbell-Smith, 
Masters of the Post, 192-96, narrates the subsequent liberalisation of the telephony market 
between 1884 and 1911, when the industry was re-nationalised under the Post Office. 
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thus became established, so that an acceptance posted within a time limit 
set by an offer but arriving with the offeror after the limit’s expiry could 
nonetheless conclude a contract between the parties.84 The explanation 
of the result was the application of the postal acceptance rule, not the 
concurrence of the parties’ subjective wills within the offer’s time limit. But 
doubt remained, and remains, about the English decision of Household Fire 
Insurance Co v Grant85 in which it was held that even if a posted acceptance 
never reaches the intended party a contract will be concluded despite the 
offeror’s ignorance of its obligations. There are several Scottish judicial dicta 
against such a rule from Thomson v James down to the present, pointing to 
a perception that the postal rule was an exception to the general rule, not 
itself reflecting the norm.86
Communication too became an objective question, with parties to be 
taken as having read that which in the ordinary course of business they 
ought to have read and being bound by the result. Thus in Burnley v Alford 
in 1919 it was held that there was no contract when A had sent an offer 
to B at the latter’s home address, B had gone on holiday without leaving 
a forwarding address, A then sent a revocation of offer to B at his home 
address, and B, on returning from holiday, had not opened the revocation 
letter before posting an acceptance of offer to A.87 Had a set of appropriate 
facts arisen, the Scottish courts would probably have reached the same 
result in the case of cross-offers as the English courts in Tinn v Hoffmann,88 
namely, no contract, because the subjective meeting of minds could not 
prevail over the objective fact that neither party could have known of the 
other’s intention at the time of making their own communication, and so 
they could not be treated as responses to each other. 
In conclusion, however, dominant as the doctrine of offer and acceptance 
has become, it remains true that, as Professor McBryde has observed, “[o]
84  Jacobsen, Sons & Co v Underwood & Son Ltd (1894) 21 R 654. 
85  (1878-79) LR 4 Ex D 216 (CA). 
86  See McBryde, Contract (n 80) para 6.115, for the doubting authorities, and add Sloans 
Dairies v Glasgow Corp 1977 SC 223 (IH) per Lord Dunpark at 239. 
87  Burnley v Alford 1919 2 SLT 123. See also Carmarthen Developments Ltd v Pennington 
[2008] CSOH 139. 
88  Tinn v Hoffmann & Co (1873) 29 LT 271. The case is cited without adverse comment in 
most Scottish contract texts: David M Walker, The Law of Contracts in Scotland, 3rd edn 
(1995) para 7.43; McBryde, Contract para 6.33; H L MacQueen & J Thomson, Contract Law 
in Scotland, 3rd edn (2012) para 2.18; The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, 
vol 15, para 634. It is not referred to, however, in Gloag on Contract (n 82). 
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ffer and acceptance … should not be regarded as the necessary form of every 
contract.”89 The master concept remains that of an “agreement between 
two or more parties … intended to establish, regulate, alter or extinguish 
a legal relationship.”90 That master concept allows the reintroduction of 
counterpart execution in Scots law by statute in 2015 without any sense 
of creeping Anglicisation.91 The story reminds us that the law goes on 
developing, however slowly and belatedly, in response to the changing 
world it exists to serve; but to do that it needs, not only legislators and 
litigants like Messrs Thomson and James, but also lawyer-jurists like Stair, 
Bell and Robert Rennie. 
89  McBryde, Contract para 6.05. 
90  Ibid, para 1.03. 
91  See the Legal Writings (Counterparts and Delivery) (Scotland) Bill 2014, implementing 
Report on Formation of Contract: Execution in Counterpart (Scot Law Com No 231, 
2013). 

5. Assignations of All Sums 
Securities
Dr Ross G Anderson
No appointment was ever more successful and none illustrates more clearly 
the desirability of having as a professor one who is conversant with the 
practice of the branch of the law he is called on to teach. To set a man to teach 
conveyancing who is not engaged in large practice, and who only knows the 
subject from books or historically, is like making a man professor of surgery 
who has only read about it and who never performed an operation.1
A.  The Chair of Conveyancing
(1) Introduction 
Robert Rennie was appointed the Professor of Conveyancing in 1993. 
During a tenure marked by indefatigable industry, Robert’s chair became, 
in the eyes of the profession, the face of the Glasgow Law School. With 
Robert’s retirement, there comes the opportunity to reflect not just on 
Robert’s contributions, but also on the place of the Chair he has held with 
such distinction in the Scottish legal profession, in legal education and in 
legal scholarship. So before addressing the technical topic I have chosen for 
my contribution, it is first to the history and context of the Chair that I turn.
1  D Murray, Memories of the Old College of Glasgow (1927) 236, describing the first holder 
of the Chair of Conveyancing, Professor Anderson Kirkwood. 
© Ross G Anderson, CC BY 4.0 http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0056.05
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(2) The first Conveyancing Chairs
2014 saw the Tercentenary of the appointment of the first holder of the 
Regius Chair in Civil Law in the University of Glasgow, William Forbes in 
1714. But it was in the nineteenth century that the Universities of Glasgow 
and Edinburgh founded chairs of Conveyancing. If the word “conveyancing” 
is considered to be a word for which Scots lawyers have peculiar affinity, it 
may be because University Chairs in Conveyancing is a peculiarly Scottish 
phenomenon (although the basic idea which underlies these Chairs has a 
modern appeal in the United States, where all self-respecting law schools 
must have a Professor of “clinical legal education”). The creation of the 
Chair of Conveyancing in the University of Edinburgh marked a significant 
break with the effective monopoly exercised by the Faculty of Advocates 
on the chairs in law in that University, since the appointment to the Chair 
of Conveyancing would come from the ranks of the Society of Writers 
to Her Majesty’s Signet. The notion of the “lower branch” of the legal 
profession – solicitors – being remotely qualified to found a University 
Chair was a source of considerable invective from members of the Faculty 
of Advocates, the politically conservative members of which found the 
appointment of the leading Whig, and future editor of the Edinburgh 
Review, Macvey Napier, as the first holder, almost too much to bear.2 One of 
the most prolific contributors to the contemporary conservative periodical, 
Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, himself an advocate, pointedly observed 
how, in England, conveyancing was in the hands of the bar:3 the English, 
he ventured, would “laugh” even to hear even of a lectureship, never mind 
a Professorship, of conveyancing in a University.4 The “abstruse science” of 
2  “Francisculus Funk,” “The Pluckless School of Politics, No 1” (1823) 14 Blackwood’s 
Edinburgh Magazine 139-44. Funk was the pseudonym of John Cay, Advocate: see A L 
Strout, A Bibliography of Articles in Blackwood’s Magazine: volumes I through XVIII, 1817-
1825 (1959) 110. Cay was sheriff at Linlithgow from 1825 to 1865. Cay was one of the 
oldest friends of John Gibson Lockhart (for whom see n 4): D Douglas (ed), The Journal of 
Sir Walter Scott, from the original manuscript at Abbotsford (1890) (reprinted 2013) I, 22, n 1. 
For the background to the Edinburgh Conveyancing chair in the WS Society’s lectures, 
first given by Robert Bell, brother of George Joseph, see my “Introduction” to G Watson 
(ed), Bell’s Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland, 7th edn (1890) (reprinted 2012) 
xviii-xxxi.
3  As it remains to this day: see, for instance, the references to “conveyancing counsel” in 
the English Civil Procedure Rules, r 40.18 and 40.19 and Practice Direction 40D.
4  “C.N.,” “Tail-Piece” (1823) 14 Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine 144. “C. N.” = Christopher 
North, the pseudonym of a number of contributors, often John Wilson, Advocate and 
Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, but in this case Strout (n 
200) attributes this tail-piece to John Gibson Lockhart, Advocate, but best known as a 
satirist and as the biographer of his father-in-law, Sir Walter Scott. 
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conveyancing,5 in so far as it related to deeds, according to this disaffected 
and “nearly fee-less advocate” was insufficiently learned to justify the 
erection of a University Chair; and esto there was a need for such a chair 
– as advocates say – only a member of the Faculty of Advocates would be 
sufficiently respectable to hold it.6
The background to the Glasgow Conveyancing chair is no less without 
human interest. As in Edinburgh, the local professional association 
– of which a good proportion of Glasgow’s law graduates have become 
members – the Faculty of Procurators in Glasgow,7 finding the instruction 
of the University Professors out of touch with the needs of aspiring 
writers,8 took matters into its own hands. The Faculty of Procurators 
appointed, in 1816, one of its own, James Galloway, to give a series of 
lectures on Conveyancing. Galloway’s lively lectures, though now largely 
forgotten,9 display considerable learning and a palpable enthusiasm for the 
subject.10 Eventually, the Faculty of Procurators agreed to endow a chair 
in the University, on the Edinburgh model, in 1861.11 The first holder was 
Anderson Kirkwood, of whom David Murray – someone well placed to 
judge12 – wrote the words which introduce this contribution. The central 
importance to the University of a Professor with the invaluable experience 
of the law in action, as well as law in the books, is evident in the roles 
of the first two holders of the Chair, whose efforts were instrumental in 
organising the practicalities – funding, contractual negotiations and dealing 
5  Cf G L Gretton, “Sharp Cases make Good Law” 1994 SLT (News) 313-14: “Feudal law is 
hardly a popular subject. Indeed, together with ‘mediaeval’ and ‘Dickensian’ it is an all 
purpose term used for condemning the grubby and unwanted survivals of an obscure 
and barbarous past. Of course, most feudal law has long since been abolished. But some 
parts remain, perhaps unloved, and perhaps unloveable, but law.” 
6  “Pluckless School of Politics” (n 2) 139 ff.
7  See D Murray, “The Faculty of Procurators in Glasgow” (1897) 13 Scottish Law Review 
36. The Faculty received its royal patronage from His Majesty in 1950. For Murray, see 
n 12 below.
8  Compare the French ‘écrivain’ and David Murray, “The Term ‘Writer’ as used in 
Scotland,” Glasgow Herald, 15 March 1884.
9  D M Walker, A History of the School of Law: The University of Glasgow (1990) 41.
10  J Galloway, Lectures in Conveyancing (1838).
11  Ordinance of the Scottish Universities Commission, 15 June 1861, signed by John Inglis 
(then Lord Advocate): Edinburgh Gazette June 18, 1861, 792-93.
12  A remarkable lawyer, scholar (not just in law) and bibliophile, Murray was himself 
a conveyancer: see e.g. J Rankine, J L Mounsey and D Murray (eds) The Scots Style 
Book (1902-1905) 7 vols. A founding partner of Maclay Murray & Spens LLP, he was 
arguably the foremost Scottish legal scholar of the generations his long life spanned. He 
donated 24,000 items of this 40,000 volume library to the University of Glasgow. To this 
day, that collection, too little recognised, remains one of Glasgow’s greatest resources. 
For Murray, see M S Moss, “Murray, David” Oxford DNB (2004-).
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with the small matter of acquiring the site – for Sir George Gilbert Scott’s 
unmistakable building at Gilmorehill.13
(3) The 1916 election to the Conveyancing Chair
The Emeritus Professor of Comparative Law at Oxford, Bernard Rudden, 
himself a qualified solicitor, once pointed out that academics are, from the 
nature of their position, risk averse, sometimes unsuited, and often little 
grounded, in the realities of commercial life.14 And it is difficult to imagine 
any Professor, insulated from the pressures of daily practice, and whose 
knowledge of the law was derived only from the books, being able to offer 
to students Galloway’s lively, if portentous, admonition that:15
One single blunder in a deed, by which it may be rendered invalid and 
ineffectual – whether this may have arisen from ignorance, or carelessness 
– might have the effect to subject the unfortunate conveyancer by whom the 
deed had been framed, in damages, to such a ruinous extent, as might blast 
all his future prospects, and involve him in penury and misery during the 
remainder of his life… 
But practical experience and scholarly achievement are not mutually 
exclusive: a point perhaps never better demonstrated in the 1916 election to 
the Chair of Conveyancing. The election would mark the first appointment 
of a professional academic in the modern sense to a law chair at a Scottish 
university. David Murray, whose words open the present contribution, 
was a colossus not just in the west of Scotland but of the Scottish legal 
profession as a whole. A former Dean of the Faculty of Procurators, he 
was a member of the Council of the Faculty of Procurators that made 
the appointment to the 1916 Chair. All of the applicants wrote to Murray 
personally and, characteristically, Murray has meticulously preserved each 
application for posterity.16 The other members of Council who would have 
been eligible to vote were William Gillies (Dean), David Murray (Ex-Dean), 
James Mackenzie (Ex-Dean), Peter Lindsay Miller, John Mair, William 
13  Murray (n 1).
14  B Rudden, “Selecting Minds: An Afterword” (1993) 41 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 481 at 486.
15  J Galloway, Lectures on Conveyancing (1838) 9. The student or academic reader who 
considers the warning overblown should reflect on Lonedale Ltd v Scottish Motor Auctions 
(Holdings) Ltd [2011] CSOH 4.
16  Applications for Chair of Conveyancing (1916) [GUL Sp Coll Mu21-a.3].
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George Black, Thomas Alexander Fyfe, Andrew Mackay, James Graham, 
Daniel Munro Alexander, and Allan Maclean.17 
(4) The candidates
In the election there were 13 candidates, all drawn from the local profession. 
For present purposes, historical interest immediately focuses on three 
of those candidates: Hugh Reid Buchanan, John Richard Cunliffe, and 
William Sharp McKechnie.
John Richard Cunliffe, a local writer with long experience, submitted 
a modest letter of application focussing on his practical experience and 
eschewing testimonials. Almost as an afterthought, Cunliffe mentions in 
passing that, since he was applying for a University Chair, it might be 
“not irrelevant to mention that I have done a good deal of literary work,” 
referring to his editorial work on a number of English classics and his New 
Shakespearean Dictionary (1910). Having been spared the responsibilities of 
the Conveyancing Chair, Cunliffe would go on to produce Blackie’s Compact 
Etymological Dictionary (1922) and the standard student text, A Lexicon of the 
Homeric Dialect (1924). To put the merit of that work in modern context, it 
was republished in the United States by the University of Oklahoma, in 
1963, with paperback editions following in 1977 and, again, as recently as 
2012.18 
Hugh Reid Buchanan,19 a prize-winning MA philosophy graduate, had 
proceeded to Germany, to study at Jena and Berlin, where he had spent 
two years studying philosophy and jurisprudence, before returning to take 
an LLB with distinction. He had been the University’s lecturer in Roman 
law before becoming the solicitor to the Caledonian Railway Company 
and, at the time of his application, a partner with M’Grigor Donald & Co. 
His time at the Railway Company had made him valuable contacts with 
establishment figures: Buchanan’s testimonials for the chair contained 
references from the Dean of the Faculty of Advocates (and future Lord 
President) James Avon Clyde, KC MP; a future Dean of the Faculty of 
Advocates and Court of Session judge, J Condie S Sandeman KC; and two 
17  Minute Book of the Royal Faculty of Procurators.
18  In addition, Cunliffe compiled Blackie’s Compact English Dictionary of Current English 
(1969) and the Secondary School English Dictionary (1969).
19  See 1912 SLT (News) 85 for a portrait. Walker, School of Law (n 9) 85 described Buchanan 
as a “vigorous and scholarly man.“ 
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future Lords of Appeal in Ordinary: H P Macmillan KC (Lord Macmillan) 
and William Watson KC MP (Lord Thankerton).
William S McKechnie20 was one of Glasgow’s limited number of 
DPhil graduates,21 who had received his doctorate for his published 
work, The State and the Individual.22 With that solid scholarly background, 
McKechnie, after working for a time as a writer,23 took his first academic 
post at Glasgow University as the Lecturer on Constitutional Law and 
History. He was, during his time as a lecturer, extraordinarily productive: 
producing what, a century on, is still considered to be a fundamental 
study of the sources for Magna Carta;24 a critique of Parliament’s second 
chamber in Reform of the House of Lords25 (which heavily influenced the 
Parliament Act 1911); and a monograph setting out the constitutional 
consequences of that far-reaching measure, The New Democracy and the 
New Constitution, in 1912. 
As a professional academic, McKechnie had applied for a University 
Chair before. In 1909, McKechnie had applied for the Chair of Constitutional 
Law and Constitutional History in the University of Edinburgh. McKechnie 
submitted what were probably (at least at that time)26 the most impressive 
20  See J S Medley (revd J C Holt) “McKechnie, William Sharp (1863-1930), historian” 
Oxford DNB (2004-); 1911 SLT (News) 9 for a portrait; and 1916 SLT (News) 89.
21  Glasgow, like Edinburgh, St Andrews and Aberdeen, awarded the DPhil, as the arts 
and humanities research degree, until at least 1917 with the regulations being finally 
amended in 1919 to introduce the PhD as the higher research degree: Regulations for the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (University Court Ordinance No LXXIV (Glasgow No 21)), 
as approved by Order in Council, dated 18th August 1919. The Ordinance is reproduced 
in A Clapperton (ed) University Court Ordinances 1915-1924 (1925) 66-67. Ironically 
it was in 1917, just as the Scottish universities introduced the PhD as its standard 
“lower” doctorate, that the DPhil became the standard Oxford doctorate: R Simpson, 
The Development of the PhD Degree in Britain, 1917-1959 and since: An Evolutionary and 
Statistical History in Higher Education (2009).
22  W S McKechnie, The State and the Individual: an introduction to political science, with special 
reference to socialistic and individualistic theories (Glasgow, 1896). W Innes Addison, A 
Roll of the Graduates of the University of Glasgow, 31st December 1727 to 31st December 1897 
(1898) 674 and 681 records that 2 DPhils were awarded in 1896.
23  McKechnie had been admitted as a member of the Faculty of Procurators in 1890 after 
serving his apprenticeship with Roberton, Low, Roberton and Cross. He appears to 
have practised full-time until 1894.
24  W S McKechnie, Magna Carta: A Commentary on the Great Charter of King John, with an 
Historical Introduction (1905) (2nd edn 1914) (reprinted 1958); R H Helmholz, “Magna 
Carta and the Ius Commune” (1999) 66 University of Chicago Law Review 297 at 303. The 
full text of McKechnie’s study has now been made available online by the Liberty Fund 
as one of the classic text’s on liberty, available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/338
25  W S McKechnie, The Reform of the House of Lords (1909).
26  Hector MacQueen has suggested that “the most distinguished field of candidates ever 
for a law chair in a British university” were received by the University of Edinburgh 
 Assignations of All Sums Securities 79
set of testimonials ever compiled for a Professorial appointment to a Scottish 
law chair:27 with a printed booklet containing glowing testimonials from 
scholars in Scotland, England, France, Germany, Austria and the United 
States, together with reviews from the Times Literary Supplement, The Daily 
Telegraph, The Manchester Guardian, some US newspapers, reviews in French 
and German journals, as well as the Scottish newspapers. But to no avail: 
the election to the Edinburgh constitutional Chair too was in the gift of the 
Faculty of Advocates and the Faculty, true to form, appointed one of their 
own, Hepburn Miller.28 
An academic background, however, was no guarantee of election to the 
Glasgow Conveyancing Chair in 1916. For although his talents as a legal 
scholar were beyond question, some members of the Council wondered 
how McKechnie would manage to discharge the duties of the chair – 
which, after all, required the teaching not of constitutional theory, but the 
intricacies of feudal conveyancing; and, moreover, placed a heavy demand 
on the Professor for opinions and appointment in many title deeds as arbiter 
(“a kind of official referee,” the English authors of his Dictionary of National 
Biography entry record). McKechnie did have conveyancing experience: he 
had practised full-time for four years after he qualified as a partner in the 
firm of McKechnie and Gray. And although, for the best part of twenty-five 
years, he had worked in the University, he had continued to practise and 
the firm remained in existence until 1915. 
David Murray, for his part, though well qualified to judge 
McKechnie’s scholarship, was of the view that McKechnie was not the 
man for the Chair, instead considering Buchanan “the best of all the 
candidates, followed by Cunliffe.” The implication is that Murray placed 
in 1938 for the Edinburgh Chair of Civil Law, which attracted Fritz Schulz, Fritz 
Pringsheim Adolf Berger, David Daube and F H Lawson: see H L MacQueen, “Two 
Toms and an Ideology for Scots Law” in E C Reid and D L Carey Miller (eds), A Mixed 
Legal System in Transition: T B Smith and the Progress of Scots Law (2005) 44 at 56. The 
Chair was in the gift of the Faculty of Advocates who nonetheless managed to elect one 
of their own, the “atrabilious” Matthew G Fisher KC (who had studied in Göttingen), 
for whom, see Sir Nicholas Fairbairn QC, A Life is too Short, autobiography, vol I (1987) 61 
and A F Rodger, “David Daube 1909-1999” (2001) 118 ZSS (RA) xxi-xxii. Fisher’s entire 
scholarly output appears to have been a single article mid-way through his two-decade 
tenure.
27  Application and testimonials of William Sharp McKechnie, M.A., LL.B., D.Phil., Lecturer on 
Constitutional Law and History in the University of Glasgow, for the Chair of Constitutional 
Law and Constitutional History in the University of Edinburgh [GUL Sp Coll MacLehose 
688]. 
28  His father was a Lord of Session, Lord Craighill.
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McKechnie third. But Murray’s was not the majority view. For the end 
result, recorded by Murray, placed Buchanan only fourth; McKillop, 
third; and Cunliffe, second. “Leaving Dr McKechnie,” Murray tersely 
noted, “as elected.”29 Murray’s dissatisfaction may be reflected in his 
recording of contemporary professional gossip. “After McKechnie had 
been elected, it was remarked,” Murray pointedly noted on the front of 
Alexander Donaldson’s application (Donaldson came seventh), “that, as 
he [McKechnie] knew nothing about Conveyancing he should take a six 
month course with Mr Donaldson, so as to qualify himself.”30 
(5) Wider significance of McKechnie’s appointment
It is a modern phenomenon that University Law Schools are often 
conspicuous for the absence of academic staff with experience of legal 
practice. It has long been suggested that there is much to be gained for 
legal scholars from obtaining at least the minimum experience of legal 
practice. But McKechnie’s appointment is a rare example of a professional 
academic being elected by a professional body for a coveted post. He was, 
indeed, the first professionally trained academic – published doctorate 
and all – to be appointed to a chair of law in a Scottish university. He 
voluntarily created honours courses for advanced study. With his 
scholarly background, and his own experience of professional practice, 
it is near certain that McKechnie would have been intimately familiar 
with the history and tradition of the Chairs of Conveyancing in Glasgow 
and Edinburgh. There was thus an obvious subject for his inaugural 
lecture. So, in the autumn of 1916, McKechnie chose to address the matter 
of professional pride that had hung over the lecturers and professors of 
Conveyancing – members, to a man, of the lower branch of the profession 
– for over a century: “Conveyancing as a University Study.”31 It may be, in 
no small part, due to the stature of men like McKechnie in the twentieth 
century that the Chairs of Conveynacing have maintained, until now, such 
a central role in the Scottish Universities. But McKechnie’s appointment 
was of wider significance still: McKechnie’s career set the mould for the 
full-time professional legal academic in Scotland.32
29  The election took place on 2 March 1916: Glasgow Herald, 3 March 1916.
30  Murray noted this on the front of Donaldson’s application. Donaldson, on the vote, was 
placed seventh.
31  Murray’s collection (n 16) preserves a flyer for the lecture: Wednesday 18th October 
1916 at 4.30pm.
32  W S McKechnie’s son, Sheriff Hector McKechnie KC too would make a significant 
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(6) The end of an era
In 1970, the holder of the Chair was J M Halliday.33 Amongst many other 
works, Halliday published a commentary on the Conveyancing and Feudal 
Reform (Scotland) Act 1970. The preface records that he was indebted to 
Mr Robert Rennie for being “largely responsible for preparation of the 
index.”34 I suspect this invaluable contribution to a standard text was 
what may have been, in University language, Robert’s first “scholarly 
collaboration” (Robert, with characteristic modesty, described to me his 
input to that commentary more prosaically: “that’s all you were allowed 
to do in those days”!) But however that may be, I have chosen to honour 
Robert’s service as a worthy holder of a Chair which has had many worthy 
holders by delving into areas surrounding the practical operations of the 
assignation of rights in security.
B.  Two Aspects of Standard Securities 
The “accessory principle” is a well-known principle common to most 
European legal systems. The accessory principle applies, in particular, 
to securities, whether real securities (such as the landlord’s hypothec) 
or personal securities (such as cautionary obligations). The accessory 
principle has a number of aspects. One is that the accessory, the security, 
cannot exist in the abstract, for it is parasitic to the principal. Discharge of 
the principal debt thus extinguishes, ex lege, the accessory security. Another 
aspect is transfer: where the principal goes, so too must the accessory 
security follow (accessorium sequitur principale).35 Cautionary obligations 
and floating charges – the subject of Robert’s PhD36 – are good examples of 
where assignation may occur automatically.37
contribution to the study of Scots law in his work as the first Literary Director of the 
Stair Society. 
33  Halliday himself was honoured with a valuable Festschrift: D J Cusine (ed) A Scots 
Conveyancing Miscellany: Essays in Honour of J M Halliday (1987). 
34  J M Halliday, The Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970 (1970) v.
35  Selby v Brough (1794) 2 Ross LC 661 at 666 per Lord President Campbell; Watson v Bogue 
(No.1) 2000 SLT (Sh Ct) 125 and Trotter v Trotter 2001 SLT (Sh Ct) 42.
36  R Rennie, Floating Charges: A Treatise from the Standpoint of Scots Law (PhD, University of 
Glasgow, 1971).
37  Assignation of standard securities, as will be seen, is covered by an express statutory 
provision: Conveyacing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970, s 14, which innovates 
on the common law accessorium sequitur principale rule. The assignation of floating 
charges, in contrast, is regulated by the ordinary law of assignation and thus more 
easily effected. 
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As Andrew Steven has demonstrated, however, the Scottish standard 
security pays little heed to such fundamental doctrines as the accessory 
principle.38 On Steven’s examination the standard security proves not to be 
much of an accessory security at all.39 But the problems to which the accessory 
principle seeks to provide answers often relate not to questions of property 
law – who holds the security – but to questions of debt:40 which debts, incurred 
to which creditor, are covered? It is this general issue I wish to address in this 
contribution in the context of the assignation of all sums securities.
C.  Further Advances 
(1) Heritable securities pre-1970
Prior to the introduction of the standard security with the Conveyancing and 
Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970, there were three ways of constituting a 
heritable security: (i) the pecuniary real burden; (ii) the bond and disposition 
in security and (iii) the ex facie absolute disposition qualified by back letter.41 
For present purposes, suffice it to say that one of the drawbacks of the bond 
and disposition in security was that it was security only for the sums advanced 
by the creditor on or around42 the time the security was taken – further 
advances made after the security had been taken were liable to founder on the 
Bankruptcy Act 1696 which struck at “debts contracted for thereafter.”43 All 
sums securities could not therefore be effectually created over real rights in 
38  A J M Steven, “Accessoriness and Security over Land” (2009) 13 Edinburgh Law Review 
387.
39  Steven (n 38).
40  For the statutory definition of which, see n 55 below.
41  A pecuniary real burden, such as a ground annual, could also be used to create a 
debitum fundi, but normally only in favour of a predecessor in the feudal chain. It could 
not generally be used in order to secure a loan from a bank not already a party to the 
feudal relationship. It was accepted that the money need not be advanced until after the 
debtor had signed. 
42  It was accepted that the money need not be advanced until after the debtor had signed 
the bond for the money: Dunbar v Abercromby (1789) 2 Ross LC 638 at 644 per Lord 
Eskgrove. “The limits of this rule,” Gloag conceded, “are not very easy to define”: 
Gloag and Irvine, Rights in Security (1897) 67. Today the issues often arise under the 
Insolvency Act 1986, s 245, for which, see Re Shoe Lace Ltd [1992] BCC 367 at 369-70 per 
Hoffmann J, affd [1993] BCC 609.
43  RPS 1696/9/57. It is necessary to appreciate the distinction between sasine and infeftment 
which, until the Infeftment Act 1845, were two separate procedures: see Burnett’s Tr v 
Grainger 2004 SC (HL) 19 at para [91] per Lord Rodger of Earlsferry.
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land;44 moreover, according to Lord Justice Clerk Braxfield, an agreement to 
provide credit was not, for the purposes of the 1696 Act, a debt.45
But the law developed. From 1814, the creation of a revolving facility 
was permitted by way of the cash credit bond and disposition in security 
where credit to a certain sum was committed up to which limit the borrower 
could redraw even after the granting of the security.46 Another development 
was the recognition that the security conferred on a holder of an ex facie 
absolute disposition was such as to cover further advances. The borrower 
under such a security was not the owner of the lands secured: the security 
holder became the owner and the borrower had a reversionary personal 
right to reconveyance of his property on repayment of the indebtedness to 
the security holder. And this right to reconveyance could itself be used as 
a security. So suppose Brian granted to the Bank of Scotland for “all sums 
due or which hereafter may become due” an ex facie absolute disposition to 
the Bank of Scotland. Having borrowed £1,000 from the Bank of Scotland 
at 8%, the Bank of Ireland offers him credit for a second ranking security at 
7%. Brian assigns his reversionary right in security to the Bank of Ireland. 
Intimation of that security to the Bank of Scotland has the effect of limiting 
the existing security for the sums already advanced. Although not spelled 
out in the speeches of the House of Lords in Union Bank of Scotland Ltd v 
National Bank of Scotland Ltd,47 the rationale for the rule where a second 
ranking security is constituted, was stated by Lord Chelmsford in Hopkinson 
v Rolt to be to ensure that no “perpetual curb is imposed on the mortgagor’s 
right to encumber his equity of redemption.”48 The rationale is similar to 
that underlying the doctrine of catholic and secondary creditors: the catholic 
44  M’Lellan’s Creditors (1734) House of Lords, unreported: see Erskine, 2.3.50 and Bell, 
Commentaries (7th edn 1870) II, 730.
45  Stein’s Creditors v Newnham, Everett & Co (1794) 2 Ross LC 648 at 650 (in which the Lord 
President sat as Lord President Probationer). See too Lord Braxfield in Pickering v Smith 
(1788) 2 Ross LC 645 at 647: “An infeftment is not to dance backward and forward; if 
extinguished today, it cannot revive tomorrow." Braxfield’s view is not modern Scots 
law.
46  Payment of Creditors (Scotland) Act 1814 (54 Geo III, c 37) s 14. Statutory authority for 
such a revolving facility remains in the form of the Debts Securities (Scotland) Act 1856 
(19 & 20 Vict, c 91), s 7 and, in addition, 1970 Act, s 9(6): “The Bankruptcy Act 1696, in 
so far as it renders a heritable security of no effect in relation to a debt contracted after 
the recording of that security, and any rule of law which required that a real burden for 
money may only be created in respect of a sum specified at the date of creation, shall 
not apply in relation to a standard security.”
47  (1886) 14 R (HL) 1, following the decision of the House in an English appeal, Hopkinson 
v Rolt (1861) ER 829.
48  Hopkinson (n 47) 845.
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creditor cannot be allowed to (ab)use his position to destroy the security of 
subsequent creditors. In modern terms, the policy could be stated to be to 
encourage competitive lending and to ensure that any attempts by the first 
creditor, in contract, to monopolise his position as lender to the borrower, is 
not supported by the general law. 
(2) Clayton’s case issues
In a case where there are two separate securities – one ranking after the 
other – the effect of notice of the subsequent security crystallises the sum 
due. Crystallisation is also important in order to apply the rule in Clayton’s 
case,49 that the earliest debit is extinguished by the earliest credit. In the event 
that the first creditor does not rule off the crystallised sum, and ensure any 
further advances (such as cheques honoured after the crystallisation date) 
are recorded in a separate account: otherwise any repayments made by 
the debtor will automatically reduce the secured (pre-crystallisation sum) 
rather than the unsecured sum (post-crystallisation advances). 
(3) The modern law
But the modern statutory provisions allow the first ranking security holder 
to maintain his priority for “any future debt which, under the contract to 
which the security relates, he is required to allow the debtor in the security 
to incur.”50 The scope of the rule on further advances is thus much reduced 
under s 13. Moreover, with the abolition of the ranking preference afforded 
by an inhibition,51 many of the issues surrounding further advances and 
which Robert explored in detail,52 no longer arise. There is also the curious 
discrepancy between the provisions of the Conveyancing and Feudal 
Reform (Scotland) Act 1970 and the Companies Act 1985 on the case of 
further advances by second ranking security holder. Originally both acts 
contained the wording still found in the Companies Acts: where a second 
ranking security is taken which is intimated to the first ranking security 
49  Devaynes v Noble (Clayton’s Case) (1816) 35 ER 767 at 793. See further P Hood, “Clayton’s 
Case and Connected Matters” 2013 Juridical Review 501-39. 
50  1970 Act, s 13(1)(b). Unlike under Land Registration Act 2002, s 49 there is no need for 
the obligation to make further advances to appear on the register. For floating charges, 
see Companies Act 1985, s 464(5)(b): “future advances which he may be required 
to make under the instrument creating the floating charge or under any ancillary 
document.” 
51  Bankruptcy and Diligence (Scotland) Act etc 2007, s 154.
52  R Rennie, “Inhibitions, Standard Securities and Further Advances” (1994) 39 JLSS 52.
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holder, the effect of intimation is to restrict the first-ranking security to the 
“advances” presently made or which he may be required to make.53 The 1970 
Act was, however, amended in 2003 in the course of the Entfeudalisierung of 
Scottish immoveable property law,54 as a result of which “advances” was 
replaced in s 13 of the 1970 Act with the more readily intelligible “debts.” 
“Debts” is defined in the 1970 Act to include any obligation, whether or 
not it is an obligation to pay money.55 “Advance,” in contrast, is limited 
to money claims. How the s 13 notice works in a case where there is a 
standard security in respect of a continuing obligation by the debtor to do 
something other than to pay money is obscure. 
(4) Relevance to assignation cases
The point about further advances is that the authorities referred to relate always 
to the situation where there are two separate security rights. The modern 
legislation – s 13 of the 1970 Act and s 464(5) of the 1985 Act – now expressly 
sanctions the situation where the first ranking security holder (subject to the 
law of catholic and secondary creditors) can maintain his priority for further 
advances. That this position has been reached in the context of two securities is 
important when we turn to consider the policy and principle that should apply 
in the case of an assignation of a single security.
D.  Assignation of All Sums Securities 
(1) Gretton’s article on all sums securities
Another contributor to this Festschrift in Robert’s honour is himself an 
honoured member of that most exclusive club, dwindling – with Robert’s 
retirement – to three members ordinarius, and known to Lords of Appeal in 
53  Companies Act 1985, s 464(5). 
54  Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003, s 111. The operation of s 13 of the 1970 is excluded 
in relation to the issue of perpetual debentures under s 736 of the Companies Act 2006: 
Redemption of Standard Securities (Scotland) Act 1971, s 2. Section 4 of the 1971 Act 
provides that the 1970 Act and the 1971 Act may be cited together as the “Conveyancing 
and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Acts 1970 and 1971.” 
55  1970 Act, s 9(8)(c): “‘debt’ means any obligation due, or which will or may become due, 
to repay or pay money, including such obligation arising from a transaction or part of 
transaction in the course of any trade, business or profession, and any obligation to pay 
an annuity or ad factum praestandum, but does not include an obligation to pay any … 
rent or other periodical sum payable in respect of land, and ‘creditor’ and ‘debtor’ shall 
be construed accordingly.” 
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Ordinary as “the Professors of Conveyancing:”56 Professor George Gretton. It 
was Gretton who first recognised the importance of Lord Dunpark’s decision 
in Sanderson’s Trs v Ambion Scotland Ltd.57 Judgment was given in 1977 and, 
until it was belatedly reported in 1994, was not widely known. 
(2) Sanderson’s Trs
The case was unusual. S Ltd granted to H Ltd a standard security over 
development land. H Ltd then assigned its standard security to the trustees 
of a discretionary trust, in security, for a loan of £28,000. The standard 
security was granted for all sums due or to become due by S Ltd to H Ltd. 
The standard security and the assignation of it were recorded, in the order 
of standard security followed by assignation, on the same day. Following 
registration, the trustees made further advances to S Ltd. S Ltd then went 
into receivership. The trustees claimed that the further advances were 
covered by the standard security which they held as assignees. The trustees 
raised an action to enforce. 
Assignations of standard securities are permitted by s 14 of the 
Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970. That section 
provides:
Any standard security duly registered or recorded may be transferred in 
whole or in part, by the creditor by an assignation in conformity with Form 
A or B of schedule 4 to this Act, and upon such an assignation being duly 
registered or recorded, the security, or, as the case may be, part thereof, shall 
be vested in the assignee as effectually as if the security or the part had been 
granted in his favour.
Form A appeared to require specification of either (a) the certain sum for 
which a security is granted; (b) a maximum sum of £X, to the extent of £Y 
being the amount now due thereunder; or (c) other cases described in terms 
of a Note to the form.58 In Sanderson’s Trs, because the standard security 
56  Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, The Church, the Courts and the Constitution (2008) 95: “That 
feudal law, which has a strong claim to being the real intellectual achievement of the 
Scottish judges, was unceremoniously binned by the Scottish Parliament, unmourned 
even by its supposed acolytes, the Professors of Conveyancing.” Although, as Robert 
has pointed out, he is the last Professor to hold a titular Chair of Conveyancing: R 
Rennie, “The End of Conveyancing as we know it” (2003) 48(11) JLSS 15 and “A Tale of 
Two Systems” (2014) 59(11) JLSS 13.
57  1994 SLT 645 OH.
58  The Note is in these terms: “In an assignation, discharge or deed of restriction (1) a 
standard security in respect of an uncertain amount may be described by specifying 
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assigned was in “all sums” terms, it was argued that the assignation was not 
in Form A terms and thus ineffectual. That argument was shortly disposed 
of on the basis that “sufficient compliance” with the forms and procedure 
contained in the 1970 Act, provided that the assignation “so conforms as 
closely as may be.”59 But Lord Dunpark also provided a number of powerful 
rationales for why specification of the sum should not be necessary. 
His Lordship did not find the pre-1970 law of much assistance. The 
Bankruptcy Act 1696, as we have seen, rendered invalid any attempt to 
extend a heritable security to a debt contracted after the recording of the 
heritable security.60 The ex facie absolute disposition in security, Lord 
Dunpark recognised, “was the only pre-1970 method of creating a real 
security for future, as well as for past, loans, without limit of amount.”61 
And where the creditor in such a case – the infeft owner – sought to transfer 
his position, by assignation (of the debt) and disposition (of ownership of 
the land), there was no requirement to specify the debt assigned.62 
The next rationale identified by Lord Dunpark was that, in a case where 
the only party who has an obligation to make further advances is the cedent 
(the creditor of the outstanding sums) it makes sense for any assignation to 
crystallise the sums assigned. In such a case, where a creditor seeks to assign 
the claim presently owed to him with the security, it is necessary to specify 
the sum assigned. Cedent and assignee need to know what is being assigned. 
Suppose a facility of £1000 of which £500 is outstanding. Any assignation by 
the creditor has to specify the sum because the creditor as cedent. For having 
agreed to a facility of £1000, the cedent has an obligation to extend credit to 
that sum. The obligation to make further advances cannot be assigned. The 
case of further advances by a cedent, following assignation of an existing 
claim plus the security, is the inverse situation of further advances on a 
shortly the nature of the debt or obligation (e.g. all sums due or to become due) for 
which the security was granted, adding in the case of an assignation, to the extent of £X 
being the amount now due thereunder and (2) a standard security in respect of a personal 
obligation constituted in an instrument or instruments other than the standard security 
itself may be described by specifying shortly the nature of the debt or obligation and 
referring to the other instrument or instruments by which it is constituted in such 
manner as will be sufficient identification thereof.”
59  1970 Act, s 53(1).
60  Ibid, s 9(6).
61  1994 SLT 645 at 649H.
62  This form of security – fiducia cum creditore – suffers from the disadvantage that the 
creditor becomes the owner of the collateral. As a result, the creditor can transfer good 
title to a third party. The borrower, who pays back the debt, may not then be able to 
acquire a re-transfer of the property from the creditor, not least in the situation where 
the creditor has become insolvent. 
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second security being taken. With assignation, the cedent transfers away the 
first-ranking position. In a case where there are two securities, one ranking 
behind the other, the s 13 notice may crystallise the sum for which the first-
ranking security holder maintains his first ranking security.
(3) The problems
It was Professor Gretton who highlighted the great practical difficulties 
which may arise on the assignation of all sums securities, in an article 
which accompanied the reporting of the Sanderson’s Trs decision.63 He used 
this example: a debtor grants an all-sums security to the Bank of Pictavia. 
Suppose the loan was originally for £100,000 but the indebtedness is now 
down to £1,000. The same debtor has unsecured indebtedness to the Bank 
of Dalriada for £100,000. As Professor Gretton pointed out, were the Bank 
of Dalriada to take an assignation of the security the debtor would now find 
himself with £101,000 of secured debt. Suppose, then, Professor Gretton 
asked, the debtor had concluded missives to sell his property, on the basis 
that the £1,000 would be discharged from the purchase price. Prior to 
settlement, the debtor learns that the Bank has assigned its security and 
that he will need to come up with a redemption figure that is now in six 
figures. Such a result, Professor Gretton argued, would be “absurd,” for it 
could place the debtor in breach of his missives. Similarly, if the debtor were 
to be sequestrated shortly after the assignation of the security, the result 
would be that the Bank of Dalriada had managed to jump the unsecured 
creditors’ queue, without being subject to the law of unfair preferences. 
For the law of unfair preferences applies only to acts of the debtor.64 An 
onerous assignation by one creditor to another, in contrast, like a ranking 
agreement concluded between creditors, is challengeable neither under 
statute nor, probably, at common law.65
Nonetheless, I suggest that Lord Dunpark’s decision was correct and 
that assignations of all sums securities are permitted. The result, I would 
suggest, is not absurd, for the following reasons: 
63  G L Gretton, “Assignation of All Sums Standard Securities” 1994 SLT (News) 207.
64  Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, s 36(1).
65  Of course, there may be questions about the extent to which an assignation is valid. An 
assignation of an all sums security for £1,000 (the outstanding indebtedness) could be 
said to be valid only to the extent of £1,000 of debt.
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(i)  The debtor seeking to sell his heritable property is, ex hypothesi, doing 
so for a price. That price can be used to pay, in Gretton’s example, the 
Bank of Dalriada (the assignee of the security) at settlement; 
(ii)  Even in the absence of assignation of the security, the Bank of Dalriada 
could use diligence by inhibition, the effect of which would cause the 
same problems as an undischarged standard security (diligence may, 
of course, not be possible if there has been no default on the unsecured 
loan to Bank of Dalriada, but if there has been no default somewhere, 
it is less likely that the BofD would be in the market for a security).66 
(iii)  The argument that the debtor’s land “cannot be burdened by the extra 
£100,000 without his consent,”67 ignores the fact that the debtor has 
already expressly, by his own deed, granted an all-sums security. 
(iv)  The effect of assignation of an all sums standard security is contained, as 
Gretton observes, in s 14 of the 1970 Act. Section 14 provides that, “upon 
such an assignation being duly registered or recorded, the security, 
or, as the case may be, part thereof, shall be vested in the assignee as 
effectually as if the security or the part had been granted in his favour.” 
The effect of the assignation, therefore, curiously, is ex tunc: the security 
is deemed to have been granted to the assignee from day one.
(v)  The assignation of the security would not breach a pre-existing negative 
pledge clause granted by the debtor: as Gretton himself perceptively 
observes, the assignation is not an act of the debtor. Moreover, the effect 
of s 14 is to deem the security to have been granted by the debtor to the 
assignee. If the security, as granted by the debtor, was not a breach of 
the negative pledge clause, neither is the assignation. 
(vi)  The assignation forms contained in Schedule 4 to the 1970 Act cannot 
supply a requirement not mentioned in s 14, namely that any all sum 
standard security is immediately converted into a security for a fixed 
sum. The wording of the style assignation in Schedule 4 does appear 
to envisage specification of a maximum sum for which the security 
is assigned. That may be for a fixed sum. But there is no good reason 
why the assignation may not be expressed to mirror the terms of the 
security itself: for “all sums due and to become due.” As the Lord 
Ordinary held in Sanderson’s Trs v Ambion Scotland Ltd, an assignation 
of a standard security is not necessarily disconform to the Act if it does 
not state the sum due to the cedent at the date of the assignation. The 
66  The loan agreement between the debtor and the Bank of Dalriada – assuming the 
unsecured indebtedness arose under a loan – may contain a consent to preservation 
and execution clause, although, if the debtor is a consumer, Consumer Credit Act 1974, 
s 93A may prevent summary diligence.
67  Gretton (n 63) at 209.
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Lord Ordinary in Liquidator of Letham Grange Development Co Ltd v 
Foxworth Investments Ltd,68 also held that it is possible to have a hybrid 
Form A/Form B security. Strict conformity, with either the security or 
the assignation forms, does not appear to be required, providing the 
security is consistent with the operative terms of the Act. 
(vii)  Assignations of personal rights to payment occur without the consent 
of the debtor. At common law, accessory securities (in the wide sense, 
including personal securities, such as cautionary obligations) are 
transferred with an assignation of the claim even if there is no mention 
of the accessory securities. The debtor’s consent to assignation of either 
the underlying debt or a security granted in respect of that debt is not 
therefore required.69
(viii)  Indeed, under the law of catholic and secondary creditors (which 
applies admittedly as between two or more secured creditors) the law 
sometimes implies a transfer of securities between creditors, where the 
creditors, as well as the debtor, do not expressly consent.70
(ix)  As Gretton observed, it was Professor Halliday’s view that in order 
for an assigned standard security to cover further advances by the 
assignee, a formal variation of the security would be required.71 The 
rationale is that such a variation would supply the debtor’s express 
consent to the security covering post-assignation further advances by 
the assignee of the security to the debtor. But is the best evidence of 
the debtor’s consent to those further advances being covered not, in 
fact, the debtor’s consent to the acceptance of those further advances? 
It might be argued that, at the stage any such advances have been 
made, the debtor would not necessarily know that the security has 
been assigned, since s 14 envisages registration rather than intimation. 
But that point is an argument for requiring, as under the general law 
of assignation, intimation to the debtor in order to interpel the debtor 
with the effects of the assignation. Further advances by an assignee of 
the security is yet another situation where it is intimation that could 
68  2011 SLT 1152 at para [101], per Lord Glennie (revd on a different point, [2013] CSIH 13; 
2013 SLT 445, itself revd [2014] UKSC 41, 2014 SLT 775).
69  Even claims arising out of regulated consumer credit agreements which are not secured 
on land may be freely assigned by the creditor although may be assigned without the 
debtor’s consent (although, between 1 February 2011 until 30 March 2014), Consumer 
Credit Act 1974, s 82A required the creditor to notify the debtor. The purpose s 82A, 
and Art 17 of the Consumer Credit Directive 2008/48/EC, was obscure given existing 
EU members states’ private laws on the question. 
70  Littlejohn v Black (1855) 18 D 207 referred to with approval by Lord Reed in Szepietowski 
v National Crime Agency [2014] UKSC 65, [2014] AC 338 at paras [81]-[84].
71  J M Halliday, Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970, 2nd edn (1977) para 
9-07; Conveyancing Law and Practice (1987) vol III, para 40-19.
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be said to play a central role: until the assignee has intimated the 
assignation to the debtor, any advances by the assignee will not be 
covered by the security.72
(x)  Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, the permissibility of assignation 
of all-sums securities, in policy terms, can be tested by the mirror-
image situation. Take the example of the Bank of Pictavia and the Bank 
of Dalriada referred to above. The Bank of Pictavia has an all sums 
security but only £1,000 of indebtedness, while the Bank of Dalriada 
has unsecured claims for £100,000. There is nothing wrong with 
the Bank of Pictavia taking an assignation of the Bank of Dalriada’s 
unsecured claim. The effect would be that the all-sums security now 
covered the £101,000. The effect on any proposed sale by the debtor 
would be the same. 
E.  Practicalities
(1) The debtor who has granted an all sums security 
All this having been said, however, the practical difficulties highlighted 
by Professor Gretton remain. Suppose the debtor has concluded missives 
to sell in the knowledge, in our example, that he has only £1,000 of debt 
outstanding to the Bank of Pictavia. After conclusion of the missives, he 
learns that the Bank of Dalriada, to whom he is already indebted to the 
extent of £100,000 now holds the security. Does this assignation render 
him in breach of the missives? Any breach of the missives relates to the 
warranty of “good and marketable title” not to acts of the seller, for, in our 
example, the seller has done nothing. The assignation is not an act of the 
seller. How then can the debtor under an all sums security protect himself? 
There are two practical responses: the first by transactional lawyers, the 
second by the courts. 
(2) The need for intimation
Transactional lawyers seeking redemption statements from a heritable 
creditor that holds an all sums security need to seek an undertaking that 
no assignation of the security has taken place or will take place prior to 
72  Cf Land Registration (Scotland) Act 2012, s 41. But that applies only to applications 
under s 21 or 29. An application to register the assignation of a registered standard 
security would fall under s 26.
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settlement. The response of the courts must be to apply by analogy the 
traditional Scottish approach to intimation: although the assignation of the 
security may take place only on registration, that registration cannot affect 
the debtor, even with respect to existing indebtedness, unless and until 
the assignee of the security has interpelled the debtor by intimating the 
assignation of the all sums security to him. For because assignation takes 
place without the debtor’s consent, the debtor cannot be prejudiced by that 
about which he does not know and about which he has no obligation to 
inquire. The result is that if a debtor concludes missives to sell, without 
having received intimation of the assignation of the security, the security, 
in any question with the debtor, cannot cover more than was due to the 
original creditor. The debtor, qua seller, has no obligation to run searches 
to check that the holder of his all sums security has not changed. That this 
is the correct analysis can be tested by asking the question of what would 
happen in the mirror-image situation where the creditors agree between 
themselves to assign not the security but the claim: the unsecured creditor 
assigns the claim to the holder of the all sums security. That assignation 
has effect against the debtor only from the date of intimation. If the debtor 
has entered into missives to sell the property, but between missives and 
settlement there has been a registration of an assignation of the security,73 
the seller cannot be prejudiced until the assignation has been intimated 
to him: he need redeem only to the extent of £1,000.74 As a result of that 
payment, he is entitled to a discharge of the security from the assignee 
who, in turn, may have a claim against the cedent. The assignee may have 
a breach of warrandice claim against the cedent, but probably not. For 
the warrandice in an assignation of a claim plus security is only debitum 
subesse: the debt is due and owing. But for warrandice purposes, as for 
others, that warranty can be given only at the date of the assignation. Take 
again the example of £1,000 owed by the seller under a standard security, 
which is assigned to another creditor who has unsecured indebtedness 
73  Of course, in most cases involving a sale, a registration of an assignation of the security 
prior to settlement will be picked up in the searches, alerting the buyer to the need for 
a discharge from the assignee.
74  The Scottish Law Commission is likely to recommend superseding intimation as a 
constitutive requirement for completing an assignation with registration: Scottish Law 
Commission, Discussion Paper on Moveable Transactions (2011) ch 11. But intimation 
will remain, as it does in other legal systems which allow for effective assignation 
without intimation, for practical purposes to "interpel" the debtor.
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of £100,000. In ignorance of any assignation of the security, the borrower 
concludes missives to sell the property in good faith. The borrower cannot 
be prejudiced by the assignation and the assignee must be considered to 
have bought a claim only of £1,000, albeit with an all sums security. In order 
for the assignee of the security to interpel the debtor with knowledge that 
the assignee now has an all sums security which, because of pre-existing 
outstanding indebtedness to the assignee now encompasses £101,000, 
intimation by the assignee to the borrower is required.
(3) Further advances
The question often arises whether an assignee of an all sums security is 
secured for any further advances made by the security holder. Providing 
there is no competition with any other security holder, no problems will 
arise. As I have indicated, any problems which may be thought to occur 
with the assignation of an all sums security, can often be avoided if, as is 
often the case in corporate groups, that it would be possible to effect the 
assignation of the claim to the existing all sums security holder. This is 
often the easiest way to deal with further advances issues that may arise. 
In the event that the security is assigned then, depending as always on 
the terms of the documentation, it may well be that the provisions of s 
14 – deeming, on registration of the assignation, the security always to have 
been held by the assignee – are sufficient to cover any advances that the 
assignee may propose to make. 
(4) Practical results
In the result, therefore, although I have disagreed with some of the 
reasoning first offered by Professor Gretton in his pioneering article on the 
assignation of all sums securities 20 years ago, and with which all studies 
of this subject must begin, we are not far apart either on principle or in the 
result. The assignation of all sums securities – including cases involving 
the taking of standard securities over existing standard securities which 
sometimes incorporate assignations75 – needs to be carefully thought 
through. I, for one, would not go quite as far as Sheriff Cusine in describing 
75  See e.g. UK Acorn Finance Ltd v Smith, [2014] Sh Ct Banff 25 (14 July 2014). 
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the assignation of standard securities for a fluctuating amount, as in the 
case of an “all sums” security as “undesirable,”76 although, as I have sought 
to highlight, the lack of careful thought leaves a potential mine field of 
problems for the unwary. But, with careful preparation, there may be a 
number of practical advantages, particularly in the corporate sphere, 
to be gained from taking the assignation of all sums securities. In most 
cases, however, if, at the outset, there is a likelihood for a need to assign 
or allow the possibility of further participation in the secured creditor’s 
position, Gloag’s advice, given over a century ago, remains good: the 
all sums security and indebtedness should be constituted in favour of a 
security trustee, with further participation taking place privately between 
the creditors.77 The delights of partial assignations of all-sums securities 
may be left for another time.78
F.  Conclusions
Robert Rennie’s retiral marks not just the end of chapter of a busy 
professional life: it also marks a sad break for an institution which, for 
centuries, has maintained close contact with its own graduates in the legal 
profession in the West of Scotland. The University has paid Robert a back-
handed compliment of sorts by deeming Robert to be irreplaceable and 
making no attempts to refill the Chair. The decision not to replace Robert 
brings an end to a significant chapter in the history of law teaching in the 
Scottish universities. What started with the appointment of Macvey Napier 
to the Edinburgh Conveyancing Chair in 1824 comes to an end with the 
retirement of Robert Rennie as the holder of the Glasgow Chair in 2014. 
At a stroke, vast numbers of arbitration clauses, tucked away in Deeds of 
Conditions to a significant proportion of Glasgow’s tenement properties, 
appointing the Professor of Conveyancing in the University as arbiter, may 
be frustrated.79 The professionalism of local practitioners is also likely to 
avoid the unseemly situation of other Professors of Law in the University, 
with considerably less experience of Conveyancing than even the great 
scholar McKechnie, being approached to accept an appointment to rule on 
76  D J Cusine, Standard Securities (1991) para 6-11; D J Cusine and R Rennie, Standard 
Securities, 2nd edn (2002) para 6-06. 
77  W M Gloag and J Irvine, Rights in Security (1897) 126, n 5.
78  See e.g. Gloag and Irvine (n 77) 126.
79  Anecdotal evidence suggests that these clauses are only infrequently invoked. 
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the finer points of the abstruse science. But I prefer to close by focussing 
instead on Robert’s qualities as a man, in particular his industry, integrity 
and, above all, good humour. 
The University of Glasgow without the waist-coated Professor 
Rennie will be a poorer place; but the University, without a Professor of 
Conveyancing at all, will be a poorer place still. 

6. Property Law, Fiduciary 
Obligations and the 
Constructive Trust
Lord Hodge
A.  Sharp, Burnett and the General Principles of 
Insolvency Law 
Insolvency is the acid test of property rights. Bankruptcy law and the law 
of corporate insolvency give – or should give – definitive answers to the 
question “who owns what?” It was in the quest for such definitive answers 
that I first befriended Robert Rennie. And over the years he has taken great 
delight in introducing me at his annual dinner for the brightest students in 
his property law honours class at the University of Glasgow as counsel on 
the losing side in Sharp v Thomson.1
In that case I was junior counsel for the receivers of Albyn Construction 
Ltd and Robert gave expert advice to the purchasers of a basement flat at 
10 Whinhill Road, Aberdeen, or (as I suspect) the professional indemnity 
insurers of their solicitors. The flat was a modest property for which the 
purchasers paid only £40,000 in 1990. But it was not the flat itself that 
was the object of the litigation. Rather the insolvency profession wanted 
some clarity in the rules of insolvency law on the transfer of ownership) of 
heritable property: did real rights matter? What the insolvency practitioners 
1  1996 SC (HL) 66.
© Lord Hodge, CC BY 4.0 http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0056.06
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wanted was a case involving personal bankruptcy in order to test whether 
there was a race to the register between the trustee in sequestration and the 
disponee. But such cases occur only very rarely as it requires the purchaser’s 
solicitor to be very dilatory before a trustee can get to the register first. As 
a result, the only case which arose at that time as a vehicle for testing the 
issue of property law was Sharp v Thomson, which, as is well known, had 
the added complication that it involved a floating charge.
That complication proved fatal to the receivers’ case in the House of 
Lords. Having obtained a magisterial judgment from Lord President Hope 
in the First Division on the structure of the Scots law of property,2 an 
opinion which will stand the test of time, our ship foundered in London on 
the rock of the floating charge. Such a charge was imported from English 
law in which it operates in equity as an equitable security. As Professor 
W A Wilson set out in an article in the Scots Law Times in 1962,3 the 
floating charge was also capable of analysis in a way that was consistent 
with traditional Scots insolvency law. However, such an analysis appeared 
strange, indeed shocking, to an English Chancery judge who was used to 
equity looking on that as done which ought to have been done. In particular, 
in the contract of sale of land equity would have transferred the beneficial 
interest in the land to the disponee, thereby protecting him from the seller’s 
insolvency. Thus, after Colin Campbell QC (now Lord Malcolm) had made 
a very skilful indeed brilliant – speech in opening his appeal, my senior, 
Ronald Mackay QC (now Lord Eassie) faced a bench which was hostile to 
his arguments. At one point when he was being assailed on all sides, we 
heard the mournful sound of bagpipes from a boat on the Thames. Ronald 
Mackay suggested to the court that it was a lament for Scots property law.
Several years later, the insolvency profession had an opportunity to 
revisit the issue when, most unusually, the question arose in a personal 
insolvency: was there a race to the register between the disponee and the 
trustee in sequestration? I was not involved at first instance but came into 
the case, Burnett’s Trustee v Grainger,4 on an appeal to the sheriff principal. 
Again, the disputed property was not of great value but the action served 
as a vehicle to clarify the law. The issue was stark: did the property, to 
which the seller retained title, fall within the sequestration of his estates 
2  1995 SC 455.
3  W A Wilson, “Floating Charges” 1962 SLT (News) 53.
4  2004 SC (HL) 19; 2002 SC 580 (Inner House); 2000 SLT (Sh Ct) 116 (Sheriff Principal).
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after he had received the purchase price and had delivered the disposition 
to the purchaser?
Reading the judgments of the House of Lords in Burnett’s Trustee one 
can gain the impression that the case was concerned solely with personal 
insolvency legislation. In a sense that is true because the central rules of the 
Scots law of personal insolvency are statutory. But in reality it concerned 
the building blocks of Scots property law. In particular, the judgment 
of the House of Lords supported the clear distinction between the law 
of property and the law of obligations which is common to many legal 
systems which have been strongly influenced in their structure by Roman 
law. It reaffirmed the decision of the whole bench of the Court of Session 
in Young v Leith that:5
[A] completed real right, good in a question between granter and grantee, 
and bad against all the rest of the world, is an absolute legal contradiction 
in terms.
I believe that the exercise of clarification, which the insolvency profession 
initiated, will bring lasting benefits to Scots law. The distinction between 
real rights and personal rights, which is the hallmark of civilian legal 
systems, gives a simple and principled framework to property law. It can 
readily be understood by the non-specialist lawyer and provide a simple 
template for legal analysis. But that does not mean that we should become 
obsessed about real rights and personal rights and treat as heretical or 
unprincipled any reform proposal which creates an exception to general 
rules. The effect of Sharp v Thomson is that a floating charge will not attach 
property for which a disponee has paid the purchase price and of which 
the disposition has been delivered. It is an exception to the general rule in 
insolvency that priority in insolvency is determined by the prior acquisition 
of the real right. That exception can be justified by the unusual nature of 
the floating charge, both in its origin as an equitable charge in English law 
and also in the way it creates a real right in security over land without 
registration in the Land Register. To deny the ability of the law to create 
exceptions to general rules would be to introduce inflexibility. It would 
risk consigning Scots property law and commercial law to an ossuary. In 
my view the real value of the clarification which Sharp and Burnett’s Trustee 
5  (1847) 9 D 932 at 945.
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have provided is that there is a clear structure which law reformers can use 
to develop our law. 
B.  Exceptions to the General Principles
The effect of the floating charge in Burnett’s Trustee is not the only departure 
from the general rules of insolvency law. There are also special rules for 
transactions specifically induced by the debtor’s fraud and also for trusts.
The title of a debtor which has been acquired through fraud is voidable in 
the hands of an attaching creditor and thus also in the debtor’s insolvency.6 
In such cases fraud passes against creditors. But the scope of the doctrine 
is not clear; fraud in a contract is not a vitium reale. Professor Thomson 
suggests that it is only where the insolvent’s fraud specifically induced the 
transfer of the ownership of the property, which would not otherwise have 
passed, that the property will not fall to the trustee in sequestration.7
It is well established in our law that property which a debtor holds in 
trust for another does not fall within the sequestration of the debtor’s estate. 
That rule extends to land and to latent trusts,8 and since 1985 has been the 
subject of a statutory provision.9 Until recently, Scots lawyers and South 
African lawyers have analysed the right of the beneficiary as an unusual 
personal right against the trustee which prevails in the latter’s insolvency 
– the protected personal right. Recently, it has become more fashionable 
to analyse trust rights in terms of a separate patrimony. The trustee has 
separate patrimonies. He has his own patrimony, which comprises his 
personal assets and liabilities, and a separate trust patrimony which 
comprises the assets and liabilities of the trust.10
It is also well settled in Scots law that an obligation to assign a security 
over property or an obligation to grant a conveyance does not create 
6  Bell, Comm I, 309-10; Mansfield v Walker’s Trustees (1835) 1 Sh & Macl 203; A W Gamage 
Ltd v Charlesworth’s Trustee 1910 SC 257. 
7  J M Thomson, “Fraud,” in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol 11 (1990) 
para 778; K G C Reid, “Property” in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, 
vol 18 (1993) para 694. 
8  Heritable Reversionary Co Ltd v Millar (1892) 19 R (HL) 43. 
9  Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, s 33(1)(b).
10  Lord Malcolm has recently supported this analysis: Glasgow City Council v The Board of 
Managers of Springboig St John’s School [2014] CSOH 76 at paras 16 and 17. So also has 
Lord Drummond Young in Ted Jacob Engineering Group Inc v RMJM 2014 SC 579 at para 
90. See also Scottish Law Commission, Report on Trust Law (Scot Law Com No 239, 
2014) para 3.4.
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a trust in respect of that property.11 This rule is of central importance to 
the Scots law of property and distinguishes it from English property law 
in a fundamental way. In Mansfield v Walker’s Trustees,12 Lord Brougham 
pointed out the absence of equitable estates in Scotland and described 
English equitable titles thus:13 
An agreement to convey an estate for a valuable consideration executed is 
with us, to all substantial purposes, a conveyance which vests the property 
in the purchaser. … Whatever is covenanted to be done is held in equity 
as done, so that a title by mere agreement is quite as paramount to any 
subsequent incumbrance, or other puisne title, as a legal conveyance. This is 
not the law of Scotland.
The last sentence is of central importance. The absence in Scots law of 
that rule of equity has generated academic controversy as to the scope 
of a constructive trust to confer rights which would prevail in a debtor’s 
insolvency. In the rest of this essay I consider that question in the context 
of a recent decision of the UK Supreme Court on the English law of 
constructive trust: FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC.14 
C.  The Constructive Trust in Scots Law
(1) FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC
FHR was a joint venture vehicle for the purchase of the issued share capital 
of Monte Carlo Grand Hotel SAM, for which the joint venture paid €211.5 
million. Cedar acted as FHR’s agents in negotiating the purchase and 
owed fiduciary duties to FHR. Unknown to FHR, Cedar also entered into 
an exclusive brokerage agreement with the vendors by which it became 
entitled to a fee of €10 million following the successful conclusion of the 
sale and purchase. The sale went ahead and the vendors paid Cedar that 
fee. FHR on learning of the payment sought to recover it from Cedar.
11  Bank of Scotland v Liquidators of Hutchison, Main & Co Ltd 1914 SC (HL) 1; Gibson v Hunter 
Home Designs Ltd 1976 SC 23.
12  (1835) 1 Sh & Macl 203.
13  Mansfield (n 6) at 338-39.
14  [2014] UKSC 45. I had the pleasure of sitting on the panel for the case and also prepared 
a briefing note for my colleagues on what might be the approach of Scots law in such 
circumstances. 
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The practical issue in FHR was whether a principal of an agent who 
had breached his fiduciary duty by taking an undisclosed commission 
could assert a proprietary remedy against a third party to which, it was 
asserted, the agent had transferred the money. The legal question was 
whether a bribe or secret commission received by an agent was held by the 
agent on trust for his principal; or did the principal merely have a claim 
against the agent for equitable compensation in a sum equal to the bribe or 
commission?
Lord Neuberger delivered the unanimous judgement of the court, 
holding that Cedar held the secret commission on trust for FHR. He set out 
three principles from the judgment of Millett LJ in Bristol and West Building 
Society v Mothew,15 namely:
(i)  an agent owes a fiduciary duty to his principal because he has 
undertaken to act for or on behalf of the principal in circumstances 
which give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence;
(ii)  an agent must not place himself in a position in which his duty and his 
interest may conflict, and as part of this rule, the agent must not make 
a profit out of his trust; and
(iii)  a fiduciary who acts for two principals with potentially conflicting 
interests breaches his obligation of undivided loyalty unless he has 
obtained the informed consent of both following full disclosure.
A Scots jurist can readily assent to those principles.16 So also can he or she 
agree with the well-established principle that where an agent receives a 
benefit in breach of his fiduciary duty, the agent is obliged to account to the 
principal for such a benefit: Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver17 has frequently 
been relied on in commercial cases in Scotland. In English law the agent 
must pay a sum equal to the profit by way of equitable compensation; Scots 
law does not speak of equitable compensation but the obligation to account 
and pay is clear.
In English law, where an agent acquires a benefit, which came to his 
notice as a result of his fiduciary position, he is treated in equity as having 
15  [1998] Ch 1 at 18.
16  See, in relation to (ii), for example Hamilton v Wright (1839) 1 D 668 (Lord Cockburn at 
first instance) (1842) 1 Bell’s App Cas 574; Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Brothers (1853) 
1 Macq 461; Magistrates of Aberdeen v University of Aberdeen (1877) 4 R (HL) 48. See also 
Laura Macgregor’s discussion of fiduciary duty in chapter 6 of her admirable book, The 
Law of Agency in Scotland (2013), including her discussion of the constructive trust at 
para 6.38ff.
17  [1967] 2 AC 134 (Note).
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acquired the benefit on behalf of the principal. Thus the thing acquired is 
beneficially owned by the principal because the general rule is that equity 
treats as done that which ought to have been done. This rule is strictly 
applied in favour of the principal so that the agent must disgorge a benefit 
even if the principal could not otherwise have acquired it.18
But what is the legal basis of the principal’s claim when a bribe or secret 
commission, unlike an emerging business opportunity which an agent 
wrongfully diverts from his principal, is something which the principal 
would not have received if the agent had complied with his fiduciary 
duty? In the past English case law has not spoken with one voice on 
whether a principal enjoys a proprietary remedy in relation to bribes and 
secret commissions, as Lord Neuberger’s judgment in FHR shows.19 More 
recently the Privy Council in Attorney General for Hong Kong v Reid20 held 
that bribes which had been paid to a corrupt police officer were held on 
trust for his principal and could therefore be traced into properties which 
the policeman had acquired in New Zealand. There has also been a very 
learned academic debate with powerful jurists on each side. On the one 
hand Professor Sir Roy Goode21 and Professor Sarah Worthington22 among 
others have argued that the principal has no proprietary interest in such 
a bribe or commission while Lord Millett23 and Professor Lionel Smith24 
among others have argued that an agent who obtains any benefit in breach 
of his fiduciary duty holds that benefit on trust for his principal.25 Many 
other articles have been published in what Sir Terence Etherton described 
as “this relentless and seemingly endless debate.”26
18  Keech v Sandford (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61; Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554; Phipps v Boardman 
[1967] 2 AC 46; Bhullar v Bhullar [2003] 2 BCLC 241.
19  FHR (n 14) at paras 15-28.
20  [1994] 1 AC 324.
21  R Goode, “Proprietary Restitutionary Claims” in W R Cornish and G Virgo (eds) 
Restitution: Past, Present and Future (1998), ch 5; R Goode, “Property and Unjust 
Enrichment” in A Burrows (ed), Essays on the Law of Restitution (1991) ch 9; R Goode, 
“Proprietary Liability for Secret Profits – A Reply” (2011) 127 LQR 493-95. 
22  S Worthington, “Fiduciary Duties and Proprietary Remedies: Addressing the Failure of 
Equitable Formulae” [2013] CLJ 720-52.
23  P Millett, “Bribes and Secret Commissions” [1993] RLR 7-30; P Millett, “Bribes and 
Secret Commissions Again” [2012] CLJ 583-614.
24  L Smith, “Constructive Trusts and the No-profit Rule” (2013) 72 CLJ 260-63.
25  Further valuable contributions to the debate include G Virgo, “Profits Obtained in 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Personal or Proprietary Claim?” (2011) 70 CLJ 502-04 and D 
Hayton, “Proprietary Liability for Secret Profits” (2011) 127 LQR 487-93.
26  T Etherton, “The Legitimacy of Proprietary Relief” (2014) 2(1) Birkbeck Law Review 59-86, 
62. 
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FHR gives an answer to this debate for the purposes of English law. 
A principal enjoys a proprietary remedy against his agent in relation to 
benefits such as bribes which were not derived from the principal’s assets 
or from assets which should have been the property of the principal. In 
the case of FHR one might readily assume that the vendor would have 
accepted a lower price for the shares in the hotel company if it had not 
had to pay the commission; but the rule did not turn on evidence that the 
purchaser had suffered any loss. The rule is simple: “any benefit acquired 
by an agent as a result of his agency and in breach of his fiduciary duty is 
held on trust for his principal.”27 Thus the principal can require the agent 
to account for any such benefit or he can claim the beneficial ownership 
of the funds or assets which the agent has obtained. The principal may 
also trace or follow in equity the proceeds of the bribe or commission in 
the hands of knowing recipients, a remedy which would not be available 
unless he had a proprietary claim. Lord Neuberger observed that this view 
was consistent with other common law jurisdictions, notably Australia, 
New Zealand, Singapore and the United States of America. 
(2) Remedies for breach of fiduciary duty in Scots law
Where does Scots law stand on this issue? 
Agency plays a central role in our commercial life. Company directors, 
solicitors, financial advisers, commercial representatives and many others 
operate through the law of agency. While James LJ may have been guilty 
of overstatement when he suggested that the “safety of mankind” required 
the enforcement of the no profit rule without any inquiry as to whether the 
principal had suffered loss,28 the strict enforcement of an agent’s duty of 
loyalty plays a vital role in our commercial law. The “no conflict” and “no 
profit” rules are essential components of the law of agency and are well 
vouched in Scots law. An agent who profits from his agency in breach of 
his fiduciary duty must disgorge his profits to his principal. That is not in 
doubt. But there is uncertainty in Scots law as to the legal mechanisms by 
which a principal can obtain a remedy for a breach of fiduciary duty. 
27  FHR (n 14) at para 35.
28  Parker v McKenna (1874) 10 Ch App 96 at p 124.
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The discussion in the English case of FHR is useful as it focused on three 
different circumstances in which an agent may act in breach of his fiduciary 
duty. They were:
(i)  Where the agent has used the principal’s property – including property 
which the agent holds on trust for his principal – to make a profit for 
himself;
(ii)  Where the agent uses his position or knowledge as an agent to divert 
from his principal an emerging business opportunity; and
(iii)  Where the agent takes a bribe or secret commission from another party.
The Supreme Court has ruled that in each case English law allows the 
principal a proprietary remedy which prevails in the agent’s insolvency 
and also allows equitable tracing.
A Scots lawyer may have difficulty in seeing a basis for a proprietary 
claim in the second and third circumstances because Scots law has no 
equitable rule treating as done that which ought to have been done.29 
Nonetheless, there are several statements in Scots cases30 and in textbooks31 
that suggest that a constructive trust may arise where a person in a fiduciary 
position breaches his duty to his principal. Thus in volume 24 of the Stair 
Memorial Encyclopaedia the learned authors state:32
A constructive trust arises from circumstances where a person in a fiduciary 
position derives a benefit from that position or a trustee makes a profit from 
carrying on the truster’s business.
But, as those authors acknowledge, it is not clear what is meant by 
“constructive trust;” and they refer to McLaren’s comment that a constructive 
trust is “merely another name for the duty of restitution, which may be 
29  Mansfield (n 6).
30  York Buildings Co v MacKenzie 13 May 1795, 3 Pat 378, Lord Thurlow at 393; Hamilton v 
Wright (1839) 1 D 668, Lord Cockburn at 673 (an obiter dictum as Wright was a trustee 
under an express trust); Laird v Laird (1858) 20 D 972, Lord President McNeill at 981 
(again obiter); Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Brothers (1853) 1 Macq 461 in which it was 
suggested by the Lord Chancellor and Lord Brougham that the laws of Scotland and 
England were essentially the same in relation to fiduciary relationships.
31  J McLaren, Wills and Succession, 3rd edn (1894) para 1926f; A Mackenzie Stuart, The Law 
of Trusts (1932) 37-38; W A Wilson and A G M Duncan, Trusts, Trustees and Executors, 
2nd edn (1995) para 6.5-6.81. 
32  D M Ross et al, “Trusts, Trustees and Judicial Factors,” in The Laws of Scotland: Stair 
Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol 24 (1990) para 30.
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enforced against a party acquiring property dishonestly or in breach of 
trust.”33 
In this essay I do not use the term “constructive trust” in that wider sense. 
Nor do I discuss the remedial constructive trust, which some common law 
jurisdictions recognise but English law does not. Rather, I concentrate on 
the institutional constructive trust in English law which arises by operation 
of law and which may exclude the assets held on trust from the insolvency 
of the fiduciary and the third party recipient. Does Scots law have such a 
trust arising from a fiduciary relationship? If so, what is its scope?
Before examining authorities which address directly the existence of 
such an institutional constructive trust, it may be useful to look at other 
remedies which Scots law provides in order to provide context for that 
examination. It is an established principle of Scots law that no man may 
profit from another’s fraud;34 and that has been extended to a principle that 
no man may profit from another’s breach of fiduciary duty.35 Professor Niall 
Whitty has discussed this in some detail in his powerful and convincing 
critique36 of the First Division’s novel reliance on the English doctrine of 
“knowing receipt” in Commonwealth Oil & Gas Co Ltd v Baxter.37 In short, if 
a trustee or other fiduciary profits from his office without the informed 
consent of the beneficiary or principal, the latter can demand an accounting 
and insist upon the performance of the trust or fiduciary obligation by 
transfer of the profit or asset to the trust patrimony or to the principal. This 
is a personal claim which is part of the law of obligations rather than a 
proprietary claim. Where the property in question is transferred to a third 
party, the beneficiary or principal will in many cases have a personal claim 
against the third party recipient where the third party has received the 
property (i) gratuitously or (ii) in bad faith with notice of the fraud or breach 
of fiduciary duty. In the first case (gratuitous transfer) the beneficiary or 
principal has a claim for restitution in our law of unjustified enrichment;38 
in the second case (bad faith) he can rely on the “no profit from another’s 
33  Ross et al, “Trusts” (n 33) para 30, fn 1, referring to McLaren, Wills (n 31) para 1517.
34  Clydesdale Banking Co v Paul (1877) 4 R 626; Thomson v Clydesdale Bank (1893) 20 R (HL) 
59; New Mining and Exploring Syndicate Ltd v Chalmers and Hunter 1912 SC 126. 
35  Style Financial Services Ltd v Bank of Scotland 1996 SLT 421; Bank of Scotland v Macleod 
Paxton Woolard & Co 1998 SLT 258; Macadam v Grandison [2008] CSOH 53.
36  N R Whitty, “The ‘No Profit from Another’s Fraud’ Rule and the ‘Knowing Receipt’ 
Muddle” 2013 Edin LR 37-62.
37  2010 SC 156.
38  New Mining (n 34).
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breach of fiduciary duty” principle.39 Thus where no claim is being made 
to recover an asset in the insolvency of the fiduciary or of the third party 
recipient, Scots law has remedies in its law of obligations which do not 
depend on the concept of the constructive trust.
That has not prevented judges and jurists from using language that 
suggests that personal remedies against the fiduciary and a third party 
recipient arise as a result of a constructive trust. Professor George has 
demonstrated in his article, “Constructive Trusts” that most of the cases cited 
in connection with constructive trusts concern other aspects of fiduciary 
relations.40 Even the comparatively recent case of Huisman v Soepboer,41 
could be said not to be concerned with an institutional constructive trust 
which had effect on insolvency. The case concerned a claim by a partner 
for a profit share of a joint venture to purchase and resell a farm. Huisman 
sued one of his co-venturers, Soepboer, and also a company controlled by 
the first defender. Soepboer had taken title to the farm in the name of the 
company contrary to the terms of the joint venture agreement. Huisman 
sought a joint and several decree against Soepboer and the company for 
payment of the profit share on the sale of the farm on the basis that the 
company obtained its title in bad faith. Lord Penrose upheld the relevancy 
of the claim and, relying on the English case of Soar v Ashwell42 and Scottish 
textbooks, held that there might be a constructive trust and that the 
company might be liable jointly and severally with Soepboer. In my view it 
was not necessary to attribute that liability to the existence of a constructive 
trust, as Lord Penrose did. The joint and several liability of the defenders 
could rest on the principle of no profit from a breach of fiduciary duty.
There are other cases where the Scottish courts have asserted the 
existence of a trust but have not analysed the meaning of the deemed trust 
or its effect, if any on the insolvency of the deemed trustee. For example, 
there is a suggestion in United Horse Shoe and Nail Co Ltd v Stewart & 
Co43 that a claim for the profits arising from an infringement of a patent 
is based on treating the infringer as if he were a trustee for the patentee. 
In Stevenson v Wilson44 the trustee in sequestration of a partnership sold 
39  The giving of valuable consideration is no defence if the third party is in bad faith: 
Clydesdale Banking Co v Paul (n 34) and Bank of Scotland v Macleod Paxton Woolard (n 35).
40  G L Gretton, “Constructive Trusts” 1997 Edin LR 281-316 and 408-19.
41  1994 SLT 682.
42  [1893] 2 QB 390.
43  (1886) 14 R 266, Lord Kinnear at 270; (1886) 15 R (HL) 45, Lord Watson at 48.
44  1907 SC 445.
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shares in a private company, the purchaser paid the price but the directors 
refused to register him as the proprietor of the shares and the vendor 
declined either to rescind the sale and repay the price or to receive the 
dividends on the purchaser’s behalf. The First Division treated the vendor 
as a quasi-trustee and upheld a declarator that the purchaser had the sole 
beneficial right, title and interest in the shares and dividends. The opinions 
in the Outer House and Inner House contained no detailed discussion of 
relevant authorities and the decision seems a pragmatic way of forcing the 
trustee in sequestration to annul the contract if he wished to wind up his 
administration of the bankrupt estate. I agree with Lord Hope’s view45 that 
the circumstances of that case were special and they do not ground any 
general rule.
But there is also clear authority in Scots law for the existence of an 
institutional constructive trust as an incident of a fiduciary relationship.46 
In my view the cases where the court has treated money or assets which 
a solicitor or factor has received from his client for a specific purpose as 
belonging to a separate patrimony and thus excluded from the former’s 
insolvency are consistent with an implied trust or an institutional 
constructive trust. 
Thus in Macadam v Martin’s Trustee47 a solicitor received funds for 
investment in a heritable security but died before making the investment. 
The First Division excluded the funds from the solicitor’s insolvency 
because they had been acquired for a specific purpose and had to be 
applied for that purpose or returned to the owner.
In Colquhoun’s Trustee v Campbell’s Trustees48 the court was faced with 
an insolvency. A solicitor was instructed by two clients to obtain securities 
over land for advances which the clients made to a third party. The solicitor 
received bonds and dispositions in security from the third party borrower 
in favour of his clients but did not record them. Instead, shortly before his 
and his firm’s insolvency, he obtained an ex facie absolute disposition in 
favour of his firm and recorded it. The estates of the solicitors’ partnership 
and the partners were sequestrated; prior bondholders sold the security 
subjects and there was a competition in a multiplepoinding between the 
45  Sharp (n 2) at 480H-481B.
46  Professor George Gretton (n 40) argued for the abolition of the constructive trust but 
did not dispute its existence.
47  (1872) 11 M 33. See also Blyth v Maberley’s Assignees (1832) 10 S 796. 
48  (1902) 4 F 739.
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trustee in sequestration and the clients for the balance of the sale price. 
The Lord Ordinary, Lord Kyllachy, held that the bankrupt firm and the 
trustee in sequestration were both disabled from taking the benefit of the 
solicitor’s breach of trust. His reasoning was that there was a constructive 
trust. He stated:49
For it being once conceded that as between a law-agent and his client there 
is a fiduciary relation, the result of what took place here was in law really 
this: The bankrupts being bound under their trust to complete their clients’ 
security by recording the bonds, must be held in law to have taken and 
recorded the subsequent absolute disposition primarily for their clients, and 
only in reversion for themselves. In short they must be held to have done in 
the matter what it was their duty to do. In that view, the absolute disposition 
was at the date of their sequestration held primarily in trust for the two 
competing claimants.
The First Division upheld his judgment. The Lord President (Kinross), with 
whom Lord McLaren concurred, adopted the Lord Ordinary’s reasoning: 
the solicitor was guilty of a fraudulent breach of trust and the trustee in 
sequestration was in no better position; accordingly the absolute disposition 
was held on trust primarily for the clients. Lord Kinnear also agreed with 
the judgment of the Lord Ordinary but relied on the principle that the 
creditors of the bankrupt and thus the trustee in sequestration could not 
take advantage of his fraud.
Jopp v Johnston’s Trustee50 is perhaps the best known of these cases. A 
solicitor who had been granted a factory and commission, sold shares on 
behalf of his client and deposited the proceeds in his personal account. 
The funds were mixed with his private money in the bank account. He 
later withdrew funds and placed them on deposit receipt. Later he died 
insolvent. The Second Division treated the deceased solicitor as having 
been in the position of a trustee in relation to his client’s funds, which 
did not form part of his sequestrated estate. The client was therefore able 
to follow the funds into the deposit receipts and recover the sums that 
remained on deposit. 
In Newton’s Executrix v Meiklejohn’s Judicial Factor51 a stockbroker, who 
had purchased shares on behalf of his client pledged those and other shares 
to a bank under a general letter of hypothecation in security for advances 
49  Colquhoun’s Trustee (n 48) at 742.
50  (1904) 6 F 1028.
51  1959 SLT 71.
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which he received. After his death a judicial factor was appointed under s 
163 of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1913. Lord Guest held that the client’s 
executrix was entitled to a preferred ranking on the sale proceeds in the 
insolvency.52 
In Southern Cross Commodities Property Ltd v Martin53 Lord Milligan held 
that the pursuers were entitled to a declaration that a heritable property, 
which had been purchased with the pursuers’ funds which two of its 
directors had misappropriated and whose title was in the name of another 
company under the directors’ control, was held on a constructive trust. It 
is true, as Professor Gretton has argued,54 that the court was concerned 
solely with the obligational issue of the transfer of the property to the 
pursuer company and not any claim against the unsecured creditors of the 
title-holding company which was not insolvent. But both counsel and the 
judge proceeded on the basis that the directors’ fiduciary position and their 
breach of fiduciary duty could make the title holding company, which was 
their creature, a constructive trustee. 
In Sutman International Inc v Herbage55 the directors of a company, who 
were a husband and wife, misappropriated funds of their company and 
invested them in heritable property. The husband became insolvent and 
his estates were sequestrated. The company and its liquidator sought a 
declarator against the couple and the husband’s trustee in sequestration 
that the company was the true beneficial owner of the property. Lord 
Cullen held that the directors had misappropriated the company’s funds 
and that made the declaration.
In those cases the Scottish courts have recognised an institutional 
constructive trust, as I have described it, in contexts where persons who 
were under fiduciary obligations, held property of their clients or company. 
In Ted Jacob Engineering Group Inc v RMJM56 Lord Drummond Young, 
in a careful judgment which focused on comparative law, explained the 
different approaches of Scots law and English law to the law of trusts and 
highlighted their functional equivalence. He discussed remedies for breach 
52  He referred to Bell, Comm I, 286 (in which Bell relied on English authorities for the 
principle that where a factor, who was entrusted with his principal’s funds for 
investment, misapplied them, the produce of his misapplication, if distinguishable, 
remained the principal’s), Macadam (n 47) and Jopp (n 50). 
53  1991 SLT 83. Dr Parker Hood commented on the case in 1994 SLT (News) 265-68.
54  Gretton (n 40) 296-97.
55  Unreported, 2 August 1991; summarised 1991 GWD 30-1772.
56  2014 SC 579.
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of trust and also for breach of fiduciary duty in an agency relationship and 
concluded that the constructive trust undoubtedly exists in Scots law.57 
He suggested that a constructive trust might be a form of remedy which 
the courts could refuse if it would produce an unfair result. I have some 
difficulty with this suggestion, because in principle it should not be a matter 
of discretion whether a trust exists. But I am not at all attracted by a more 
generalised notion of a remedial constructive trust, which Lord Neuberger 
in a recent lecture suggested “displays equity at its flexible flabby worst.”58 
If the courts were able retrospectively to impose a trust as a remedy, this 
would come at a high price to the predictability of our law of insolvency, 
which is of central importance to our commercial law and to people who 
do business in Scotland.59
In Scots law the institutional constructive trust exists in the context of 
a fiduciary relationship which most commonly is agency. But it also clear 
that not every aspect of the relationship between a principal and an agent 
involves fiduciary obligations. In particular, parties can enter into contracts 
within an agency relationship which do not give rise to fiduciary obligations. 
Thus in Style Financial Services Ltd v Bank of Scotland (No 2)60 Style collected 
and held funds for the retailer, Goldberg. Style were Goldberg’s agents but 
Lord Gill, on analysis of the contractual documents, held that they had a 
debtor/creditor relationship with Goldberg in relation to the funds.61 
Many commercial arrangements in which one person holds the property 
of another do not involve any fiduciary relationship. In Raymond Harrison & 
Co’s Trustee v North West Securities Ltd62 a hirer sold the property of the lessor 
without its authority and in breach of the leasing agreement. The lessor 
sought to claim the sale proceeds in the hirer’s insolvency, arguing that 
they were held on a constructive trust. But Lord Clyde held that the contract 
57  Ted Jacob Engineering (n 56) at para 99.
58  Lord Neuberger, “The Remedial Constructive Trust – Fact or Fiction,” The Banking 
Services and Finance Law Association Conference, Queenstown, New Zealand, 10 
August 2014.
59  If a remedial constructive trust were not to protect against a defender’s insolvency, it 
would add nothing to a restitutionary claim based on either the principle of no profit 
from fraud or breach of fiduciary duty or unjustified enrichment. 
60  1996 SLT 851.
61  See also NZ Netherlands Society “Oranje” Inc v Keys [1973] 1 WLR 1126, Lord Wilberforce 
at 1130-31 and Walker v Corboy (1990) 19 NSWLR 382 which were discussed in Style (n 
60).
62  1989 SLT 718.
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of hire did not give rise to a fiduciary relationship which might ground a 
constructive trust over the leased cattle or the proceeds of their sale.
(3) The constructive trust in Scots law
Where does all this lead? It is clear that in Scots law an institutional 
constructive trust does not arise in the transfer of property, whether 
or not registration is needed to complete the transfer. The institutional 
constructive trust arises from a fiduciary relationship. It is important, in 
order to maintain coherence in Scots law to confine fiduciary obligations to 
relationships where they are appropriate; and that is where the agent owes 
the principal a duty of loyalty giving rise to the three principles which I 
have quoted above from Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew. There 
is, as I have said, no general rule in Scots law that equity treats as done 
what is covenanted to be done. Mansfield v Walker’s Trustees has long been 
authority for the absence of that rule of equity in Scots law in relation to 
the transfer of property. But the rule is relevant to the law of trusts and, I 
would suggest, in the analogous obligations of a fiduciary. 
Looking at the three categories or circumstances that the court 
discussed in FHR, it seems to me that Scots law can readily recognise that 
where an agent in a fiduciary context makes a profit from the use of his 
principal’s property, the fruits of that use are held on trust for the principal. 
That is consistent with what Bell suggested in Commentaries I. 286 and 
the cases which I have cited since Macadam v Martin’s Trustee. The second 
category – where the agent diverts an emerging business opportunity 
from his principal – has long been treated in English law as giving rise 
to a proprietary claim. From the viewpoint of Scots property law, there is 
nothing proprietary about such a claim. But if it is an incident of the duty 
of loyalty which a fiduciary owes that the law treats as done what ought 
to have been done, then there may be scope in an appropriate case to hold 
that the opportunity is held on trust for the principal and thus does not 
fall within the agent’s insolvency.63 The claim which is the least obviously 
“proprietary” is the claim for a secret commission or bribe. That is why 
there has been such an extensive academic debate in England,64 to which 
63  This would apply event where the principal could not benefit from the opportunity (n 
20).
64  The battle lines appear to be between equity lawyers on the one hand and restitution 
and commercial lawyers on the other.
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the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court referred in FHR. Again, in 
Scots law, a property law analysis would lead one to reject the claim. But 
the result which English law has arrived at could be justified in Scots law 
if – as in FHR – the court were to treat the obligation of undivided loyalty 
as requiring the fiduciary to disgorge his profit to his principal and the 
equitable principle as treating that disgorgement as having occurred.
It will be for the courts to decide in a future case whether or not Scots 
law recognises the existence of a constructive trust in the second and 
third circumstances discussed in FHR. On the one hand there are policy 
arguments that the parity in ranking of unsecured creditors should prevail: 
the principal is such a creditor, unless the law creates a constructive trust. 
On the other hand there are considerations of commercial policy which 
point towards the incidents of agency being similar within the United 
Kingdom economy. Scots law is a mixed legal system that can adapt to such 
policy considerations and can, as I have argued, make exceptions within a 
clear conceptual framework. But if the latter policy were to find favour, the 
coherence of Scots law would be greatly assisted if (i) both the equitable 
principle of treating as done what ought to have been done and the 
constructive trust are strictly confined to circumstances in which fiduciary 
duties are owed, (ii) such duties arise only where a person is acting on behalf 
of another in a relationship of trust and confidence and (iii) the courts are 
astute not to invent such a relationship where it does not exist. 

7. The Offside Goals Rule and 
Fraud on Creditors
Dr John MacLeod
I understand that, as a student, Professor Rennie was known to miss the 
occasional conveyancing class in order to play football. This siren call is not 
the only danger that the beautiful game has posed for Scots property law. 
It also gave us a name, and a dubious metaphor, for the so-called offside 
goals rule.
Few areas of Scots property law have attracted as much modern scholarly 
interest.1 One of the reasons why the rule might appear unworthy of the 
fuss is the simplicity with which the core case may be stated. The classic 
instance is double sale: Alfred concludes a contract for the sale of his field 
to Betty; before Betty has obtained her real right, Alfred sells it a second 
time to Cecil, who registers first. The offside goals rule says that, if Cecil 
was in bad faith, the transfer to him is voidable at Betty’s instance. Betty 
can also set aside a gratuitous transfer to Cecil even if he is in good faith. 
1  D Carey Miller, “A Centenary Offering: The Double Sale Dilemma – Time to be Laid 
to Rest” in M Kidd and S Hoctor (eds), Stella Iuris: Celebrating 100 years of the teaching 
of law in Pietermaritzburg (2010) 96; R G Anderson, Assignation (2008) paras 11-04-30; D 
L Carey Miller with D Miller. Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law, 2nd edn (2005) paras 
8.28-32; D A Brand, A J M Steven and S Wortley, Professor McDonald’s Conveyancing 
Manual, 7th edn (2004) paras 32.52-62; S Wortley, “Double Sales and the Offside Trap: 
Some Thoughts on the Rule Penalising Private Knowledge of a Prior Right” 2002 JR 
291; K G C Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) paras 695-700. Professor Rennie 
has perhaps been a little sceptical about the attention lavished on it, observing that 
“the rule against offside goals has become quite fashionable recently.” R Rennie “Land 
Registration and the Decline of Property Law” (2010) 14 Edin LR 62 at 74.
© John MacLeod, CC BY 4.0 http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0056.07
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There is broad consensus on the basic elements. A grant is voidable 
under the offside goals rule if:
(i)  the granter was under a prior obligation to grant a real right to the 
avoiding party, which obligation gave rise to a concomitant obligation 
not to alienate or burden the property;
(ii)  the grant was made in breach of the prior obligation;
(iii)  the grantee knew of the obligation or the grant was not for value.2
If the rule can be briefly stated and there is agreement about its content, 
why are Scots property lawyers so concerned about it? One reason is that 
it bears on the discussion of the relationship between real and personal 
rights which was at the centre of Scots property law discourse at the 
turn of the 21st century. In particular, it threatens to undermine the clear 
distinction between real and personal rights established in Burnett’s 
Trustee v Grainger.3 The rule appears to run contrary to the maxim prior 
tempore potior iure est.4 The puzzle is to explain how a party with a real 
right can be vulnerable to a challenge brought by someone with a mere 
personal right.
A.  Mala Fides, Personal Bar and the Publicity Principle
Although the topic was addressed during the foundational period in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,5 modern discussion begins with 
Rodger (Builders) Ltd v Fawdry6 which offers little consideration of the basis 
of the rule. Lord Jamieson, giving the leading judgment, was content to rely 
on three nineteenth-century cases where the rule had been applied and to 
observe that the purchaser was in bad faith.7
In the first of these, Marshall v Hynd,8 the judges’ primary concern was 
the level of knowledge needed to put the second purchaser in bad faith. 
2  Reid Property para 695, approved in Advice Centre for Mortgages v McNicoll 2006 SLT 591 
at para 46.
3  2004 SC (HL) 19. For a summary of this debate, see the Scottish Law Commission Report 
on Sharp v Thomson (SLC No 208, December 2007) Part 1.
4  For a very forceful statement of this view, see Anderson Assignation paras 11-05 and 
11-30.
5  Anderson Assignation paras 11-06-23.
6  1950 SC 483.
7  1950 SC 483 at 500, citing Marshall v Hynd (1828) 6 S 384, Petrie v Forsyth (1874) 2 R 214 
and Stodart v Dalzell (1876) 4 R 236.
8  (1828) 6 S 384.
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If knowledge is to constitute bad faith, there must be some rule which 
explains why the party with the knowledge should have acted differently. 
This issue was addressed in the third case mentioned in Rodger (Builders), 
Stodart v Dalzell, where Lords Ormidale and Gifford suggested that the 
second purchaser’s knowledge of the prior right meant that he was not 
entitled to rely on the faith of the records regarding his seller’s right.9 
These authorities make Lord Gifford’s characterisation of the rule as 
a species of personal bar in the second of the three cases, Petrie v Forsyth, 
understandable.10 On this model the first buyer has acquired a right, albeit 
not one which has been published. Under normal circumstances, that right 
could not be invoked against second buyer who had registered because the 
latter could invoke the faith of the records. However, the second buyer’s 
knowledge of the right means that he is barred from making this argument 
since he knew better. As Reid and Blackie point out, however, personal bar 
is difficult to maintain in this context because of the absence of inconsistent 
conduct by the second buyer.11 
Even if the language of personal bar is eschewed, a rule which restricts 
reliance on the register to those who are in good faith is conceivable. 
Indeed such rules exist in the Land Registration (Scotland) Act 2012.12 
Wortley makes tentative moves towards such an analysis with his 
suggestion that the basis of the offside goals rule might lie in an aspect 
of the publicity principle: “the publicity principle is not merely there 
to protect third parties: in certain circumstances, it can also be used to 
penalise them.”13
The difficulty with this approach is that the act of publicity (be it 
registration, intimation or delivery) is not merely a mechanism for making 
a transfer known. It is constitutive of the transfer. Until that act is completed, 
ownership remains with the seller and the first buyer’s right is merely 
personal. The first buyer has no proprietary interest of which third parties 
could have notice. This stands in contrast to the good faith requirements 
9  (1876) 4 R 236 both at 242. Similar comments were made by Lord Kinloch in Morrison v 
Somerville (1860) 22 D 1082 at 1089 and by Lord Jamieson in Rodger Builders 1950 SC 483 
at 500.
10  (1874) 2 R 214 at 223. 
11  E C Reid and J W G Blackie, Personal Bar (2006) para 2-08. See further J W G Blackie, 
“Good Faith and the Doctrine of Personal Bar” in ADM Forte (ed) Good Faith in Contract 
and Property Law (1999) 129 at 147-60.
12  E.g. Land Registration (Scotland) Act 2012 s 86, particularly paragraph (3)(c).
13  Wortley (n 1) at 314.
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in the 2012 Act,14 which cover cases where the Land Register misstates the 
relevant real rights. 
In that context, an argument based on the faith of the records or the 
publicity principle might have difficulty answering Lord Low’s objection: 
“Assuming that they knew of the obligation, they knew also that it did not 
affect the lands.”15 Like its correlative right, the seller’s duty is personal. The 
second buyer might argue that his knowledge of it was irrelevant because 
the obligation of which he knew did not bind him. Further, arguments 
about publicity or personal bar offer little in the way of an explanation for 
why a gratuitous transferee who was ignorant of the earlier transfer should 
be vulnerable.16
B.  Mala Fides and the Transfer Agreement
Carey Miller suggests that the import of the second buyer’s bad faith can 
be explained, not by reference to the publicity principle but by invoking 
the principle of separation of contract and conveyance.17 This principle 
recognises transfer as a distinct juridical act requiring intention on the part 
of transferor and transferee. Carey Miller argues that the second buyer’s 
bad faith means he has a defective intention to acquire, which renders his 
right voidable.18 
Carey Miller employs an unusual understanding of intention. 
Both seller and second buyer wish the transfer to take place and, on a 
conventional view of intention, that would be enough. At the time of the 
transfer their wills are directed to that end. The fact that they know it to 
be wrong does not affect this intention. A poacher has a sufficient animus 
acquirendi, although he knows that he is committing a crime.19 Further, 
14  Land Registration (Scotland) Act 2012 ss 86-93.
15  Morier v Brownlie & Watson (1895) 23 R 67 at 74.
16  E.g. Alexander v Lundies (1675) Mor 940.
17  Wortley describes Carey Miller’s analysis as an “abstract system approach” (Wortley 
(n 1) at 312), a characterisation which Carey Miller accepts (“A Centenary Offering” at 
96). However, the analysis turns on the need for a real or transfer agreement. A transfer 
agreement might be necessary even in a system which also requires a valid causa for the 
transfer. Therefore, it seems marginally preferable to see the analysis as resting on the 
principle of separation.
18  Carey Miller Corporeal Moveables para 8.28. See also para 8.30 and Carey Miller (n 1) at 
114.
19  Erskine, Inst 2.1.10. 
 The Offside Goals Rule and Fraud on Creditors 119
the vices of consent, such as fraud and force and fear, operate for the 
protection of one of the parties to a transaction where his consent has 
been improperly obtained. What is being suggested here is something 
completely different: both parties give free and informed consent and it 
is a third party who needs the protection.
A second problem with Carey Miller’s analysis is a variant of the 
problem with the publicity principle argument. Even if bad faith can affect 
intention to acquire, some explanation of why the knowledge amounts to 
bad faith is needed. As noted above, knowledge only constitutes bad faith 
when coupled with a rule explaining why the knowledge should have 
made you act differently.
As for the gratuity case, Carey Miller addresses this in straightforward 
policy terms, suggesting that the reason is simply that “a party who fails 
to give value should not trump a competing party with an earlier right.”20 
This approach has intuitive appeal. The law of transfer is primarily geared 
towards the needs of commerce and thus of onerous transferees. Donees 
are not worthy of this protection. 
Once again, however, a little more seems necessary. Suppose Donna 
makes a written promise to David that she will convey a field to him. 
The next day, she concludes a contract with Betty for the sale of the 
same field. Foolishly, Betty pays up front. On the third day, Donna 
delivers the disposition to David who duly registers it. Betty clearly 
has a right against Donna for breach of contract but David is safe. The 
story would be different if Betty’s missives had been concluded on Day 
1 and the promise to David made on Day 2. If the basic idea behind 
the vulnerability of donees under the offside goals rule is that they are 
less worthy of protection than onerous transferees, it is difficult to see 
why Betty should be worse off because the promise happened to come 
first. To say that David has the earlier right is to fall into the error which 
underlies the personal bar analysis: the idea that some kind of proto-
property right is acquired before completion of the transfer of which the 
act of transfer merely gives notice. All David has on Day 1 is a personal 
right against Donna. Similarly, if the gratuity case is explained by lack of 
sympathy for donees, why can a promisee invoke the rule against later 
donee?21 
20  Carey Miller Corporeal Moveables para 8.32.
21  E.g. Alexander v Lundies (1675) Mor 940.
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C.  Mala Fides and Fraud
The difficulties with the publicity principle and the transfer agreement as 
bases for the offside goals rule drive analysis back to an earlier approach. 
The nineteenth-century cases cited in Rodger (Builders) marked a shift in the 
analysis of the rule. Up to that point, it was thought to rest on fraud. 
Seatoun v Copburnes,22 decided in 1549, is probably the first recorded case 
which can be understood in terms of the offside goals rule. Lady Seatoun 
sought to reduce an infeftment given to James Copburne by his father. She 
argued that, prior to that sasine, she and the priests and college of the Kirk 
of Seatoun had bought an annualrent23 of the lands from the father. Lady 
Seatoun alleged that infeftment on the annualrent had been completed, so 
she might have relied on her prior real right but she chose not to do so. 
Instead she suggested that “the said laird in manifest defraud of the said 
lady and preistis dolose infeodavit suum filium in suis terris, and sua, said 
scho [i.e. she], that that alienatioun in dolo et fraude (ut predicitur) facta de iure 
erat retractanda.” In other words, she sought reduction of the infeftment on 
the basis that it was granted in fraud of her right to the lands.
Fraud also played a key role in the first major scholarly discussion of the 
offside goals rule: Stair’s treatment of resolutive conditions in contracts of 
sale. A resolutive condition is a term which purports to make the property 
revert to the transferor in given circumstances. Stair’s view was that 
such conditions had no proprietary effect. The transferee merely had an 
obligation to reconvey if the condition occurred. This raised the question 
of the effect of the obligation on third parties who obtained the property 
from the transferee. Although the origin of the obligation to convey differs 
from double sale, the end result is the same: an alienation in breach of an 
obligation to grant a real right to someone else. 
As with Seatoun v Copburnes, Stair analyses the situation in terms of 
fraud:24 
…though there may be fraud in the acquirer, which raiseth an obligation of 
reparation to the party damnified by that delinquence, yet that is but personal; 
22  (1549) Sinclair Practicks n 459.
23  I.e. a subordinate real right, giving the holder a right to an annual payment from the 
owner of the burdened property.
24  Stair, Inst 1.14.5. He does go on to consider whether the 1621 Act might apply to 
gratuitous alienations of property subject to a resolutive condition but concludes that 
the law is not clear. It would later become firmly established that insolvency at the time 
of the grant was a prerequisite of such a challenge.
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and another party acquiring bona fide or necessarily, and not partaking of 
that fraud, is in tuto. But certain knowledge, by intimation, citation, or the 
like, inducing malam fidem, whereby any prior disposition or assignation 
made to another party is certainly known, or at least interruption made 
in acquiring by arrestment or citation of the acquirer, such rights acquired, 
not being of necessity to satisfy prior engagements, are reducible ex capite 
fraudis, and the acquirer is partaker of the fraud of his author, who thereby 
becomes a granter of double rights; but this will not hinder legal diligence 
to proceed and be completed and become effectual, though the user thereof 
did certainly know of any inchoate or incomplete right of another.
Certain elements of the analysis are worthy of particular note: the idea 
that the primary wrong is done by the granter (referred to as the acquirer 
because of the context of a resolutive condition); that the successor is only 
vulnerable if the prior right is known of and that the basis of this is not 
his own fraud but participation in the granter’s fraud. As with his general 
analysis of fraud,25 Stair characterises the vulnerability of a transaction 
affected by fraud in terms of a personal right to reparation from the 
wrongdoer. 
D.  Is Fraud a Broad Enough Concept to Account for 
the Offside Goals Rule?
As Anderson and Reid show,26 the fraud analysis persisted until the 
nineteenth century. Indeed references to it can also be found in the later 
cases, existing alongside arguments based on publicity or personal bar. 
Thus, in Morrison v Sommerville, Lord Kinloch gives a classic fraud-based 
analysis:27
In granting a second right, the seller is guilty of fraud on the first purchaser. 
Against the seller himself the transactions would be clearly reducible. But, 
in taking the second right in the knowledge of the first, the second disponee 
becomes an accomplice in the fraud, and the transactions is reducible 
against both alike.
25  Stair, Inst 1.9.9-15.
26  Reid Property para 695; Anderson Assignation 11-06-23.
27  (1860) 22 D 1082 at 1089. This analysis is reflected in the issue which the Inner 
House appointed to be put to the jury: “whether, in violation of a previous minute 
of agreement, dated 7th October 1850, No 8 of the process, the said disposition was 
granted fraudulently by the said George Somerville, and was taken fraudulently by 
the said John Craig Waddell, in the knowledge of the said previous agreement, and in 
defraud of the pursuer’s rights under the same.” (1860) 22 D 1082 at 1090.
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In Petrie v Forsyth, Lord Neaves proceeded on the basis that the second 
purchaser’s conduct was fraudulent.28 However, Lord Gifford took a 
different approach, distinguishing between fraud, mala fides and “mere 
knowledge.”29 He concluded that what was needed was knowledge 
sufficient to put the second purchaser under a duty to contact the first. 
Lord Gifford clearly considered this to fall short of fraud. On such a model 
it is difficult to see how fraud can form the basis for the doctrine. 
A similar line of reasoning is articulated by Lord Drummond Young in 
Advice Centre for Mortgages:30
The theoretical basis for the foregoing principle is not discussed in any detail 
in the decided cases, perhaps because its practical application is very obvious, 
at least in simpler cases. The origins of the principle seem to lie in the concept 
of fraud in its older sense. This is not the modern sense, involving a false 
representation made knowingly, but rather consists of actings designed to 
defeat another person’s legal right. Nevertheless, the law has moved away 
from the concept of fraud. In Rodger Lord Jamieson said: “[F]raud in the 
sense of moral delinquency does not enter into the matter. It is sufficient 
if the intending purchaser fails to make the inquiry which he is bound to 
do. If he fails he is no longer in bona fide but in mala fide.” Thus implied or 
constructive knowledge, just as much as actual knowledge, will bring the 
principle into operation and render the second purchaser in mala fide.
The discomfort with fraud as a rationale is also evident in academic 
analysis: Kenneth Reid is careful to specify that “the original analysis 
based on ‘fraud’ remains correct, provided that ‘fraud’ is not confined to its 
narrow modern meaning.”31 Wortley goes further, seeming to regard the 
second purchaser’s liability in cases of mere knowledge of the prior right as 
being more than a fraud-based justification can support.32 Dot Reid views 
offside goals as part of the law of fraud, specifically of secondary fraud, but 
suggests that this is a survival of the older, broader view which was heavily 
dependent on the concept of inequality derived ultimately from scholastic 
thinking. This leaves the offside goals rule in the law of obligations but 
outside the established categories of enrichment or delict.33
28  (1874) 2 R 214 at 221.
29  Ibid at 223.
30  2006 SLT 591 at para 44.
31  Reid Property para 695.
32  Wortley (n 1) at 301.
33  D Reid “Fraud in Scots Law” (PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2012) ch 7, esp pp 
243-44 and 250-51.
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The doubt stems from the interaction of two developments. First, there 
is the sense that while Scots law took a broad view of fraud in the early-
modern period, later developments saw it narrow considerably. This 
process, particularly the influence of Derry v Peek,34 is thought to have 
limited fraud to deceit.35 Secondly, there appears to be a relaxation in the 
level of knowledge required for offside goals in some of the dicta in the 
nineteenth-century cases. This broadened the scope of the rule and can 
appear to move it away from a category of intentional wrongdoing. 
Is it possible to address these concerns and thus to continue to rely on 
fraud as a basis which can guide future development?
(1) Fraud on creditors rather than fraud as deceit
In response to the objection that the meaning of fraud has narrowed, 
reference may be made to a species of fraud which is recognised by the 
modern law but which does not involve deception: fraud on creditors. It 
is worthy of note that mere knowledge of what is going on is sufficient to 
render the debtor’s counterparty a participant in the fraud in that context.
The best known example of fraud on creditors is the transfer or 
burdening of assets by an insolvent debtor. The classic examples are well-
known. A debtor recognises that he is irrecoverably insolvent. Knowing 
that his assets will be sold to pay his debts, he decides that he would rather 
see them go to his friends, so he gives them away. In some cases the transfer 
might be intended to allow the debtor continued use of the property, as 
where a businessman in embarrassed circumstances transfers the family 
home to his wife. Whatever the purpose, the result is the same: a pool of 
assets which was already insufficient to meet the debtor’s obligations is 
further diminished. Creditors’ interests are thus prejudiced. Both common 
law and statute allow for the reversal of such transfers or grants at the 
instance of creditors or the insolvency official. These grants are usually 
gratuitous but an onerous grantee who colludes with the debtor in his 
attempt to frustrate his creditors is also liable to have his grant reduced.36
It is clear that the basis of this rule at common law is that the transactions 
are fraudulent.37 This rule is very widely recognised in both the Common 
34  (1889) 14 App Cas 337.
35  This development is discussed in detail in Reid “Fraud in Scots Law” ch 4 and 5.
36  J MacLeod “Fraud and Voidable Transfer: Scots Law in European Context” (PhD thesis, 
University of Edinburgh, 2013) ch 4 esp pp 83-92 and 113-24.
37  W W McBryde Bankruptcy, 2nd edn (1995) ch 12 esp paras 12-11-48; MacLeod “Fraud 
and Voidable Transfer” ch 4.
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Law and Civilian tradition.38 In the latter it is commonly referred to as the 
actio Pauliana, a term which betrays the rule’s origins in Roman law.
The debtor may have contracted the debts in good faith with the full 
intention of paying them. In such a case, the creditors have not been 
deceived into giving credit but they are nonetheless said to be defrauded. 
As with the offside goals rule, this provokes a degree of discomfort in the 
modern sources, leading McBryde to suggest that fraud in this context is 
anomalous and to caution against use of authorities on fraud in the general 
sense.39
The striking thing is that the anomalous fraud looks very similar to the 
offside goals rule. Both rules involve actions by a debtor which render him 
incapable of fulfilling his obligation and thus frustrate the creditor’s hopes 
of recovery. As with the offside goals rule, the grantee may find himself 
liable either because he knew what the debtor was doing or because his 
grant was gratuitous. Furthermore, as with Stair’s account of the offside 
goals situation, the primary fraud is that of the debtor while the grantee is 
liable as a participant in the debtor’s fraud.40
Anderson notes the parallel between the offside goals rule and the 
actio Pauliana, but points to two differences: in the actio Pauliana having 
given good consideration is usually a defence and the relevant mala fides is 
knowledge of insolvency rather than knowledge of a prior right.41 However, 
these differences reflect a different context rather than a fundamental 
conceptual division. The reason that payment is usually a good defence to 
the actio Pauliana is that such payment renders the transaction neutral in 
its effect on the patrimony. There is no prejudice to ordinary creditors. It 
makes no difference to them whether the debtor has a piece of machinery 
worth £5,000 or £5,000 in his bank account. Both are assets which are 
38  B M Goodman, “The Revocatory Action” (1934-35) 9 Tulane Law Review 422; A Boraine 
“Towards Codifying the actio Pauliana” (1996) South African Mercantile Law Journal 213; A 
Vaquer, “Traces of Paulian Action in Community Law” in R Schulze (ed), New Features 
in Contract Law (2007) 421; J J Forner Delaygua La protección del crédito en Europa: La 
acción pauliana (2000); P R Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance (University edn, 
2008) 79-85; C von Bar and E Clive, Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European 
Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference Full Edition (2009) Vol 5 2634ff and R J de 
Weijs “Towards an Objective Rule on Transaction Avoidance in Insolvencies” (2011) 
International Insolvency Review. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/iir.196 
39  McBryde Bankruptcy para 12-13.
40  E.g. M’Cowan v Wright (1853) 15 D 494 at 500 per Lord Hope. See further MacLeod 
“Fraud and Voidable Transfer” 82-87.
41  Anderson Assignation para 11-17.
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available to them for the satisfaction of their rights. Things are different in 
the offside goals situation because what matters for the creditor is not the 
value of the patrimony as a whole but the presence in it of the particular 
asset to which he is entitled.
This line of thought leads to an explanation of why the relevant mala 
fides is knowledge of the insolvency in an actio Pauliana situation and 
knowledge of the competing right in an offside goals situation. Knowledge 
that someone is insolvent implies knowledge of personal rights against 
his patrimony: if you know someone is insolvent you know that he has 
creditors whom he cannot pay. Specific knowledge of the creditors’ rights is 
not necessary because the counterparty knows enough to understand that 
the transaction will frustrate the creditors’ hopes of recovery. Conversely, 
if a buyer knows that someone else has a personal right to a particular 
asset, the general solvency of the seller is not relevant. Even if the seller is 
generally solvent, the competitor will still be frustrated.
The actio Pauliana and the offside goals rule can both be seen as protecting 
creditors whose debtors act to frustrate their hopes of satisfaction, the 
difference in the detail of the two rules results from differences in context 
and thus in the nature of the protection necessary. 
Insolvency fraud is not the only instance of fraud on creditors recognised 
by Scots law, although the other instance is less obvious at first sight. A 
creditor who intends to do diligence can use an inhibition to render the 
debtor’s heritable property litigious.42 As with the actio Pauliana, the concern 
is that the creditor’s recourse (in this case by means of diligence) against 
the debtor’s assets will be frustrated by voluntary acts of the debtor. The 
point is made most clearly by reference to the historic terms of letters of 
inhibition. Prior to their abolition,43 letters of inhibition were the means by 
which the Court of Session, acting in the name of king or queen sanctioned 
the inhibition of the debtor. The letters instructed messengers at arms to 
make two prohibitions. First, they were to “inhibit and discharge” the 
debtor, prohibiting any dealing with his property whether heritable or 
moveable and any act pursuant to which diligence might be done against 
his assets. Secondly, “all our lieges of this realm, and all others whom it 
42  Burnett’s Tr v Grainger 2004 SC (HL) 19 at para 22 per Lord Hope. Inhibition is not the 
only instance of litigiosity in Scots law for the others, and for more extensive discussion 
of inhibition, see MacLeod “Fraud and Voidable Transfer” ch 5 and 6.
43  Bankruptcy and Diligence etc (Scotland) Act 2007 s 146.
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effeirs” were to be inhibited and discharged from concluding any of the 
prohibited transactions with the debtor. The former prohibition required 
to be by personal service on the debtor, the latter by proclamation at the 
market cross. The reason for this drastic action was also narrated in the 
letters: namely that the king is informed that the debtor intends to diminish 
his estate “in defraud and prejudice of the complainer.”44
Again, the fraud in this case is not deception. The problem facing the 
creditor is assets leaving the debtor’s patrimony meaning that there is 
not enough there to satisfy the former’s right. Letters of inhibition are no 
longer issued but the new schedule of inhibition reflects the old thinking. 
To take the example of an inhibition by a creditor suing to enforce a debt in 
the Court of Session:45
…In Her Majesty’s name and authority, I [name], Messenger at Arms, by 
virtue of [document which warrants the inhibition] inhibit you from selling, 
disposing of, burdening or otherwise affecting all land and heritable 
property in which you have an interest to the prejudice of [the inhibitor].
Again, inhibition has its own special characteristics, notably the absence of 
any need to prove bad faith on the part of those dealing with the debtor but 
that is because registration of the inhibition operates to put everyone on 
notice that the debtor has been so restricted.
Another speciality of inhibition illustrates the fact that inhibition 
operates to protect satisfaction of a personal right. A general creditor’s 
inhibition covers the heritable property of the debtor because any of it 
could be subject to an adjudication for enforcement of the debt. Where, 
however, the creditor inhibits with a view to enforcing a personal right to 
a particular plot, the effect of the inhibition is restricted to that asset.46 The 
general state of the patrimony is irrelevant to the creditor, provided that his 
access to that plot is secured.
Fraud in the sense of deception and fraud on creditors may well have 
been part of a broader concept of fraud which has since fallen away but 
both survive in the modern law. Therefore, a narrowing of the concept of 
fraud is not a reason to doubt its appropriateness as a grounding concept 
for the offside goals rule.
44  Stair, Inst 4.l.4.
45  Diligence (Scotland) Regulations 2009 Sch 1.
46  Bankruptcy and Diligence etc (Scotland) Act 2007 ss 150(1) and 153.
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Mala fides without knowledge
The second problem identified by the modern accounts relates to the 
knowledge requirement. Mala fides can be fixed even in cases where the 
second purchaser is unaware of the prior right, provided that he knows 
enough to put him on his inquiry and then fails to properly investigate. 
Thus the rule can apply where a naïve second purchaser honestly thought 
that there was no problem. That is the basis for Lord Jamieson’s observation 
that “fraud in the sense of moral delinquency does not enter into the 
matter.”47
The courts have been somewhat evasive about the precise circumstances 
which will raise the duty of inquiry and what the content of the duty is.48 
This is regrettable because it makes life difficult for potential purchasers, 
but the basic idea is clear enough: where there is a duty of inquiry on a 
purchaser and he fails to make that inquiry, he cannot rely on his ignorance 
of a fact of which he would have known had he fulfilled the duty. You are 
treated as knowing what you should have known.
Lord Drummond Young was therefore correct to characterise 
circumstances where the duty of inquiry is neglected as cases of “implied 
or constructive knowledge.”49 Again, this reflects analysis found in other 
instances of fraud on creditors: the result of publication of an inhibition 
is that everyone is deemed to know of it. Where there is constructive 
knowledge of a prior right, the grantee is deemed to have that knowledge 
and the analysis therefore proceeds on the basis that he does know.
Where Lord Drummond Young went astray was to conclude that this 
amounted to a move away from the concept of fraud. The fraud is still 
there: the seller knows of the prior right and sells anyway. Mala fides is 
not watered-down fraud; mala fides is knowing that the fraud is happening. 
Such a view is consistent with the standard understanding of bona fides in 
property transactions: ignorance of another’s right.50
It is worth bearing in mind that the offside goals rule is not the 
only circumstance where failure to come up to an objective standard of 
reasonable inquiry can leave a naïve counterparty liable on the basis of 
47  1950 SC 483 at 499.
48  See further J MacLeod and R Anderson “Offside Goals and Interfering with Play” 2009 
SLT (News) 93 at 94-95.
49  2006 SLT 591 at para 44.
50  As, for instance in the Sale of Goods Act 1979 s 24 or the Land Registration etc (Scotland) 
Act 2012 s 86.
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complicity in fraud. A solicitor’s naïve trust in his client was held sufficient 
to render him liable as an accessory to (conventional) fraud by deception in 
Frank Houlgate Investment Co Ltd v Biggart Baillie.51 
Why is the faith bad?
If fraud is to provide a convincing rationale for the offside goals rule 
some explanation is needed of why the third party must take account of a 
personal duty owed by someone else.
It is not quite sufficient to point to the accessory nature of the liability, 
however. In criminal law, such an assertion suffices because criminal law 
duties typically bind everyone and therefore the conduct in question is 
wrong for both principal and accessory. The same can be said of inducing a 
payment by deception.52 Everyone owes everyone else a duty not to commit 
such fraud. So, where Alfred induces Brenda to pay him by deception using 
forged documents and Cecil helps to prepare the documents, knowing 
what they are for, both are liable. Cecil was obliged not to deceive Brenda 
just as much as Alfred. 
In offside goals, however, the position is different. The seller’s conduct 
is only wrong because of a particular duty that he and only he owes to 
the first purchaser. Until the first contract was concluded, a sale to the 
second purchaser was perfectly lawful. The duty not to sell flows from 
that contract to which the second purchaser was not a party. The second 
purchaser might argue that, although he knew that the seller was behaving 
wrongfully, this fraud arose from the personal relationship between the 
seller and the first buyer and was therefore none of his business. 
This problem is not unique to the offside goals rule. It is also raised 
by fraud by insolvent debtors but it is felt more sharply in relation to 
offside goals, perhaps because the actio Pauliana is so ubiquitous, and 
perhaps because the requirement of insolvency is thought to keep it within 
reasonable bounds.
Dot Reid explains the accessory’s liability by reference to the moral 
sense of Stair and Aquinas and the latter’s broad notion of inequality.53 
51  2014 SLT 1001. As with the offside goals rule, there is an argument that the requisite 
mental element here should be drawn relatively narrowly: E C Reid “‘Accession to 
Delinquence’: Frank Houlgate Investment Co Ltd (FHI) v Biggart Baillie LLP” (2013) 17 
Edin LR 388 at 394.
52  As in Frank Houlgate (n 50).
53  Reid “Fraud in Scots Law” 242.
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That, however, raises the question of how this moral sense might be 
conceptualised as a duty with legal consequences.
The rules on fraud on creditors, whether they arise in the context 
of offside goals, insolvency or inhibition, presuppose a limited duty of 
non-interference with other people’s personal rights. While a personal 
right is only enforceable against the debtor, it is not a matter of complete 
indifference to third parties. They have a duty not to facilitate breaches 
of the relevant obligation. However, since personal rights are invisible, 
facilitation only renders the facilitator liable in circumstances when 
he knew or ought to have known of the right and that the conduct in 
question would breach it.
Further evidence of such a duty can be found in the delict of inducing 
breach of contract. The five characteristics or essential elements of that 
delict were set out by Lord Hodge in Global Resources Group Ltd v Mackay:54
(i)  breach of contract;
(ii)  knowledge on the part of the inducing party that this will occur;
(iii)  breach which is either a means to an end sought by the inducing party 
or an end in itself;
(iv)  inducement in the form of persuasion, encouragement or assistance;
(v)  absence of lawful justification.
The parallels with the requirements for the offside goals rule are close 
but not exact.55 Some differences are not surprising given the differing 
origins. Nonetheless, the parallels between the two rules are striking: in 
the core offside goals case, the second purchaser persuades the seller to 
sell when the latter was already contracted to transfer the property to 
another; in the foundational authority on inducing breach of contract a 
theatre owner persuaded a singer to appear in his theatre when she was 
contractually bound to sing in another.56
Both rules are part of modern Scots law and both point towards 
recognition of an obligation to take account of other people’s personal 
rights. Both do so on the basis of accessory liability.57 Absent an obligation 
54  2009 SLT 104 paras 11-4. Lord Hodge drew heavily on the restatement of the law in this 
area in OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1.
55  See further J MacLeod “Offside Goals and Induced Breaches of Contract” (2009) 13 
EdinLR 278.
56  Lumley v Gye (1853) 2 E & B 216; 118 ER 749.
57  The basis for the distinction between inducing breach of contract and causing loss by 
unlawful means in OBG v Allan was that the former, but not the latter was concerned 
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not to participate in breach of a personal right, it is difficult to see how 
inducing breach of contract or participating in a fraud on creditors could 
be considered wrongful.
Of course, that answer raises its own question: if third parties owe the 
holder of a personal right a duty not knowingly to participate in or encourage 
the breach of that right, why is the third party’s liability accessory? The 
answer lies in the trigger for the liability. Liability depends on breach by 
the debtor. Until the debtor defaults on his obligation, the third party is not 
liable. So a third party who tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade a seller to sell 
to another incur no liability.
A duty of non-interference sits well with the idea that personal rights 
are property which is owned in essentially the same way as corporeal 
property.58 It can then be seen as equivalent to the duties of non-
interference which protect corporeal moveables or land. Of course, the 
content of the duty is not absolute but neither is the duty not to interfere 
with corporeal property: a landowner, for example, must tolerate access 
taken under Part 1 of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, and the law 
of nuisance does not give a remedy against every use of neighbouring 
property which has implications for the enjoyment of his own; likewise 
a bona fide possessor of a corporeal moveable belonging to another does 
no wrong.
Admittedly, the duty of non-interference is not the same as the duty of 
non-interference with corporeal property, but that is because the nature 
of the property being protected is different. And in any event, the level 
of protection against interference by third parties is not uniform between 
the different types of corporeal property. There is no right to roam over 
corporeal moveables.
(2) The scope of the offside goals rule
Personal rights to real rights
Traditionally, the offside goals rule was said to protect only “rights capable 
of being made real”59 or, more precisely, “personal rights to real rights.” This 
with accessory liability: paras 3-8 and 32 per Lord Hoffmann.
58  See e.g. S Ginossar Droit réel, propriété et créance: Élaboration d’un système rationnel des 
droits patrimoniaux (1960) n 22-25.
59  Wallace v Simmers 1960 SC 255 at 260 per Lord Guthrie.
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limitation to the rule has been doubted in light of Trade Development Bank v 
Warriner & Mason (Scotland) Ltd.60 In that case, a condition against leasing 
in a standard security was given effect against a tenant on the basis of the 
tenant’s bad faith vis-à-vis the prohibition. This led Kenneth Reid to suggest 
that the personal-right-to-a-real-right requirement had fallen away and that 
the scope of the rule was instead controlled by the requirement that the 
granter was in breach of an antecedent obligation in making the grant.61 
As Webster has pointed out,62 framing the rule’s application in these 
terms is difficult to reconcile with the earlier decision of the Inner House 
in Wallace v Simmers.63 There the court declined to apply the rule to protect 
a licensee against an action for ejection by a third party purchaser on the 
basis that this was not a personal right to a real right. Sale by one who has 
granted an irrevocable licence is a breach of an antecedent obligation (since 
it renders the licensor unable to fulfil his obligation), but Wallace means that 
the rule will not apply even if the third party is in bad faith.
The view that not every grant in breach of a prior obligation is 
challengeable as an offside goal is supported by recent authority.64 In Gibson 
v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc, however, Lord Emslie expressed some doubts 
about whether the “personal right to a real right” test was appropriately 
expressed.65 Nonetheless, his alternative formulation: that the right be 
capable of “affecting the records” seems to come to much the same thing 
for heritable property. The records are only affected in any meaningful way 
by transfer, extinction or grant of a real right. 
Lord Emslie’s formulation has the disadvantage of not being apposite to 
cover moveable property. On the other hand it usefully raises the question 
of the holder of a real right who is contractually bound to grant a discharge 
transferring that right before the discharge is granted. For instance, Dominic 
may own a plot which has the benefit of a right of way over Serena’s land. 
She pays him for a discharge because she wants to develop the land. Before 
the discharge is granted, Dominic gifts the plot to Gary, who refuses to 
grant the discharge. Should Serena be able to invoke the offside goals 
60  1980 SC 74, approved in Trade Development Bank v Crittall Windows Ltd 1983 SLT 510.
61  Reid Property paras 695-96.
62  P Webster “The Relationship of Tenant and Successor Landlord in Scots Law” (PhD 
thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2008) 211-13.
63  1960 SC 255.
64  Optical Express (Gyle) Ltd v Marks & Spencer plc 2000 SLT 644 and Gibson v Royal Bank of 
Scotland Plc 2009 SLT 444.
65  2009 SLT 444 at paras 43-50, esp para 44.
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rule? On Lord Emslie’s formulation, she can. On the traditional model, the 
picture is less clear but protecting her seems to be the correct result. Had 
Dominic contracted to grant a servitude to her, Serena would have been 
able to rely on it and there is no obvious reason why one type of transaction 
with a servitude should be favoured over another. 
Therefore, the requirement might be better rephrased as a personal right 
to the grant, transfer, variation or discharge of a real right. This is rather 
cumbersome. The basic point expressed by the “personal-right-to-real-
right” formulation appears to be widely accepted and the phrase remains a 
useful (if slightly imprecise) handle for the concept. The question remains, 
however, of how this idea sits with the rationale for the offside goals rule 
presented here.
Personal rights to subordinate real rights
One implication of the suggestion that the offside goals rule protects 
personal rights to the grant, transfer or discharge of real rights is that the 
rule extends beyond double sale. Someone with a personal right to the 
grant of a servitude or a lease should be able to invoke the rule too.66 So, if 
Bert contracts to grant a right of way to Sally but transfers the property to 
Ernie before Sally is able to register the grant, Sally can invoke the offside 
goals rule against Ernie if he was in bad faith or the transfer was gratuitous.
Subordinate real rights present difficulties in terms of remedies. If, the 
holder of the prior personal right hears of the wrongful grant before it is 
completed, he may be able to obtain an interdict against completion.67 What 
of the case where the prior rightholder only discovers the grant after the 
fact? Where the first grantee was entitled to transfer of the asset, there is no 
difficulty in returning the property to the seller. That is only a short term 
step, after which it will pass to the first grantee. Where, on the other hand, 
the first grantee is merely entitled to a subordinate right, setting a transfer 
aside seems to go too far. If the first grantee is entitled to a servitude, all he 
needs is an opportunity to complete his real right. He has no interest in the 
seller being the owner instead of the second buyer.
66  There is express authority to this effect in South Africa Grant v Stonestreet 1968 (4) SA 1 
(A). A similar result was reached in Greig v Brown and Nicholson (1829) 7 S 274, although 
the court’s reasoning is not very clearly expressed.
67  Spurway, Petr (10 December 1986, unreported), OH, available on LexisNexis.
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The South African solution is to allow the personal right to be enforced 
directly against the successor.68 This result has been explained in terms 
of a broad, equitable approach.69 It seems to come close to collapsing the 
distinction between real and personal rights and may explain the tendency 
in South Africa to suggest that the doctrine of notice (their equivalent of 
the offside goals rule) affords “limited real effect” to personal rights.70 Such 
an approach is not particularly attractive for Scots law. How then can the 
problem of the offside goal against a right to a servitude be solved? 
One answer is suggested by reflecting on the fact that reduction of a 
deed granted in breach of inhibition is ad hunc effectum. Everyone also 
knows that reduction ad hunc effectum means that only the inhibitor is 
entitled to treat the reduced deed as null. Familiarity with the rule and lack 
of familiarity with Latin are apt to mask how strange this is. The words ad 
hunc effectum simply mean “to this effect.” Why should those words have 
come to signify that the reduction only benefits the inhibitor? 
To answer this question, we need to make brief mention of seventeenth-
century decisions concerning fraud on creditors by an insolvent debtor. In 
many of those cases, reduction was granted but the Lords specified the 
effect of reduction. In some cases this was to allow the reducing creditor to 
rank pari passu with other creditors;71 in others, the reduction only benefited 
certain classes of creditor.72 The particular scope was determined by what 
was necessary to reverse the prejudice caused by the debtor’s fraudulent 
actions and the rationale is fairly clear. To go further would be to go beyond 
the purpose of the rule: which is to secure creditors against the debtor’s 
attempts to frustrate their claims. The limitation was typically introduced 
by the phrase “to the effect that” or some variation thereon.
68  1968 (4) SA 1 at 20 per Ogilvie JA. The reasoning of the court in Greig v Brown and 
Nicholson (n 65) in Shaw’s report is limited to the brief and rather surprising suggestion 
that since both rights were personal “the common owner is divested by the conveyance” 
without the need to complete the grant of servitude by taking possession. This analysis 
would be difficult to maintain light of the clarification of the relationship between real 
and personal rights and of the race to completion in Sharp v Thomson 1995 SC 455 and 
Burnett’s Trustee v Grainger 2004 SC (HL) 19.
69  Meridian Bay Restaurant (Pty) Ltd v Mitchell 2011 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at paras 30-1 per Ponnan 
JA.
70  “Die juiste siening na my mening is dat vanweë die kennisleer aan ’n persoonlike reg 
beperkte saaklike werking verleen word”: Associate South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v 
Oryx & Vereinigte Bäckerien (Pty) Ltd 1982 (3) SA 893 (A) at 910 per Van Heerden JA.
71  E.g. Kinloch v Blair (1678) Mor 889 and Brown v Murray (1754) Mor 886.
72  E.g. Cunninghame v Hamilton (1682) Mor 1064 and Bateman & Chaplane v Hamilton (1686) 
Mor 1076. For further discussion of these cases, see MacLeod “Fraud and Voidable 
Transfer” 124-26.
134 Defects in Acquisition and How to Fix Them
Turning back to inhibitions, the import of the phrase ad hunc effectum is 
readily explicable. The prohibition on dealing was imposed to protect the 
inhibiting creditor and no one else. Therefore, to allow the reduction to 
have effect in relation to anyone else would go beyond the purpose of the 
rule. We can surmise that there was an initial period when the words ad 
hunc effectum merely introduced the statement of the reduction’s operation 
and that later the specification was dropped as the Latin tag became 
detached from its meaning. 
What this shows us is that limitation of the effect of reductions is not 
limited to inhibitions, which raises the possibility of applying it in the third 
class of fraud on creditors: offside goals.
Reduction of deeds granted in fraud of creditors is about putting assets 
back in a patrimony so that creditors can obtain rights in them. This is 
obviously the case with inhibition, or fraud by an insolvent debtor, but 
it is also the case in a classic double sale of land. Reduction is not an end 
in itself. Rather, it puts the fraudulent granter in a position to perform by 
granting a real right affecting the asset. Alternatively, it allows the creditors 
to get the court to make the grant for the debtor by means of diligence. This 
endgame is what justifies the reduction. 
Where reduction is ad hunc effectum, its effect is specified so it goes no 
further than necessary to secure the protected interest. Thus reduction ex 
capite inhibitionis merely operates to render an adjudication against the 
former owner competent. That being achieved, it has no further value. 
In some cases, the practical distinction between ad hunc effectum and 
catholic reduction is a minor one: if a transfer to Billy is reduced to allow 
Dan to register his disposition, Dan’s registration will deprive Billy of any 
right that he has. However, it makes a big difference where an offside goal 
has been scored and there is a personal right to a servitude. The reduction 
would be ad hunc effectum to enable a deed of servitude granted by the seller 
to be registered and constituted a real right, but it would go no further. For 
all other purposes Billy would remain owner.
Of course, the net result of this approach is very similar to the South 
African rule. A transferee who was faced with a valid offside goals challenge 
in these circumstances could save everyone a lot of time and money simply 
by agreeing to grant the relevant subordinate real right. In doing so, he 
would be in no worse a position than if reduction ad hunc effectum had 
been obtained and the grant had been made from his author. The courts 
might even be justified in allowing the procedure to be short-circuited and 
compelling the transferee to make such a grant. Nonetheless, for the sake 
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of a proper understanding of the relationship between real and personal 
rights, it is important to grasp why such a short cut might be permitted.
Does the fraud-on-creditors analysis prove too much?
The fraud-on-creditors analysis can account for one implication of the view 
that the offside goals rule is a mechanism for protecting personal rights to 
real rights rather than being restricted to the case of double sale. However, 
it appears to struggle with a more fundamental aspect. If the basis of 
the offside goals rule is fraud on creditors and some general duty not to 
participate in the breach of personal rights owed to others, why should it 
be restricted to creditors holding a particular class of personal rights? After 
all, any kind of creditor can challenge a fraudulent grant by an insolvent 
debtor or protect his right with an inhibition. Why then, should the offside 
goals rule be restricted to a particular class of personal right?
The first point to note is that the offside goals rule is not the only 
mechanism which gives external effect to personal rights. Scots law also 
recognises that inducing breach of contract and the personal-right-to-
a-real-right restriction do not apply to it. Therefore, the fact that a right 
is not a personal right to a real right does not necessarily mean that the 
third party is safe. Rather, it is likely to mean that he is liable in damages 
but safe from reduction of the transfer (as there is no offside goal). So the 
consequences of the personal-right-to-a-real-right restriction are not as 
sharp as first appears.
This argument depends on the mental element of inducing breach 
of contract being substantially the same as that for offside goals. This is 
broadly the case: the test for the mental element of inducing breach of 
contract is likely to be met in most bad-faith offside goals cases. If the 
second purchaser knows of the prior right, then breach of its correlative 
obligation is a necessary means to the end sought by the second purchaser: 
obtaining the property for himself.
The difficulty arises in those cases where the second purchaser is put on 
notice but has something which falls short of clear and certain knowledge 
of the prior right. This is a divergence between inducing breach of contract 
and offside goals. However, it is not as big a gap as may appear at first. In 
OBG v Allan, Lord Hoffmann made it clear that wilful blindness, where 
someone decides not to inquire for fear of what they might find, was as 
good as knowledge.73 That is sufficient to cover a lot of the offside goals 
73  [2008] 1 AC 1 at paras 40-41.
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cases and a reining in of the mental element to match that for inducing 
breach of contract would be desirable since the present approach creates 
too much uncertainty for potential purchasers.74
Even under the present law, there will be few cases where the mental 
element for the offside goals rule is fulfilled but that for inducing breach of 
contract is not. Where both are fulfilled, the restriction of the offside goals 
rule to personal rights to real rights affects which remedies are available 
rather than whether any remedy is available.
This brings the analysis back to the nature of the remedy under the 
offside goals rule. As suggested above, avoidance for fraud on creditors is 
aimed at putting an asset back in a patrimony so that a creditor can obtain 
a real right in it. It operates ad hunc effectum and goes no further. It gives the 
fraudulent transferor no right to possess the property.
That, in turn, provides a rationale for the result in Wallace v Simmers.75 
Miss Simmers had a licence (a personal right) against her brother which 
entitled her to occupy a house on his property. He sold the property in 
breach of that licence. Suppose that she had obtained a reduction of the 
transfer from her brother to the buyer. What would the effect of that 
reduction have been? Her brother had no obligation to grant her any real 
right and, since reduction would not have given him any right to possess 
the property, he would not be in a position to secure her possession and 
thus to fulfil his obligation under the licence. The hunc in ad hunc effectum 
in this case would have no content. Therefore the reduction would have 
been pointless.
Restricting offside goals to personal rights to the grant of real rights is 
therefore consistent with the fraud rationale because it reflects the nature 
of avoidance for fraud on creditors. 
(3) Gratuitous acquirers
An analysis based on the wrongful nature of the second purchaser’s conduct 
faces obvious challenges in dealing with the case of gratuitous acquisition.76 
Yet recognition that the seller’s conduct amounts to fraud means that the 
“no profit from fraud” rule and the law of unjustified enrichment can be 
74  See further MacLeod and Anderson “Offside Goals and Interfering with Play” at 94-95 
and MacLeod “Offside Goals and Induced Breaches of Contract” 278 at 281-82.
75  1960 SC 255.
76  For examples of an offside goals challenge by a gratuitous acquirer, see Alexander v 
Lundies (1675) Mor 940 and Anderson v Lows (1863) 2 M 100.
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invoked to explain the vulnerability.77 This rule presents its own challenges 
because of the indirect nature of the enrichment. However, this exception 
to the normal rule against recovering indirect enrichment can be explained 
as an extension of the fraud rule: had the donee known what was being 
done, he would have been bound to refuse the property. That being the 
case, it might be argued that he would act wrongfully in seeking to hold 
onto the property when he finds out the facts.78 The voidability of the grant 
enables the party who would be so-wronged to prevent this wrong from 
being done. Therefore, an obligation to reverse the enrichment is justified 
although the enrichment is indirect.
Of course, an onerous transferee in good faith may also discover later 
that he was an unwitting accomplice in the seller’s wrong, but in such a case 
the balance of policy is a little different. Such a transferee is not seeking to 
retain a pure enrichment but rather the benefit of a lawful bargain. Were 
it to be forfeited, he would be left with a claim for money and so exposed 
to the risk of the seller’s insolvency. Given the personal rights do not rank 
according to the rule prior tempore potior iure, there is no obvious reason 
why that burden should be shifted from the first buyer to the second when 
both were duped by the seller. 
This analysis draws on the point made by Carey Miller regarding 
the relative lack of favour which the law shows to donees, but it gives a 
reason for allowing a donee whose personal right predates a right under 
an onerous contract to keep the property if he got his real right first. In 
that case, the donee was not an unwitting accomplice in any fraud because 
his author was perfectly entitled to make the promise at the time when he 
made it.
E.  Implications of Fraud on Creditors as a Rationale
On the analysis suggested above, avoidance of the transfer gives effect to 
the first creditor’s delictual right to reparation against a second purchaser 
who acquired in bad faith. It does that by putting the second purchaser in 
the position he would have been in had the wrongful act not taken place. 
The voidability of gratuitous grants is based on an analogous rule in the 
77  Reid “Fraud in Scots Law” 243-49 and 256-58.
78  This idea of “incomplete dolus” which is completed at the time of enforcement has been 
deployed in the context of innocent misrepresentation: MacLeod “Fraud and Voidable 
Transfer” 48-50.
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law of enrichment, which can be viewed as an extension of the fraud rule. 
One advantage of this view is that it allows the offside goals rule to be set 
alongside the other instances of fraud on creditors. Once that is established, 
they can offer guidance on some of the contested issues surrounding the 
offside goals rule. 
The implications for the relationship between offside goals and 
subordinate real rights have already been discussed but the fraud-on-
creditors analysis also casts light on another point of contention: the time 
at which the grantee must be put in bad faith for the offside goals rule to 
apply. It was suggested obiter in Rodger (Builders) that a buyer who was in 
good faith when missives were concluded but who discovered the prior 
right before registration of the disposition would be vulnerable.79 This 
view was followed by Lord Eassie in Alex Brewster & Sons v Caughey,80 
whose decision was, in turn, endorsed by Lord Rodger in Burnett’s Trustee 
v Grainger.81 Lord Rodger took pains to explain why the position of the 
trustee in sequestration was distinguishable from that of a second buyer in 
an offside goals case. That was necessary because of his view that a second 
buyer who hears of a prior right must stand aside for the first purchaser 
whereas there is no such obligation on the trustee.
Despite its high authority this seems to be wrong in principle and has 
rightly been subject to academic criticism.82 A clue as to why it is wrong can 
be found in the extract from Stair which Lord Rodger gave to distinguish 
between the position of the trustee or the creditor doing diligence and the 
second purchaser:
But certain knowledge, by intimation, citation, or the like, inducing 
malam fidem, whereby any prior disposition or assignation made to another 
party is certainly known, or at least interruption made in acquiring by 
arrestment or citation of the acquirer, such rights acquired, not being of 
necessity to satisfy prior engagements, are reducible ex capite fraudis, and 
the acquirer is partaker of the fraud of his author, who thereby becomes a 
granter of double rights.83
While the general rule is that a bad faith acquirer will be vulnerable 
as a partaker in his author’s fraud, the rule does not apply to those who 
79  1950 SC 483 at 500 per Lord Jamieson.
80  Unreported, 2 May 2002. Available at http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/EAS0904.
html
81  2004 SC (HL) 19 at para 142.
82  Anderson Assignaton paras 11-24-31.
83  Stair, Inst 1.14.5, cited 2004 SC (HL) 19 para 142.
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acquire “of necessity to satisfy prior engagements.” As Lord Rodger rightly 
observed, the trustee in sequestration and creditors doing diligence may 
readily be considered to fall into this class. 
However, Lord Rodger neglects the fact that, once a purchaser has 
concluded his contract with the seller, he too is a creditor84 and takes “of 
necessity” because, like other creditors, taking an asset is the only way that 
he can ensure that his right is fulfilled. Indeed, it might be argued that 
the necessity affecting a purchaser is more pressing than that affecting a 
creditor who is owed money. It makes no difference to the latter which 
of the debtor’s assets is sold provided that it raises sufficient funds to pay 
the debt. A purchaser’s right, on the other hand, can only be satisfied by 
transfer of the asset he contracted to buy.
The point becomes clearer after reflection on other cases for fraud on 
creditors in the context of insolvency and of inhibition. It is no fraud to 
accept what you are owed and that is all that a buyer who registers with 
supervening knowledge of a prior contract does. There is an unavoidable 
conflict of rights and, in such a situation, each person is entitled to look to 
his own interests. The purchaser who knows of the prior contract before he 
concludes his own contract is in a different position because he can avoid 
the conflict of rights by not agreeing to buy the property.
F.  Summary
The analysis in this chapter has suggested that the offside goals rule is 
best understood as an instance of the law’s response to fraud on creditors. 
Avoidance is natural restitution, giving the defrauded creditor reparation 
for the wrong. Like the other instances of fraud on creditors, grantees 
may be liable as participants in the fraud (where they are in bad faith) or 
on the basis of an enrichment rule which prevents the completion of an 
incomplete dolus (where the grant is gratuitous).
Categorisation of the rule as an instance of fraud on creditors suggests 
that avoidance on the basis of the offside goals rule is ad hunc effectum, with 
the scope of the reversal being defined by what is necessary to allow the 
defrauded creditor satisfaction by obtaining a real right in the relevant 
property. This factor explains both how the offside goals rule can protect 
84  R G Anderson “Fraud and Transfer on Insolvency: ta … ta… tantum et tale” (2004) 11 
Edin LR 187 at 202.
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a personal right to a subordinate real right and why the rule is limited to 
personal rights to real rights. The fraud-on-creditors rationale also implies 
that a creditor who was in good faith when he acquired his personal right is 
entitled to pursue satisfaction of that right even if he discovers a conflicting 
personal right before he gets his real right.
Painful though it is for an academic to admit it, skipping those 
conveyancing classes does not appear to have done any harm to Professor 
Rennie’s grasp of Scots property law. The Scots lawyer can handle a little 
football and, it appears, Scots law can handle the offside goals rule too. 
8. A New Era in Conveyancing: 
Advance Notices and the 
Land Registration etc. 
(Scotland) Act 2012
Ann Stewart
For decades, property lawyers in jurisdictions other than Scotland 
expressed astonishment that Scottish solicitors effectively underwrote their 
seller client’s obligation to a purchaser to provide, after settlement, records 
in the property and personal registers that would be clear of any entry, 
deed, decree or diligence, which was either prejudicial to the validity of, 
or was an encumbrance on, the seller’s title to the property. Solicitors did 
this by granting to the purchaser, by way of formal letter to the purchaser’s 
solicitor, a firm’s undertaking either that the records would be clear, or 
to clear them if they were not. The “letter of obligation,” the document 
by which this apparently reckless practice was effected, was an invariable 
feature of the Scottish conveyancing landscape. 
But that has all now changed. The Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 
2012 introduced a new concept to Scottish conveyancing – the advance 
notice procedure – which has transformed the way in which property 
transactions are conducted, and in the vast majority of cases has eliminated 
the requirement for any letter of obligation.
© Ann Stewart, CC BY 4.0 http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0056.08
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A.  Letters of Obligation
(1) Historical background
The origin of the practice of granting a letter of obligation at settlement 
may be said to be lost in the mists of time. As early as 1900 James Sturrock,1 
in an annotation to a lecture by Professor Allan Menzies on searches in 
conveyancing transactions, refers to a case in 18962 in which Mr Gordon, the 
law agent, sold the property “and granted the usual obligation to produce 
a search showing a clear record.” Although in that case, the law agents 
themselves had had an interest in the property and signed the disposition 
as consenters, the fact that, four years later, Sturrock describes the granting 
of a letter of obligation as “usual” indicates that this was already standard 
practice. This is in spite of the fact that there is no legal obligation on a 
seller’s solicitor to give a letter of obligation.
Is it necessary to delve back further to identify the origins of this 
practice? Arguably, over a century of practice must be compelling enough 
evidence that this was firmly embedded in Scottish conveyancing tradition. 
Later conveyancing manuals allude to this practice as being “general and 
almost universal”3 and “usual practice.”4
(2) What is the function of a letter of obligation?
Until recently, the letter of obligation was a “little understood, but vital, 
part of any transaction.”5 There is an intrinsic weakness in the conveyancing 
process, for which the letter of obligation was the plaster cast. The weakness 
arises because of a hiatus in the succession of steps in the conveyancing 
process around settlement.6 
1  J S Sturrock, Conveyancing According to the Law of Scotland (1900) 935, based on the 
Lectures of Allan Menzies, Professor of Conveyancing at the University of Edinburgh 
between 1847 and 1856.
2  Dryburgh v Gordon [1896] 24 R 1.
3  J Burns, Conveyancing Practice According to the Law of Scotland, 4th edn (1957) 302.
4  J M Halliday, Conveyancing Law and Practice in Scotland, 2nd edn (1997) 515.
5  J H Sinclair and E Sinclair, Handbook of Conveyancing Practice in Scotland, 5th edn (2006) 
181.
6  “Settlement” is the term used for the steps that take place on the date of entry when 
the price is paid by, and the disposition is delivered to, the purchaser and (usually) 
entry is taken by him. In commercial property transactions this is often referred to as 
“completion.”
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The “gap” period
A seller is required to exhibit clear searches in the property and personal 
registers before settlement of the purchase takes place. The existence of any 
adverse deed, or an inhibition against the seller that predates the missives, 
will be disclosed in such searches, and usually steps have to be taken to 
discharge such entries before the purchaser will proceed to completion 
and pay the price. Those searches must be ordered up and exhibited to the 
purchaser’s solicitors as close as possible to the date of entry, but before 
settlement takes place. Such searches can only disclose the state of play 
of the registers at a date that pre-dates settlement. The date to which the 
searches are certified may also pre-date the date of settlement, perhaps by 
two or more days. So there is a gap between the date to which the Registers 
have been searched, and the date on which the purchaser hands over the 
price.
There is another, consecutive gap that occurs between settlement and 
the date on which the purchaser registers his title and obtains a real right 
to the property. While it is possible, immediately following completion of 
the transaction, to take the delivered deed to the Land Register and present 
it in person (and this does happen reasonably frequently), in the majority 
of cases, following completion there is a delay, perhaps only of a day or 
two, while the post completion formalities are dealt with, any stamp duty 
land tax7 paid, and registration forms completed, before the disposition 
in favour of the purchaser arrives at the Registers and is entered onto the 
records. Professional practice guidance permits a period of up to fourteen 
days after settlement within which to present the purchaser’s application 
for registration.8 Solicitors whose offices are not located in Glasgow or 
Edinburgh usually have no choice but to submit applications by post or 
through legal document exchange arrangements, or resort to the expense 
of a courier.
During this gap, or invisibility period, there are risks. A competing 
deed could be presented for registration before the purchaser’s disposition 
is presented. Until comparatively recently, the possibility of the seller 
being sequestrated or going into liquidation or administration during the 
7  To be replaced in Scotland on 1 April 2015, by land and buildings transaction tax.
8  Law Society of Scotland, Rules and Guidance, Section F, Division C – Letters of 
obligation and advance notices, para 3, available at http://www.lawscot.org.uk/
rules-and-guidance/section-f-guidance-relating-to-particular-types-of-work/
division-c-conveyancing/guidance/letters-of-obligation-and-advance-notices/
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gap period also posed a serious risk. To provide protection against the 
occurrence of these risks – particularly insolvency or the emergence of a 
rival deed – the letter of obligation historically stepped into the breach.
The guarantee of clear records
It is unusual for a solicitor to bind himself personally, and thus be liable to 
incur personal liability, in respect of the obligations of his client. Generally 
when conducting a transaction, it will be beyond any doubt that the solicitor 
is acting as the agent for a disclosed principal. Missives are entered into by 
solicitors “for and on behalf of our client.” The letter of obligation was a 
clear exception to this general rule.
The letter of obligation was, in effect, a guarantee that the registers 
would be clear of any competing deeds or decrees and diligences affecting 
the seller. Although the styles of wording used varied slightly depending 
on whether the transaction involved recording in the General Register of 
Sasines (now unlikely, since all transfers of property9 will induce a first 
registration in the Land Register, where the seller’s title is in the Sasine 
Register), or in the Land Register, the effect was the same: if any deed, 
decree or diligence appeared on the records that would prejudice the 
purchaser’s title, then provided these had not been created by or against 
the purchaser, the firm was obliged to remove them. The firm’s exposure 
under a typical letter of obligation was a maximum of fourteen days, or 
until the purchaser’s deed was registered, if earlier.
The undertaking
The undertaking given in a typical letter of obligation (for a sale of registered 
property) would say:
With reference to the settlement of this transaction today, we undertake to 
clear the records of any deed, decree or diligence (other than such as may be 
created by, or against, the Purchaser) which may be recorded in the Personal 
Registers or to which effect may be given in the Land Register in the period 
from [date of certification of Form 12 or 13 Report (search)] to fourteen 
days after today’s date inclusive (or to the earlier date of registration of the 
9  Following the introduction of the 2012 Act on 8 December 2014, all conveyances, 
whether for valuable consideration or not, induce a first registration in the Land 
Register, if the title to the property is still in the Sasine Register.
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Purchaser’s interest in the Property) and which would cause the Keeper10 to 
make an entry on, or qualify her indemnity in, [the Title Sheet to be updated]
[the Land Certificate to be issued] in respect of that interest.
(3) Minimising risk to the seller’s solicitor
Professional indemnity insurance
That the solution to the gap period, and the underwriting of these risks, 
was taken on by the solicitor profession in Scotland (which appears to be 
the only jurisdiction in which such a mechanism was used) seems, on the 
face of it, perverse. If there is a risk associated with a process, then the 
obvious solution is to arrange insurance to protect against that risk. In fact, 
title indemnity insurance cover was available in situations where no letter 
of obligation was to be granted, although it was not routinely obtained.
However, insurance cover was and remains available, albeit indirectly, 
for the gap period risks. It takes the form of the professional indemnity 
insurance that all firms of solicitors have to take out to be able to practice. 
The Master Policy is arranged by the Law Society of Scotland, to provide 
indemnity for solicitors against a variety of types of professional liability, 
arising out of business which is customarily carried on or transacted by 
solicitors in Scotland. This includes claims arising out of letters of obligation. 
Solicitors make a contribution annually to the Law Society for the cost of 
this insurance which sets a mandatory limit of indemnity, currently £2 
million, for each firm. Individual firms can, and do, arrange their own 
top-up cover for protection in the case of claims of higher amounts. Since 
letters of obligation were given in commercial property transactions 
involving tens or hundreds of millions of pounds, such top-up cover was 
essential for firms with a commercial property practice.
Professional indemnity insurance cover was and remains available for a 
letter of obligation or other undertaking by the firm in any circumstances. 
However the letter of obligation was given a benign treatment under 
Special Conditions that apply to the Master Policy if it is “classic.”11
10  The Keeper of the Registers of Scotland.
11  That “benign” treatment continues beyond 8 December 2014, at least for the PI insurance 
year 2014/2015. Whether it will continue beyond November 2015 is up to the insurers.
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The classic letter of obligation
The wording of the classic letter of obligation had to contain the components 
of the style wording above, including the fourteen day time limit, although 
there was no mandatory style. Before granting the letter of obligation, the 
seller’s solicitor had to comply with certain conditions, designed to ensure 
that any risk of a claim was minimised. 
The conditions were:
•  A search in the property and personal registers must have been obtained 
immediately before settlement. What was meant by “immediately 
before” was not always clear, but Law Society Guidance indicated that 
the searches in both registers could be up to seven days’ old (equivalent 
to five working days), counting back from the date of settlement to the 
date to which the search was certified as being correct.12 In residential 
property transactions there was a requirement under the Council of 
Mortgage Lenders Scottish Solicitors’ Handbook13 for the search in the 
personal registers to be no more than three working days old.
•  The client had to be asked to confirm whether or not there were any 
outstanding securities. 
•  The solicitor issuing the letter of obligation had to be unaware of any 
other security; and
•  Where the undertaking was a firm’s undertaking to deliver a discharge 
of a standard security, the solicitor granting the obligation had to have 
sufficient funds to pay off the loan.
Provided these conditions were complied with for a letter of obligation, 
then even in the case of a claim which had to be met from professional 
indemnity insurance, the excess that the firm in question was required 
to pay in the event of any claim (the “self-insured amount”) was nil, and 
there was no adverse impact on any premium loading or discount for that 
firm. If a letter of obligation was given in classic terms, but the conditions 
had not been complied with (known as a “failed classic”), then the normal 
self-insured amount applied. Obligations which fell outside the “classic” 
12  Law Society of Scotland, Rules and Guidance, Section F, Division C – Letters of 
obligation, para 4, available at http://www.lawscot.org.uk/rules-and-guidance/section-
f-guidance-relating-to-particular-types-of-work/division-c-conveyancing/guidance/
letters-of-obligation-and-advance-notices/
13  Available at http://www.cml.org.uk/cml/handbook/scotland. No changes have been 
made to the CML Handbook to reflect any changes in practice relating to the coming 
into force of the provisions of the Land Registration (Scotland) Act 2012, although 
individual lenders are left to make whatever arrangements they consider are required. 
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obligations to clear the records or deliver an executed discharge (known 
as “non-classic”) resulted in the application of a double excess if a claim 
was made and met14 as well being taken into account for any discount or 
loading to Master Policy premiums for the firm in question.15
An unpopular arrangement
It probably goes almost without saying that the letter of obligation was 
extremely unpopular with solicitors in Scotland, but it had for many years 
been an unavoidable evil, due in large part to the effect of professional 
custom and tradition, and it is a not an understatement to say that, without 
the letter of obligation as an integral part of the settlement procedure, the 
conveyancing process as we knew it would have collapsed.
While, as already noted, a solicitor had no legal obligation to grant a 
letter of obligation, Law Society guidance had moved from the position 
held several decades ago that no letter of obligation had to be given unless 
the missives expressly provide for it, to the recent view of the Conveyancing 
Committee of the Law Society that “conveyancing transactions should be 
settled with a letter of obligation being granted by the solicitor personally” 
and “[w]hile there is no legal obligation to give a letter of obligation where 
missives are silent, there is a professional duty on a solicitor to grant a 
letter of obligation unless the solicitor advises to the contrary at the earliest 
possible opportunity.”16
In recent years there had been increasing unwillingness on the part 
of solicitors to grant letters of obligation in certain circumstances. In 
transactions where the solicitor acted for an insolvency practitioner in 
a sale, for example, the practice had evolved of flatly refusing to give 
any letter of obligation. This was in part due to the refusal by insolvency 
practitioners to accept any personal liability. The letter of obligation was 
equally unpopular with insurers, and this was exacerbated in the late 
1980s and early 1990s by the increased incidence of second standard 
securities over residential properties which were granted unknowingly 
by home owners. These securities were usually granted at the time of 
making home improvements, such as installation of double glazing 
14  Known as a “double deductible.”
15  But see n 11
16  Law Society of Scotland, Rules and Guidance, Section F, Division C – Letters of 
obligation. 
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or replacement kitchens, with the owner being under the impression 
that they were being asked to sign some credit agreement, unaware 
that the “agreement” would then be registered against their title. The 
preponderance of such second standard securities led to the requirement 
to make proper enquiry of the client as to the granting of other securities, 
and the prudent conveyancer would include an enquiry about carrying 
out any home improvements.
Against a background of increasing concern, it was clear that something 
would need to be done. One only needs to look at the legal systems of 
other countries and jurisdictions, including our closest neighbour, England, 
and to certain advance warning systems that were already operating in 
Scotland – the most obvious being the notice of letters of inhibitions 
procedure17 – to see the prospects of a solution in some form of priority 
notification procedure, linked to the registration of deeds and documents 
in the Registers of Scotland.
B.  The New System of Advance Notices
(1) The genesis of the Scottish Advance Notice
The Scottish Law Commission, always innovative in bringing forward new 
approaches to old problems, had already decided to include the thorny 
topic of land registration reform in its Sixth Programme of Law Reform,18 at 
the request of the Keeper of the Registers of Scotland. There then followed a 
series of Discussion Papers19 on a wide range of aspects of land registration, 
which had been introduced in Scotland by the Land Registration (Scotland) 
Act 1979. The third of these Discussion Papers, which dealt with a 
miscellaneous collection of issues, first flagged the prospect of a priority 
notice scheme.20
That early consideration of how a priority notice procedure in Scotland 
could work drew from a number of other jurisdictions for inspiration, both 
selecting and rejecting elements of other systems to consider how best to 
17  Introduced by the Titles to Land Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1868, s155.
18  (Scot Law Com No 176, 2000).
19  Discussion Paper on Land Registration: Void and Voidable Titles (Scot Law Com DP 
No 125, 2004), Discussion Paper on Land Registration: Registration, Rectification and 
Indemnity (Scot Law Com DP No 128, 2005) and Discussion Paper on Land Registration: 
Miscellaneous Issues (Scot Law Com DP No 130, 2005).
20  DP on LR: Miscellaneous Issues (n 19) part 7.
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tailor the system for Scotland. The DP identified the key advantages of a 
scheme of advance notices.21 Uppermost is the certainty of success against 
the threat of a competing title (or the comfort that there are no competing 
titles) that a priority notice system would bring,22 coupled with the 
reduction of exposure to risk from letters of obligation that would follow 
as a consequence.23 
However the DP also identified disadvantages to such a system, citing 
arguments that it could be regarded as unnecessary24 – the imminent 
introduction of ARTL25 would enable the instantaneous signing, 
payment for and delivery of conveyancing documents, removing the 
risk from a competing deed. It was, however, recognised in the DP that 
ARTL would not necessarily be suitable for all types of transaction, 
and might not therefore be a sufficient solution.26 It has proved to be 
the case that, although there have been many transactions completed 
under ARTL, it can only cope with transactions that are a dealing of 
the whole of an already registered interest, and its application, since 
introduction, has been largely confined to residential transactions and 
remortgages.
Another criticism of a priority notice system identified in the DP was 
that it would be disproportionate.27 The level of risk from insolvency 
has in any event decreased, since a trustee in sequestration is no longer 
able immediately to complete a title to property in the bankrupt’s estate 
following on appointment, but must wait for a period of 28 days to elapse.28 
While there may be risks attendant with the liquidation or administration 
of a company, the Scottish Law Commission did not consider these to be 
either considerable or insurmountable.
The original proposal for priority notices in the DP suggested 
backdating the effective date of registration of the protected deed to 
21  DP on LR: Miscellaneous Issues (n 19) para 7.21-7.28.
22  Ibid para 7.22-7.24.
23  Ibid para 7.25-7.27.
24  Ibid para 7.29-7.30.
25  Automated Registration of Title to Land, a system by which the transfer document 
(disposition) is created within an electronic system, digitally signed and electronically 
delivered, thus eliminating the gap period. ARTL was subsequently introduced, but it 
is (currently) limited in the types of deeds and transactions that it can facilitate.
26  DP on LR: Miscellaneous Issues (n 19) para 7.30.
27  Ibid para 7.31-7.33.
28  Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007, s 17.
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the date of registration of the notice.29 This would be similar to the way 
inhibitions work: a notice of letters of inhibition is registered,30 which 
provides a period of twenty one days in which the inhibition itself can 
be registered on condition that the schedule of inhibition is served on the 
debtor after registration of the notice.31 If registration takes place within 
this period, the effective date of the inhibition is backdated to the date of 
service of the schedule of inhibition. If registration does not take place, 
the notice lapses.
Applying this backdating effect to priority notices would mean 
that a real right in the property could, retrospectively, be obtained 
prematurely.32 The priority notice would always be registered before the 
date of entry, and sometimes could be registered before conclusion of 
missives. To adopt this model would mean that ownership) would pass 
to the purchaser before settlement, but so too would liabilities incidental 
to ownership. It is easy to see why these proposals were not generally 
supported at the time.
However pressure on, and dislike of, the system of letters of obligation 
continued to grow. By the time the Scottish Law Commission was 
preparing its Report on Land Registration33 it had already received 
representations, including from the Law Society of Scotland, to look again 
at a priority procedure for land registration. The Report proposed a much 
more straightforward system of advance notices,34 that this time received a 
considerable degree of support from the profession. 
The Report also contained a draft Land Registration Bill,35 which was 
the starting point for the Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012. The 
Bill introduced to the Scottish Parliament on 1 December 201136 differed 
in some material (and minor) respects from the draft Bill prepared by the 
Scottish Law Commission, but the proposals for a system of advance notice 
were largely intact. 
29  DP on LR: Miscellaneous Issues (n 19) para 7.19-7.20.
30  Titles to Land (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1868, s 155.
31  Ibid. The addition of service of the schedule of inhibition on the debtor was amended 
by the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland) Act 2007, s 149, after the publication of 
the DP.
32  DP on LR: Miscellaneous Issues (n 19) para 7.34.
33  Scot Law Com No 222, 2010.
34  Report on Land Registration (n 33) part 14.
35  Ibid vol 2.
36  Available at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/Bills/44469.aspx 
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(2) The statutory system of Advance Notices
The principles of Advance Notices
The statutory structure for advance notices in conveyancing transactions 
adopts the principles for providing a period of priority protection for deeds 
that are intended to be granted and intended for registration in the Land 
Register.37 The key elements of the advance notice procedure are:
(i)  An advance notice relates to a specific deed that a granter intends to 
grant to another person.
(ii)  An advance notice has to be applied for by the person who intends to 
grant the deed, and who may validly grant the deed, or by a person 
who has the consent of the person who may validly grant the deed.38
(iii)  Once registered, the advance notice provides a period of thirty-five 
days’ protection to the grantee, from any competing deeds, or other 
subsequent advance notices, that are registered against the property 
during that period, or an inhibition registered against the granter 
during the protected period.
(iv)  The protected period starts the day after the date of registration of the 
advance notice.
(v)  A second advance notice (and third (and potentially an unlimited 
number of advance notices))39 can be applied for, but subsequent 
advance notices provide a separate, not a continuous, period of 
protection.
The detail of the Advance Notice protection
The introduction of Advance Notices is a major transformation for 
conveyancing practice in Scotland, and one that many in the profession 
would regard as long overdue. 
The Advance Notice concept is similar to, but not exactly the same as, 
the priority period which currently exists for registration of documents 
in the Land Registry of England and Wales. In England and Wales it is 
tied in with a register search. The system that now applies in Scotland 
37  See generally Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012, Part 4. Specific provisions are 
discussed in detail below. 
38  There is something of a conceptual non sequitur in the way the legislation has been 
drafted, discussed further below.
39  There is nothing in the legislation about multiple consecutive advance notices for the 
same deed, but in theory this is technically possible although, in practice, unlikely.
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borrows from both the English system40 and the system that applies in 
Germany.41
It should be borne in mind that the advance notice procedure is 
voluntary. There is no compulsion to use it, but the advantages of it over 
the flawed and precarious letter of obligation alternative are compelling. 
Under the provisions of the 2012 Act, it is possible to apply to the Keeper 
for an advance notice in respect of a deed that a person intends to grant.42 For 
a fee of £10,43 an advance notice application can be submitted,44 for example 
when a seller has agreed to sell a piece of his land, and consequently will be 
granting a disposition in favour of the purchaser. 
The advance notice application is submitted to the relevant register in 
advance of the completion date for the transaction, and once it is registered, 
it provides a period of protection of thirty-five days (beginning with the 
day after the advance notice is registered in the relevant register)45 in 
which any competing deed, or another advance notice, would not have 
priority.46 
So, for example, if the seller registers an advance notice for a disposition 
over his property that he intends to grant in favour of the purchaser, and 
then some other person presents a competing disposition for registration 
in respect of the property in question, although the competing disposition 
would be entered onto the Register initially, the existence of the earlier 
advance notice would prevent the competing disposition from prevailing, 
provided always that the purchaser with the benefit of the advance notice 
submits his disposition for registration within the thirty-five day period of 
protection. 
However, if the purchaser fails to submit his disposition within the 
thirty-five day period, in that case, the earlier registered disposition will 
take effect at the expiry of the thirty-five day period. 
Advance notices apply to other types of deed, such as a standard 
security or deed of servitude, and also to a registrable lease or sub-lease, 
40  The Land Registration Act 2002 and Land Registration Rules 2003.
41  German Civil Code BGB, Articles 883 to 888.
42  Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012, s 56.
43  The Registers of Scotland (Fees) Order 2014, SSI 2014/188, sched 1, para 3(b).
44  Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012, s 57.
45  Ibid, s 58.
46  Ibid, ss 59-61.
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but the deed must be a bilateral one,47 that is, with a granter and a grantee.48 
Unilateral deeds, such as a local authority charging order, are not covered, 
nor actually are they likely to have need of advance notice protection.
Only a person who intends to grant the deed and may validly grant 
the deed can apply for an advance notice.49 However, a person with the 
consent of such a person may also apply.50 The statutory wording is a 
little problematic in a situation where the purchaser wants to register an 
advance notice for a deed that the purchaser plans to grant as part of the 
purchase transaction, for example, a standard security in favour of its 
heritable creditor. Only the purchaser can intend to grant that deed, but 
there is an argument that the purchaser may not validly grant the deed until 
it is the owner, therefore it needs the consent of the seller to apply for the 
advance notice. But in these circumstances, the seller cannot intend to grant 
the standard security by the purchaser, so neither of the parties can fulfil 
the two part statutory requirement: (i) intention to grant and (ii) ability 
validly to grant, at the time of applying for the advance notice. However, 
unless the effect of the statutory provision is to permit a purchaser to apply 
for an advance notice of this type, its inclusion in the 2012 Act is pointless. 
The Registers are in no doubt that the intention of the legislation was that 
a purchaser would be able to register an advance notice for a standard 
security it intends to grant, if it has the consent of the seller, and that they 
will accept such applications.51
An application for an advance notice can be made for a title that is 
recorded in the General Register of Sasines, as well as for titles that are 
registered in the Land Register.52 As all dispositions, whether for valuable 
consideration or not, induce a first registration under the provisions of the 
2012 Act, if the title is still in the Sasine Register, advance notices can be 
recorded in the Sasine Register in those cases. For a title that is already in 
47  Note however that it is not currently possible to apply for an advance notice for any 
bilateral deed. Renunciation of leases and section 75 agreements are two obvious 
examples of deeds that are conspicuous by their absence from the current advance 
notice application system.
48  Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012, s 56(1).
49  Ibid, s 57(1) and (2)(a).
50  Ibid, s 51(2)(b).
51  Registers of Scotland. Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012 General Guidance – 
Advance Notices, available at https://www.ros.gov.uk/about-us/2012-act/general-guidance/
advance-notices
52  Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012, ss 59 and 60.
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the Land Register, the advance notice will be registered in the application 
record of the Land Register. 
If for any reason settlement of the transaction is delayed, it is possible 
to apply for another advance notice giving the purchaser (or other grantee 
as appropriate) another thirty-five day period of protection. However, it 
is important to note that this is not an extension of the first advance notice 
period: it is a separate period of protection. So, in the example above, the 
competing disposition submitted during the first thirty-five day period 
would remain on the Register and the second priority period will not 
protect against it. The competing disposition would of course show up 
on a search of the Register, which it is recommended be obtained up to a 
date when the advance notice to be relied on by the purchaser is disclosed 
in that search. That search would also disclose the competing disposition 
alerting the purchaser to its existence. This would mean that the purchaser 
ought not to proceed to settlement without requiring the seller to take steps 
remedy the position, should he still wish to buy the property. In the face of 
a competing disposition, no purchaser would be expected to proceed. 
Once an advance notice is on the application record of the Land Register, 
or in the Sasine Register, it is possible to apply to have it discharged, while 
it is current (i.e. during the thirty-five day period).53 The circumstances 
where this will be necessary may occur from time to time, but as a general 
rule there is no need formally to discharge an advance notice. It will expire 
automatically at the end of the thirty-five day period, and the Keeper will 
remove it from the application record in the Land Register, and archive 
it.54 Most advance notices will therefore simply be allowed to lapse. If an 
applicant wants to have an advance notice discharged, it must obtain the 
consent of the person in whose favour the notice has been registered (e.g. 
the purchaser). This will ensure that the protection given by an advance 
notice is not cancelled without the knowledge and permission of the person 
benefitting from the protection.
One innovative effect of an advance notice is that, if an inhibition is 
registered against the granter of the deed during the protected period, 
provided the protected deed is registered during the protected period, it 
53  Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012, s 63.
54  Ibid, s 62. An advance notice recorded in the Sasine Register will always be shown on 
that Register. While a formal discharge of such an advance notice can be recorded, it 
will be evident from the date of recording of the advance notice when its protection will 
have expired after thirty-five days.
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will not be affected by the inhibition.55 This could mean, in circumstances 
where an advance notice is submitted before conclusion of missives and 
the inhibition is also registered before a contract was in place, but after 
the protected period of the advance notice has begun, that nonetheless the 
purchaser’s deed would be protected, and he could complete the purchase. 
This represents a change in the law of inhibitions,56 although it is unlikely 
that this particular convergence of circumstances will happen very often.
There are some entries in the Registers that an advance notice does not 
affect. Notices of potential liability for costs under the Tenements (Scotland) 
Act 200457 or the Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 200358 are specifically 
carved out from the effect of the advance notice protection.59 Scottish 
Ministers have the power to specify other deeds that should prevail despite 
the existence of an advance notice on the Register.60 
(3) Conveyancing procedures for Advance Notices
The statutory provisions relating to advance notices provide what advance 
notices are, who may apply for them and what their effect will be. But 
they are voluntary, and therefore there is nothing in the 2012 Act that sets 
out how they are to be used in a transactional context. So it has been up to 
the conveyancing profession to work out how to use the advance notice 
procedure in practice.
The (PSG)61 took on the task of considering how this would work in 
practice, and it produced a recommended form of wording for offers62 that 
sets out the steps for parties to a typical sale and purchase transaction to take 
to implement the advance notice procedure. In doing so, the PSG wanted 
to ensure that the new process, that is now becoming an integral part of 
55  Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012, s 61.
56  Under the previous law, an inhibition registered before conclusion of missives 
would prevail against the rights of the subsequent purchaser. Only sales completed 
in implement of missives concluded before the inhibition is registered are currently 
unaffected in these circumstances.
57  Tenements (Scotland) Act 2004, s 12(3).
58  Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003, s 10(2A).
59  Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012, s 61(3).
60  Ibid, s 61(3)(b).
61  A group of four commercial property lawyers, including the writer, from four of 
the major Scottish firms, who have worked together for over a decade to produce 
agreed form standardised commercial property documents which are available to the 
profession to access on the PSG website at www.psglegal.co.uk 
62  PSG Offers to Sell incorporating 2012 Act wording are available to download at http://
www.psglegal.co.uk/offer_to_sell.php 
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conveyancing procedure, would be clear, and also as straightforward as 
possible. Although PSG styles are produced from the perspective of the 
commercial property lawyer, the PSG form of words, and general approach, 
has also been adopted (with some minor modifications) in standard form 
residential missives.63
Practical issues that the PSG had to consider in formulating the new 
wording included:
(i)  What is the optimum time in the transaction to submit the advance 
notice application?
(ii)  Should the provision of an advance notice be compulsory or optional?
(iii)  How should the requirements for consent be addressed?
(iv)  How should the possible need for a second advance notice be tackled? 
and
(v)  Who pays the cost of the advance notice application?
The optimum time to obtain an advance notice
The purchaser (or other grantee) will want advance notice protection to 
subsist until the application to register the deed in question has actually 
been submitted to the registers and has entered the application record. 
So the protection needs to extend beyond the settlement date, even if the 
purchaser’s solicitor is going to personally present the deed for registration, 
and potentially for up to fourteen days after – or whatever reasonable 
period of time is appropriate. In reality it may be a lot closer to settlement 
before the advance notice application is lodged, to make sure that the 
maximum period of protection is available after settlement. 
The PSG wording provides for submission of the advance notice 
application not earlier than five working days before settlement. This 
allows as much of the protected period as possible to cover the period after 
settlement, in case of delays, or rejection of the application first time around. 
It is however a bit of a balancing act, and the parties to the transaction 
should be prepared to be flexible to suit the circumstances of the transaction. 
The Scottish standard clauses set out a longer period of ten days before the 
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date of entry in residential offers. The PSG approach proceeds on the basis 
that the more of the protected period that continues after settlement will 
mean that if the application for registration were to be rejected for some 
reason, there would be a good chance that the presenting solicitor could 
correct whatever was wrong with the application and re-submit it, all still 
within the protected period of the advance notice.
Compulsory or optional?
The approach recommended by the PSG is that the seller should be bound to 
apply for an advance notice. The advantages to a purchaser of the advance 
notice protection are obvious, but some sellers might question why they 
should have to make this application, which they may not consider to be 
of any benefit to them. However, while the protection is principally for 
the purchaser against any competing deeds, it also brings certainty for 
the seller, since, once a search has been obtained disclosing the advance 
notice, the seller can relax for the rest of the protected period too, and the 
protection provides greater certainty around settlement, compared to the 
step into the unknown that the gap period presented.
The form of the advance notice should be adjusted with the purchaser, 
since the advance notice will only protect the specific deed to be granted 
by that seller to that purchaser. The purchaser will want to be sure that the 
purchaser’s details on the application are correct. Practitioners will need to 
bear this in mind, in case of a last minute substitution of a nominee to take 
title to the property. An advance notice that does not refer to that nominee 
will not protect a deed in its favour.
The requirement for consent
Only the seller can apply for an advance notice for the disposition to 
the purchaser, because of the requirement in the 2012 Act that only a 
person who intends to grant, and may validly grant the deed can make 
the application.64 So, if there is a requirement for an advance notice for a 
standard security that the purchaser intends to grant, or for any other deeds 
that the purchaser intends to grant – for example, where the purchaser is 
planning a back-to-back sub-sale – the consent of the seller will be needed 
64  Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012, s 57(1).
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to make that application. To avoid the requirement in each transaction for 
specific consent to be sought each time (with the possibility that it is then 
withheld by the seller) the PSG wording builds in automatic consent of the 
seller to any application for an advance notice that the purchaser wants 
to submit. This allows these applications to go ahead at a time to suit the 
purchaser, without further reference to the seller.
One aspect of the procedure that a purchaser intending a back-to-back 
(i.e. simultaneous) sub-sale needs to consider is the approach to take where 
the purchaser does not want the seller to know about the sub-sale. Care 
would need to be taken in relation to applying for an advance notice for 
the proposed sub-sale disposition, because that advance notice will show 
up in any search obtained by the seller after the advance notice has been 
registered, alerting the seller to its existence. The alternative would have to 
be either that that no advance notice application can be made, or that the 
timing of the application for the sub-sale deed advance notice will need to 
be later than the period covered by the search, meaning that it would need 
to be a last minute application.
The automatic consent of the purchaser to the discharge of the advance 
notice, should this ever be required, has also been built in to the PSG offer. 
If the advance notice has to be discharged, this is likely to be because the 
original purchaser has withdrawn or failed to complete the transaction, so 
obtaining consent at that time could be problematic, although there may be a 
need to discharge an advance notice if it transpires that the purchaser’s name 
is incorrectly stated, or, as anticipated above, a last minute substitution of a 
nominee is made. A discharge in the case of a failed purchase may only be 
necessary if there is an immediate requirement to apply for another advance 
notice in favour of a new purchaser, with an imminent settlement date. The 
second purchaser will want to have the first advance notice removed, as 
otherwise it would have priority over any advance notice registered for the 
second purchaser. In most cases, however, it will simply be a case of allowing 
the first advance notice to expire at the end of its thirty-five day period. 
Additional advance notices
The PSG wording provides for a seller to obtain a second advance notice 
in a transaction, if the purchaser requests it. This could be necessary, if the 
first advance notice has been obtained too soon, or if there is a delay in 
completing the transaction and the protected period is due to expire in only 
a few days after the postponed settlement date.
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Who pays?
The cost of the advance notice should be met by the seller. The application 
is made by the seller, so the seller is responsible for paying the fee for 
the application to the Registers. The cost is only £10, and it would cost 
much more than that in administrative time to recover that sum from the 
purchaser and process it. While the advance notice provides the purchaser 
with protection, it is protection against the possible acts of, and deeds 
granted by, the seller, or decrees or diligence done against the seller, so it 
seems a fair arrangement in all the circumstances.
If the purchaser wants to submit an advance notice application for 
any deeds it intends to grant, it should meet the cost of those, and of any 
discharge of such advance notices, if the seller requires it in cases where the 
transaction does not proceed. 
If a second advance notice is required in the transaction, it should be paid 
for by whichever of the seller or the purchaser is responsible for the delay. 
Although there can be disagreement sometimes about the party to which 
any delay is attributable, this provision will cater for most circumstances, 
where the position is usually clear.
(4) Timing issues for advance notices
The PSG wording proposes submitting the application for an advance 
notice not earlier than five working days before completion. In terms of 
transactional timing, this also really means not later than five working days 
before completion as well. This timescale pre-supposes that a search (now 
called a legal report) in the property and personal registers has already 
been obtained, and the parties have seen and dealt with anything relevant 
that it discloses. As soon as the advance notice application has been made, 
a continuation legal report can be ordered, immediately before completion. 
That continuation report will disclose the advance notice,65 and the 
purchaser can complete the transaction in the knowledge that protection 
is in place. 
Timing will also be important if there is a delay in settlement, or if 
the purchaser’s application for registration is rejected immediately. If 
the parties have allowed as much of the protected period as possible to 
65  The advance notice can also be viewed on Registers Direct (an online system allowing 
viewing access to information in the Registers of Scotland).
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be extant after completion, then this may be sufficient to turn around a 
rejected application and submit it again before the expiry of the protected 
period. Correctly counting the number of days could become important: the 
thirty-five day period does not start until the day after the day the notice is 
entered in the application record, or recorded in the Sasine Register, where 
applicable. 
(5) The application process
Application types
Applications for an advance notice are created electronically, within a 
system built by the Registers of Scotland, access to which is by secure 
login.66 
The online form is simple and easy to complete. It requires details of:
(i)  the granter of the deed, 
(ii)  the grantee of the deed,
(iii)  the type of transaction (first registration, dealing of whole, transfer of 
part),
(iv)  the type of deed, and 
(v)  details of the property (including the title number if it is registered, 
or an adequate conveyancing description (sufficient to identify the 
boundaries of the property concerned) if it is not).
However not all advance notice applications can be submitted electronically 
– some have to be printed out.
The advance notice system will accept four types of application:67
(i)  A first registration – this is where the advance notice is in respect of the 
grant of a deed that will take the property out of the Sasine Register, 
and transfer it to the Land Register. However the advance notice has to 
be recorded in the Sasine Register, as the title to the property is not yet 
in the Land Register – that will only happen when the intended deed 
is actually presented for registration.
(ii)  An intended deed that applies to the whole of a registered interest.
(iii)  An intended deed that applies to part only of a registered interest, and
66  Registers of Scotland, Guidance (n 51).
67  Ibid.
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(iv)  Where an extant advance notice requires to be discharged. This will 
only be necessary if it needs to be removed from the application record, 
or its discharge needs to be shown in the Sasine Register during the 
currency of the thirty-five day period. 
It has transpired that the online system for creation of advance notices does 
not have the ability to save drafts of advance notice applications, meaning 
that it is not possible for the purchaser to approve the seller’s electronically 
created draft. As such approval is recommended, so that the purchaser’s 
solicitor can ensure that his client’s details are correct, Word version 
drafts of the advance notice forms have been created by the PSG, to allow 
adjustment of the terms of the application to be made between the parties, 
then copied and pasted directly into the online form. As an immediate 
solution to the shortcomings of the online system, these draft forms have 
helped to maintain transactional momentum in the early days of adjusting 
to the 2012 Act. However, it would be just as acceptable, as the profession 
becomes more familiar with the content of advance notice applications, for 
these details to be adjusted by email.
Submission of advance notice applications
Where an advance notice is sought for a deed relating to a property to 
which title is still in the Sasine Register, in which case the deed will, when 
presented for registration, induce a first registration, it is necessary to print 
the advance notice form, sign and date it and submit it in paper form.68 This 
is because the advance notice has to be recorded in the Sasine Register, and 
every writ to be recorded in the Sasine Register has to be “impressed with a 
stamp or seal,"69 which can only be done in hard copy. Electronic submission 
would not be competent, since a hard copy print of that submission would 
not be the original. An application for discharge of an advance notice that 
is recorded in the Sasine Register must also be printed, signed, dated and 
submitted in hard copy.70
If the advance notice relates to a deed which will transfer part of 
a registered interest, then a plan to identify that part has to accompany 
68  Registers of Scotland, Guidance (n 51)
69  Land Registers (Scotland) Act 1868, s14.
70  Registers of Scotland, Guidance (n 51).
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the application (unless the part is a flat in a flatted building, where it is 
the whole building that is shown as a single unit on the cadastral map).71 
The plan must sufficiently identify the property to allow it to be plotted 
immediately onto the cadastral map. Submission of a plan can be done by 
way of uploading an electronic plan, including a plan in pdf format, to the 
advance notice system, or by providing co-ordinates for the plot, or, if the 
part to be transferred is a plot in a development that has Development Plan 
Approval,72 then all that is required is the Development Plan number and 
the relevant plot number in the development. If the plan is not available 
in some electronic format, then the advance notice application has to be 
printed, signed, dated and submitted in hard copy, with a suitable paper 
plan, signed and docqueted as relative to the advance notice application.73
An advance notice application for a deed that relates to the whole of 
a registered title, and an application for a discharge of an advance notice 
in the Land Register, can be submitted electronically.74 An application 
for a discharge must refer to the allocated advance notice number for the 
advance notice to be discharged, which will then enable automatic pre-
population of the discharge application form with other details from the 
original advance notice.75 Exceptions to electronic submission of these types 
of advance notice application are only permitted in certain circumstances: 
where the online submission system is “down” for a forty eight hour period, 
or longer; where the person applying for the advance notice is the applicant 
who is not using a solicitor (it is expected that such applications will be 
rare); or if the applicant does not have access to a computer (possible in 
remote areas of Scotland where internet access is unavailable).
Where the property affected by the advance notice application is 
partly Sasine Registered and partly Land Registered, two advance notice 
applications are required, one for each register.76 However if the title to 
71  Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012, s 56(d)(iii).The cadastral map is the name 
given to the map, maintained by the Registers of Scotland showing the extent of all 
registered titles. See the 2012 Act, s 11. 
72  Development Plan Approval is a service offered by Registers of Scotland to developers 
(e.g. house builders), that will identify and resolve any title extent issues in advance 
of the sale of individual houses (or plots) from the development. The development 
is approved and allocated a reference number and the location of each plot in the 
development is allocated a plot number. 




 A New Era in Conveyancing 163
the property is in the Land Register and encompasses more than one 
title number, only one application is required, and can be submitted 
electronically, referring to each title number affected, unless the transfer 
relates to part only of one or more of the titles, and a plan showing the 
extent to be transferred cannot be uploaded electronically (or Development 
Plan Approval, or co-ordinates are not available).
Acknowledgement of advance notice applications
Electronic submissions of advance notice applications receive an email 
acknowledgement confirming that submission has been successful.77 Once 
the advance notice has been entered on the application record, which 
should be the same day as submission, provided the application record is 
still open (meaning usually receipt of the application before 4pm), a second 
email is sent, confirming that it has been registered. 
Paper submissions to the Land Register receive an email acknowledgement, 
whereas submissions to the Sasine Register are acknowledged by letter.78 
Email acknowledgements include a pdf of the completed advance 
notice form, together with an application number and an advance notice 
number, and, where the advance notice relates to part of a registered plot, a 
pdf plan showing the extent that has been delineated on the cadastral map 
is included with the acknowledgement.
The thirty-five day period starts the day after registration. The 
acknowledgement notifies the applicant of the start and finish dates of the 
protected period.
C.  The Future is Here
A new era of conveyancing started on 8 December 2014. But the fun doesn’t 
stop here. The appetite for land reform at the Scottish Parliament appears 
to be unabated, with a Bill currently progressing through the Parliament 
that will see the community right to buy extended to the whole of Scotland, 
77  Registers of Scotland, Guidance (n 51).
78  Ibid. The logic of this is unclear. Acknowledgement by letter is stated to be “in accordance 
with usual Sasine practice.” It is to be hoped that in practice email acknowledgement 
will be adopted, with the letter is sent as an email attachment.
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not just rural areas,79 and the passing of a Bill that enables counterpart 
execution of deeds and effective delivery by electronic means.80 
The Law Society of Scotland has set up a Working Party on the Future 
of Conveyancing, with a remit to take forward a variety of initiatives to 
ensure that conveyancing procedures in Scotland keep pace with modern 
practice, as well as harnessing the benefits of technology. The Working 
Party will be looking at standards, processes and standardisation, to make 
the sale and purchase of property a better experience for the consumer and 
for the practitioner. There is plenty of scope for improvement and, in most 
quarters, an appetite for change for the better.
With the advent of the advance notice system, will the traditional letter 
of obligation become a thing of the past? Early experiences of advance 
notice applications have not been entirely trouble free. Rejection of 
applications, with greater frequency than the profession anticipated, or 
delays in processing applications, has produced situations where recourse 
has had to be made to a hybrid form of letter of obligation – the gap now 
being the date of last search or settlement and the start of the protected 
period – admittedly a much shorter gap, usually no more than a day or 
two. But this, like all new procedures should settle down with time, and 
the profession cannot count on the benign treatment of letters of obligation 
under the Master Policy continuing indefinitely.81 
And there will still be circumstances anyway, in which a letter of 
undertaking will have to be given in conveyancing transactions. The 
advance notice procedure will not cover the situation where a discharge of 
the seller’s standard security is not available at settlement (an increasingly 
common occurrence, in both commercial and residential transactions). 
While the default position in commercial property transactions is to 
insist on delivery of a discharge at completion, undertakings to deliver a 
discharge are routinely given at residential settlements. How long that can 
continue, and whether the Working Party can find a way to tackle that 
issue are challenges for the future.
It is clear that the ghost of Mr Gordon82 would have considerable 
difficulty in recognising the post-designated-day conveyancing landscape, 
but there can be no doubt that more change, and for the better, awaits us all. 
79  The Community Empowerment (Scotland) Bill.
80  The Legal Writings (Counterparts and Delivery) (Scotland) Bill.
81  See n 11.
82  The solicitor who gave the undertaking in Dryburgh (n 2).
9. Bona Fide Acquisition: New 
in Scottish Land Law? 
Professor David Carey Miller1
A.  Introduction
It is a privilege and a pleasure to write in recognition of the outstanding 
contribution of Professor Robert Rennie. The law and legal education of 
Scotland has traditionally recognized the subject of conveyancing as one 
demanding acute legal skills directed to matters of obvious social utility. 
Robert Rennie has been a standard-bearer in the field.
The Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012 (“2012 Act”) has been 
described as a “bold step forward” by Scottish conveyancing specialists 
Professors Robert Rennie and Stewart Brymer.2 The primary purpose of 
the 2012 Act is to provide a new legislative base for the Land Register 
and reform and restate the law on the registration of rights to land.3 The 
limited focus of this paper is on a provision making possible acquisition 
1  Thanks to 2014 Aberdeen LLB Hons graduate Katriona Dunn for her invaluable 
contribution as a research assistant. I am also grateful to Dr Craig Anderson, Mr 
Malcolm Combe, Dr Simon Cooper, Professor Roderick Paisley, Professor Kenneth 
Reid, Dr Andrew Simpson and Dr Andrew Steven for commenting on my drafts or 
discussing the paper’s subject with me; but the flaws and failings are mine alone. 
2  R Rennie, S Brymer, “A Bold Step Forward” (2012) 57(3) The Journal of the Law Society of 
Scotland 32, available at http://www.journalonline.co.uk/Magazine/57-3/1010910.aspx
3  Registers of Scotland, Consultation on Implementation of the Land Registration etc. (Scotland) 
Act 2012 – Post Consultation Report (March 2014) 2.
© David Carey Miller, CC BY 4.0 http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0056.09
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by a good faith party from a disponer (i.e. transferor) who does not have 
a valid title. 
The 2012 Act will replace much of the Land Registration (Scotland) Act 
1979 (“1979 Act”) and the Land Registration (Scotland) Rules 2006 (“2006 
Rules”). The 1979 Act has come under considerable criticism. It was 
some twenty years old when Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle said: “Nobody 
could accuse the [1979] Act of being well drafted.”4 The context of this 
paper is the 2012 Act’s policy departure from the “registration of title” 
system under the 1979 Act which provided a comprehensive guarantee 
of title linked to possible compensation. The Scottish Law Commission 
Report (“SLC Report”), from which the 2012 Act derives, recommended 
a departure from the Keeper’s ‘Midas touch’ under the 1979 Act with, 
instead, the effect of registration “determined by the relevant legislation 
and the general principles of property law.”5 This short paper cannot deal 
with the differences between the 1979 and 2012 statutes in any detail; 
after a brief overview comment on the apparent change of direction, 
the focus will be on a provision – section 86, in Part 9 of the 2012 Act – 
dealing with invalid titles including the situation of what might be called 
a “registered fraud” – i.e. the situation of a transaction void on account 
of fraud – therefore invalid – which gets on to the register. Under this 
section, provided there has been a total period of one year’s possession, 
a good faith party registered as proprietor acquires ownership) through 
a process of ‘realignment’ even though his or her transferor’s title was 
invalid – and may have been obtained by fraud. 
In permitting bona fide acquisition, section 86 is notable in a number 
of respects and the provision also raises certain questions. It appears to 
be a novel form of acquisition in Scottish land law. But is it positive or 
negative prescription, or, rather, is it simply a statutory form of original 
acquisition? It is necessary to examine the role and functioning of 
section 86, as well as the context from which it arose and that in which it 
applies, in order to reach a conclusion as to its novelty and nature. This 
contribution will also seek to comment on the form of acquisition the 
provision represents and, perhaps more importantly, its policy position.
4  Short’s Trustee v Keeper of the Registers of Scotland 1996 SC (HL) 14 at 26.
5  Scottish Law Commission, Report on Land Registration (Scot Law Com No 222, 2010) 
recommendation 62(b).
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B.  Context of Section 86
The Registration Act 1617 introduced land registration into Scotland 
by establishing the Register of Sasines, a register of deeds subservient 
to ruling property law. A full and viable land law and conveyancing 
developed albeit on a model initially overtly feudal. Over time, the feudal 
factor came to be more relevant in terms of form than substance. Its final 
demise6 – following a Scottish Law Commission reform project with 
Edinburgh University property specialist Professor Kenneth Reid as lead 
Commissioner7 – was the immediate predecessor, in terms of land law 
development milestones,8 of the reform of the 1979 registration system, the 
focus of this paper. Unrelated to the feudal factor, the Register of Sasines 
was beginning to show its age by the latter half of the twentieth century.9 
The 1979 Act introduced the Land Register to Scotland, which became 
operational on a limited area basis in 1981 and gradually extended to the 
entire country as a register controlling the state of title in respect of all new 
property transactions. The 1979 Act, largely reflecting an English model10, 
came to be subject to criticism, not least for its curative effect which put 
the emphasis on compensation from public funds rather than rectification 
of the register. One commentator described the 1979 Act as “both badly 
drafted and conceptually lacking."11
In 2002 the SLC commenced an examination of the law. Three extensive 
Discussion Papers were issued12 and the SLC Report with a draft new Act 
was published in February 2010.13 The Bill received Royal Assent on 10 
6  In the Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc (Scotland) Act 2000, s 1.
7  Scottish Law Commission, Report on Abolition of the Feudal System (Scot Law Com No 
168, 1999). 
8  On this and other major legislative developments in land law see R Rennie, Land Tenure 
in Scotland (2004).
9  See A J M Steven “Scottish Land Law in a State of Reform” 2002 Journal of Business Law 
177, 193. 
10  See SLC Discussion Paper on Land Registration: Void and Voidable Titles (DP No 125, 2004) 
para 1.22, n 54: “The Reid Committee saw the English system as its main model, and in 
important respects the 1979 Act is a copy of the English Land Registration Act of 1925.”
11  Steven (n 8) 179.
12  (1) Discussion Paper on Land Registration: Void and Voidable Titles (DP No 125, 2004); (2) 
Discussion Paper on Land Registration: Registration, Rectification and Indemnity (DP No 
128, 2005); (3) Discussion Paper on Land Registration: Miscellaneous Issues (DP No 130, 
2005).
13  Report on Land Registration (n 4).
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July 2012 and a designated day of 8 December 2014 was later announced.14 
Professors Rennie and Brymer commented positively, stating that “[t]
he Registers of Scotland and the Scottish Law Commission are to be 
congratulated for undertaking such a much-needed and comprehensive 
review of our land registration system.”15
Under section 3(1) of the 1979 Act the registered proprietor is owner of 
the land. Upon the registration of an invalid transaction, the register may be 
rectified but not to the prejudice of the registered proprietor in possession 
unless that party caused the inaccuracy by fraud or carelessness.16 If, by 
B’s act of fraud, the land of registered proprietor A is transferred to C as 
proprietor, under the 1979 system, C is owner.17 Of course, according to the 
ordinary rule of property law, A ought to remain owner regardless because 
he did not intend any transfer of his property and, quite obviously, the 
right of disposal is key to ownership. That said, the 1979 Act represents the 
position of a positive system of registration of title in which a conveyance 
“forged or granted a non domino confers ownership in just the same way 
as registration of a conveyance which was granted by the true owner and 
properly executed.”18 The extent to which this position changes under the 
2012 Act is the essential subject of this paper.
Section 86 being concerned with acquisition from one without a valid 
title is pertinent to the situation of a title deed void on the basis of fraud. 
Of course, the case of a void (i.e. invalid) title is distinguishable from 
that of a voidable title (i.e. “a subsistent title subject to the possibility of 
future challenge”19). A measure of the position of a system of registration 
is, arguably, its treatment of the fraud situation. It is submitted that the 
extent to which the registration factor has priority over the defect of a 
fraudulent act is a telling one in assessing the position of the system on the 
scale between, on the one hand, the position of the principles of property 
law being controlling and, on the other, that of the overriding primacy of 
registration.
14  Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012 (Designated Day) Order, 2014/127, art 2.
15  Rennie and Brymer, “A Bold Step” (n 1), 32.
16  1979 Act, s 9(3)(a)(iii).
17  See this discussion in Part C below. 
18  See DP on LR: Void and Voidable (n 9), para 1.9. See also E Cooke “Land Registration: 
Void and Voidable Titles” 2004 Edin LR 401-405, 402.
19  K G C Reid, “Property," in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol 18 
(1993) para 601. 
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C.  Outline of Section 86
Part 9 of the 2012 Act is headed “Rights of persons acquiring etc in good faith." 
The “etc” refers to provisions relevant to servitudes and encumbrances, 
not concerned with acquisition as such. This paper is concerned only with 
acquisition of ownership from a “disponer without valid title”20 in terms of 
section 86. Part 9 also deals with the good faith acquisition of leases.21
The role of section 86 is provided for in section 50 concerned with transfer 
by disposition; the requirement that ownership of land is transferred by a 
valid disposition is stated in section 50(2) in the form of a rule, i.e. that 
“[r]egistration of a valid disposition transfers ownership.” This positive 
proposition is fortified by being stated in the negative in the following sub-
section: “[a]n unregistered disposition does not transfer ownership.”22 The 
prerequisite of registration provided for in section 50 is stated to be subject 
to the provisions of “(a) sections 43 and 86 and (b) any other enactment or 
rule of law by or under which ownership of land may pass.”23 Section 43, 
concerned with “prescriptive claimants," provides for a provisional form 
of registration by the Keeper which remains provisional until the normal 
ten year prescription is completed.24 It may be noted that sections 43 and 86 
are complimentary in providing for a non domino transfers in the respective 
situations of, on the one hand, that fact being known to the Keeper and, on 
the other hand, it being unknown. Section 43 represents a new application 
of positive prescription in its familiar role providing for the obtaining of 
title to land through the passage of time on the basis of an ex facie valid 
deed; no more will be said of it.  
The sphere of application of section 86 is defined in subsection 1: a non-
owner (“A”) registered as proprietor and in possession of the land purports 
to dispone the land to a good faith party (“B”). This follows the SLC Report 
which states that “[t]he first condition for the realignment of rights is that 
the granter of the disposition in question is not the owner but is registered 
as owner.”25 The following conditions – continuing the usage of “A” as non-
owner registered as proprietor and “B” as good faith acquirer – set out in 
section 86(3) must be met:
20  s 86 subheading. 
21  Under ss 88 and 89.
22  s 50(3).
23  s 50(4).
24  See D Johnston, Prescription and Limitation of Actions, 2nd edn (2012) para 17.18.
25  Report on Land Registration (n 4), para 23.4.
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(i)  the land has been in the possession, openly, peaceably and without 
judicial interruption – 
(a)  of A for a continuous period of at least 1 year, or
(b)  of A and then of B for periods which together constitute such 
a period,
(ii)  at no time during that period did the Keeper become aware that the 
register was inaccurate as a result of A (or B) not being the proprietor,
(iii)  B is in good faith,
(iv)  the disposition would have conferred ownership on B had A been 
proprietor when the land was disponed,
(v)  at no time during the period mentioned in paragraph (a) – 
(a)  was the title sheet subject, by virtue of section 67, to a caveat 
relevant to the acquisition by B,
(b)  did the title sheet contain a statement under section 30(5), and
(vi)  the Keeper warrants (or is to be taken to warrant) A’s title.
Section 86 is the most important part of Part 9 of the 2012 Act dealing with 
the “realignment” of rights.26 In the Consultation on Implementation of the 
2012 Act, Professor George Gretton comments as follows on realignment:27
The basic rule in the 2012 Act is that where an entry in the LR is not justified 
by the deeds, the LR is inaccurate and ought to be rectified. But the Act 
specifies an exception, in certain types of case where the rule is that the LR 
is not to be rectified, but instead, the parties should have the rights (or lack 
thereof) that the LR says they have (or that they lack). This is realignment. 
It is the converse of rectification. Where there is realignment, the effect is 
that the entries in the LR are deemed accurate. Accordingly, where there is 
realignment, no question of rectification can arise.
The reference to realignment as the converse of rectification is, it would 
appear, on the basis that realignment provided for in the 2012 Act represent 
an opposite policy to the general one insofar as, in realignment, the incorrect 
26  The label “realignment principle” seems more appropriate than “integrity principle” 
which features as an alternative in the SLC papers: see Report on Land Registration (n 4), 
paras 13.12 and 23.4.
27  RoS, Post Consultation Report (n 2), part 9, para 9.3.
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position prevails and is not open to rectification. It may be noted that the 
Registers of Scotland describe Part 9 as “an exception to the rule that if 
there is an inaccuracy in the Land Register it is to be rectified.”28
Under section 86(3)(b), the fact that the person named as proprietor 
in the register is not actually the true proprietor must not be known to 
the Keeper or the acquirer. The acquirer will be in bad faith if he or she 
knows. The Keeper, knowing that the grantee cannot acquire because the 
party purporting to be grantor in fact has no right to the property, should 
obviously not register on a final basis.29 Consistent with recognition of 
this is the prerequisite of section 86(3)(b) that at no time during the one 
year period did the Keeper become aware of the ownership issue. The 
Explanatory Notes30 state that: “[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
the awareness of the Keeper referred to in subsection (3)(b) can be deduced 
from the information on the register.”31 In other words, the Keeper’s state 
of knowledge is assumed to be consistent with what appears to be the 
position as reflected on the register and any contrary allegation must be 
established by reference to the actual knowledge of the Keeper. 
David Johnston QC, in the second (2012) edition of his definitive work 
on prescription in Scots law, distinguishes the section 86 scenario as 
“entirely distinct”32 from the provisions that apply to “normal” prescriptive 
claimants under the 2012 Act’s revised position,33 where the Keeper marks 
the entry provisional because he or she knows that the applicant named 
on the register is not the owner. The question whether acquisition in terms 
of section 86 is a form of prescription will be considered in a subsequent 
section of this paper. 
Turning to the Explanatory Notes, the effect of section 86(1)-(3) is stated 
to be that:34
if the register shows someone as proprietor, but that person’s title is in fact 
void, then when that person dispones the title to another (and that second 
person is duly registered as owner), if the requirements in subsection (3) 
28  Registers of Scotland, Consultation on Implementation of the Land Registration etc. (Scotland) 
Act 2012 (2013) para 9.01.
29  But may do so on a “provisional” basis; see, below, n 32.
30  Prepared by the Scottish Government to assist the reader of the 2012 Act but not 
forming part of the Act and not endorsed by Parliament.
31  Explanatory Notes (n 29), para 201.
32  Johnston, Prescription (n 23), para 17.21.
33  Set out in Land Registration (Scotland) Act 2012, s 43.
34  Explanatory Notes (n 29), para 201.
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(including regarding good faith and possession for one year) are met, then 
that second person acquires ownership. 
This highlights the importance of the good faith and possession 
requirements, both of which are examined in more detail below.
Responding to an invitation by the writer to comment on section 86 
and its application to a problem scenario – drafted for teaching purposes 
and presented later in this paper – Professor Kenneth Reid noted that the 
section’s solution was less radical than the “Midas touch” of the 1979 Act 
and provided the following example:35
Suppose that land belongs to A. Forging A’s signature, B dispones the land 
to C, whose title is registered in the Land Register. Under the 1979 Act, C 
becomes owner on registration and, if C is in possession, A cannot get the 
land back but must make do with indemnity from the Keeper. Under the 
2012 Act, C’s registration has no effect and A remains owner throughout. C 
then has a claim for indemnity against the Keeper. 
Taking the same situation, but adding that C has disponed the land to D, 
under the 1979 Act he or she would, of course, be in the same protected 
position as C. D’s position, like C’s would be secure provided possession 
was retained. The Register would be inaccurate in showing C or D as owner 
and could, in principle, be rectified in the event of a loss of possession 
by the registered owner. Under section 86 of the 2012 Act, provided D’s 
acquisition was in good faith and the other requirements of the section are 
complied with, he or she will be owner. In this situation there would be no 
question of an inaccuracy in the register.
Section 86 appears to be an exception to the principle of nemo dat quod 
non habet.36 Indeed, Johnston notes that section 86-89 are exceptions to the 
nemo dat principle.37 Of course, the notion of registration as a guarantee 
of title necessarily involves some compromise in terms of adherence to 
nemo dat.38 For Johnston the justification is the importance that the public 
35  Email message of 20 March 2014 from Kenneth Reid to David Carey Miller. I am grateful 
to Professor Reid for agreeing to my reference in this paper to this and subsequent 
comments made by him.
36  Or, perhaps strictly correctly in terms of the sources of Scots law: “nemo plus juris ad 
alienum transferre potest, quam ipse haberet”: see Reid, Property (n 18), para 669, n 1. See 
also Report on Land Registration (n 4), para 19.2, n 2.
37  Johnston, Prescription (n 23), para 17.21.
38  See Report on Land Registration (n 4), para 21.21.
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should be able to place reliance on the register, and it is essential to the land 
registration system that a registered title is guaranteed.39 
Before examining the possession and good faith aspects of section 86 in 
more detail, the position regarding the date of acquiring ownership may 
be noted. This is provided for in section 86(4)-(6). Where the land has been 
in the possession openly, peaceably and without judicial interruption of A 
for a continuous period of at least one year or of A and then of B – the good 
faith disponee – and their possession together constitutes a period of at 
least one year, ownership is acquired on the date on which the disposition 
in favour of B is registered.40 Alternatively, where a continuous period of 
the requisite possession commences before registration in B’s name, but 
does not expire until a date later than the date of registration, ownership 
is acquired on the date on which the period of possession is completed.41 
D.  Section 86(3) Conditions
(1) Possessory Requirement
Under section 86(3)(a), there must have been a period of at least one 
year of continuous possession, “openly, peaceably and without judicial 
interruption.” The SLC Report notes that this definition “ties in with 
the concept of possession in the prescription legislation.”42 This is a 
reference to the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 197343 which 
gives title on the basis of an ex facie valid deed where there is possession 
for “a continuous period of ten years openly, peaceably and without any 
judicial interruption." But does this affinity mean that section 86 is a form 
of prescription? The role of positive prescription in the context of Scottish 
land law and conveyancing practice is a most significant one and one might 
be forgiven for identifying section 86 as another form of prescription. As 
already mentioned, David Johnston covers the provision in a chapter 
dealing with the positive prescription of interests in land.44 But, of course, 
that could be said to be justified on the basis that section 86 provides for 
39  Johnston, Prescription (n 23), para 17.21.
40  ss 86(4), (5).
41  ss 86(4), (6).
42  Report on Land Registration (n 4), para 23.7.
43  s 1(1)(a).
44  Johnston, Prescription (n 23), para 17.21.
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a form of acquisition involving possession for a stipulated period of time. 
The passage of time factor in the required period of one year’s possession 
is, of course, the reason why the provision is thought, by some, to be 
prescription. But a one year prescription of heritable property? Turning 
back to the Prescription Act 1594, the original period in Scotland was 40 
years. This was reduced by the Conveyancing (Scotland) Act 1874, s 34 to 
20 years and then to ten in the 1973 Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) 
Act. The requirement of only one year’s possession would be exceptional 
but is a comparison appropriate? Section 86 requires registration in good 
faith whereas positive prescription is about possession animus domini – 
possession on the basis of an intention to hold as owner evidenced by an 
ex facie valid deed in favour of the possessor. The 1973 Prescription and 
Limitation (Scotland) Act does not allow prescription where possession 
is on the basis of a registered forged deed where the party appearing as 
grantee was aware of the forgery at the time of registration in his or her 
favour.45 The starting point here is the position of the common law that 
forgery cannot be a basis for acquisition.46
In commenting on the Draft Prescription and Title to Moveable Property 
(Scotland) Bill,47 one writer notes that “[t]he fact that the entire period of 
possession would have to be completed in good faith is a major distinction 
when viewed in comparison to positive prescription of land.”48 The better 
view, it is submitted, is that the established form of prescription in land law 
reflects an approach incompatible with, or at least distinct from, acquisition 
in terms of section 86 on the basis of a passage of time factor subject to a 
controlling good faith requirement. The important good faith requirement 
will be looked at in more detail in the next section.
Against identification as prescription, acquisition can only be by B 
who does not necessarily have to have possessed but must always take 
transfer by registration in good faith. This, it may be argued, points to a 
form of original acquisition distinct from positive prescription.49 Indeed, 
45  s 1(2)(b). See Johnston, Prescription (n 23), para 17.19. See also n 10, DP No 125, 2004, 
paras 3.4-11.
46  Hence s 1(2)(a) ruling out prescription based on possession founded on the recording in 
the General Register of Sasines of a forged deed; see Johnston, Prescription (n 23), para 
17.30. 
47  See Scottish Law Commission, Report on Prescription and Title to Moveable Property (Scot 
Law Com n 228, 2012). 
48  C M Campbell “Prescription and Title to Moveables” (2012) 16 Edin L R 426-430.
49  In my continuing interchange with Professor Kenneth Reid (n 34), on 24 March 2014, 
he rejected the “form of prescription” suggestion on the basis of the possessory aspect. 
Explaining that the reason for the possession requirement is to give notice to the true 
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title could be said to arise by registration. Certainly, in acquiring a title 
under section 86, more than just the possessory requirements have to be 
fulfilled. In terms of section 86(3) six separate requirements must be met. 
In essence, in addition to the possession and good faith requirements, 
derivative acquisition must be competent in terms of the system of the 2012 
Act with the Keeper unaware of the invalidity and, of course, no caveat50 or 
statement of uncertainty regarding registration.51 As the SLC Report puts it, 
“the disposition should be such that, were it not for that defect, the disponee 
would acquire a good title."52 
A counter to any suggestion that a form of prescription was intended 
by the drafters of section 86 is the fact that their thinking appears to have 
been influenced by section 25 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (SOGA).53 With 
regard to the general issue of a choice between the protection of an owner’s 
interest and recognition of the interest of an innocent good faith acquirer, 
the SLC Report notes that there are exceptions to the general position that 
an acquirer’s good faith is irrelevant to the problem of a void title.54 
The general law says that good faith does not protect…against such nullities. 
But there are exceptions. One of these is section 25 of the Sale of Goods Act 
1979 which in some cases enables a good faith buyer to acquire a valid title 
from a non-owning seller. We mention this particular exception because, as 
will be seen, it has had an influence on our thinking about land registration. 
While a mutual feature of section 86 and section 25 of the SOGA is the 
priority accorded to a good faith purchaser, it does seem that the notion 
of a SOGA provision pointing the way for a land registry property issue 
owner that there is a threat to his title, Professor Reid observes, “unlike true prescription, 
the disponee is rewarded with a good title, not because he has possession for a period … 
but because he relied on the Register in good faith.”
50  In terms of s 67.
51  In terms of s 30(5).
52  Report on Land Registration (n 4), para 23.5.
53  SOGA, s 25 provides: “Where a person having bought or agreed to buy goods obtains, 
with the consent of the seller, possession of the goods or the documents of title to the 
goods, the delivery or transfer by that person, or by a mercantile agent acting for him, 
of the goods or documents of title, under any sale, pledge, or other disposition thereof, 
to any person receiving the same in good faith and without notice of any lien or other 
right of the original seller in respect of the goods, has the same effect as if the person 
making the delivery or transfer were a mercantile agent in possession of the goods or 
documents of title with the consent of the owner.”
54  Report on Land Registration (n 4), para 19.3; see also para 13.21: “Assuming good faith 
… a third party … would receive a good title, rather as under section 25(1) of the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979.”
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needs to be justified in view of the policy distinction between, on the one 
hand, title to corporeal moveable property and, on the other, title to land.
The affinity between section 86 of the 2012 Act and section 25 of the 
SOGA is referred to by Professor Reid in his email correspondence with 
the writer. Noting that “there are comparable provisions to protect bona fide 
acquirers…in other countries” he observes that the provisions concerned 
have “no effect on voidable titles, because a bona fide acquirer already gets…
title under the common law; so [the] purpose is to give protection where 
the registered title of the transferor is void.”55 The void/voidable distinction 
is, indeed, an important one in terms of defining section 86 with reference 
to the principles of the common law. On the basis that control over disposal 
is fundamental to the right of ownership, there is an important difference 
between, on the one hand, a complete absence of the owner’s intention 
to transfer property in the circumstances of an act of fraud and, on the 
other hand, the owner’s sufficient consent obtained in a way which makes 
it challengeable as an act of intention. Section 86 – applying to “acquisition 
from disponer without valid title” – is, of course, concerned only with the 
former situation. It may be noted that in the case of a voidable deed which 
is reduced by court decree, the decree is registered to reflect the correct 
position.56 In a subsequent section defining ‘inaccuracy’ it is stated that a 
voidable deed reduced does not produce an inaccuracy.57 Observing that 
this is not the rectification of an inaccuracy but “simply a later registration 
that changes the register” the Explanatory Notes go on to note that “[t]
his applies only to voidable deeds” because where an entry proceeds from 
a void deed the register is “inaccurate from the outset, and should be 
rectified.”58
Moving from characterisation to substance, as regards the period 
of “at least”59 one year of possession, it suffices that there is “straddling 
possession,” that is possession of A and then of B for periods which 
together constitute at least one year, or indeed that A possesses for such a 
continuous period.60 
55  See message of 20 March 2014 (n 34).
56  See s 54 inserting a new provision (s 46A) in the Conveyancing (Scotland) Act 1924.
57  s 65(4)(a).
58  Explanatory Notes (n 29), para 170.
59  Why “at least”? Whether acquisition in favour of B obtaining registration in good 
faith is on the basis of A’s possession (s.86(5)(a)) or A’s and B’s combined (s.86(5)(b)) a 
minimum period of one year must have passed, hence “at least.”
60  Report on Land Registration (n 4), para 23.6; Recommendation 105.
 Bona Fide Acquisition: New in Scottish Land Law? 177
If the section 86 one year passage of time requirement is not in direct 
support of B’s acquisition why is it there? Primarily, it seems, as an 
appropriate window within which the party potentially affected by the 
invalid register entry may intervene and assert his or her position in terms 
of the principles of property law. This is accepted in relevant comments on 
section 86. In the Annotations provided to the Bill, the Committee note that 
“in the majority of circumstances, one year’s possession is sufficient.”61 Yet 
this does not cover every single circumstance, and the Committee go on to 
further note that “we feel that it may not be long enough in all circumstances, 
especially where large amounts of land or pieces of land spread out across 
the country are owned, for example by utility companies..."62 However, in 
the SLC Report, it is noted that no clear view was held as to what the length 
of the period should be,63 however one year is “enough time for a person 
to become aware of the problem, seek legal advice and, if necessary, raise 
an action in court.”64 Does this suggest that the provision is in fact a form 
of negative prescription? One way of looking at the device is in terms of its 
protection of the affected party in requiring a period of “at least one year” 
in which it is open to him or her to challenge the position as reflected in the 
Register and apparently confirmed by the circumstances of possession. But, 
that said, the true owner is not deprived by the lapse of time but remains 
owner until conveyance to an innocent third party or, if that does not 
happen, until the normal ten year prescription has effect. 
(2) Good Faith Requirement
The SLC Report notes that the aim of the good faith requirement is “to 
protect the innocent, but only the innocent,”65 something the Report feels 
that the 1979 Act falls short on in its “fraud or carelessness” test66 – “[e]
xperience has exposed the shortcomings of this test.”67 It may be noted that 
61  Economy, Energy and Tourism Committee, Stage 1 Report on the Land Registration etc. 
Scotland Bill (2012), 213.
62  Stage 1 Report (n 61), 213.
63  See DP on LR: Void and Voidable (n 9), para 4.52 (proposal 7(e)) – as to whether one year, 
two or some other period.
64  Report on Land Registration (n 4), para 21.32.
65  Ibid, para 23.8.
66  Land Registration (Scotland) Act 1979, s 9(3).
67  Report on Land Registration (n 4), para 23.8.
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the SLC’s preference for a good faith control over the problem of title from 
a void basis was first presented in a 2004 Discussion Paper.68
From the point of view of the position of the 1979 Act vis-à-vis an act 
of fraud it is significant that only the proprietor’s “fraud or carelessness” 
gives an exception to the central rule that the Register cannot be rectified 
if this would prejudice a proprietor in possession. The possibility of this 
formulation leading to an undesirable outcome is shown in the case of 
Kaur v Singh69 where an estranged husband forged his wife’s signature and 
disposed of their flat; the innocent purchaser in possession was protected 
against rectification until the defrauded wife was able to retake possession. 
Under section 86 the innocent – i.e. good faith – registering purchaser 
would be protected, regardless of the present circumstances of possession, 
provided there had been one year’s possession by the fraudulent seller or 
one year made up by that party’s possession combined with that of the 
innocent purchaser. Both the 1979 and 2012 approaches give title despite a 
basis invalid for fraud. Whereas under the 1979 Act the critical factor is the 
innocent party’s maintenance of possession70, under the new legislation it is 
the factor of good faith at the time of registration – if necessary continuing 
until the required one year period is complete. 
The concept of bona fides has a well-established general role in Scottish 
property law.71 The SLC Report indeed notes that in Scots law, “good faith 
is the traditional and well-understood test."72 Certainly Scots law has a long 
history of penalising bad faith; in a case in 1781, Lord Braxfield noted that 
“[a]s to bona fides, although male fides may cut down a right, bona fides cannot 
establish a right.”73 But while bona fides has a long-standing general role in 
Scottish property law, until the 2012 Act it does appear to have been used 
as a control device in the law regulating the acquisition of land. In contrast, 
68  See DP on LR: Void and Voidable (n 9); for a succinct review see Cooke, Void and Voidable 
(n 18).
69  1999 SC 180.
70  Report on Land Registration (n 4) is critical of the uncertainty of a wronged party’s right 
to rectification being suspended in the circumstances of an innocent party’s possession, 
see para 17.23-27, noting, at para 17.27, that the notion that the law requires “the 
Register to remain in error” causes the public to be “incredulous and sometimes irate.” 
71  See “Bona Fide Possession” in Reid, Property (n 18), paras 131-37; see also my “Good 
Faith in Scots Property Law” in Forte (ed) Good Faith in Contract and Property Law 
(1999) 103.
72  Report on Land Registration (n 4), para 23.9.
73  Mitchells v Ferguson (1781) Ross’s Leading Cases 120 at 127, per Lord Braxfield.
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in the Victorian statutory development of commercial law applying to 
moveable property good faith came to have an important role.74
In land law bona fide possession gives entitlement to the fruits and 
benefits of property but the good faith factor does not have a key role – 
perhaps no role – in any translation of possession into title. This has been 
noted above in respect of positive prescription. Historically, in the context 
of a basic system of registration, possession supported by a colourable title 
had a certain role but this declined with the development of registration.75 
The common law possessory judgment protecting seven years possession 
on the basis of a written title76 is of limited relevance in modern law and, 
in any event, the better view is that it did not require good faith.77 From 
the point of view of the novelty of section 86, the position of the common 
law was clear, in principle – regardless of the grantee’s good faith in being 
innocent of any defect – there could not be acquisition on the basis of an 
invalid deed. In modern law the controlling limit – and the clear indication 
of applicable policy – is the ten year period of possession on the basis of an 
ex facie valid deed required for positive prescription. 
This generalized background survey suggests that good faith did not 
play any significant part in the process of acquisition of ownership of land. 
The paramount nemo plus (or nemo dat)78 principle ruled. But for present 
purposes the main point is that although “fraud or carelessness” could be 
relevant in the case of a bad faith acquirer, good faith has no role under the 
1979 Act but has an important one in the new system. As already noted, the 
1979 Act does not apply the good faith factor in determining the priority 
issue which may arise as a consequence of the register being guaranteed.79 
For the purposes of section 86 the registering grantee’s good faith must be 
subjective in the sense of actual belief in the Register. The SLC Discussion 
Paper explains the position:80
74  Perhaps most significantly, as part of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (first passed in 1893); 
See Carey Miller, “Good Faith” (n 70) 120.
75  Reid, Property (n 18), para 134.
76  See Craig Anderson, “The Protection of Possession in Scots Law” in E Descheemaeker 
(ed) The Consequences of Possession (2014) 111.
77  Reid, Property (n 18), para 146.
78  See message of 20 March 2014 (n 34).
79  See Report on Land Registration (n 4), para 23.8-14 concluding that a good faith test 
would be preferable to the “fraud or carelessness” one of the 1979 Act. 
80  See DP on LR: Void and Voidable (n 9), para 7.11.
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It seems self-evident that only subjective good faith can be relevant for 
Register error. To lose the statutory protection the acquirer must know, as a 
positive fact, that the Register is wrong… If mere suspicion were enough, an 
acquirer, alerted to the possible error, would have no choice but to go behind 
the Register and inspect the prior deeds, in disregard of the curtain principle 
and consequently of one of the main purposes of registration of title.
E.  Possible Section 86 Application Scenario
This possible working example of the application of section 86 was drafted 
for the Aberdeen University Conveyancing (Honours) class of 2013/2014.81 
Mr and Mrs Grabbie have looked after their aged neighbour John Kindness 
at Kinmuck in Aberdeenshire, for almost ten years. Mr Kindness’s only 
relation is his son Bruce who lives in Australia. In addition to his house 
property Mr Kindness owns, under a separate title, a three acre field where 
he keeps a pair of Shetland ponies. The Grabbies have a Welsh cob which 
shares the field with the Shetland ponies. Mrs Grabbie looks after the land 
and the three ponies. In January 2014, in declining health, going blind and 
showing signs of dementia, Mr Kindness gave Mr Grabbie a full power of 
attorney. At the same time he says that he wants to talk to his son about 
the Grabbies getting a liferent over the pony field when he dies. Kindness’s 
solicitor, who drew up the power of attorney, is present at the signing and 
hears his client’s statement about the field. In October Mr Grabbie gets Mr 
Kindness to sign a paper telling him, untruthfully, that it is a council tax 
exemption document. In fact, it is a letter from Kindness to his solicitor 
stating that he has decided that the Grabbie’s should get the field outright 
and instructing that it be transferred to Mrs Grabbie as soon as possible, 
with all necessary formalities dealt with by Mr Grabbie in terms of the 
power of attorney he holds. This deception is only possible because of Mr 
Kindness’s eyesight and there is no question of his lacking capacity. Mr 
Grabbie takes the letter to Kindness’s solicitor who draws up missives and 
a disposition transferring the field to Mrs Grabbie. The disposition is signed 
by Grabbie acting on the basis of his authority under the power of attorney. 
In January 2015 the field property is registered in Mrs Grabbie’s name in 
terms of the Land Registration (Scotland) Act 2012. She informs the Council 
that she is owner and arranges for payment of the council tax from her bank 
account. Mrs Grabbie continues to attend to the ponies in the field on a daily 
basis but also has the property re-fenced. In February 2016, after moving 
the ponies to her daughter’s farm, she sells the field to property developer 
Phil Marbles who knows nothing of the circumstances of Mrs Grabbie’s 
81  For further examples of the working of the 2012 Act, see Report on Land Registration (n 
4), Part 25.
 Bona Fide Acquisition: New in Scottish Land Law? 181
acquisition. The field is sold for £9,000. Mr Marbles obtains possession of the 
field and commences a market gardening operation pending his intended 
application for a change of use for development. In March 2016 the field is 
registered in Mr Marbles’ name. In August he obtains planning permission 
to erect fifteen houses and the field is now valued at £180,000. Prior to that, 
in May 2016, John Kindness died. After the funeral his son from Australia 
goes drinking with the Grabbies and tells them that he has inherited the 
entire estate of his father who died intestate. At the end of a long evening Mr 
Grabbie tells Bruce Kindness what he did with the field. In the sober light 
of day Kindness reports the transgression to his dad’s solicitor and asks if 
the transfer to Mrs Grabbie and the subsequent one to Phil Marbles can be 
reduced because of Mr Grabbie’s fraud. 
An Edinburgh QC gives the Kindness solicitor an opinion to the effect that: 
(i) in terms of section 86 Marbles got a good title to the field on registration 
in his name in March 2016, and; (ii) that the John Kindness estate is entitled 
to compensation from the Keeper on the basis of sections 94 and 95. The 
opinion adds that, applying section 95(1), the increase in value is not a 
consequential loss which the Kindness Estate can recover because it was 
solely due to Mr Marbles’ efforts and, for this reason, the compensation 
payable will be quantified on the basis of value of the field at the time the 
right was lost – i.e. £9000.
F.  Conclusion
The SLC Report, progenitor of the 2012 Act, in a part on the “[e]ffect of 
registration," says that there are two types of inaccuracy under the 1979 
Act “which we call in the discussion papers ‘actual’ inaccuracy and ‘bijural’ 
inaccuracy." The Report goes on to explain:82
An inaccuracy is actual if what the Register says in simply untrue. An 
inaccuracy is ‘bijural’ if what the Register says is false in terms of general 
law, but true for the purposes of the Act.
In a subsequent part on “[i]naccuracy in the register” the Report says 
that “as a result of the new scheme bijural inaccuracies83 will disappear” 
for which “there will be few mourners.”84 One takes this to mean that the 
82  Report on Land Registration (n 4), para 13.7.
83  On this see P O’Connor “Deferred and immediate indefeasibility: bijural ambiguity in 
registered land title systems” (2009) 13 Edin LR 194-223.
84  Report on Land Registration (n 4), para 17.33.
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revised registration system of the 2012 Act will square more with general 
property law than the 1979 Act’s system did. As the Explanatory Notes 
state: “[t]he Act seeks to re-align registration law with property law by, 
for example, adjusting the circumstances in which a person can recover 
their property rather than only receive compensation under the state 
guarantee of title from the Keeper.”85 But all that said, section 86 represents 
a compromise – involving the ‘integrity’ or ‘realignment’ principle – in 
terms of which “in certain cases the registration of an invalid deed will 
confer on the good faith grantee an unchallengeable right.”86   
Without acknowledging the utility of the bijural analysis, section 86 
does seem to be a departure from the general position of the 2012 Act 
insofar as this seeks to bring the registration system closer to the general 
law. The section imports a corporeal moveables exception to nemo dat in 
the justification for recognising the entitlement of a good faith acquirer 
in circumstances in which there is nothing to suggest that the disponer 
does not have a right of disposal. The position of section 86 is seen to 
be analogous to that of section 25 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and, to 
that extent – as the SLC position seems to be – this is not an alternative 
regime but, rather, a realignment providing a new statutory answer to a 
particular question, if not deriving from, at least with some relationship 
to existing law. 
An alternative perspective is that the 2012 Act’s treatment of fraud 
gives a reduction window to the defrauded party and, to that extent, eases 
the extreme position of the 1979 legislation. This, combined with the 
justification for benefitting an honest acquirer in circumstances which raise 
no doubt, is part of a new registration law system. To that extent, if there is 
any utility in the bijural analysis, one might say that this is a replacement 
of the bijural content rather than a departure from the bifurcated approach 
implicit in bijuralism. 
What may be seen as the extreme – but, of course, widely subscribed 
to – idea of registration wiping the fraud slate clean is replaced but the 
statute, nonetheless, retains a system allowing what amounts to relatively 
easy condoning of the wronging of an owner of land deprived by fraud. 
The scenario produced for the 2013/14 Aberdeen Conveyancing Honours 
class seems to me to demonstrate that. 
Seeing the one year period of the 2012 Act as a form of negative 
prescription could be contrasted with the twenty year period applying to 
85  Explanatory Notes (n 29), para 3.
86  Report on Land Registration (n 4), para 13.36.
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an owner’s right to recover stolen moveables from a party innocent of the 
theft.87 But, of course, the real right of ownership in land is imprescriptible88 
and, on that basis, we probably cannot see section 86 as a form of negative 
prescription. That would, in any event, be problematic because it is not an 
external challenge to the registration system89 but integral to it.
This rather leads to the conclusion that section 86 is consistent with 
the SLC’s conceptual system in the 2012 Act. The section provides for 
a “realignment” of general property law in bringing recognition of the 
good faith purchaser’s interest into the equation. The radical extent of this 
“realignment” is demonstrated by the policy borrowing from moveable 
property. Whoever would have thought of “mobilia non habent sequelam” 
applying to land? 
Conceptual structure and system apart, is the policy position of section 
86 a good one? That, it is suggested, comes down to the question how far 
the security of a registered deed, in giving priority to the property, should 
go. Of course, one needs to address the effects of policy to be in a position to 
make an informed choice. In a recent contribution focussing on registered 
land titles in English law Dr Simon Cooper, referring to the solution route 
of “correction power… controlled by a clearly defined and hard edged 
rule," observes that:90
[t]he quality of predictability inherent in such a rule would avert potential 
costs of policing and enforcing property claims, it would allow better 
forecasting of the occasions for correction and ensure improved information 
about risk, thus removing a potential deterrent to entering the land market. 
Prima facie, it seems that section 86 scores relatively well on these criteria. 
While section 86 is an innovative solution which much to commend 
it this writer is not convinced that the position of good faith should give 
priority over an act of fraud after only one year. From the point of view of 
the common law of Scotland that would be a radical concession and it is 
difficult to see why such a position should be adopted in the context of a 
shift from positive registration to a system intended to be generally closer 
to the common law.
87  Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, Schedule 3 (g).
88  Ibid, Schedule 3 (a).
89  See Johnston, Prescription (n 23), para 3.02, arguing that if negative prescription were 
allowed to extinguish rights “the standing of the property registers would soon become 
very dubious.”
90  Simon Cooper “Regulating Fallibility in Registered Land Titles” (2013) 72 CLJ 341-68, 
346.

10. Res Merae Facultatis: 
Through a Glass Darkly
Sheriff Douglas J Cusine
A.  Introduction
When Robert and I went to study Law at the University of Glasgow in 
1964, one of the entrance requirements was a pass in what was then called 
“Lower” Latin, later an “O” level and now a Standard Grade. In the class 
on Civil (Roman) Law, there were frequent mentions of Latin, without any 
translation, and in it and the other classes such as Scots Law, there was 
an assumption that the audience had some idea of what the various Latin 
terms meant. At present, any such assumption would be misplaced. I do 
not know when the requirement for Latin was dropped, but in more recent 
times, because the language is taught in only a few schools, law lecturers 
will either continue to use Latin terms, but translate them, or perhaps avoid 
using them.
When I was an academic lawyer, I benefited enormously from Robert’s 
knowledge of the law and his experience of practice. We rarely conversed 
in Latin, but it might have seemed to so a bystander!
While a knowledge of Latin is no longer required of law students, Latin 
survives in at least one Scottish statute – the Prescription and Limitation 
(Scotland) Act 1973 (“the 1973 Act”). In Schedule 3, the Act gives a list of 
things to which the rules on prescription do not apply and one of these is 
something which is “exerciseable as a res merae facultatis.” One assumes 
that the term was used in the legislation simply because a translation 
© Douglas J Cusine, CC BY 4.0 http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0056.10
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would not assist in understanding what is comprehended by it. There is no 
discussion of the concept in the Scottish Law Commission documentation 
which led up to the Act, beyond the description “rights of such a character 
that their exercise would be expected only periodically or irregularly,”1 nor 
in the Parliamentary debates which preceded the 1973 Act,2 except that 
during the Second Reading on the Bill, the Minister described the right as 
one “which the proprietor may assert or not as he pleases, without the risk 
of losing the right by failure to assert it.”3 As the expression is not defined 
in the 1973 Act, its meaning must be the common law meaning.4
Res merae facultatis means a thing or right which is a mere faculty, but 
it is clear that the right being discussed is something which the holder 
can exercise or not,5 and if it exercised, it can be done at any time. As the 
Extra Division in Peart v Legge6 observed, that is “correct (up to a point) 
because the possessor of any right may choose to exercise it or not.”7 Thus 
every right could be described as res merae facultatis. However, that leads 
to confusion and it is clear that res merae facultatis is narrower than other 
rights, if only because it is exempt from prescription. An example of the 
confusion which could arise can be seen in the following example. If I 
own a piece of ground, I am at liberty at any time to build on it (title and 
planning considerations apart), or to refrain from building. The right of 
ownership never prescribes, unless there has been prescriptive possession 
for 10 years on a competing title. Assuming that there is no such adverse 
possession, my rights as owner are res merae facultatis. However, if I have 
an express grant of a servitude of access, it is entirely up to me whether 
I use it or not, but if I do not use the servitude right, it will be lost in 20 
years, and so the choice whether to exercise it or not also goes. If that right 
were categorised as res merae facultatis, it would be a subsidiary right, and 
as such, would remain valid only if the principal right remained. If I have 
the right to use a piece of ground for the construction of a road, that is a 
principal right, and it never prescribes. Res merae facultatis, therefore, has to 
be confined to that narrower class of rights which do not prescribe, unless 
1  Memorandum on Prescription and Limitation of Actions (SLC Memo n 9, 1968) p 12.
2  HL Deb 5 April 1973, cols 418-25; HL Deb 17 April 1973, cols 1050-51; HL Deb 8 May 
1973, cols 257-58; HL Deb 10 May 1973 cols 513-14.
3  HL Deb 5 April 1973, col 422 (Lord Polwarth).
4  Peart v Legge 2008 SC 93 at 101.
5  D Johnston, Prescription and Limitation of Actions, 2nd edn (2012) para 3.07.
6  2008 SC 93.
7  Peart (n 4) at 101, citing W M Gloag, The Law of Contract, 2nd edn (1929) 738.
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lost in some other way. If I have a right which is res merae facultatis, I could 
discharge it expressly, or by my abandoning it, or it could be discharged 
by my acquiescing in something done by another which is inconsistent 
with the exercise of my right, e.g. by permitting a wall to be built over a 
passageway which I could, at some time, make into a road.
I intend to look at Institutional and other writings, and some of the 
reported cases, not with a view to trying to categorise rights which are res 
merae facultatis, but rather to challenge the view that a right which is res 
merae facultatis does not impose any obligation on any other party.
B.  Institutional and other Writers
The customary place to begin is with Stair, but I have not been able to trace 
any mention of res merae facultatis, except in More’s Notes: “But rights merae 
facultatis are not liable to be cut off by prescription.”8
The first mention I have been able to trace is in Bankton:9
It is a general rule, that res merae facultatis numquam praescribitur. A mere 
faculty, or power of using a thing cannot prescribe. A faculty is either a 
Liberty granted by the public law … or Private, competent to one in the 
exercise of his right, as to build on his own ground at his pleasure…. One, 
by forbearing the exercise of a faculty during the course of prescription will 
not be hindered to use it, which is the import of the foresaid maxim: thus the 
proprietor may raise his building to the prejudice of his neighbour.
Erskine states:10 
Certain rights are ex sua natura incapable of the negative prescription, at 
least where statute does not interpose. First, powers which one may exercise 
or not at his pleasure ex gr. a power or faculty to burden lands with a certain 
sum, or to revoke a right granted.... Hence also the right inherent in every 
proprietor of building or using any other act of property on his grounds, 
cannot prescribe by any length of time, though a neighbouring landholder 
should suffer ever so much by the exercise of it.
Bell in his Principles says no more than “negative prescription will not affect 
res merae facultatis.”11
8  Stair, Inst (5th edn) notes pcclxvi. 
9 Ibid 2.12.22-23.
10  Ibid 3.7.10.
11  Bell, Principles, 10th edn §2017.
188 Enjoying Property
Turning to other writers, Kames mention the notion:12
But there is here a remarkable Limitation, which makes a considerable 
further Restriction upon Rights prescribable; which is, That personal Powers 
or Faculties, such as Faculties to burden, to alter or innovate, to revoke, &c. 
though inferring a Burden upon others, are not lost non utendo. The true 
and adequate Reason whereof is this, that it being involved in the very Idea 
of a Faculty, to be exercised quandocunque at the arbitrary Pleasure of the 
Possessor, as well now as afterwards, as well afterwards as now, Neglect 
or Desertion, the Causes operative of Prescription, can never be inferred 
simply from Forbearance. In Rights the very Design of which is to be made 
effectual quam primum, such as Obligations for Money, or other Prestation, 
Forbearance to act upon these, implies Neglect and Dereliction. But where 
it is the very Intention of the Thing, that the Matter should lie over, where 
it is entirely arbitrary, whether the Power be exercised this Day or hereafter, 
the forbearing to act at present cannot infer in the Nature of Things Neglect 
or Dereliction. These Limitations upon the negative Prescription, viz. Acts of 
personal Liberty, that imply but one Person, and Faculties of the Nature to 
be exercised quandocunque, are both of them generally comprehended under 
the Expression of, though very different in their Natures and carefully to be 
distinguished. As for the positive Prescription, all Rights may be acquired 
thereby that are capable of Possession. 
In Kames’ Elucidations, commenting on the Prescription Act, he states:13 
The statutes of this island are not illustrious for profound knowledge. The 
exceptions are few, and this present act 1672 is one of the most illustrious 
... Res merae Facultatis. Where a man provides to himself a power to exercise 
the faculty or not, as he finds it convenient and where therefore delay is no 
evidence of dereliction, nor even of negligence. 
Further on in the same Article, he says:14
(T)here is another species of rights and privileges more properly termed res 
merae facultatis, because they concern the privileged person only and affect 
not others; such as my choosing a spot for a kitchen-garden, planting a tree, 
or building a house at my March.
In his Lectures, while not specifically mentioning res merae, Hume states:15
12  H H Kames, Essays Upon Several Subjects in Law (1732) 108.
13  H H Kames, Elucidations Respecting the Common and Statute Law of Scotland (1777) 275.
14  Kames, Elucidations (n 13) 248.
15  G Campbell H Paton (ed), Baron David Hume’s Lectures 1786-1822: Volume 3 (1952) 65.
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Prescription shall not apply to those claims which by their kind, do not seem 
destined to be used at any particular season, but are in their very nature 
arbitrary or discretionary to be used at any time – sooner or later – according 
to the convenience of the person concerned; so that his silence is no sufficient 
ground of inference of a purpose to abandon, nor can any particular day or 
term be fixed on, at which, more than another, prescription should begin to 
run against him.
Slightly further on, he makes this point:16 
Beside, in some of those instances the right, ... is effectual, to the party 
concerned, and yet does not encroach on or shall impair the interest of any 
other person, does not operate in the shape of a call or claim on any one, 
does not result in any demand against any one, to yield anything, or donor 
perform anything, for the benefit of the party who uses the right.
In Lectures on the Law of Scotland, J S More has this to say:17
Rights which are mere facultatis, as they are called – that is rights which a 
party may or may not exercise at pleasure, and by the non-exercise of which 
no right is enjoyed or conferred on any other party, are not liable to be cut 
off by prescription. Thus the right of a proprietor to erect a mill or any other 
building on his lands, though not exercised for a hundred years, will never 
prescribe, however desirable it might be for his neighbour that no such 
building be erected.
Napier observes:18
Negative prescription involves the idea of opposing interests; a party debtor 
being thereby understood to be relieved from his obligation by the neglect, 
inferring dereliction, of the party creditor. So all rights and uses of property 
which imply no claim against another may be exercised quandocunque; 
[citing Kames and a case]19 These, and the like Imprescriptible rights, have 
come under the denomination of res merae facultatis.... Besides the res merae 
facultatis which involve no idea of any opposing interests, there are certain 
personal powers and faculties which, from their nature, come under the 
same demomination, although the patrimonial interests of another be 
concerned in the exercise or non exercise of such powers. It is involved in 
the very idea of a faculty that it may or may not be exercised, according to 
the will of the party in whose favour it is constituted.
16  Paton, Hume’s Lectures (n 15), 65.
17  J S More, Lectures on the Law of Scotland (1864) vol 1, 419. 
18  M Napier, Commentaries on the Law of Prescription in Scotland (1839) 645-47.
19  Kames, Elucidations (n 13) 248; Haig v Haliburton (1707) M 10727. 
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Millar on Prescription comments:20 
The solum of a public footpath belongs to the proprietor of the land through 
which it runs; and his right to erect gates across the path ... is consequently 
a right to make a certain use of his property at his own pleasure, is res merae 
facultatis, and is not liable to be extinguished by failure to exercise it.21
Trayner’s Latin Maxims defines res mere facultatis in this way:22 
A matter of mere power; a mere faculty.... It is a right which may or may 
not be exercised at the pleasure of him who holds it; and such rights are 
never lost by their non-exercise for any length of time, because it is of their 
essential character that they may be used or exercised at any time.
Gloag:23 
[I]n certain cases the negative prescription is excluded on the ground that 
the right against which it is pleaded is one res mere facultatis, a right which 
the creditor may exact or not at pleasure. In one sense this is obviously 
true of every right, and it is difficult to frame a general canon of distinction. 
According to Pothier (Vente, v391), the principle of res merae facultatis applies 
where the right in question is one Implied by law, e.g. the right to increase 
the height of a building; or where it is inter naturalia of a contract e.g. the 
right, in pledge, to recover the article. 
In his book on Prescription and Limitation, David Johnston looks at the 
notion of res merae facultatis against the background of some of the reported 
cases and then states:24 
It seems reasonable to conclude that res merae facultatis is a property right 
which cannot be lost by negative prescription either: (1) because it is a right 
whose exercise implies no claim on anyone else or against their rights; or (2) 
because it is a (normal) incident of ownership) which can be lost only as a 
consequence of the fortification in some other person of a right inconsistent 
with it. The common ground between these two categories is that they are 
rights which are lost only by the establishment of any adverse right, and that 
can happen, if at all, only by positive prescription. But so long as there is no 
adverse right there is no question of their prescribing. 
20  J H Millar, A Handbook of Prescription According to the Law of Scotland (1893) 87. 
21  He cites Sutherland v Thomson (1876) 3 R 485 and Galbreath v Armour (1845) 4 Bell App 
374.
22  J Trayner, Trayner’s Latin Maxims, 4 edn (1993) 554.
23  Gloag, Contract (n 7), 738.
24  Johnston, Prescription (n 5), para 3.16.
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He also observes that there has been recent academic discussion of the 
concept, principally against the background of Peart v Legge.25
In A S Brett’s Liberty, Right and Nature,26 in a chapter entitled “The 
language of natural liberty: Fernando Vazquez de Menchaca,”27 the author 
says: 
Within the prescription literature in general, prominent among those 
imprescriptibilia is facultas, where by a facultas is understood a power of free 
choice of doing something or not, at will…. A faculty is, in this connection, 
expressly contrasted with a right (ius): if I have right of doing something 
which I do not exercise, then after thirty years another person may claim to 
have prescribed that ius, to the extent that I no longer have it. But a faculty, 
which lies within my own free will, can never enter the sphere of civil law.
While there may be some merit in drawing a distinction between a right 
and a faculty, it does not advance our understanding of what rights are 
comprehended within res merae facultatis and which are not. It may be that 
while an elephant is difficult to describe, but is easily recognised, a res merae 
facultatis is neither easy to describe, nor to recognise. In the end, what is or 
is not res merae facultatis may come within that well-known jurisprudential 
notion that each case turns on its own facts. 
C.  Cases
Morison’s Dictionary has a separate heading of Res Merae Facultatis and 
reports a number of cases on it,28 but they do not greatly assist in defining 
or categorising those rights which are res merae, and some of the cases relate 
to issues which are no longer of any moment.
In Crawford v Bethune,29 the right to work minerals was regarded as res 
merae facultatis and in Agnew v Magistrates of Stranraer30 a right of oyster 
fishing was also so regarded. These are examples of incidents of ownership 
and, as has been noted, the right of ownership of land never prescribes, 
25  Peart (n 4).
26  A S Brett, Liberty, Right and Nature (1997) 192-93.
27  Author of Controveriarum illustrum usuque frequentium libri tres (1564), born 1512.
28  10728-32.
29  (1822) 1 S 111.
30  Ibid 2 S 42.
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except against an adverse title followed by prescription.31 In Gardner v 
Scott,32 Lord Fullerton stated:33 
[I]t is true that where a party grants a disposition with a double manner 
of holding ... the disponee has the option of holding by a base or a public 
infeftment. It is with him to choose either, so long as no other completed 
right intervenes. In any question with the grantee of such a right, the grantee 
is bound to throw no obstacle in the way of completing the right granted by 
himself. 
This will be a mystery to those unfamiliar with the feudal system of 
landholding. In Swan’s Trs v The Muirkirk Iron Co34 the right to use a 
watercourse as a navigable canal was res merae.
Leck v Charmers35 involved a dispute about the use of a common stair. In 
1812 a tenement of land in Trongate, Glasgow was disponed and the deed 
provided that the disposers and disponees intended to erect an outside 
staircase to access the upper storeys. The ground on which the staircase 
was to be erected was held pro indiviso, maintained at mutual expense 
and it was foreseen that both parties would use the stair. The defenders 
averred that they had had exclusive use of the stair for 40 years and sought 
to exclude the pursuers from using it. The court held that one co-proprietor 
could not exclude the other from the use of such a stair. In his decision, 
Lord Cowan said:36
Mere discontinuance to use and enjoy his property or its consequent for a 
hundred years, or any period, could not prevent the right being asserted at 
any time, so long as no adverse right has been reared up to its prejudice.... 
The joint right of the pursuers to use this staircase ... was, in truth, capable, 
at any distance of time, to be resumed and asserted…. The precise character 
of the legal right thus contended to have been acquired by the defenders 
is not very clearly stated in the record, but was explained by their senior 
counsel to be that of servitude. What kind of servitude could thus be raised 
up I am at some loss to understand…. [His Lordship notes that property 
cannot be lost simply by non use, but mentions another title followed by 
prescriptive possession] The right of the pursuers was, in truth, res merae 
facultatis capable at any distance of time to be resumed and asserted.
31  See also Mackenzie v Davidson (1841) 3D 646 on the right of salmon fishing, especially 
the opinion of Lord Moncreiff at 657.
32  (1840) 2 D 185. 
33  Gardner (n 32) at 201.
34  (1847) 12 D 622.
35  (1859) 21 D 408.
36  Leck (n 35) at 417.
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In Gellatly v Arrol37 a tenement was conveyed in different storeys. The upper 
storeys were reached by a common stair, but the titles reserved the right 
in the proprietor of the ground storey to open up and use a door which 
already existed from the common stair and this right was res merae. Some 
of the judicial observations are useful. Lord Benholme:38 
Now I think that a right thus originally vested in the proprietor of this lower 
storey is, and can never be held as derelinquished; but that he should be 
held at any time entitled, in terms of the titles of both parties, to revert to the 
exercise of the original right of access. 
Lord Neaves:39 
It is certain that the rugby of a party to make operations in suo never can be 
lost non utendo; and the question here is, strictly speaking, as to operation 
of that kind. It regards the right of the pursuer to open a door in his own 
wall, so as to give him physical access to the common stair.... This seems to 
me clearly to be res merae facultatis. It has been kept up in the titles, and still 
belongs to him as an accessory of his property. 
Finally, Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis:40
[A]ssuming that there is a door-way, the reserved right to open it is res marae 
facultatis, to which negative prescription is inapplicable.
In Sutherland v Thomson41 the proprietor of land through which there was a 
right of way was held entitled to erect gates over the route provided they 
did not constitute an obstruction.42 
In Smith v Stewart43 the litigation arose out of the terms of a document 
described as a “Bond of Servitude” dated 1825 which was related to a piece 
of ground between two properties. The Bond contained the following 
provisions: 
[R]estricting us and our assignees ... from building nearer to the garden wall 
belonging to the said John Baxter ... than twenty feet ... hereby grant to the 
said John Baxter ... full power and liberty to use the said space of twenty feet 
37  (1863) 1 M 592.
38  Gellatly (n 37) at 602.
39 Ibid.
40  Gellatly (n 37) at 599.
41  (1876) 3 R 485.
42  Sutherland (41) at 490 (Lord Neaves).
43  (1884) 11 R 921.
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as a road or entry ... and to open up a passage or entry not exceeding ten feet 
wide in [said] dyke.
The litigation arose more than 40 years later (which at that time was the 
period of the long negative prescription). The pursuers argued that the 
right had prescribed, but this was rejected by the First Division. Lord 
President Inglis, with whom the other judges agreed, said:44 
It appears to me that the provision in Mr Baxter’s favour entitled him to 
use the strip ... as an entry ... whether it was to be made into a street or not. 
There was no restriction as to the time within which the privilege was to 
be exercised…. But how is it possible to say that such a right ... can be lost 
by negative prescription? The right is clearly of the nature of a res merae 
facultatis – a right which is to be used in the future when occasion arises 
and is of such a nature as has never been held to fall under the negative 
prescription.
Rankine describes the decision as “narrow.”45 Two sheriff court decisions 
applied Smith v Stewart, – Mitchell v Brown46 and Crumley v Lawson.47 In 
Mitchell, Sheriff Guthrie (the editor of the 10th edition of Bell Principles) 
commented on res merae, saying, “It may be thought that the doctrine has 
been borrowed from some civilians without sufficient consideration or 
definition.”48
The final case prior to Peart v Legge49 is Anderson v Robertson50 in which 
it was held that a lower proprietor whose land was damaged by surface 
water coming from the land of an upper proprietor because that proprietor 
had filled in a ditch had no ground of action as the right to fill in the ditch 
was res merae.51 There is a list of cases on res merae in Walker on Prescription 
and Limitation of Actions.52 A South African case is mentioned in Voet53 and 
in that case, it was submitted by counsel that the right to have a veranda 
over a public road was res merae.54
44  Smith (43) at 924-25.
45  J Rankine, Law of Land-ownership in Scotland, 4th edn (1909) 87, n 5.
46  (1888) 5 Sh Ct Rep 9.
47  (1892) 8 Sh Ct Rep 307.
48  5 Sh Ct Rep at 13.
49  2008 SC 93.
50  1958 SC 367.
51  Lord Mackintosh in Anderson (n 50) at 375.
52  D M Walker, Prescription and Limitation of Actions, 6th edn (2002) 78. 
53  Voet, Commentaries on the Pandects, 13, 7, 7 (ed Percival Vane). 
54  Jones v Town Council of Cape Town 12 SC 19 at 25 (1895) C J de Villierv.
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In Peart v Legge,55 the parties owned neighbouring irregularly-shaped 
pieces of ground. There was a dispute about access. In 1981, the defender’s 
father acquired ground from the Marquis of Lothian, and that ground was 
separated by a stone wall from a track owned by the Marquis. The 1981 deed 
included an express right of access over ground owned by the Marquis and 
a right to breach the wall, subject to certain conditions. In 1997, the Marquis 
sold the ground to the pursuer, but that was subject to the right of access 
in the 1981 deed. No attempt had been made since 1981 to take access, nor 
had the wall been breached. The court rejected an argument that the right 
to breach the wall was res merae.
Having examined some of the cases cited above, Johnston concludes 
that res merae is a property right and it does not impose any obligation 
on any other party,56 a comment with which David Carey Miller agrees.57 
However, both Kames and Hume mention that, in some cases, there is an 
obligation on others. Thus Kames in the passage cited above says, “that 
personal Powers or Faculties, such as Faculties to burden, to alter or 
innovate, to revoke, &c. though inferring a Burden upon others, are not 
lost non utendo.”58 Hume’s position is that, “in some instances,”59 the right 
does not impose any obligation on others. Furthermore, having quoted the 
passage from Johnston, the court in Peart observed, “the present case (like 
Smith v Stewart) cannot be said to involve a right whose exercise implies no 
claim against the rights of another; any right of access over the property 
of another implies such a claim.”60 If one considers cases such as Gellatly,61 
Leck62 and Smith v Stewart,63 while the issue was whether the rights had 
prescribed, I submit that in Gellatly and Leck, it would not have been open 
to the other co-proprietor to do something to frustrate the right of access 
to the common stair and in Smith, the adjoining proprietor would not have 
been entitled to dig up the route over which the road might have gone, or 
to build over it. 
55  2008 SC 93.
56  Johnston, Prescription (n 5), para 3.16.
57  D Carey Miller, “Res Merae Facultatis: Mysterious or Misunderstood” (2008) Edin LR 
451-55.
58  Kames, Essays (n 12) 108.
59  Paton, Hume’s Lectures (n 15), 65.
60  Peart (n 4) at 102. 
61  (1863) 1 M 592.
62  (1859) 21 D 408.
63  (1884) 11 R 921.
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Against that background, the purpose of this article is to give examples 
of rights which, in my view, are res merae facultatis and do impose an 
obligation on someone else. There are, to my mind a number of rights 
which look like servitudes, but are not. In Servitudes and Rights of Way,64 
we mention some of these rights and have a question mark against them, 
largely because at the time of writing in 1998 there were no reported cases 
settling matters one way or another. The two main rights which I want to 
address are access to a neighbour’s property and fire escape. I will also 
suggest some further possible examples of res merae. 
D.  Examples of Res Merae Facultatis Imposing 
Obligations
(1) Access to a neighbour’s property
I have been unable to find any reported Scottish case where the issue of 
whether one has a right to access a neighbour’s property was decided. That 
may be because in most instances, neighbours will be accommodating to 
reasonable requests. That said, in April 2014, The Times reported the results 
of a survey carried out by Yale, the home security company, which revealed 
that one in three stated that they did not get on with their neighbours, and 
for one in seven, things were so bad that they had decided to move house.65 
However, for whatever reason, the matter, if litigated in Scotland, has 
not been reported. There is a plethora of cases, reported and not, about 
ownership of, or access over tiny strips of ground. (The lengths to which 
neighbours are prepared to go (as a matter of principle) over such matters 
brings only joy to a lawyer’s heart, provided always that funds for payment 
are available.)
To start, here is a simple example. During high winds, A’s dustbin 
lid is blown into the neighbour’s garden. It would seem strange to say 
that A does not have the right to enter the garden to recover the bin lid. 
Should the neighbour seek to prevent recovery, that would be theft, and 
so I would suggest that there is an obligation on the neighbour either 
to assist recovery, or least not to obstruct it. In Roman law, a neighbour 
could be interdicted from refusing to allow A to recover fruits which had 
64  D J Cusine and R R M Paisley, Servitudes and Rights of Way (1998) Ch 3.
65  The Times, 2 April 2014, 3.
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fallen from A’s tree into the neighbour B’s property.66 It also permitted a 
person to access a neighbour’s property to recover trees which had blown 
down.67 The access required in such cases is for a limited purpose and a 
limited period. Removing the football from the remains of the glasshouse 
is another example.
However, access to a neighbour’s property might be required in 
circumstances where the access might have to be combined with some 
form of “parking” as the following example shows. Let us assume that in 
the high winds, the roof of A’s garden shed is blown into the neighbour’s 
garden. Whether the roof is intact or not, it is unlikely that A will manage 
to remove the roof without using, for example, a wheelbarrow or a trailer 
to transport the roof back to A’s premises. Other help may also be needed. 
In these examples, the neighbour will probably be keen for A to remove the 
items as quickly as possible.
There must be a large numbers of properties where the boundaries are 
so close together that it would be highly desirable, or in some instances 
essential, to get access to the adjoining property to carry out inspection 
and, more important, repair, or perhaps demolition. For example, there 
might not be sufficient room on a property to put up scaffolding, or use 
a cherry-picker which may be essential for inspecting, and if necessary 
repair, say, the pointing. Another situation where access to a neighbouring 
property would be needed would be where branches of a tree overhang 
a neighbouring property, and the owner of the tree wishes to cut the tree 
back, rather than entrust this to the neighbour. 
The right, I suggest, can be exercised not only by A, but also by 
contractors instructed by A. A might not be able to paint the eaves of his 
house, or do the pointing. Furthermore, I would suggest that A’s contractor 
would be entitled to leave materials on the neighbour’s property pending 
completion of the work. For example, it would be unreasonable to argue 
that scaffolding would have to be dismantled and removed each day. By 
contrast, it might not be unreasonable to argue that a ladder be removed 
each day.
A “servitude” of scaffolding erection to repair a wall has been recognised 
in the Civilian authorities.68 It has long been recognised in mixed legal 
66  Dig. 43/8.1 pr; Ulpian 71 Ad Edictum.
67  Dig. 43, 27.
68  Voet, Commentaries on the Pandects, 8, 2, 14 (ed Percival Vane).
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systems similar to Scotland, e.g. Sri Lanka.69 The right is implied where 
the location cannot be accessed by other means and the repair is necessary. 
That is broadly the principle in Moncrieff v Jamieson70 which decided that 
foreseeability is also needed.
The right of “laddergang” would entitle the owner of one property 
to rest a ladder on the property of another in order to carry out repairs, 
maintenance, or renewal of parts of the “dominant” subjects. In the title 
on Conveyancing in the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia,71 mention is made 
of a letter in the Workshop section of the The Journal of the Law Society of 
Scotland which mentions this “servitude.”72 It is stated to be common in 
the Dumfries area to find a provision in the titles of buildings which are 
divided horizontally to the effect that the owner of one property may rest a 
ladder on another in order to paint or clean windows. As the author of the 
title observes, there is no reported case on the point and he also suggests 
that the true test of whether a right exists would arise in a situation in 
which there was no provision in the titles of the “servient” tenement and 
the right required to be established by means other than express grant. 
Such a right might be constituted as a real condition in the titles of the 
servient tenement.73 The only reported case which is close to one involving 
laddergang is Finlay & Co Ltd v Bain74 where the right claimed became 
necessary only upon severance of the properties which had originally been 
in single ownership. Among other things, the defender claimed a right of 
access over the pursuer’s property in order to inspect and repair the back 
of his property which, as the report discloses, abutted on to that of the 
pursuer. The properties were too close to allow this to be done without 
obtaining access to the other property. Sheriff Principal Cameron (later 
Lord Cameron) refused interdict and was prepared to recognise the 
existence of a right of access for these limited purposes. It seems to follow 
that the limited right might entail the need for a ladder to be placed on the 
“servient” tenement or, in the case of repointing, scaffolding, moveable or 
69  VC Cooray v U P Samarasinghe (1959) 60 NLR 389. I am grateful to Roddy Paisley for this 
reference.
70  2001 SC (HL) 1.
71  R Rennie, “Conveyancing,” in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue 
(2005) para 515, n 4.
72  (1979) 24 JLSS (Workshop) xliv.
73  K G C Reid, “Property,” in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol 18 
(1993) paras 344 and 375.
74  1949 SLT (Sh Ct) 2. See also Murray or Brydon v Lewis Unreported, 1957, Edinburgh 
Sheriff Court (Scottish Record Office ref. A1522/1957, SC 39/17, Box No 1141). 
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otherwise, might have to be “parked” on the adjoining property. As a matter 
of principle I would argue that Sheriff Principal Cameron was correct in his 
opinion, but the principle he laid down would have to be extended in order 
to make the right to repair the adjoining property effectual. 
Other examples would involve subjects such as railway lines where the 
operator of the track, currently Network Rail, is required by statute to carry 
out repairs.75 The obligation to carry out repairs includes an obligation to 
maintain, in good order, fences alongside railway tracks. Network Rail 
has a right of way over accommodation/occupation roads provided under 
the Railways Clauses Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1845, s 60. The Railway 
Regulation Act 1842, s 14 enables Network Rail to apply to the Department 
for Transport for permission to go on to land near to the railway to make 
good after an accident or slip has happened, or to take preventive measures 
if an accident or slip is anticipated. Access can be taken without the 
Department’s prior consent in cases of necessity.
Another example is a similar obligation imposed on the operators of 
airports. The Civil Aviation Authority has a right of access at all times to 
aerodromes.76 The definition of “aerodrome” includes not only the airport 
buildings, but the surrounding ground.77 Prison walls would be in the 
same category, as would electricity sub-stations, nuclear power plants and 
the like. In these examples, the same issue arises about an obligation on the 
neighbour not to impede this right. In each case, if access was impeded, the 
operator of the railway, aerodrome etc. would be in breach of a statutory 
obligation. 
A right of access to a neighbouring property to effect repairs is 
recognised in English law,78 but the matter is now regulated by the Access 
to Neighbouring Land Act 1972 as amended.79 Under this Act, the court 
must be satisfied that the proposed works are “reasonably necessary for the 
preservation of the whole or any part of the dominant land; and that they 
cannot be carried out, or would be substantially more difficult to carry out, 
without entry upon the servient land.”80 That said, the court will not make 
an order for access if the servient proprietor or any other person “would 
75  Railways Clauses Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1845, ss 57-69.
76  Air Navigation Order 2005. SI2005/1970, art 145(1)(c).
77  Civil Aviation Act 1982, s 105(1); Transport Act 2000, ss 40 and 84.
78  Ward v Kirkland [1967] Ch 194.
79  For details, see C J Gale, Easements, 19th edn by J Gaunt (2012) paras 11-60 and 11-84; C 
Sara, Boundaries and Easements, 5th edn (2011) 116-20.
80  1972 Act, s 1(2).
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suffer interference with, or disturbance of, his use and enjoyment of the 
servient land, or that proprietor, or any other person in occupation of the 
land would suffer hardship.” It is not the purpose of this article to examine 
this Act in detail, but it is obvious that access will be granted under it only 
in very limited circumstances. It is, however, equally obvious that the 
need for such access can be broader than that which the 1992 Act permits, 
which is access for (a) maintenance, repair or renewal of buildings, (b) the 
clearance, repair or renewal of drains, sewers, pipes or cables, or (c) the 
treatment, cutting back, felling, removal or replacement of any hedge, tree 
shrub which is, or is in danger of becoming, damaged, diseased, dangerous, 
insecurely rooted or dead. There have been very few cases under the Act.81
In these examples of repairs, there must be some doubt about whether 
there is any obligation on the neighbour to do anything more than facilitate 
the work. It may be that scaffolding can rest on a relatively flat part of 
the neighbour’s ground, but does that prevent the neighbour changing the 
landscape, with the result that it is more difficult, or even impossible to 
put scaffolding up? It is one of the features of ownership) that, subject for 
example to title conditions, planning etc., one can do with one’s property 
as one wishes. The other proprietor might not be pleased, but on what 
basis could the neighbour be prevented from doing as he or she wishes? 
This right to access a neighbouring property cannot, in my view, be 
a servitude. It is a right to be exercised only when required. It would be 
somewhat odd to argue that one would need to point or repair one’s 
property at least once in 20 years to prevent the right prescribing. 
(2) The right of fire-escape 
Assume that I own premises which require a fire-escape, but the boundary 
of my property is so close to the neighbour’s that my fire escape rests 
thereon. The Fire Regulations require the occupiers of some premises to 
conduct regular fire alarm tests and “mock” evacuations. Not all occupiers 
are required to do so and, accordingly, there will be a large number of 
properties with fire escapes which will be used only when required. Again, 
it would be absurd to suggest that there would need to be a fire at least 
every twenty years to stop the right prescribing. The right therefore is res 
81  E.g. Dean v Walker (1997) 73 P & CR 366 in which it was argued, unsuccessfully, that 
because a wall was owned in common, the Act did not apply.
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merae facultatis and so it would not prescribe. So far, this is not so different 
from the other examples of access to neighbouring properties. However! I 
would suggest that, in this example, there is an obligation on the adjoining 
proprietor not to interfere with the fire escape, for example by undermining 
the foundations. Interference would have the consequence of putting the 
owner of the premises with the fire escape in breach of the Planning and 
Building Regulations. In the most recent case involving a fire escape,82 the 
Court held that a servitude of projection and support existed in Scots Law. 
It is submitted that these rights are res merae facultatis in that it would not 
be open to the “affected” proprietor to remove the projection, or support, 
even if the fire-escape had not been used for 20 years.
(3) Other examples
Three other examples will be suggested here. One example is a “servitude” 
which is used only occasionally. In Durham v Briggs,83 the court held that 
a servitude to water cattle in time of “great frost or drought” had been 
established by usage. While it is unlikely in Scotland that either weather 
condition would not be seen for 20 years, such a right is, without doubt, 
a servitude, as would be a right of pasturage used, say, only in summer. 
Nevertheless, the following example may be one where the right is res merae, 
rather than a servitude. Assume that I have the right to draw water from 
A’s well, but also a right to draw from B’s well, but only if the supply from 
A’s well is either not available or not adequate. Twenty years might pass, 
during which time A’s well has proved to be fit for purpose. If, however, in 
year 22, there is a severe drought, my right to draw from B’s well, I would 
submit, cannot have prescribed despite its not having been required up 
to that point. A right to make up title to a property, I would suggest, is 
res merae. Finally, a right to access a property. In Bowers v Kennedy84 it was 
argued that the right of access in that case was res merae, but the Court did 
not accept that and held that the access right had prescribed. Nevertheless, 
it did say that access to a property is an incident of ownership85 and I would 
submit that the right is also res merae.
82  Compugraphics International Ltd v Nikolic 2011 SC 744.
83  (1793) Hume 735.
84  2000 SC 555.
85  Bowers (n 84) 564 C-D per Lord President Rodger delivering the Opinion of the Court.
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E.  Conclusions
(i)  A res merae facultatis is a property right which does not prescribe. 
(ii)  It can be a right in respect of one’s own property, or over another 
property.
(iii)  Like a servitude, it can be constituted expressly or by Act of Parliament, 
but it cannot be constituted by other methods by which a servitude may 
be, such as implied grant or acquiescence. In the case of neighbouring 
properties, it can be created by implication.
(iv)  It is not open to parties to provide that a right is res merae (because it 
is not possible to contract out of ss 6-8 of the 1973 Act),86 but a right 
which is described, say, as a servitude, may nevertheless be res merae.
(v)  Where the right is in respect of another property, the proprietor of that 
property is under an obligation not to impede the exercise of that right, 
in the parlance of servitudes “patiendo.” 
(vi)  While a right which is res merae does not prescribe, it can be discharged 
expressly, or lost in other ways, such as abandonment, or acquiescence, 
or where another person acquires by positive prescription a right 
which is inconsistent with the continued existence of the res merae.
86  1973 Act, s 13.
11. The Use of Praedial Servitudes 
to Benefit Land outside the 
Dominant Tenement
Professor Roderick R M Paisley
Throughout my entire legal career I have had the pleasure of discussing 
property law with my good friend Robert Rennie. Having learned much in 
the process, I hope that I have contributed at least a little. Such discussions 
were of particular value where the issue was one upon which only brief 
comment was available in the published legal literature. One of the issues 
that cropped up in our conversations is the subject matter of this essay. 
We both recognised that it was a topic requiring some detailed research. 
Having now had the opportunity to carry out that research I have pleasure 
in dedicating this essay to Robert as a token of my esteem.
A.  Introduction
The rule now known to Scottish property lawyers as “the Irvine Knitters 
rule”1 limits the use of praedial servitude rights.2 It does so by linking 
1  Irvine Knitters Ltd v North Ayrshire Cooperative Society Ltd 1978 SC 109. For material in the 
National Archives of Scotland see CS258/1976/11833.
2  Praedial (otherwise predial) servitudes benefit a plot of land known as the dominant 
tenement or benefited property. They are to be distinguished from personal servitudes 
which benefit a legal person. Both types of servitudes burden a plot of land known as 
the servient tenement or burdened property. However, given that they lack a dominant 
tenement, the Irvine Knitters rule has no application to personal servitudes or similar 
rights: Monkland and Kirkintulloch Railway Company v Dixon (1842) 1 Bell’s App Cas 347 
at 360 per the Lord Ordinary (Jeffrey).
© Roderick R M Paisley, CC BY 4.0 http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0056.11
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exercise of the particular servitude to the purposes of the relevant 
dominant tenement (otherwise known as “the benefited property”). All 
other exercise is regarded as in excess of the proper use of the servitude 
and can be interdicted at the instance of the servient proprietor (otherwise 
known as “the burdened proprietor”). The rule may be classified as one 
of the three legally implied servitude conditions.3 The effect of the rule is 
that the dominant tenement is fixed in geographic extent at the time of 
creation of the particular servitude and, apart from very specific statutory 
exceptions that have no general relevance,4 does not expand to incorporate 
other land when the dominant proprietor acquires that other land even if 
that additional land is used together with the original dominant tenement 
to enable the carrying out of a single business or the construction of a single 
development project. What is required in such a situation of expansion 
is usually some variation of the existing servitude or the obtaining of a 
new, more expansive, servitude.5 The issue therefore comes into sharp 
focus where potential development sites are being assembled from various 
constituent parts.
Although now widely known by the name of the pursuers in the 
particular case, Irvine Knitters Ltd,6 and albeit the case was decided by the 
3  D J Cusine and R R M Paisley, Servitudes and Rights of Way (1998) paras 12.164-12.179. 
The other two legally implied servitude conditions are that the servitude will be 
exercised (a) civiliter, i.e. in a reasonable manner and (b) so that it does not exceed the 
acceptable burden on the servient tenement. The dispute in Irvine Knitters was sparked 
by construction traffic on the servient tenement going to the redevelopment on the 
dominant tenement and prima facie engaged both of these. However, their application 
requires and assessment of the impact of conduct whereas the limitation of the servitude 
to the benefit of the purposes of the dominant tenement involves an examination of title 
and is often perceived as holding out a clearer way to stop the unacceptable behaviour 
of the dominant proprietor. The thrust of this essay is that matters are perhaps not so 
cut and dried as that.
4  See e.g. the limited number of government backed projects where the Scottish 
Parliament disapplied the Irvine Knitters to assist the development: Forth Crossing Act 
2011 s 27; Airdrie-Bathgate Railway and Linked Improvements Act 2007 ss 37 and 54; 
Edinburgh Airport Rail Link Act 2007 s 55; Glasgow Airport Rail Link Act 2007 s 42; 
Waverley Railway (Scotland) Act 2006 s 44.
5  The legally implied servitude condition, being a negative in nature, cannot be varied 
or discharged by reference to the Lands Tribunal in terms of the Title Conditions 
(Scotland) Act 2003 ss 90 and 122(1) definition of “title condition,” para (c).
6  The Irvine Knitters Limited, Company Number SC026008, was incorporated on 31 
December 1947 but is now dissolved, having been taken over in 1968 by Courtaulds 
plc. The archives of the company are privately held and enquiries may be made to the 
National Archives (England), Archives Sector Development under reference NRA29343 
Courtaulds plc and reference GB/NNAF/C102224 (former ISAAR ref GB/NNAF/B3426). 
See also B G Rudd, Courtaulds and the Hosiery and Knitwear Industry (2014) 68, 77-78, 126-
28, 134-35 and 158.
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First Division of the Court of Session in 1978, the rule is long established,7 
having its origins in the writings of various Roman jurists collected in 
the Digest of Justinian.8 It is clear the Scottish rule did not appear out of 
nowhere. The prior Scottish authorities cited by Lord President Emslie in 
Irvine Knitters comprise two Nineteenth Century cases, Scott v Bogle9 and 
Anstruther v Caird.10 Despite the existence of these earlier authorities there is 
no record of the rule being known in Scotland as the Scott or Anstruther rule. 
Other, even older, Scottish authorities illustrating the rule also exist but are 
not now cited in modern practice having been eclipsed by the decision in 
Irvine Knitters.11 The most recent Scottish restatement of the Irvine Knitters 
rule is found in Alvis v Harrison12 (a Scottish appeal to the House of Lords) 
in the opinion of Lord Jauncey. He stated:13
A servitude right of access inures to the benefit of the dominant tenement 
and no other. Thus it cannot be communicated for the benefit of other 
tenements contiguous thereto (Scott v Bogle). In Irvine Knitters Ltd v North 
Ayrshire Co-operative Society Ltd the Lord President ... said: “What they [the 
dominant proprietors] may not do, however, is to use the way, or permit its 
use by others, to obtain access to subjects other than the dominant tenement, 
whether or not they happen to be heritable proprietors of those others 
subjects. They may not, in short, increase the scope of the right of access, and 
in particular they may not use the way for the purpose of securing access 
for persons or goods to subjects contiguous to the dominant tenement by 
using the dominant tenement merely as a bridge between the end of the lane 
and the non dominant subjects.”… The underlying reason for restricting the 
7  It is described as “well known” in Hay v Hay or Robertson (1845) 17 Sc J 186 at 187 per the 
Lord Ordinary (Cuninghame).
8  D 8.3.29 (Paul); D 8.3.33 (Africanus).
9  1809, 15 FC 397. The case is named as Bogle v Bogle in Hume, Lectures, vol 3 (Stair Society 
No 15) 281.
10  (1862) 24 D 149. For material in the National Archives of Scotland, see reference 
RHP40965 containing a plan of part of lands concerned.
11  See e.g. Brown v Kinloch, 20 Dec 1775, M 14542, with a relevant plan in the National 
Archives of Scotland at reference RHP4008; Stewart v Caithness: Stewart v Smart (1788) 
Hume 731 with material in the National Archives at reference CS271/34657; Scoullar 
(otherwise Brownlee) v Robertson (1829) 7 S 344, with material in the National Archives at 
reference CS46/1830/3/4.
12  1991 SLT 64. For material in the National Archives of Scotland, see references 
CS258/1989/2650A and CS258/1992/4088. 
13  1991 SLT 64 at 68. The law as stated in the latter part of the quotation is incorrect. The 
use of a servitude of access to benefit land outwith the dominant tenement breaches 
the Irvine Knitters rule even though such use reduces the burden of traffic passing 
on the servient tenement: Cusine and Paisley, Servitudes and Rights of Way (n 3) para 
12.158. Material is available in the House of Lords archives under references HL/PO/
JO/10/11/2590 and HL/PO/JU/4/3/1681.
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benefit of a servitude right of access to the dominant tenement alone is that 
to use it for the benefit of a second or third tenement is likely to generate 
more traffic and so increase the burden.
Not only in Alvis v Harrison but also in Irvine Knitters14 has the substantial 
identity of English and Scots law on this point been emphasised. So too, in 
reported English cases, has Scottish authority been used to illustrate the 
application of the analogous common law principle.15 As a result, with 
their usual caution, Scottish lawyers may look to English law, and also to 
Common law jurisdictions based on English authorities, to ascertain the 
likely position of Scots law. 
It should be noted that almost all the reported cases relate to servitudes 
of access. The rule equally applies to egress (i.e. coming out of a property).16 
Moreover, it applies to all servitudes including servitudes involving 
transport of material extracted or abstracted from lands adjacent to the 
dominant tenement whether by means of a road or other service media. 
For example, in one Scottish case a party was not allowed to use a drain 
benefiting one field for another field owned by him nor to eject water from 
extra fields onto the original dominant tenement for onward drainage via 
the servitude of drain.17 One of the reasons for the concentration of cases on 
access may be that such activity is usually obvious and thus discoverable in 
comparison with the leading of a drain to additional property which may 
be underground and substantially obscured from view. 
The Irvine Knitters rule relates to the dominant proprietor taking unfair 
advantage of a servitude to the disadvantage of the servient proprietor. The 
rule permits the servient proprietor to restrain the dominant proprietor 
from doing so and, as such, imposes a negative restraint on the latter. 
Although the quotation from Lord Jauncey, above, indicates the dominant 
proprietor must not “permit” third parties using the servitude to pass to 
lands outwith the dominant tenement, it is hard to see how this can apply 
in such a way. The rule does not impose any positive obligation on the 
dominant proprietor. For example, there is no implied obligation on the 
14  Irvine Knitters Ltd v North Ayrshire Co-operative Society Ltd 1978 SC 109 at 117 per Lord 
President Emslie and 121 per Lord Cameron.
15  See e.g. Giles v Tarry [2012] EWCA Civ 837 at para 41 per Lewison LJ; Peacock v Custins 
[2002] 1 WLR 1815 at para 19 per Schiemann LJ.
16  As is demonstrated by the English case of Williams v James (1867) LR 2 CP 577.
17  Magistrates of Dunbar v Sawers (1829) 7 S 672. For assorted relevant material in the 
National Archives of Scotland see the references CS235/D/27/2, CS271/55016, CS311/11, 
GD314/63 and GD314/64. See also Scoullar (otherwise Brownlee) v Robertson (1829) 7 S 344.
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dominant proprietor to fence off the dominant tenement so that the taking 
of access into adjacent land from the dominant tenement is impossible. In 
Scotland such a positive obligation could be imposed by a real burden 
or possibly by a servitude condition. Such a provision is not unknown 
in practice18 but appears to be rare. In one modern English case19 it was 
observed that it is acceptable for a dominant proprietor, a farmer, to 
transport his sheep up an easement of access over the servient tenement 
onto the dominant tenement so that they might graze on the dominant 
tenement and, having grazed on that tenement, if the sheep spread out onto 
the adjacent land outwith the dominant tenement, the servient proprietor 
could have no objection. Although no time period as regards the sheep 
grazing on the dominant tenement was judicially specified, one would 
expect this observation would relate to a situation in which the sheep are 
allowed to move naturally as they graze. A different situation might arise 
if the dominant farmer used devices giving encouragement to the sheep 
to move quickly from the dominant tenement onto the adjacent land such 
as the storage on the adjacent land of particularly attractive food for the 
sheep. This sort of nutritional inducement to directed movement of the 
livestock may well be restricted by the negative restraint imposed by the 
Irvine Knitters rule. Difficult cases may arise if a shop has been built on a 
composite site comprising and extending beyond the dominant tenement 
in a servitude of access. It is undecided what sort of devices, presumably 
employed as part of what is now termed “the overall retail experience,” 
would be regarded as unacceptable inducements to the potential customers 
to move from the dominant tenement into the remainder of the shop. 
B.  Minerals Rights
The Scottish case law decided in relation to the Irvine Knitters rule invariably 
relates to the use of the surface of land on both the servient and dominant 
tenements. However, given Professor Rennie’s longstanding interest in 
18  In Magistrates of Dunbar v Sawers (1829) 7 S 672, the magistrates granted a servitude of 
drainage. There was an express reservation of the magistrates (who were the servient 
proprietors) as a counter stipulation to the servitude of the right to enter the dominant 
tenement and put up works to ensure that the dominant proprietor did not use drain 
for adjacent land. The exact nature of that reservation is unclear. It may have been a real 
burden or a servitude condition.
19  Giles v Tarry [2012] EWCA Civ 837.
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minerals rights and areas below the surface of land,20 a brief comment on 
that particular matter is required. 
Minerals rights are regarded in Scotland as capable of being conveyed 
as geographic separate tenements (i.e. slices of land) and there is no reason 
in principle why the Irvine Knitters rule should not apply to minerals rights 
just as it applies to slices of land such as storeys of property above first floor 
level, airspace above land21 or land at ground level. Some Scottish cases22 
have been decided in which one of the parties has attempted to apply the 
Irvine Knitters rule so as to limit the other party’s activity (usually access) 
in what the first party believed was his own land. However, this body of 
Scottish case law relating to minerals has typically dodged the application 
of the Irvine Knitters rule by deciding that the rule did not apply because 
the area where the activity was carried out was also owned as a property 
right by the owner of the minerals. Put another way, it was decided that 
the area in question was not owned by the party objecting to the activity 
and was not subject only to a servitude in favour of the minerals proprietor. 
These cases relate to the proper construction of the wording employed in 
particular grants or reservations of minerals. They in no way suggest that 
the Irvine Knitters rule does not apply to servitudes benefiting minerals 
held as a property right.
Two early English cases confirm that the analogous English rule does 
indeed apply to such minerals held as property rights.23 Both of these cases 
were considered and distinguished in a Scottish case24 but only on the 
basis that the Scottish court was not dealing with a servitude benefiting a 
20  R Rennie, Minerals and the Law of Scotland (2001).
21  In this regard see the terms of the Tenements (Scotland) Act 2004 s 2(7). It is unstated 
whether this section carries with it a servitude of access to obtain access to the additional 
triangular area of airspace but, it is submitted, such a servitude is likely to be implied 
by statutory expansion of the dominant tenement of any servitude benefiting the sector 
including the roof failing which the taking of access to the triangular area may breach 
the Irvine Knitters rule.
22  See e.g. Duke of Hamilton v Graham (1871) 9 M (HL) 98; W Davidson v Duke of Hamilton 
and W Walker (1822) 1 S 411; Turner (Tait’s Trustee) v Ballandene and Husband (1832) 10 S 
415 at 418 per Lord Craigie.
23  Dand v Kingscote (1840) 6 M & W 174, 151 ER 370; Durham and Sunderland Rail Co v 
Walker [1842] 2 QB 940.
24  Hamilton v Graham (1871) 9 M (HL) 98. The rule in Irvine Knitters would also be 
inapplicable if the access were taken over an area held in common property by the 
owner of the benefited property: Gavin v Junor 2009 SLT (Sh Ct) 158; MacKay v Gaylor 
2014 SLT (Sh Ct) 131. An issue of construction sometimes arises as to whether a right 
expressed in loose terms is a servitude of access or a right of common property: Willemse 
v French 2011 SC 576.
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property right. It seems clear that the Irvine Knitters rule would be applied 
in a Scottish case to a servitude benefiting minerals held as a property right 
if the issue ever came up for decision in a pure and unavoidable form. That 
did occur in the two English cases just noticed. At that time the minerals 
working and processing appear to have been a relatively simple affair 
of the minerals being dug out by miners at a particular coal or mineral 
face in manageable amounts and immediately loaded into bogies. The 
material was then transported across the dominant tenement and onto the 
servient tenement. There was no issue of a manufacturing complex or any 
processing of the minerals within the dominant tenement. This is an issue 
that will be considered later in this essay.
C.  Qualified Nature of the Rule
Absolute though the rule in Irvine Knitters appears to be at first blush, further 
examination shows that this is not so nor is it applied in a wholly inflexible 
way. Common law jurisdictions such as England, certain Canadian 
Provinces and some Australian States have attempted to mitigate the 
rigours of their own native version of the Irvine Knitters rule by developing 
a number of judicially created qualifications to permit extension of an 
easement of access to benefit additional land in several situations. These 
are not yet fully worked out in reported Scottish case law but, in principle, 
they all appear compatible with Scots law. These will be set out below as 
the first and second exceptions. In addition, there are a couple of exceptions 
that are better established in “native” Scottish authority. These are set out 
below as the third and fourth exceptions. 
The qualifications permit the servitude to be used to benefit land outwith 
the dominant tenement where one or more of the following exceptions 
apply. In very brief summary they are:
(i)  First exception – ancillary use. 
(ii)  Second exception – anticipated additional land. 
(iii)  Third exception – personal bar. 
(iv)  Fourth exception – separate journeys. 
These will be examined in turn.
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(1) The first exception
This applies where the use of the additional land outside the dominant 
tenement is ancillary to a permissible use of the dominant tenement.
The main body of case law illustrating this exception relates to English 
easements of access.25 This indicates that access will be allowed to and from 
relatively small areas of land adjacent to the dominant tenement where 
access to such areas is required for the proper enjoyment of the dominant 
tenement. A similar notion of a servitude benefiting the dominant tenement 
being capable of facilitating access to an adjacent area of land where the 
use of that area is ancillary to the dominant tenement is seen in only one 
Scottish case.26 In that Scottish case a stable originally built on the dominant 
tenement had been redeveloped and a new stable serving the house on the 
dominant tenement had been built so that it was located on a small plot 
of land adjacent to the dominant tenement. In a decision that has never 
properly been reported, the Sheriff took the view:27 
I am disposed to think that the subjects benefited in this case was [sic] still 
the same, the stable being really an adjunct to the dwellinghouse.
This case was appealed to the Court of Session and the Sheriff’s interlocutor 
reversed in part but the judgement is not reported.28 Albeit the records that 
remain are unclear, the Court of Session appears to have restricted the 
dominant proprietor’s access to his house only and to have excluded access 
to the stable.29 By reference to authority, therefore, one cannot therefore 
25  The English cases comprise National Trust v White [1987] 1 WLR 907; Macepark 
(Wittlebury) Ltd v Sargeant [2003] 1 WLR 2284; Das v Linden Mews Ltd [2002] 2 EGLR 
76; Peacock v Custins [2002] 1 WLR 1815; Massey v Boulden [2003] 1 WLR 1792; Martin 
Wilkins and Wendy Wilkins v Thomas William Lewis [2005] EWHC 1710 (Ch).
26  Blair v Strachan, 20 Jun 1889, Sheriff Guthrie Smith. See Aberdeen Weekly Journal, 25 Jun 
1889. There is other material relevant to the case in the Aberdeen Journal, 13 Mar 1889 
at 7; Aberdeen Evening Express 13 Mar 1889 at 3. The property was at 124 Hadden Street, 
Woodside, Aberdeen.
27  The use of “was” in the quoted text follows from the odd Scottish conveyancing 
convention that regards “the subjects” as singular.
28  There was further litigation on a matter of obstruction of the same servitude of access 
reported as Blair v Strachan (1894) 21 R 661. For material in the National Archives of 
Scotland relative to both actions see CS46/1890/6/56 and CS46/1894/6/65.
29  See the note of the terms of the interlocutor in that appeal at (1894) 31 SLR 548 at 549. 
There is similar authority in Canada excluding the possibility of taking access via an 
easement of access to a plot adjacent to the dominant tenement even though the use of 
that plot benefited the dominant tenement: Gordon v Regan (1985) 15 DLR (4th) 641 at 
paras 28-37 per Griffiths J.
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argue with any assurance that the “ancillary use” exception has been 
judicially recognised as part of Scots law. 
However, albeit seemingly rejected in this one Scottish case, there still 
appears to be room for development of the exception in cases with more 
suitable circumstances. What then might those circumstances be and how 
can one circumscribe them? Clearly this exception relating to “ancillary 
use” cannot be used to undermine the entire Irvine Knitters rule although 
it has been applied enthusiastically in some English cases. For example, in 
one case30 where an easement of way benefitted a cottage it was held the 
easement could be used even where the cottage was extended with two 
rooms on adjacent land not part of the dominant tenement. By contrast, in 
a case decided only two years later,31 it was held inadmissible to take access 
over an easement of way to some 800 acres of farm land outwith the dominant 
tenement which itself consisted of about 1,200 acres of agricultural land. 
Albeit some of the decisions are somewhat difficult to reconcile,32 for this 
exception to the Irvine Knitters rule to operate, it remains the case that there 
must be some element of the use of the adjoining land being “ancillary” to 
the use of the dominant tenement. Consequently, a dominant proprietor 
cannot take access to adjacent land of whatever extent and whatever the 
slimness of the connection with the proper use of the dominant tenement. 
Furthermore, the use of the adjacent land must be ancillary to some use of 
the dominant tenement that was not expressly excluded by the terms of 
the servitude itself. For example, where a servitude of access is granted to 
a plot of land expressly on the basis that it may be used as an access to a 
house but not as an access to a vehicle garage, the owner of the house on 
the dominant tenement cannot build a garage on the adjacent land and 
claim to take access to the garage over the servitude route on the basis that 
the use of the garage is ancillary to the house. 
A clear example of ancillary use as an exception to the Irvine Knitters 
rule that is recognised daily in Scotland is a servitude of access over a lane 
leading to a house on the dominant tenement that is also benefited by a 
servitude of drain and septic tank over a field in the ownership of a third 
party. If the owner of the house wishes to repair the drain and septic tank 
it is manifestly clear that he, together with his contractors and employees, 
30  Massey v Boulden [2002] EWCA Civ 1634, [2003] 2 All ER 87.
31  Martin Wilkins and Wendy Wilkins v Thomas William Lewis [2005] EWHC 1710 (Ch).
32  As noted in Macepark (Wittlebury) Ltd v Sargeant [2003] 1 WLR 2284 by Gabriel Moss QC, 
who attempted to provide some guidance as to the meaning of “ancillary.”
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may take access from the public road, up the servitude lane, across his own 
property and into the land of the third party located outside the dominant 
tenement in the access servitude. It does not matter at all that the servitude 
of drainage and septic tank is first acquired long after the creation of the 
servitude of access and was not clearly envisaged by the parties to that 
original servitude of access. So too, can the owner of a dominant tenement 
use a servitude of way to take access to his property and then proceed to 
leave his property by another servitude of way leading over an entirely 
different servient tenement. Both such examples of ancillary use, however, 
could be regarded as being in excess of the servitude of access if the terms of 
the grant or reservation of that servitude of access expressly prohibit such 
use. That, however, would not be a breach of the Irvine Knitters rule but a 
transgression of an express servitude condition restricting the purpose of 
the servitude.
Another example would be where a person purchases a field with 
a servitude of access out to the public road along a private lane. The 
dominant field benefits from rights of lateral support, most likely in the 
form of servitudes or rights of common interest, owed to it by adjacent land 
in the ownership of third parties. The dominant proprietor may acquire 
rights of access to the adjacent land to carry out works to enhance that 
lateral support. The owner of the dominant tenement, together with his 
contractors and employees, may use the servitude of access and pass across 
his own property into the land of the third party to carry out the works 
to enhance lateral support. Again, this ancillary use could be excluded by 
express provision in the terms of the servitude of access. 
So too, one may consider part of an underground tunnel used for 
passage based on a servitude of access where the next part of the same 
tunnel is also used for passage but this time based on a property right held 
by the person taking passage. The servitude of access over the first part of 
the tunnel may be regarded as benefiting, inter alia, the second part of the 
tunnel. It may happen that the owner of the second part of the tunnel may 
require to drive large pins into the roof and walls of that part of the tunnel 
to stop that roof and those walls falling in. Those pins will penetrate into 
the surrounding strata which are outside the dominant tenement and are 
owned by a third party.33 So too, if the pins are insufficient, may the owner 
of the second part of the tunnel require to excavate part of the surrounding 
33  For this a servitude tigni inmittendi would be needed.
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rock outside the dominant tenement to stop the rock falling into the part 
of the tunnel comprising the dominant tenement. Additional rights from 
the third party may require to be obtained. In both of these cases, however, 
additional rights do not have to be acquired by the owner of the second 
part of the tunnel from the owner of the first part of the tunnel (the servient 
tenement) to enter or use the land of the latter. The owner of the second 
part of the tunnel may use the existing servitude of access over the first 
part of the tunnel to go into the dominant tenement and then enter the 
lands of the third party to carry out these works as they are ancillary to, 
and necessary for, the proper use of the dominant tenement comprising the 
second part of the tunnel.
A further example may be seen where a servitude of access benefits a 
dominant tenement consisting of a quarry. If the quarry is dug out of the 
ground so that it forms an open basin, the quarry walls cannot safely be 
dug in such a way that would leave a cliff face existing at ninety degrees to 
the remaining surrounding surface of the land. Instead, for safety sake, the 
walls of the quarry must be stepped at an angle so that there is a reduced 
danger of collapse or rockfall. If the stepping takes place entirely within the 
dominant tenement so that the top of the stepping, which is at the level of 
the surface of the land, is located inside or on the very boundary line this 
will inevitably result in a measure of rock within the dominant tenement 
remaining unexploited. This could be avoided if the dominant proprietor 
stepped the sides of the quarry by digging out some of the minerals on 
the neighbouring land owned by a third party leaving the bottom of 
the stepping on the boundary line between the dominant tenement and 
the third party land. Of course, the dominant proprietor would require 
to obtain rights from the third party to encroach in this way into the 
neighbouring land. However, as regards the servitude of access into the 
quarry, the stepping of the sides of the quarry may be regarded as ancillary 
to the originally envisaged and proper use of the dominant tenement to 
the extent that such digging and stepping is required to extract all of the 
minerals from the dominant tenement. 
In all of the examples indicated above, the additional rights in the land 
adjacent to the dominant tenement may be obtained by means of a positive 
servitude benefiting the same dominant tenement served by the servitude 
of access. On one view, the very form of the additional rights as servitudes 
could be argued as fitting well with the “ancillary” use exception as 
a positive servitude, by definition, is ancillary to the relevant dominant 
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tenement. The positive servitude over the adjacent land may exist only if 
it confers a benefit on the land which is also the dominant tenement in the 
servitude of access. However, it would be too much to suggest that the 
servient tenement in any positive servitude benefiting land which is also 
the dominant tenement in a servitude of access can be accessed by that 
servitude of access. Consider, for instance, a servitude of access benefiting 
a farm extending to 100 hectares. If the owner of the farm subsequently 
obtains a grant of a servitude of pasturage over 10,000 hectares of adjacent 
hill pasture benefiting the farm, it seems somewhat extravagant to suggest 
that he may use the existing servitude to take access to the extensive hill 
pasture. It seems likely that the “ancillary” use exception to the Irvine 
Knitters rule will be more tightly drawn but it is not at all clear upon what 
basis that will be done. Perhaps recourse could be had to an element of 
“reasonable foreseeability.” That, however, is to speculate far beyond any 
decided authority. 
Lastly, one should notice that other doctrines may assist the law to 
overcome some of the conceptual limitations and uncertainties of the 
“ancillary” use exception to the Irvine Knitters rule. Where the owner of 
the servient tenement in a proposed route of passage grants a servitude of 
access to a 100 hectare farm which is then already benefited by a servitude 
of pasturage over the adjacent 10,000 hectares of hill grazing, the access 
in favour of the farm is clearly a positive servitude. The access to the 
hill grazing cannot be a servitude unless separately granted in favour 
of the owner of the hill grazing over which the servitude of pasturage 
is exercised. If constituted in this way the owner of the hill grazing can 
then communicate the benefit of enjoyment of his servitude of access to 
the dominant proprietor in the servitude of pasturage as the latter has 
a lawful right to be on the dominant tenement in that servitude. Such a 
method of creation, however, requires the co-operation of the owner 
of the hill grazing and he is entitled to refuse to accept the benefit of a 
servitude of access. Alternatively, the party owning the servient tenement 
in the proposed servitude of access to the farm may simultaneously grant 
two rights. First, a servitude of access to that farm and, secondly, a right 
of access which, although not a separate servitude in its own right, is a 
right ancillary to the servitude of pasturage over the hill grazing.34 There 
is no requirement, either at the time of grant of the ancillary access right 
34  The possibility of the implied grant of such ancillary rights was recognised in Moncrieff v 
Jamieson 2008 SC (HL) 1. It is a fortiori the case that such rights may be granted expressly.
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or at any time thereafter, that the servient tenement in the servitude of 
pasturage must be owned by the same person who owns the land subject 
to the right of access ancillary to that servitude of pasturage. So too there 
is no requirement that the servient tenement in the servitude of pasturage 
and the land subject to the ancillary right of access be contiguous and not 
separated by the dominant tenement in the servitude of access. This double 
grant is useful in two situations. First, where the grant of access is made 
when the farm is already benefited by the servitude of hill grazing. Second, 
where the owner of the route in the proposed servitude of access is also the 
owner of the hill grazing. 
(2) The second exception
The second exception exists where, although there is no express provision 
to that effect,35 it is clear by reasonably implication from the terms of 
the deed or the surrounding circumstances that it was always intended 
by both parties to the servitude that the dominant tenement would be 
extended to incorporate the additional land or, at least, this possibility 
was contemplated and left open by both parties to the servitude when the 
servitude was created. 
The authority for this rule is contained in a number of English36 and 
Australian cases.37 For example, if a servitude is expressly created in favour 
of the front door and entrance hall of a house, it is reasonable to accept that 
the servitude benefits the entire house as the front door and access hall are 
merely means of access to the house itself. Another example is where the 
deed itself defines as the dominant tenement “Plot A” but contemplates 
access to Plot B even though the definition of the dominant tenement does 
not expressly extend to it. Involved in this exception are elements of the 
function of the dominant tenement and the adjacent land. The exception 
could be regarded as relating to situations in which it is reasonably 
35  Express provision would expressly bring the additional land within the dominant 
tenement and thus access to that additional land would comply with the Irvine Knitters 
rule. However, there are difficulties in the drafting and registering of deeds with such 
express provision: Cusine and Paisley, Servitudes and Rights of Way (n 3) paras 2.41-2.43; 
Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003 s 75. 
36  See e.g. Thorpe v Brumfitt (1872-73) LR 8 Ch App 650; Callard v Beeney [1930] 1 KB 353. 
37  See e.g. Shean Pty Ltd v Owners of Corinne Court [2001] WASCA 311; Owners Corporation 
– Strata Plan no 8450 v Owners Corporation – Strata Plan No 54547 [2002] NSWSC 780; 
Perpetual Trustee Company Limited v Westfield Management Ltd [2006] NSWCA 337; 
Westfield Management Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [2007] 233 CLR 528.
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foreseeable that the dominant tenement, by design or natural topography, is 
to perform function ancillary to the adjacent land. It perhaps must perform 
a role benefiting the adjacent land similar to that performed by the servient 
tenement in relation to the dominant tenement. This seems to be the case 
in servitudes of access where the dominant tenement’s only function is as 
a route of access to the adjacent property. If such be the case, when one 
considers the benefit to the adjacent land, the dominant tenement in the 
servitude of access operates functionally as part of a servient tenement. If 
indeed that is so, the elements of this function or design must exist as at the 
date of the grant or reservation of the servitude of access so that they are 
reasonably evident to the parties to that juristic act. Years after the grant of 
a servitude of access the dominant proprietor cannot so design a house so 
that the sole means of entry is located on Plot A and the remainder of the 
property on Plot B. 
The argument is perhaps easiest to make where the servitude is one 
of drain or other service media. Consider the case where the servitude is 
phrased that a property owner is entitled to join a particular drain on his 
property into the main drain on the servient property and thereafter use 
it. It seems to be overly strict to argue that the dominant tenement is only 
the particular drain within the property owner’s land. It seems manifestly 
obvious that it would always have been intended that this particular drain 
should be connected to a house or other structure on the land to which it 
provides a benefit and that that house or structure would be comprised 
within the dominant tenement for the servitude of drainage. Again, it is 
the function of the drain that strongly suggests the existence of a more 
extensive dominant tenement.
(3) The third exception
This applies where the owner of the servient tenement personally bars 
himself as regards objection to an extension of the benefit of the servitude to 
adjoining land. This is truly not a special exception to the Irvine Knitters rule 
but an application of a general principle. The basis of this line of authority 
is perhaps to be seen in Roman Dutch and Roman law. The Roman Dutch 
writer Johannes Voet (1647-1713) illustrates this by reference to a servitude 
of leading water:38 
38  Voet, Pandects, 8 4 13. 
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Et aquae ductum habens, inde 
rursus aquam alteri nequit praedio 
concedere, nisi id nominatim pacto 
praeter ordinariam servitutum 
naturam actum sit. Nec ad alium 
fundum proprium postea forte 
acquisitum ducere: imo, ne ad 
aliam quidem eiusdem fundi partem, 
quam ad quam servitus ab initio 
acquisita fuit.
And one who has a right of water-
leading cannot in turn grant water 
out of it to another tenement, unless 
that has been specially arranged by 
agreement apart from the ordinary 
nature of servitudes. Nor can he lead to 
another farm of his own which perhaps 
he has later acquired. Nay he cannot 
do so even to another part of the same 
farm than that for which the servitude 
was originally acquired.1
This, in turn, is derived from the writings of the Roman jurists Pomponius 
and Africanus collected in the Digest of Justinian.39 They wrote respectively 
as follows:
Ex meo aquae ductu Labeo 
scribit cuilibet posse me vicino 
commodare: Proculus contra, ut 
ne in meam partem fundi aliam, 
quam ad quam servitus adquisita 
sit, uti ea possit. Proculi sententia 
verior est.
Per plurium praedia aquam ducis 
quoquo modo imposita servitute: 
nisi pactum vel stipulatio etiam 
de hoc subsecuta est, neque eorum 
cuiuis neque alii vicino poteris 
haustum ex rivo cedere: pacto enim 
vel stipulatio intervenientibus et 
hoc concedi solet, ...
Labeo states that if I have a right 
to channel water, I can oblige any 
neighbour I chose with the use of the 
watercourse. Proculus, on the other 
hand, holds that I cannot even use it 
for the benefit of any part of my estate 
other than that for which the servitude 
was acquired.
You are channelling water across the 
estates of a number of owners by 
virtue of a servitude, however created. 
You cannot grant the right to draw 
water from the channel to any of these 
owners whom you chose or to another 
neighbouring proprietor, unless a pact 
or stipulation was added to this effect. 
Such a right is normally granted by the 
addition of a pact or stipulation....
39  D 8.3.24 (Pomponius) and D 8.3.33 (Africanus).
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This reference to a special arrangement in the passage from Voet, quoted 
above, was considered in the South African Courts as having the potential 
to permit the recognition of a new servitude in addition to the primary 
servitude.40 In the case in hand that was regarded as an additional personal 
servitude but, on different facts, could potentially be a praedial servitude 
benefitting the additional land. Scots law has some difficulty in recognising 
that servitudes are created by personal bar alone.41 The better analysis 
appears to be that the doctrine precludes the Erskine, John of Carnock 
enforcement of the Irvine Knitters rule by the person concerned, the present 
servient proprietor, but that this bar remains personal and would not bind 
his singular successors. They, of course, could bar themselves by their own 
acts. This personal bar preventing the servient proprietor’s objection to an 
extension of the use of the servitude to benefit land adjacent to the dominant 
tenement has been recently applied in the Scottish case.42 A broadly similar 
principle is known in England43 albeit in the most recent case relating to the 
matter sufficient facts were not proved to apply the doctrine.44 
To give rise to personal bar the actings of the dominant proprietor must 
be known to the servient proprietor or at least reasonably ascertainable 
by him. Similar actings, even if unknown to the servient proprietor, if not 
hidden could be regarded as being “open” as that term is recognised in 
the context of the Scottish doctrine of positive prescription and may, in 
due course of time give rise to a prescriptive servitude in respect of which 
40  Van der Merwe v Wiese 1948 (4) SA 8 (C) at 14 per Fagan J and discussed in R J P Jordan, 
“Praedial servitudes: the imposition of positive duties upon the servient owner” (1958) 
75 SALJ 181 at 186. 
41  See Cusine and Paisley, Servitudes and Rights of Way (n 3) 377-85, para 11.37-11.46; E C 
Reid and J Blackie, Personal Bar (2006) paras 6.56 and 6.63; Moncrieff v Jamieson 2005 1 
SC 281 at paras 25-29 per Lord Marnoch and paras 80-86 per Lord Hamilton; Moncrieff v 
Jamieson 2007 SC (HL) 1 at para 46 per Lord Scott of Foscote; Robson v Chalmers Property 
Investment Co Ltd 2008 SLT 1069; George Jobson Forbes Fyvie v J Ross Morrison and Yvonne 
Morrison, Arbroath Sheriff Court, case ref A155/98, decision of Sheriff Principal R A 
Dunlop QC and decision of the Sheriff on 10 Dec 1999. For more general application 
see MacGregor v Balfour (1899) 2 F 345 per Lord President Balfour at 352; Munro v Jervey 
(1821) 1 S 161; cf Winans v Lord Tweedmouth (1888) 15 R 540.
42  Ben Henderson and Mrs M A (otherwise Rita) Henderson and Michael John Walker and Mrs 
Gail Mather Walker and Andrew Connor and Linda Connor v William Irvine and Mrs Gillian 
Irvine, Alloa Sheriff Court, case ref A314/08 (hearing 20 Apr 2010), note of Sheriff D N 
Mackie. See K G C Reid and G L Gretton, Conveyancing 2010 (2011) 13.
43  Price and another v Nunn [2013] EWCA Civ 1002.
44  At para 32.
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the dominant tenement comprises an area outwith the dominant tenement 
in the original servitude.45 The principle in all of this is clear. The servient 
proprietor, by doing nothing to prevent excessive use of a servitude, could 
contribute to the eventual creation of a second real right of servitude that 
entitles the dominant proprietor use the route of the original servitude to 
benefit an area outwith the dominant tenement in that original servitude. 
(4) The fourth exception
This exception may be best illustrated in a servitude of access. It applies 
where the activity on the additional land does not lead to a direct and 
single journey from that land across the dominant tenement and down 
the servitude road but there are actually two journeys interspersed by an 
intervening legitimate act of “processing,” “storage” or something similar. 
This exception is truly a way of saying that the basic rule in Irvine Knitters 
is not engaged at all. Put another way, there is no breach of the Irvine 
Knitters rule where someone using the servitude to access the dominant 
tenement does so in connection with a legitimate and genuine purpose 
on that dominant tenement before passing through to the additional land 
and there are substantially two separate journeys. This applies equally in 
reverse when someone leaves the adjoining land via the dominant tenement 
and then passes out to the public road over the servient tenement. There 
is no need in this case to show the use of the adjoining land is “ancillary” 
to the proper use of the dominant tenement. There is no need to show 
that the access to adjacent land was envisaged when the servitude was 
originally constituted. There is no need to show that the servient proprietor 
is personally barred from objecting. This is an entirely different exception 
with a different justification. All that needs to be shown is that the journey 
to/from the adjoining land from/to the dominant tenement is genuinely 
separate from a genuine journey to/from the dominant tenement over the 
servitude access. To explain why this is so requires a detailed examination 
of the general Irvine Knitters rule.
45  Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 s 3(2); See also the observations in the 
English case of Smiths v Muller and Fowlers [2008] EWCA Civ 1425 at para 10 per Rimer 
LJ; CDC2020 Plc v Ferreira [2005] EWCA Civ 611 per Lloyd LJ at para 21; Mills v Silver 
[1991] Ch 271.
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D.  The Formulation of the General Irvine Knitters Rule 
with Specific Reference to the Fourth Exception
In the context of a servitude of access it is a convenient shorthand to express 
the Irvine Knitters rule to the effect that a servitude of access is to be used 
only for the purpose of taking access to the dominant tenement. However, 
this abbreviation does tend to mislead somewhat. The rule is not that the 
servitude of access can be used only to take access to the dominant tenement 
but that the servitude of access may be used only for the legitimate and 
genuine purposes of the dominant tenement. It is worth confirming that this 
formulation relating to the purposes of the dominant tenement is indeed 
the position of both Scots and English law. In one of the leading English 
cases46 the various judges emphasised the easement of access could be used 
for the reasonable and honest use of the dominant tenement, a formulation 
which can be construed to open the door to consideration of the purposes of 
the dominant tenement. In Irvine Knitters the wording used was even more 
explicit in this regard in that Lord President Emslie spoke of the link of 
the servitude to the genuine “purposes of the dominant tenement.”47 This 
distinction between the servitude linked not to the dominant tenement but 
the purposes of the dominant tenement is subtle but very important. The 
distinction may immediately be illustrated by reference to simple examples 
with the underlying principle then being drawn out. 
(1) Examples
A rule which limits the exercise of a servitude of way to the geographic 
bounds of the dominant tenement is a rule that seeks a red line to be drawn 
round a dominant tenement and this is to be regarded as the ne plus ultra 
of anyone properly using the servitude. It would preclude anyone using 
the servitude of access to access the dominant tenement and then moving 
outside the boundary to conduct a simple operation such as painting the 
outside face of the fence on the boundaries of the dominant tenement. It 
would preclude the taking of access into the dominant tenement by means 
of a servitude of way and leaving the dominant tenement by means of a 
second servitude of way as the solum of the second servitude would be 
46  Williams v James (1867) LR 2 CP 577 at 580-81 per Bovill CJ, at 581-82 per Willes J and at 
583 per Montague Smith J.
47  1978 SC 109 at 119.
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outside the dominant tenement. It would preclude the receipt of water 
in a plot of land by means of a contract or lease or other right enabling 
aqueduct into the dominant tenement and then the transport of that same 
water in tankers down a servitude road where the dominant tenement in 
that servitude road comprised the plot of land but not the source of the 
water. It would prevent a plot of land being used as a distribution centre 
for goods that need to be carted to other lands operated as part of the same 
business group. None of these examples fall foul of the Scottish rule that is 
to the effect that a servitude must be used for the legitimate and genuine 
purposes of the dominant tenement.
In addition to these examples some further applications have been 
judicially noticed. If the rule were to the effect that the servitude may 
be used only to gain access to the dominant tenement (and not for the 
legitimate and genuine purposes of the dominant tenement) then the 
dominant proprietor taking access to the dominant tenement via the 
access servitude would have to retrace his steps if he wished to proceed to 
anywhere else. He clearly does not have to do so because this is not the rule. 
In the Canadian case of Miller v Tipling, Mulock CJ, sitting in the Ontario 
Court of Appeal, stated the matter thus:48 
The law is well established that a right-of-way appurtenant to a particular 
close must not be used colourably or for the real purpose of reaching a 
different close. This does not mean that where the way has been used in 
accordance with the terms of the grant for the benefit of the land to which it 
is appurtenant, the party having thus used it must retrace his steps. Having 
lawfully reached the dominant tenement, he may proceed therefrom to 
adjoining premises to which the way is not appurtenant; but, if his object 
is merely to pass over the dominant tenement in order to reach the other 
premises, that would be an unlawful user of the way...
One consequence of what is observed in this dictum is this. Having used 
the servitude and having reached the dominant tenement the dominant 
proprietor (and anyone else entitled to use the servitude as his invitee) is not 
wholly precluded from passing onto adjacent lands even if these adjacent 
lands are outside the dominant tenement. The point was re-emphasised 
in another Canadian case in which a passage from Gale on Easements was 
quoted. This is Gamble v Birch Island Estates Ltd, decided in the Ontario 
High Court.49 
48  (1918) 43 DLR 469 at para 31.
49  (1970) 13 DLR (3d) 657 at para 23 per Stark J.
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It now remains to consider whether the law will permit the extension of 
the user of the right of way to additional property acquired by the grantee or 
its successors in title. This branch of the law appears to be well established. 
In Gale on Easements, 13th ed. (1959), p. 265, one finds this language:
“If a right of way be granted for the enjoyment of close A, the grantee, because 
he owns or acquires close B, cannot use the way in substance for passing 
over close A to close B. Romer L.J., Harris v. Flower & Sons (1905) 74 L.J.Ch. 
127. It need hardly be said that the mere fact that the grantee uses the way to 
enter close A does not make close B incapable of access from A; the question 
must always be whether the ostensible use of the way for the purposes of the 
dominant tenement is genuine or colourable.” 
This is slightly reworded in later editions as may be illustrated by the 
nineteenth edition of Gale on Easements published in 2012:50
“It does not, of course, follow that the mere fact that the grantee uses the 
way to enter close A makes close B incapable of access from close A. The 
question must always be whether the ostensible use of the way for the 
purposes of the dominant tenement is genuine or colourable: “the true point 
to be considered … should seem to be, quo animo the party went to the close; 
whether really and bona fide to do business there, or merely in his way to 
some more distant place.”
The quotation within this passage from the sixteenth edition of Gale is from 
the seventeenth-century English case of Lawton v Ward.51 This indicates 
the longstanding nature of this form of the rule related to the legitimate 
purposes of the dominant tenement. In Scotland we are not dealing with 
a variant of or exception to the rule established for the first time in Irvine 
Knitters but with the true nature of the rule itself. 
It is clear that a dominant proprietor may not use the servitude of 
access to the dominant tenement merely for the purpose of taking access to 
lands outwith the dominant tenement. A number of Australian,52 English53 
50  Para 9.56. This same passage also appears in earlier editions such as the 16th (1997) at 
para 9.31.
51  (1697) 1 Ld Raym 75 at 76 note (a); 91 ER 946 at 947.
52  See e.g. Westfield Management Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [2007] 233 CLR 528.
53  See e.g. Skull v Glenister (1864) 16 CBNS 81; 143 ER 1055; Finch v Great Western R Co 
(1879) 5 Ex D 254; Harris v Flower & Sons Limited [1904] WN 106; Ackroyd v Smith (1850) 
10 CB 164, 138 ER 68. 
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Canadian54 and South African55 cases illustrate this. It is little surprise 
that Scots law is to similar effect.56 The rule may now be regarded as well 
established and is expressed in the phrase – the dominant tenement may 
not be used as a “bridge.” A clear cut case is where the dominant proprietor 
uses the servitude merely for the purpose of taking access to property 
outwith the dominant tenement and the servitude is used merely for the 
“colourable” purpose of taking access to those premises.57 Such a taking of 
access to property outwith the dominant tenement without any reference 
to the use of the dominant tenement itself is not part of the legitimate 
purposes of the dominant tenement.
(2) “Legitimate and genuine purpose”
What then distinguishes the “legitimate and genuine” purposes of the 
dominant tenement from a mere “colourable purpose”? This is a simple 
question with a multifaceted answer. The following discussion may be 
helpful in making the distinction. 
(3) Single journeys
Single unbroken journeys, particularly if repeated, are likely to fall foul of 
the Irvine Knitters rule and be regarded as using the dominant tenement as 
a “bridge.” If the taking of access involves a single, unbroken journey over 
the servient tenement through the dominant tenement to the land outside 
the dominant tenement that is likely to be regarded as an improper use of 
the servitude. This would apply mutatis mutandis to egress out to the public 
road from land outwith the dominant tenement.
54  See e.g. Telfer v Jacobs (1888) 16 OR 35; Purdom v Robinson, [1899] 30 Can SCR 64 at 71 per 
Sir Henry Strong CJ; Friedman v Murray [1953] 3 DLR 313; Pearsall v Power Supermarkets 
[1957] 8 DLR (2d) 270; Gordon v Regan (1985) 15 DLR (4th) 641 at paras 28-37 per Griffiths 
J; Eastern Contractors v Gamble (1970) 13 DLR (3d) 657; Graham v Kucera 2009 BCSC 1508.
55  See e.g. Berdur Properties (Pty) Ltd v 76 Commercial Road (Pty) Ltd 1998 (4) SA 62 (D) 
examined in R R M Paisley, “The demon drink and the straight and narrow way: the 
expansion and limitation of praedial servitudes,” in H Mostert and M J de Waal (eds), 
Essays in Honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 193.
56  There is a discussion of the authorities in Cusine and Paisley, Servitudes and Rights of 
Way (n 3), paras 12.64 et seq.
57  See, once again, the Canadian case of Miller v Tipling (1918) 43 DLR 469 at para 31 per 
Mulock CJ.
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However, this is not an absolute rule because, quite apart from the 
ancillary uses examples noticed above, it may be possible to construct an 
argument that there may be instances where a journey to a point outwith 
the dominant tenement could be regarded as genuinely for the purposes 
of the dominant tenement itself. For example, if a dominant proprietor 
is approached by a neighbour who requests a one off permission to use 
the servitude access and then to cross the dominant tenement to carry 
out some small task on the neighbouring property, it would appear to 
be good neighbourliness on the part of the dominant proprietor to allow 
such a journey. It seems at least arguable that such a good neighbourly act 
would be within the genuine purpose of the use of the dominant tenement 
and would not be regarded as using the dominant tenement as a bridge. 
However, such acts may require to be relatively small and this particular 
example does appear to stretch the point a little. The better view seems to 
be that such access may simply constitute a de minimis breach which is not 
truly an exception but is simply not worth litigating. It is most unlikely 
that this neighbourly behaviour example could be extrapolated to allow a 
journey for major engineering or building works (even on a one off basis) 
on the adjacent land or activities such as the widespread planting of trees 
on, or removal of trees from, the adjacent land if that was not also related 
to the legitimate and genuine purposes of the dominant tenement. On 
balance, it seems best to seek to justify single journeys to a point outwith 
the dominant tenement by reference to the “ancillary use” exception.
(4) Separate journeys
Separate journeys (a) over the servient tenement to the dominant tenement 
and (b) from the dominant tenement to the adjacent land comply with 
the Irvine Knitters rule in that they do not use the dominant tenement as 
a “bridge.” Where the dominant proprietor takes access over the servitude 
road into the dominant tenement for legitimate and genuine purposes 
within the dominant tenement, this, if there were to be nothing else, clearly 
complies with the rule. If he should then make an entirely separate journey 
from the dominant tenement into the adjacent land, this will comply with 
the rule because he is not in any way exercising the servitude in respect 
of this second journey. So too if he returns to the dominant tenement and 
then makes a separate journey out through the servient tenement this is 
not in any way an exercise of the servitude and will not breach the Irvine 
v Knitters rule. The key issue is that the journey to the dominant tenement 
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over the servient tenement and the journey from the dominant tenement 
to the servient tenement are “separate.” It is not enough to preclude the 
journeys from being separate to show that the second journey into the 
adjacent lands could be made only after making the first journey. So too 
it is not enough to preclude the journeys from being regarded as separate 
to show the dominant proprietor has put himself into the position to make 
the second journey by making the first. 
(5) How to distinguish separate journeys
The separate nature of the journeys (a) across the servient tenement to 
the dominant tenement (“the first journey”) and (b) from the dominant 
tenement to adjacent land (“the second journey”) can be observed from 
certain circumstances. It is important to note that none of the factors 
identified below will be determinative in its own right. They will all be 
assessed together to determine whether the servitude is being exercised for 
the genuine purposes of the dominant tenement.
(6) A gap in time between journeys
A gap in time between the various journeys assists in showing they are 
separate and thereby in complying with the Irvine Knitters rule. Let us 
look at an extreme case which illustrates the matter beyond all doubt and 
then move onto more usual situations. In the extreme case a person who 
has entered the dominant tenement a year ago may leave that dominant 
tenement and pass into adjacent land as he pleases. The gap of a year 
is more than sufficient to show the second journey has no connection 
with the first. More usual day to day cases involves a lesser period of 
time but this does not preclude a shorter period being a sufficient gap 
between the journeys. If a lorry or van leaves the public road, using the 
servitude of access to cross the servient land and enters a factory on the 
dominant tenement and stops there for a legitimate reason, that amounts 
to a genuine self-contained journey to the dominant tenement over the 
servitude road. If, later in the same day, for some legitimate reason that 
lorry or van then moves to another part of the factory complex on land 
adjacent to the dominant tenement that may be regarded as a separate self-
contained journey from the dominant tenement to adjacent land and not 
an abuse of the servitude of access to the dominant tenement because it 
does not involve any exercise of the servitude. The fact that there is a gap 
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in time between the two journeys assists in demonstrating the separate and 
legitimate nature of the journeys. 
Certainly, it may be that the longer this intervening time gap is, the 
easier it may be to demonstrate two separate journeys. For example, in 
one nineteenth century English case, Williams v James,58 the period of time 
between moving hay from adjacent fields onto the dominant tenement 
and the transport of the hay down the servient road was rather vaguely 
stated as the period between summer and September.59 That might have 
been as little as a few weeks but also it could have been a month or so. The 
period was a factor in determining that the dominant proprietor’s use of 
the easement of access to the dominant tenement was consistent with the 
proper exercise of that right. Another example of a time period of what is 
probably about a week or a fortnight may be observed in a Scottish case.60 
The exact time period is uncertain but, as will become clear from the dictum 
quoted below, may be calculated with reasonable certainty by reference to 
the time between repeat municipal bin collections. In the Scottish litigation 
in question the Lands Tribunal considered an expressly constituted 
servitude of passage in the following terms: 
…a right of access over the footpath lying to the side and rear of the adjoining 
subjects known as number Six Maxwell Crescent, aforesaid which footpath 
is shown delineated and hatched in black on the plan Declaring that the 
right of access hereby granted is for the purpose of gaining access to and 
egress from the rear garden ground pertaining to the subjects disponed and 
for no other purpose whatsoever…
In their comments the Lands Tribunal observed:61 
We do not accept that the use of a wheelie bin is an improper use of the right 
of access. Use of a garden for storage of a wheelie bin must now be accepted 
as a reasonable garden use. That the refuse in the wheelie bin may come 
from the house rather than the garden does not affect the means for access 
and egress to and from the garden by someone using a wheelie bin.
In the Irvine Knitters case itself, a small shop on the original dominant 
tenement (84-90 High Street) and property on additional adjacent land on 
either side of the original dominant tenement were demolished and rebuilt 
58  (1867) LR 2 CP 577.
59  Ibid.
60  Forrester & Fleetham v Sharp, 6 Mar 2001, unreported, LTS/LO/2000/45.
61  Page 5 of the written decision.
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as a single larger shop on a composite site (78-106 High Street) including 
the original dominant tenement and the additional land.62 It was during 
the construction phase that the servient proprietors first raised objections 
to construction traffic using the servitude over their land. Presumably 
the route of access had been a quiet back lane and then, without their 
agreement, it became an access to a construction site and was traversed 
by lorries carrying materials and equipment. One wonders if a degree of 
sensitivity and diplomacy on the part of the dominant proprietors or their 
contractors might have avoided any problem. However, that was not to be. 
What then followed was a little surprising, at least at first blush. Instead of 
litigating the matter on the basis of inciviliter use (the first legally implied 
servitude condition) or by reference to an asserted unwarranted increase in 
the burden on the servient tenement (the second legally implied servitude 
condition), the servient proprietors took a different approach. They argued 
that the proposed access to the new shop would breach the third legally 
implied servitude condition in that the dominant proprietor sought to 
take access to land outwith the dominant tenement. This approach had 
tactical advantages in that it avoided a difficult examination of matters of 
fact and law regarding the conduct of the dominant proprietors (or their 
contractors) within the servient tenement and concentrated attention on 
interpretation of titles where one might anticipate an answer might be 
more clear-cut particularly where a plan is attached to the title deeds. It 
also allowed the servient proprietors to seek the remedy of interdict even 
after the construction traffic had ceased and enabled them to object to the 
future commercial use of the composite shop. So, the commercial pressure 
could be maintained on the dominant proprietors even if they were to 
rush through the construction phase and claim the offending conduct had 
already ceased.
Consequently, it was not until the development was complete that 
litigation actually started as regards the proper use of the existing 
servitude of passage. That servitude was exercisable over a private lane 
and originally gave access only to the rear of the original shop on the 
dominant tenement but not to the property on the additional adjacent land 
on either side. Lord President Emslie and Lord Cameron considered that 
the dominant proprietor could comply with the rule limiting the exercise 
of the servitude to original dominant tenement by converting the part of 
62  Irvine Knitters Ltd v North Ayrshire Co-operative Society Ltd 1978 SC 109.
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the new shop within the footprint of the old shop into a distribution centre. 
Lord President Emslie observed:63
… the access may unquestionably be used for all purposes to which the 
[dominant proprietors] choose to devote the dominant tenement and it is 
easy to figure that some rearrangement of the [dominant proprietors’] use 
of their new building, even if they choose to devote that part of it built on 
the dominant tenement exclusively to the function of a genuine distribution 
centre or store in connection with all their retail enterprises, will result in 
their being able to use the right of access for purposes which can be identified 
as the purposes of the dominant tenement. That a proprietor may use his 
dominant subjects for a genuine purpose which serves the interests of his 
business enterprise, as a whole, carried on in those subjects and elsewhere, 
cannot be doubted and the case of Williams v James is a good example of 
circumstances in which a proprietor’s use of a right of access to one of three 
fields on which he grew hay all of which he stacked on the dominant field, 
was held to be unexceptionable.
Lord Cameron set out a similar view, albeit his observations as regards 
distribution appear to me more limited to distribution not to all other retail 
outlets but to distribution within the greater retail outlet on the composite 
site:64
I do not doubt that if the [dominant proprietors] decided to designate and 
to use the whole of the subjects 84-90 High Street as a store or distribution 
centre for the whole of their supermarket compound within the range of 
78-106 High Street, they could legitimately do so, but equally I am of opinion 
that if they were to claim a right to import through the access or accesses 
giving on to 84-90, goods of any kind which immediately were delivered 
or transported to other parts of 78-106 High Street then they were acting 
beyond the legal limits of the right of way in favour of the subjects identified 
as 84-90 High Street. The proof appears to me to yield an inference beyond 
doubt that this is precisely what the [dominant proprietors] have been doing 
to a material degree. What the [dominant proprietors] are not entitled, in my 
opinion, to claim a right to do in virtue of this servitude right, is to use the 
subjects Nos. 84-90 as a “bridge” over which passengers or goods can pass 
as of right to the subjects Nos. 78-82. That the [dominant proprietors] might 
legitimately “ferry” such goods once properly received by this right of 
access into the subjects Nos. 84-90, used as a storage and distribution centre, 
by way of the public highway to other subjects in the same ownership is a 
very separate issue, and one in which other considerations might operate 
and I expressly reserve my opinion on that matter.
63  At 119.
64  At 122.
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There probably is an element of time delay suggested in these judicial 
references to the legitimate use of the dominant tenement as a storage 
or distribution centre in the context of a single retail unit straddling 
the dominant tenement and adjoining land. The process of storage or 
distribution usually takes some time. However, it would be fair to say that 
one would not expect material to rest in a store for months or even for weeks. 
It is worth remembering that the entire premises in Irvine Knitters were 
developed as a supermarket. It is reasonable to assume that perishables 
and fresh food would be delivered. It is equally reasonable to assume that 
when delivered to a distribution centre within the dominant tenement it 
would be a legitimate use of the dominant tenement to distribute this sort 
of material within a very short period of time, certainly within the same 
day, probably within hours if not minutes of its delivery to the distribution 
centre. 
Albeit Lord Cameron observed that materials could not be “immediately” 
delivered from the storage centre forming the dominant tenement to other 
parts of the building outside that tenement, the gap in time to constitute 
legitimate “storage” or “distribution” may be very short – possibly 
extending to a few minutes in appropriate commercial cases. One might 
surmise that the courts might be tempted to allow a party conducting 
a genuine business on the dominant tenement the opportunity to make 
a genuine business choice as to how long this period should be. If good 
commercial practice indicates that the storage period should be a certain 
period of time, it is to be doubted if the courts will take the view that this 
is wrong and impose some arbitrary period divorced from commercial 
reality. For example, it seems unlikely that the Courts would require 
fresh milk to be stored for days in order to qualify as the legitimate and 
genuine use of the area to which the milk was delivered as a storage facility. 
Similarly, where stone is extracted from a quarry face on the land outwith a 
dominant tenement and conveyed to places within the dominant tenement 
for processing and storage, it seems unlikely that the courts would require 
that process to be extended to some arbitrary minimum of time so that 
it might be regarded as sufficiently stored or processed to form part of 
the legitimate purposes of the dominant tenement. The important issue is 
that the material has gone through a genuine commercial process within 
the dominant tenement. Although foreseeability is not required, this seems 
all the more acceptable where the process is one which was within the 
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contemplation of the parties when the servitude right of access and egress 
to and from that dominant tenement was granted. 
Indeed, it may be possible with regard to some journeys, that a gap in 
time is not essential to show that they are separate. A gap in time is just one 
factor in the identification of a gap between two legitimate journeys. For 
example, if a postman enters a factory on the dominant tenement via the 
servitude road and hands in a letter at the factory office, an employee in 
the office who picks up the same letter may wish to deliver it immediately 
to the addressee in another part of the factory complex which is located 
outside the dominant tenement. On the face of it there appear to be two 
separate legitimate journeys. The first enables access to the dominant 
tenement via the servient tenement. The second is undertaken as part of 
the purposes of the dominant tenement. 
(7) Different transport for the two journeys
A factor in showing the distinction between the two journeys may be 
the method of transport. Where different vehicles are used for the two 
journeys this may assist in showing the journeys are separate and thus 
in complying with the Irvine Knitters rule. This is particularly so where 
the vehicles carrying out the second journey never enter the servient 
tenement but are specialised vehicles adapted for the second journey. 
The access over the servient tenement to the dominant tenement is a 
general access for all purposes but the access taken to the adjacent land 
from the dominant tenement is for certain defined, limited purposes. For 
example, let us consider a dominant tenement operated as a quarry and 
containing rock crushing machinery, quarry offices and a weighbridge. 
Assume that the source of the rock is outside the dominant tenement and 
the dominant tenement is accessed via a single servitude of access from 
the main public road. If workmen employed at the quarry travel along 
the public road and up the servitude road and arrive in their own private 
cars they may park them in a safe area within the quarry (the dominant 
tenement). Following modern work practices, we may assume, typically, 
they will then dismount from their vehicles and sign into work in some 
way and not use their private cars until they leave at the end of the day. 
That entry into the quarry on the dominant tenement represents a single 
journey. It is separate and distinct from any journeys they might make 
within the quarry. Even if these same employees drive quarry trucks, vans 
or lorries back and forth all day between the dominant tenement and the 
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rock face within the adjoining land, this is arguably not a misuse of the 
servitude of access. These journeys made during the working day are all 
separate journeys between the dominant tenement and the adjacent land 
and the workmen do not use the servitude route at all. These journeys are 
all legitimate uses of the dominant tenement. Even if the initial journey of 
the employee in the morning and his last journey at night both require him 
or her to cross the servient tenement, and even though this initial and last 
journey is carried out to enable the workmen to carry out their jobs (which 
necessarily involves repeatedly passing into land adjacent to the dominant 
tenement), arguably this would not be a misuse of the servitude of access. 
In addition, the position appears to be no different even if a workman had 
a role in the quarry that required him to spend most of his working day at 
the quarry face in the adjacent land. His private car, presumably, is parked 
at a safe place in the quarry (the dominant tenement).
This applies mutatis mutandis to journeys out of the adjacent land and 
into the dominant tenement. For example, where material is ferried into the 
dominant tenement from the quarry face on the adjacent land by special 
vehicles (such as large quarry trucks unsuited or un-licenced for the public 
road) and deposited in the dominant tenement and, at some later stage, 
is taken out of the quarry on the dominant tenement over the servitude 
in different vehicles licenced for public road use, this will be a factor in 
demonstrating two separate journeys. 
An example in a domestic setting could be as follows. A house with 
attendant garage is built on a dominant tenement benefited by a vehicular 
servitude of access. A part of the garden to the house, comprising the lawn, 
is held on a separate title not benefited by the servitude of access. If the 
owner of the house comes home from work in her car she will park it in the 
garage. After entering the house to change clothing she may take a mower 
from the same garage and proceed to the lawn to cut the grass. The second 
journey to the lawn outside the dominant tenement is made on foot. An 
additional factor favourable to regarding this journey as separate from the 
one taken over the servient tenement is the fact that the second journey is 
not taken every time the first journey is completed. Normally, a person 
does not mow his or her lawn every evening in the year. In this regard it 
is possible to argue there is a distinction with the quarry example given 
above. It may be a factor adverse to showing the journey to the quarry 
face is indeed separate journey if the workmen invariably make the second 
journey every time they complete the first journey.
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(8) Nature of the activity between the journeys 
The dicta quoted above from the Irvine Knitters case contemplated involved 
storage and distribution on the dominant tenement. It is important to note 
that this is not a closed list of the activities that may be taken into account 
in determining if there are two separate journeys. These two activities 
identified in Irvine Knitters are largely “passive” in their nature, albeit 
distribution infers the activity of sorting and taking away. If such passive 
activities are sufficient to distinguish one journey from another, it seems 
likely that a more “active” manufacturing process between journeys would 
lead to a stronger case. 
At the lower end of the spectrum of “active” behaviour one could cite 
the instance of employees reporting for work at a site hut on the dominant 
tenement and then passing to a point of work on the adjacent land outwith 
the dominant tenement whether that land is owned or leased by the 
employer. The fact that signs are placed on the dominant tenement which 
expressly require such reporting of employees and members of the public 
could be argued to indicate, in a modest way, the policy of complying 
with a two separate journey requirement. Further across the spectrum 
one may refer to a process of manufacture of some sort on the dominant 
tenement which is a much more active “activity.” For example, where a 
source of sand or particular clay in an adjacent field facilitates a cement 
making business on a dominant tenement, the servitude of egress from 
that dominant tenement may be used to ferry out the finished product of 
cement even though it contains sand that had its origins in the land outwith 
the dominant tenement. This seems to hold good whether the sand is dug 
out of the adjacent land by vehicular diggers driven by men or by some sort 
or automated machine with conveyor belts. A multitude of other variants, 
of even more intense activity and duration, can be imagined.
(9) No artificial expedients to mark a distinction
It is clear that the Courts will be alert to artificial expedients intended 
to exaggerate a distinction between the two journeys. Such artificial 
expedients will be discounted entirely. This approach is clear from the 
highly significant nineteenth century English case of Williams v James65 
which was relied on in Irvine Knitters. This English case involved the owner 
of the solum of the route of an easement of access seeking a declaration for 
65  (1867) LR 2 CP 577.
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trespass to land. The easement benefited a field known as the Nine acre 
field. The owner of that field also owned two adjoining fields known as 
Parrott’s land. Those two fields had no easement over the plaintiff’s land. 
In the summer of 1866 the tenant of all three fields mowed all three fields 
and stacked the hay on the Nine acre field. In September the tenant sold 
the hay to the defendant who extracted it via the route of the easement. 
The jury found that the stacking of the hay was done “honestly.”66 All the 
judges opining considered this significant. Bovill, C.J. indicated that there 
must be a bona fide and not a mere colourable use of the right of way.67 
The stacking of the hay was in the ordinary and reasonable uses of the 
dominant tenement and therefore complied with this. So too was carriage 
of the hay out within the “ordinary and reasonable” uses of the servitude 
itself. Similar sentiments were expressed by Montague Smith J68 and Willes 
J. The latter of these judges expressed himself as follows:69
The finding of the jury was, that the land was used honestly, and not in 
order to get a right of way further on. This is equivalent to finding that the 
stacking of hay on the Nine acre field was in the reasonable and ordinary 
use of it as a field; and also that the carting was from the Nine acre field and 
not from Parrott’s land.
There was no issue of using the ground as a distribution centre to commercial 
retail centres in this English case although, it seems reasonable to surmise 
that the hay would be used on other farms or perhaps even sold at market. 
In the passage of his opinion in Irvine Knitters quoted earlier, Lord 
Cameron expressly reserved his view as to whether goods could be taken 
over the servient tenement by means of the servitude into the part of the 
new shop located on the dominant tenement, then immediately out onto 
the public road and then directly into the remainder of the shop outside the 
dominant tenement. If this indeed were to be possible it would amount to 
a neat trick in the particular location of the shop to enable circumvention of 
the Irvine Knitters rule. The very same device came up for consideration in 
a more recent English case involving an agricultural operation.70 A farmer 
owned two separate but adjacent fields only the first of which was benefited 
by an easement of access. The first field also benefited from a gate leading 
directly out to the public highway. The easement could not be used by the 
66  At 577.
67  At 580.
68  At 582-83.
69  At 582.
70  Giles v Tarry [2012] EWCA Civ 837.
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famer to bring his sheep directly to the second field. So, to circumvent this 
limitation, he led them over the easement of access into the first field and 
out onto the public road. Following a brief pause on the public road, he led 
them back into the dominant tenement and across into the adjacent land. 
In the Court of Appeal it was held this was an artificial device or expedient 
and the farmer, in substance and intention, was using the easement to 
access property outwith the dominant tenement.71 From this it is clear 
that in applying the Irvine Knitters rule that the law will give no regard to 
commercially pointless and self cancelling manoeuvres intended to give an 
impression that there are two separate journeys.
(10) Servitude conditions in the servitude excluding the activity
In some situations the servient proprietor may be able to preclude the 
activity which the dominant proprietor wishes to carry out on the dominant 
tenement to justify the distinction between the first and second journeys. 
For example, if a servitude of access is granted with the express servitude 
condition that the servitude will not be used to facilitate storage or a 
distribution centre on the dominant tenement, the servient proprietor will 
be entitled to seek interdict of any traffic purporting to use the servitude 
where that traffic is bringing material into the dominant tenement for 
storage or distribution even to adjacent property owned by the dominant 
proprietor. An example of this occurred in a recent English case.72 In that 
case the storage of agricultural materials on the dominant tenement where 
those materials had been grown outside the dominant tenement was held 
to be in breach of the title conditions (imposing a servitude condition) 
requiring it to be used for the business of running an agricultural and 
forestry estate.73 Consequently, it was not permissible to seek to use the 
easement to facilitate such storage. 
E.  Conclusion
In all of the above it is important to recognise that the potential existence 
of various exceptions does not empty the Irvine Knitters rule against use 
of the dominant tenement as a bridge of all substance. There remain 
71  At paras 10-23 per Norris J.
72  Wilkins and Wilkins v Lewis [2005] EWHC 1710 (Ch).
73  See Wilkins at paras 31 and 37 et seq, especially at 50.
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cases, chiefly involving a building or a business in a building straddling 
the dominant tenement and adjacent land, where it does operate – indeed 
this is illustrated by the actual decision in Irvine Knitters.74 However, the 
various exceptions outlined above are yet to be fully judicially explored 
and developed. If this is done the rigid use of the rule to cause injustice 
will be avoided and Scottish property law will operate better for both the 
dominant and servient proprietors.
74  See also the South African case of Berdur Properties (Pty) Ltd v 76 Commercial Road (Pty) 
Ltd 1998 (4) SA 62 (D).

12. Enforcing Repairing 
Obligations by Specific 
Implement
Professor Angus McAllister
A.  Repairing Obligations
Repairing obligations in leases may either be owed by the landlord to the 
tenant or vice versa, depending upon which of them has responsibility for 
the repair in question. Which party owes the obligation is likely to vary 
according to the type of lease. At common law, all landlords of urban leases 
have an obligation to provide subjects in a tenantable or habitable condition, 
and to maintain them in a like condition throughout the let.1 However, most 
commercial leases are granted on a full repairing and insuring (FRI) basis, 
contracting out of the common law and making repairs the responsibility 
of the tenant. 
The opposite is true in the case of residential leases: it is not normally 
possible to contract out of the landlord’s common law obligation because 
it has been strengthened and considerably reinforced by statute.2 In all 
residential tenancies, the landlord has a duty to provide a house that is 
1  J Rankine, A Treatise on the Law of Leases in Scotland, 3rd edn (1916) 241; for other 
references, including the institutional writers, see A McAllister Scottish Law of Leases, 
4th edn (2013) paras 3.12 and 3.40.
2  There may be a partial exception to this in the case of private sector residential tenancies 
under s 18 of the Housing (Scotland) Act 2006, which allows limited contracting out of 
statutory repairing obligations.
© Angus McAllister, CC BY 4.0 http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0056.12
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wind and watertight and in all other respects reasonably fit for human 
habitation at the commencement of the tenancy and to keep it that way 
throughout its currency.3 The slight discrepancy in wording between the 
common law and statutory wording is probably due to the fact that the 
latter is taken from the equivalent English provision; however, it has been 
held that there is no significant difference between the common law and 
the statutory formulations.4 
The repairing obligations of private sector residential landlords 
(collectively known as “the repairing standard”) extend much further and 
are spelled out in greater detail, beyond the basic habitability requirement, 
which mirrors the common law obligation and applies to social tenancies.5
In agricultural leases, both the landlord and the tenant have repairing 
obligations, e.g. their respective obligations regarding the maintenance of 
fixed equipment.6
B.  Enforcement by Specific Implement
In principle, it ought to be possible for either party to enforce a repairing 
obligation by specific implement, by means of a decree ad factum 
praestandum, compelling the other party to fulfil the broken obligation. 
Specific implement is a primary breach of contract remedy in Scotland.7 
There are a number of situations where it cannot be used (e.g. for the 
payment of money), but where it is competent it is a right which the court 
has the discretion to refuse only in exceptional circumstances; these include 
situations where it would be impossible to enforce, or where its imposition 
would cause exceptional hardship to the recipient. Damages would then 
be the appropriate alternative remedy. In such cases the onus is on the 
defender to aver and prove that it would be inequitable for implement to 
be granted.8
3  Housing (Scotland) Act 2006 ss 13(1)(a) and 14(1) (private sector tenancies); Housing 
(Scotland) Act 2001, Sch 4, para 1 (social tenancies).
4  Galloway v Glasgow City Council 2001 HousLR 59; Todd v Clapperton [2009] CSOH 112, 
2009 SLT 837.
5  Housing (Scotland) Act 2006 s 13(1)(b)-(f).
6  Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1991, s 5; Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 
2003 s 16.
7  For a general discussion of specific implement, see WW McBryde The Law of Contract in 
Scotland, 3rd edn (2007) para 23-01 to 23-37. 
8  Salaried Staff London Loan Co Ltd v Swears & Wells Ltd 1985 SC 189; 1985 SLT 326.
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This contrasts with the situation in England, where damages is the 
primary remedy, and specific performance (the nearest English equivalent 
of specific implement) is an equitable alternative that the court only has 
the discretion to grant in cases where damages would not be a sufficient 
remedy. As Lord Watson observed in the leading case of Stewart v Kennedy:9 
In England the only legal right arising from a breach of contract is a claim 
of damages; specific performance is not a matter of legal right, but a purely 
equitable remedy, which the Court can withhold when there are sufficient 
reasons of conscience or expediency against it. But in Scotland the breach 
of a contract for the sale of a specific subject such as landed estate gives 
the party aggrieved the legal right to sue for implement, and although he 
may elect to do so, he cannot be compelled to resort to the alternative of 
an action of damages unless implement is shown to be impossible… Even 
where implement is possible, I do not doubt that the Court of Session has 
inherent power to refuse the remedy on equitable grounds, although I know 
of no instance in which it has done so.
There are past examples of specific implement being used successfully to 
enforce a repairing obligation.10 However, the few reported cases are more 
likely to be examples of failure, and it is necessary to consider the reasons 
for this.
C.  Problems of Specification
The main problem seems to have been the need for precision, the traditional 
rationale being that breach of an order ad factum praestandum could result 
in penal consequences (at one time most likely imprisonment), and so the 
defender had to be absolutely clear about what needed to be done in order 
to obey it:11
In pronouncing decree ad factum praestandum, the Court has to bear in mind 
the consequences and sanctions of such a decree. Failure to implement such 
a decree exposes a defender to the penalty of imprisonment which it is in 
9  (1890) 17 R (HL) 1. See also Co-operative Insurance Society v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd 
[1998] AC 1 at 9-10; [1997] 2 WLR 898 and Beardmore v Barry 1928 SC 101; 1928 SLT 143.
10  Marianski v Jackson (1872) 9 SLR 80.
11  Middleton v Leslie (1892) 19 R 801 at 802 per the Lord President; see also Fleming & 
Ferguson Ltd v Paisley Magistrates 1948 SC 547 at 557 per Lord Cooper, 1948 SLT 457; D M 
Walker Civil Remedies (1974) at p 270; McBryde, Contract (n 7) para 23.13 and 23.14. The 
need for precision was thoroughly re-examined in Retail Parks Investments v Royal Bank 
of Scotland (No2) 1996 SC 227, 1996 SLT 669, discussed below in relation to keep-open 
obligations.
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the power of the pursuer to put in force. I therefore think that in the case of 
decrees which may be thus enforced, or which expose a defender to penal 
consequences, it is right that the court should so express the decree that the 
defender shall be in no doubt regarding the obligation he has to discharge. 
For example, an action requiring a residential landlord to comply with the 
common law obligation to maintain the subjects in a tenantable or habitable 
condition, according to the traditional view, would be likely to fail for 
want of specification if framed in such broad terms. Instead, it would be 
necessary to give precise details of the repairs required, thereby placing a 
substantial burden upon the pursuer, one which in practice would prove 
extremely difficult to overcome.12
It should be noted right away that the spectre of imprisonment 
was greatly weakened some time ago by Section 1 of the Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940, which (in the case of 
natural persons) sanctions imprisonment only in cases where the breach is 
wilful, and gives the court the discretion to impose an alternative penalty. 
Moreover, imprisonment was never an option in the case of corporate 
bodies such as companies or local authorities, and it is now clear that the 
imposition of a fine is an appropriate alternative in such cases.13 
D.  Keep-open Obligations
However, much of the case law relating to the enforcement (or attempted 
enforcement) of repairing obligations is very old, and virtually all of it 
predates the considerable development in the law of specific implement 
deriving from another area of lease law, the enforcement of so-called keep-
open obligations in commercial leases. In the substantial body of case law 
12  The case law is extremely sparse and often lacking in depth or detail, but see, for 
example, Renfrew District Council v McGourlick 1987 SLT 538 (an attempt to enforce a 
local authority’s repairing obligations by utilising the statutory nuisance provisions, 
but in which Lord McCluskey analysed at some length the problems of specification 
attending a decree ad factum praestandum in this context); Traynor v Monklands District 
Council 1988 GWD 8-327; Gunn v Glasgow District Council (1990) 1 SHLR 213; Nicol v 
Glasgow District Council (1990) 1 SHLR 229 (The single volume of Scottish Housing 
Law Reports (SHLR) was published jointly in 1991 by Shelter (Scotland) and the Legal 
Services Agency. Gunn was successfully appealed to the Inner House, but only on the 
issue of damages – see 1992 SCLR 1018). For a useful discussion of the legal problems 
encountered in the housing sector see M Dailly “The Law of Specific Implement” (1993) 
SCOLAG 102.
13  See Postel Properties Ltd v Miller and Santhouse plc 1993 SLT 353 at 357 per Lord Sutherland.
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on this topic the remedy of specific implement has come under intensive 
judicial scrutiny, and the courts have addressed many of the same 
difficulties that have prevented the enforcement of repairing obligations.
From the 1980s onwards, cases began to arise of tenants in shopping 
centres who ceased to occupy shops that were trading unprofitably. This 
was invariably in breach of the standard lease condition requiring the 
tenant to occupy and trade from the subjects in terms of the lease’s use 
clause. The tenant would continue to pay rent, but would cut its overheads 
by closing down the unprofitable branch.
There was never any doubt that such a tenant was in breach of contract 
and that the landlord could claim damages and/or rescind the lease. 
However, damages could be difficult to quantify and there was no point in 
ending the lease of a property that could not be re-let. Instead, landlords 
tried to resort to specific implement, in order to compel the tenant to 
re-occupy and continue trading from the shop.
At first specific implement was thought to be incompetent in such cases, 
for the familiar reasons involving specification.14 How could the court 
grant a decree ad factum praestandum for an activity which (like carrying 
out repairs) involved performing, not a single action, but a large number of 
actions? Moreover (unlike the situation with repairs) enforcing keep-open 
provisions involved compelling the tenant not merely to carry out a once-
and-for-all action or number of actions, but a series of actions that would 
continue for a period of years until the lease came to an end.
However, this position was reversed by the Inner House of the Court of 
Session in the leading case of Retail Parks Investments v Royal Bank of Scotland 
(No 2),15 a decision that has been followed in a number of subsequent cases. 
The court granted an order of specific implement compelling the Royal 
Bank to re-open their branch in the Sauchiehall Centre in Glasgow and to 
continue conducting their business there for the remaining seven years of 
their lease.
While recognising that each case had to be decided on its own merits, 
Lord McCluskey was able to formulate some general statements of the 
legal considerations to be kept in mind when assessing the competence of 
an action ad factum praestandum. Several of these are relevant to the present 
discussion:16
14  Grosvenor Developments (Scotland) plc v Argyll Stores Ltd 1987 SLT 738. 
15  1996 SC 227; 1996 SLT 669.
16  Ibid 1996 SLT 669 at 678 per Lord McCluskey.
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(i)  The material wording of the contract must make it certain what the 
defender has to achieve in order to fulfil the obligation, though this will 
not by itself guarantee the granting of a decree of specific implement. 
(ii)  An order of specific implement may require a number of distinct 
acts in order to secure compliance. However, the more numerous the 
required acts, the more necessary will it be to find terms for the order 
that will satisfy the need for adequate precision. 
(iii)  An order may specify the end to be achieved but leave open the precise 
means whereby that end is to be achieved, thereby allowing a degree 
of flexibility. 
(iv)  In considering the necessary degree of precision (bearing in mind that 
breach of the order could have serious, including penal, consequences) 
the court should consider the commercial realities which form the 
background to the undertaking of the parties’ mutual obligations. In 
Retail Parks the defenders were a large commercial organisation that 
freely undertook the obligation with legal advice, and they had already 
occupied the subjects for the purpose stated in the lease for nearly 20 
years without any apparent difficulty or misunderstanding. When 
seeking to enforce repairing obligations, one could make a similar 
comment, for example, about large residential landlords, such as local 
authorities, housing associations or private letting organisations with 
many properties and many years of experience. 
(v)  Even if the defenders experienced difficulties in knowing what was 
required of them, the matter would have to come before the court again 
before any penalty for breach could be imposed. The court would have 
to be satisfied that the breach was wilful and any imprecision in the 
wording of the order would be exposed; if satisfied that the breach 
was not wilful, the court could even give the defenders a further 
opportunity to comply before imposing a penalty.
E.  The English Position
As noted above, in England specific performance is a purely equitable 
remedy that will only exceptionally be granted. It has been argued in the 
past that the distinction between the English and Scottish positions is more 
apparent in theory than in practice.17 It has been suggested that the main 
difference in practice is that in Scotland, but not in England, there is a 
presumption in favour of specific implement,18 though the circumstances 
17  See E McKendrick, “Specific Implement and Specific Performance – A Comparison” 
1986 SLT (News) 249; McBryde, Contract (n 7) para 23-09.
18  Walker, Civil Remedies (n 12) 276.
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in which both remedies are likely to be denied, and those where they may 
be granted tend to be similar. A notable exception is keep-open obligations, 
where the landlords’ remedy is still confined to damages, a position 
confirmed by the House of Lords in Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll 
Stores (Holdings) Ltd.19 Interestingly, however, the court made a distinction 
between court orders requiring a defendant to carry on an activity, such 
as running a business, and orders which require him to achieve a result, 
such as the enforcement by specific performance of building contracts and 
repairing obligations.20
The English action is therefore supposedly more restricted in scope 
than the Scottish one, but can, nevertheless, encompass the enforcement 
of repairing obligations. Admittedly, English house tenants are given 
statutory assistance by section 17 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 
which specifically facilitates the use of specific performance to enforce 
repairing obligations against residential landlords. There is no statutory 
equivalent of this in Scotland. Nevertheless, given the wider scope of the 
Scottish remedy indicated in the keep-open cases, it would seem strange if 
it could not be successfully used to enforce repairing obligations.
F.  Keep-open Decrees
If we look at the actual wording of the decrees granted in keep-open cases, 
we find a degree of generality and even vagueness that would never have 
been contemplated under the old law. In Retail Parks Investments the Royal 
Bank was ordered inter alia “to use and occupy the premises as bank offices” 
and to keep them open for business during “all normal business hours.” In 
Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Saxone Ltd21 the defenders were ordered 
“to keep the subjects open as a high class shop” for the sale of “footwear, 
hosiery, and handbags of all descriptions.” In Lord Hamilton’s view the 
expression “high class shop” was “a familiar commercial expression readily 
capable of objective assessment.”22 In Highland and Universal Ltd v Safeway 
Properties Ltd (No 2)23 the expressions “high class retail store” and “normal 
19  [1998] AC 1; [1997] 2WLR 898.
20  1998 AC 1 at 13 per Lord Hoffmann. For a general discussion regarding the competence 
of specific performance to enforce repairing obligations in England, see Rainbow Estates 
Ltd v Tokenhold Ltd and Another [1999] Ch 64.
21  1997 SLT 1052; 1997 SCLR 835.
22  1997 SLT 1052 at 1055.
23  2000 SC 297; 2000 SLT 414
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hours of business” were again held, for the purposes of a decree ad factum 
praestandum, to be sufficiently precise phrases with an easily ascertainable 
meaning. And in Oak Mall Greenock Ltd v McDonald’s Restaurants Ltd24 decree 
was granted ordaining McDonald’s to keep the restaurant in question open 
as “a quick service restaurant for the consumption of food and non-alcoholic 
drink both on and off the Leased Premises.” In applying the guidelines laid 
down in Retail Parks, Lord Drummond Young observed:25
In framing an order for specific implement of a lease or other contract, 
commercial realities must be taken into account. In particular, it must be 
presumed that, when they agreed on the terms of their contract, the parties 
considered the expressions used by them to be sufficiently precise to let 
them know what had to be done. Consequently, if the order for implement 
essentially repeats the provisions of the contract, it is inherently likely that 
the parties will know what [it] means and what must be done to comply 
with its terms. 
Unmoved by the hardship that would be experienced by the McDonald’s 
organisation by having to keep open a restaurant that had been trading 
at a loss for almost four years, his lordship decided that this was not an 
exceptional case where the court should exercise its discretion to refuse 
specific implement.
As already noted in relation to Lord McCluskey’s comments in Retail 
Parks, Lord Drummond Young’s observation could equally apply to the 
repairing obligations owed by many social and private landlords.
G.  Pik Facilitites v Shell UK
In Pik Facilities Ltd v Shell UK Ltd and Another26 a specific implement action to 
enforce a commercial tenant’s repairing obligation failed because the lease 
had ended. However, the case did not fail because of lack of specification or 
precision. Lord Kingarth concluded, though without any great enthusiasm, 
that the pursuers’ pleadings were adequate in this respect. This case is 
significant as it is an isolated example following in the wake of the keep 
open decisions in which an action of specific implement almost succeeded.
24  2003 GWD 17-540.
25  Ibid at para 6.
26  2005 SCLR 958
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H.  Third Party References
Rule 29(2) of the Ordinary Cause Rules for the Sheriff Court provides as 
follows:27
29.2 – Remit to person of skill.
(1) The sheriff may, on a motion by any party or on a joint motion, remit to 
any person of skill, or other person, to report on any matter of fact.
(2) Where a remit under paragraph (1) is made by joint motion or of consent 
of all parties, the report of such person shall be final and conclusive with 
respect to the subject-matter of the remit.
The remit of technical detail to a person of skill has a long history at common 
law, and has been used in the past in order to determine the detailed 
measures required to fulfil repairing obligations in leases. In Barclay v 
Neilson28 the Inner House, finding that the landlord of a farm was obliged 
to carry out such repairs and make such additions as were necessary to 
enable the tenant properly to cultivate the farm according to the terms and 
conditions of the lease, ordered:
Of consent remit to Mr John Dickson, Saughton Mains, to visit the said farm, 
and report to the Court what additions and repairs are necessary for that 
purpose…
In the words of the Lord President:29
I do not think that this is a case for a proof at large, and I take the liberty of 
suggesting that, if neither of the parties have anything to say against it, the 
proper course will be to have the amount of additions and repairs  which 
are necessary to enable the tenant to cultivate the farm in a proper manner 
settled by a remit to a man of skill.
This procedure would therefore appear to have the potential to help get 
round some of the problems of specification involved in framing an action 
ad factum praestandum. However, two difficulties immediately arise, both 
inherent in what was said above.
27  Act of Sederunt (Sheriff Court Ordinary Cause Rules) 1993, SI 1956. For a discussion 
of this procedure see T Welsh (ed), Macphail’s Sheriff Court Practice, 3rd edn (2006) para 
13.27-13.34.
28  (1878) 5 R 909; see also Brock v Buchanan (1851) 13 D 1069.
29  (1878) 5 R 909 at 911 per the Lord President.
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(1) Rule 29(1) makes it absolutely clear that such a remit can only be made 
on matters of fact, and not on questions of law. This principle is also long 
established at common law. In Quin v Gardner & Sons Ltd30 it was held that 
a remit requiring construction of the contract in question was incompetent 
because it involved a question of law. In the context of repairing obligations 
in leases, in was held in McFarlane v Crawford,31 applying Quin, that a crave 
framed in the following terms was incompetent:
to remit to a person of skill (a) to inspect the premises at 19 Duncan Street; 
(b) to report to the Court the present condition thereof, and whether the 
premises are wind and water tight and in good repair and in a proper 
tenantable and habitable state; and (c) if not, what repairs are necessary to 
make the premises thoroughly wind and water tight, and otherwise put 
them into good repair and a proper tenantable and habitable condition…
In the words of Sheriff Welsh:32
[T]he lease being silent as to the obligation of the defenders for the upkeep 
of the premises, the reporter would require to inform himself what the 
common law implied in such circumstances; that is to say, he would require 
to apply his mind to a question of law at the outset of his investigations. 
Having informed himself upon this matter, he would then  require to find 
out the state of the facts. He would next require to apply his mind to the 
construction of the defenders’ legal obligation for upkeep, and consider 
whether that obligation applied to each or all of the matters of fact which he 
so found. In short, the Court is asked to remit a mixed question of law and 
fact, which is, in my opinion, incompetent. The question of the nature and 
extent of the defenders’ obligation for upkeep is a question of law for the 
consideration of the Court. 
Presumably the same objection would apply whatever the source of the 
repairing obligation, whether it involved interpretation of the common law, 
or the construction of a statutory or lease provision.
(2) Under Rule 29(2) a remit is not conclusive unless it is made jointly 
by both parties or with the consent of both. The wording would appear to 
exclude a remit by the sheriff ex proprio motu.33 If made by only one party, 
therefore, the other could object (presumably a likely occurrence) and the 
expert’s findings would not be conclusive. The matter would have to go 
30  (1888) 15 R 776.
31  1919 35 Sh Ct Rep 78; see also Maclagan v Marchbank (1911) 2 SLT 184; (1911) 27 Sh Ct 
Rep 282.
32  McFarlane v Crawford 1919 35 Sh Ct Rep 78 at 79 per Sheriff Welsh.
33  Welsh, Macphail (n 28) para 13.29.
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back to the court for determination, and possibly involve the competing 
testimony of expert witnesses. This is consistent with the decision in 
Barclay v Neilson referred to above. The main issue in that case was whether 
the landlord owed the repairing obligation at all. The court having decided 
that he did, there appeared to be no difficulty with obtaining the consent of 
both parties to the remit.
I.  Specific Performance of Statutory Duty
Section 45 of the Court of Session Act 198834 provides inter alia:
The Court may, on application by summary petition …order the specific 
performance of any statutory duty, under such conditions and penalties 
(including fine and imprisonment, where consistent with the enactment 
concerned) in the event of the order not being implemented, as to the Court 
seem proper.
This Scottish use of the term “specific performance” appears to be distinct 
from specific implement, but to operate in a similar way, though only in 
relation to the enforcement of a statutory duty:35
Those who invoke this remedy must, I think, be careful to aver a clear 
statutory duty which those on whom its performance is incumbent have 
refused, or unduly delayed, to perform; and to state in precise terms the  
order which, by their prayer, is sought from the Court. Such an order is more 
or less equivalent to the English mandamus, as to the nature and application 
of which there is much authority in England. 
There is therefore the same need for precision that was noted above in 
relation to specific implement.36
This procedure could, in theory at least, provide an alternative remedy 
in cases where a repairing obligation is imposed by statute. This excludes 
commercial leases, where such obligations derive from the common law or 
the terms of the lease, but not residential leases where, as we saw above, the 
34  Re-enacting s 91 of the Court of Session Act 1868. The cases quoted below relate to the 
1868 Act. For an example of a petition under the 1988 Act see Magnohard Ltd v United 
Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority 2004 SC 247, 2003 SLT 1083. For a general discussion of 
this remedy see Walker, Civil Remedies (n 12) 271-74.
35  Carlton Hotel Co Ltd v Lord Advocate 1921 SC 237 at 246 per Lord Dundas, 1921 1 SLT 126. 
Regarding the comparison with mandamus, see also Sons of Temperance Friendly Society, 
Petitioners 1926 SC 418 at 426 per Lord President Clyde, 1926 SLT 273.
36  In this regard see also Fleming & Ferguson Ltd v Paisley Magistrates 1942 SC 547 at 557 per 
Lord Cooper; 1948 SLT 457.
248 Enjoying Property
landlords’ repairing obligations largely derive from statute. In particular, it 
might be used to enforce the obligation to provide a house that is wind 
and watertight and in all other respects reasonably fit for human habitation 
at the commencement of the tenancy and to maintain it in that condition 
throughout currency of the lease.37
The procedure has been held to be competent against a local authority,38 
against a friendly society,39 (which arguably could extend to other bodies 
regulated by statute, such as housing associations) and (in the opinion of 
Professor Walker) “against a private person such as an employer who is 
subject to a statutory duty.”40 This last category could presumably also 
extend to private landlords under an assured tenancy and registered social 
landlords other than local authorities or housing associations.
While the availability of this remedy seems worth pointing out, it has 
the obvious disadvantage of only being competent in the Court of Session.41 
It therefore offers no clear advantage over raising an action ad factum 
praestandum in the sheriff court and, as we will see below, in the case of 
private sector residential tenancies the repairing standard enforcement 
order (RSEO) probably remains the best remedy.
J.  Repairing Standard Enforcement Orders (RSEOs)
In relation to private sector residential tenancies only42 the Housing 
(Scotland) Act 2006 introduced the Repairing Standard and set out the 
obligations of landlords regarding compliance with it.43 In addition to the 
requirement to provide and maintain a house that is wind and watertight 
and reasonably fit for human habitation (the “habitability” obligation), 
which is also owed by social landlords and mirrors the common law 
obligation,44 it goes into much more detail about the structure and exterior 
37  Housing (Scotland) Act 2006 ss 13 (1)(a) and 14 (1) (private sector tenancies); Housing 
(Scotland) Act 2001, Sch 4, para 1 (social tenancies).
38  T Docherty Ltd v Monifieth Burgh Council 1970 SC 200, 1971 SLT 13.
39  Sons of Temperance Friendly Society, Petitioners 1926 SC 418, 1926 SLT 273.
40  Walker Civil Remedies (n 12) 272. However, Professor Walker cites no authority in 
support of this view.
41  Court of Session Act 1988 s 51.
42  Mostly assured and short assured tenancies under the Housing (Scotland) Act 1988, 
but also a diminishing number of regulated tenancies under the Rent (Scotland) Act 
1984. For a general description of these and a brief historical background see McAllister 
Leases (n 1) para 17.1-17.4
43  Housing (Scotland) Act 2006 ss 13 and 14.
44  Ibid s 13(1)(a). 
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of the house, sanitary, heating and other installations, the safety of fixtures 
and appliances supplied by the landlord, and fire safety.45
The 2006 Act also provides a statutory mechanism for the enforcement 
of the landlord’s repairing obligations. If a tenant believes that the 
landlord has failed to comply with the repairing standard, he or she can 
apply to the Private Rented Housing Panel (formerly the Rent Assessment 
Panel), whose chairman may refer the matter to a private rented housing 
committee (formerly a rent assessment committee).46 The constitution of 
each private rented housing committee, consisting of a chairman and two 
other members, is determined by the president of the Rent Assessment 
Panel.47 A Committee will usually be made up of a lawyer acting as 
chairperson, a chartered surveyor and a lay member. Lay members come 
from a diverse range of backgrounds and many of them are acknowledged 
experts in housing issues.48
If a committee decides that a landlord has failed to comply with 
the repairing standard, it has the power to issue a repairing standard 
enforcement order (RSEO) requiring the landlord to carry out any necessary 
work and make good any damage caused by it within a reasonable deadline 
of at least 21 days.49 A landlord who fails to comply with an RSEO is guilty 
of an offence and may be subject to a fine.50
It will be noted right away that RSEOs are effectively a statutory form 
of specific implement. It will also be noted that the constitution of a private 
rented housing committee makes it well placed to overcome some of the 
difficulties with specific implement, as it is not only qualified to decide 
questions of law, but also to address problems of specification, effectively 
taking on the role of expert witness.
Since 3 September 2007, when the relevant part of the 2006 Act came 
into force,51 a surprisingly large number of RSEOs have been granted. 
Between that date and 31 October 2014, 1167 decisions by private rented 
housing committees relating to repairs have been reported. 864 of these 
concern breaches of the habitability obligation contained in section 13(1)
45  Housing (Scotland) Act 2006 s13(1)(b)-(f). 
46  Ibid s 22.
47  Rent (Scotland) Act 1984 sch 4, paras 5 and 6 (as amended).
48  See the website of the Private Rented Housing Panel, available at www.prhpscotland.
gov.uk.
49  Housing (Scotland) Act 2006 s 24.
50  Ibid s 28.
51  Ibid (Commencement No. 5, Savings and Transitional Provisions) Order 2007, SSI 270.
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(a) of the Act, the one which also applies to social tenancies and mirrors 
the landlord’s common law obligation. In some of them the committee has 
refused to grant an order, and others deal with matters like the variation of 
an order (usually by extending the deadline), but a large proportion of the 
reports are of orders which have been granted.52
The following is an example of a recent order:53
NOTICE TO
Colin Todd
Whereas in terms of their decision dated 21st May 2014, the Private Rented 
Housing Committee determined that the Landlord has failed to comply 
with the duty imposed by Section 14 (1)(b) of the Housing (Scotland) Act 
2006 and, in particular, that the Landlord has failed to ensure that the 
property is wind and watertight and in all respects reasonably fit for human 
habitation and that installations in the Property for the supply of water, gas 
and electricity and for sanitation, space heating and heating water are in a 
reasonable state of repair and in proper wording order.
The Private Rented Housing Committee now requires the Landlord to 
carry out such work as is necessary for the purposes of ensuring that the 
Property meets the repairing standard and that any damage caused by the 
carrying out of any work in terms of this Order is made good.
In particular the Private Rented Housing Committee requires the following:
1.  The landlord has to ensure that a suitably qualified heating engineer 
inspect the heating system with regard to providing a report on 
whether or not it has sufficient and proper thermostatic control and 
thereafter to comply with any recommendations of the engineer.
2.  The landlord is to ensure that the bath panel and its trim are properly 
fitted.
3.  The landlord is to carry out work to ensure that the front door is wind 
and water tight.
The Private Rented Housing Committee order that these works must be 
carried out and completed within twenty-eight days of the date of service.
A typical report will not only contain the order itself, but will give a detailed 
account of the committee’s determination, including the background of the 
case, a summary of the issues, an account of the evidence, the committee’s 
findings in fact and the reasons for their decision.
52  Reports of the decisions of the private rented housing committees can be found on the 
Panel’s website, available at www.prhpscotland.gov.uk.
53  Cameron v Todd, 21 May 2014, reported at www.prhpscotland.gov.uk.
 Enforcing Repairing Obligations by Specific Implement 251
It is submitted that a landlord receiving such an order, coupled with 
the committee’s detailed account of their decision, will be left in no 
doubt about what is required of him or her in order to avoid incurring a 
penalty. At any rate, any landlord or tenant aggrieved by the decision of a 
private rented housing committee may appeal to the Sheriff by summary 
application within 21 days of being notified of the decision.54 If any such 
appeals have raised substantive legal issues, none of them have made it 
into the casebooks.
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that RSEOs, in sharp contrast with 
their common law counterparts, have been remarkably successful in the 
enforcement of repairing obligations.
K.  Conclusions
Specific implement, as a remedy to enforce repairing obligations in leases, 
has long fallen into disuse because of its long history of failure, mainly due 
to problems of specification and the fear of the unfair imposition of penal 
consequences. For a number of reasons that have been set out above, it is 
submitted that the remedy is worth reconsidering and has the potential to 
be a much more useful tool for both landlords and tenants when enforcing 
repairing obligations. In particular:
(i)  The greater flexibility enabled by the keep-open decisions has 
addressed many of the fears regarding specification and possible 
penal consequences. It is worth pointing out that part of the perceived 
problem with keep-open decrees was not only that they related to a 
large number of actions, but also that these actions extended over a 
lengthy period of time. Repairing obligations present only the first and 
not the second of these difficulties. As Lord Hoffmann pointed out 
in Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd55 (in 
relation to the supposedly more restricted English remedy of specific 
performance) a distinction can be made between court orders requiring 
a defendant to carry on an activity, and those designed to achieve a 
result. And one of the examples which he gave of the latter was the 
enforcement of repairing obligations by specific performance.56
(ii)  The possibility of delegating technical details to a person of skill could 
go some way to addressing any remaining problems of specification, 
54  Housing (Scotland) Act 2006 ss 64(4). 
55  1998] AC 1; [1997] 2WLR 898.
56  1998 AC 1 at 13 per Lord Hoffmann.
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provided that care is taken to confine any such remit to questions of 
fact. Even if the objection of one of the parties prevents the expert’s 
decision being final, the court could nevertheless be given considerable 
assistance in wording a suitable decree.
(iii)  Repairing standard enforcement orders have proved to be a formidable 
tool by means of which private sector residential tenants can compel 
their landlords to carry out necessary repairs. They have operated in 
a similar way to specific implement, without apparently throwing 
up any substantial legal difficulties. The decisions of the private 
rented housing committees (which include legal expertise) have been 
thoroughly documented and their experience could provide valuable 
guidance for the courts in framing decrees ad factum praestandum. 
There seems no reason in theory why social tenants and commercial 
landlords should remain the poor relations.
The greatest potential for the revival of specific implement is probably in 
the case of residential tenants in the social sector, who do not of course 
have recourse to the Private Rented Housing Panel. Problems of disrepair 
in residential property have a long history in social as well has private 
housing, one of the most notorious examples being the severe dampness 
frequently experienced in sub-standard council housing.57 For the tenant of 
such a property, who possibly has limited opportunities to move elsewhere, 
damages alone may not be an adequate remedy, and the ability to compel 
the landlord to carry out repairs could be invaluable.
We noted above the remarks of Lord McCluskey in Retail Parks that 
the defenders were a large commercial organisation that freely undertook 
their obligation with legal advice, and that they had already occupied the 
subjects for the purpose stated in the lease for nearly 20 years without any 
apparent difficulty or misunderstanding. A similar comment could be 
made about social landlords, particularly local authorities and housing 
associations. As well as being large organisations who freely undertook 
their obligations with legal advice, one would expect them normally to have 
extensive experience and expertise in executing repairs. And the meaning 
of “wind and water tight and in all other respects reasonably fit for human 
habitation” (and its common law equivalent) has been thoroughly explored 
in legal precedent, mainly because the statutory formulation is identical to 
its English counterpart, and has been so for more than 100 years.58
57  Problems thoroughly examined in P D Brown and A McIntosh Dampness and the Law 
(1987).
58  See for example the leading English case of Summers v Salford Corporation [1943] AC 283, 
[1943] 1 All ER 68.
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It is also worth pointing out that the model tenancy agreement for 
Scottish secure tenancies recommended by the Scottish Executive59 
elaborates substantially upon the basic habitability obligation prescribed 
by statute, including many of the obligations spelled out in the repairing 
standard introduced for the private sector by the Housing (Scotland) Act 
2006, and also setting out in detail the landlord’s repairing obligations in 
relation to dampness, condensation and mould. In cases where a social 
landlord has adopted this model, therefore, the enforcement rights of 
tenants have been even more strengthened.
Specific implement has perhaps less potential in the case of commercial 
leases. As noted above, the standard commercial lease is the tenant’s FRI 
(full repairing and insuring) lease, by which the landlord’s common law 
repairing obligation has been passed on to the tenant. It is also standard 
for commercial leases to provide that, in the event of the tenant failing 
to carry out repairs, the landlord may step in and carry them out at the 
tenant’s expense. This right also provides the legal justification for the 
landlord presenting an outgoing tenant with a bill for dilapidations. In 
these circumstances, specific implement may not be the most effective and 
convenient remedy. However, there may still be cases where the possibility 
of specific implement may be useful, for example in cases where commercial 
landlords may be short of the funds to carry out the repairs themselves.
In any case, any further development of the common law can only 
enhance the enforcement potential of repairing obligations in all types of 
lease. We have seen above how the development of specific implement 
deriving from the keep-open issues in commercial leases can be applied 
to assist with the enforcement of repairing obligations in residential leases. 
There is no reason why this type of cross-fertilisation could not work in the 
opposite direction, with the result that new precedents in the residential 
sector could establish principles applicable in other areas of lease law. 
Landlords and tenants of commercial and agricultural leases could 
therefore also benefit in the longer term.
As we saw above, specific implement is a primary remedy for breach of 
contract in Scotland, there is a presumption in favour of it being available, 
and the onus is upon the defender in any case to show why it should be 
denied. It is hoped that the above discussion may help to make that onus 
more difficult to overcome.
59  Scottish Executive “Model Scottish Secure Tenancy Agreement” (revised version July 
2002), available at www.scotland.gov.uk/publications.





In his years as a practitioner and as holder of the Chair of Conveyancing at 
Glasgow University, Professor Robert Rennie has served his profession and 
his alma mater with distinction. His contribution to the development of our 
property law is fittingly recognised by the publication of this Festschrift. It is a 
privilege to contribute this essay in honour of my good and esteemed friend. 
In this essay I consider the meaning and effect of the decision of the 
House of Lords in Clydesdale Bank plc v Davidson.1 That decision raised 
two fundamental questions; namely, the nature of the rights of pro indiviso 
proprietors of heritable property and the nature of the tenant’s right in a 
contract of lease. I put forward the following propositions, namely (1) that 
in modern Scots law, on entry or, in the case of a long lease, on registration, 
the tenant in every contract of lease has a right in rem in respect of the 
subjects of let; (2) that on the question of the validity of the lease in that 
case, the Clydesdale Bank case was correctly decided; (3) that the decision 
of the Scottish Land Court in Serup v McCormack,2 being a logical extension 
of that decision, was correctly decided; and (4) that the obiter dicta of the 
judges in the Clydesdale Bank case to the effect that the invalid lease was a 
valid contract for occupation and management of the land were unsound. 
1  1998 SC (HL) 51 (“the Clydesdale Bank case”).
2  2012 SLCR 189.
© Lord Gill, CC BY 4.0 http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0056.13
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B.  The Nature of the Rights of a Pro Indiviso Proprietor
In Magistrates of Banff v Ruthin Castle Ltd3 Lord Justice Clerk Cooper, as he 
then was, eruditely expounded the distinction in Scots law between joint 
ownership, being the class of right typified by the ownership of co-trustees, 
and ownership in common, being the right typified by the ownership of 
two or more persons in whom the right to a single subject has come to be 
vested, each being entitled by his separate act to dispose of his separate 
share. I am concerned in this article with owners in common in the sense 
in which Lord Justice Clerk Cooper used that expression.4 There are three 
defining characteristics of the relationship that governs such owners. 
(1) Unanimity
Since pro indiviso proprietors hold the property in common, there is deemed 
to be unititular possession among them, each having an equal share or 
such proportionate share as they may agree upon.5 The universal rule of 
common ownership is that there must be unanimity in decision-making 
affecting the subjects. This principle is based on the Roman law.6 Bell 
recognised that that was the law,7 but he advocated a principle of majority-
based decision making.8 That idea failed to find favour in the courts. In 
the Clydesdale Bank case Lord Clyde described it as “somewhat delphic” 
and as being “unilluminated by authority.”9 But in the context of this essay 
that is a side issue, since Bell insisted that there had to be unanimity in 
the granting of leases.10 That has been the consistent view of the courts. It 
is now beyond question that a single pro indiviso proprietor cannot grant 
a lease that would be binding on singular successors.11 Each individual 
proprietor has an effective veto, unless by contract he renounces it, on any 
proposed act of management with which he disagrees. 
3  1944 SC 36.
4  Magistrates of Banff (n 3) at p 68.
5  Cf K G C Reid, “Property,” in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol 18 
(1993) paras 22-34. 
6  J Inst 3.27.3; C 10.35.2.
7  Bell, Principles §1072.
8  Ibid §1077.
9  Clydesdale Bank (n 1) at 61.
10  Bell, Principles §1075.
11  Campbell and Stewart v Campbell Fac Coll 24 January 1809; Morrison, Petr (1857) 20 D 276; 
cf Bell’s Exrs v Inland Revenue 1986 SC 252. 
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(2) Use
Each proprietor is entitled to make use of every inch of the property. 
Therefore, no single pro indiviso proprietor may take exclusive possession 
of any part of the property unless the others consent.12 If the land is 
let, each proprietor is entitled to a share of the rents.13 No individual 
proprietor may obtain an excessive benefit at the expense of the other 
proprietors without prior agreement.14 If he does so, he must account 
to them for the ordinary profits accruing to him from the period of his 
possession. 
Nevertheless, the proprietors may validly agree inter se that the subjects 
will be possessed by one or more of their number. It is then a matter 
for agreement on what terms the occupying proprietor will occupy the 
subjects.15 In such a contract, it is open to the proprietors to agree that in 
return for having sole and exclusive possession, the occupying proprietor 
will make a compensatory payment to the others.16
(3) Division and sale
In a relationship of the kind considered in the Clydesdale Bank case each of 
the pro indiviso proprietors can rely on the rule nemo in communione invitus 
detineri potest, a rule said by Lord Jauncey to be justified by considerations 
of public policy. The dissatisfied proprietor has no right to evict a 
co-proprietor from the subjects. His only remedy is the drastic remedy of 
the action of division and sale, which is derived from the Roman actio de 
communi dividundo. The right of each proprietor to enforce this remedy is 
absolute.17 In an action of division and sale the court may order that the 
subjects should be divided up rateably or, if that is impracticable, that 
they should be sold and the proceeds divided.18 
12  Bailey v Scott (1860) 22 D 1105, Lord Benholme at 1109.
13  Erskine, Principles 3.3.56; Bell, Principles §1072.
14  George Watson’s Hospital Governors v Cormack (1883) 11 R 320.
15  Price v Watson 1951 SC 359.
16  Price (n 15), Lord Keith at 366.
17  Brock v Hamilton (1857) 19 D 701 at 703; Banff Magistrates v Ruthin Castle Ltd 1944 SC 36, 
Lord Justice-Clerk Cooper at 68.
18  Brock (n 17) Lord Rutherford at 702-03.
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C.  The Decision in Clydesdale Bank Plc v Davidson
In the Clydesdale Bank case the central question for the House of Lords was 
whether pro indiviso proprietors could grant a valid lease to one of their 
number.
The appellant was one of three pro indiviso proprietors of a tract of 
agricultural land. All three entered into a contract that purported to be a 
lease by which the other two let the land to the appellant. A month later, 
all three granted a standard security in favour of the Bank over part of 
the property. Some years later, they granted a further standard security 
over the rest of the property. The standard securities were granted in 
consideration of loans to the appellant only. When the appellant defaulted, 
the Bank enforced the securities and raised an action of removing against 
him. The appellant defended the action on the plea that he had a protected 
agricultural tenancy. 
A straightforward resolution of the case was set out by Lord Jauncey 
to the following effect. At the date of the purported lease the appellant 
enjoyed a real right in the subjects entitling him to possess them jointly 
with the other pro indiviso proprietors. The contract concluded on that 
date neither superseded nor altered that real right. It conferred on the 
appellant a personal right to enforce the obligation by his co-proprietors 
to refrain from exercising their rights to joint possession in return for the 
compensatory payments. When the contract ceased to have effect, the 
appellant’s right to possession qua proprietor would continue unchanged 
but his co-proprietors would no longer be disabled from jointly exercising 
their possessory rights. The contract was not a lease.19 
Lord Clyde and Lord Hope concurred in holding that on general 
principles of contract a body of pro indiviso proprietors cannot grant a valid 
lease to one of their number. In doing so they adopted the reasoning of 
Lord Justice Clerk Ross in the court below, which was based on the view 
that a party cannot be both creditor and debtor in the same obligation, 
and that the purported lease could not validly confer on the appellant 
the subordinate right in rem of tenancy in respect of land over which he 
enjoyed the pre-eminent right of ownership. 
19  Clydesdale Bank (n 1) at 54.
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D.  Serup v McCormack
A similar issue has since been considered by the Scottish Land Court in 
Serup v McCormack.20 In that case a tenant who had a valid lease of an 
agricultural holding became one of the pro indiviso proprietors of the 
subjects of let during the course of the lease. Some years later she conveyed 
her pro indiviso share to a partnership in which she was one of the partners. 
The Land Court’s general conclusion was that on the tenant’s becoming a 
pro indiviso proprietor, all of the considerations relied on by the Inner House 
and by the House of Lords in the Clydesdale Bank case applied. Therefore 
the lease then became invalid. Distinguishing the principle that applies in 
the case of a servitude21 the Land Court held that when the former tenant 
thereafter divested herself of her pro indiviso share in the subjects, the lease 
was not thereby resuscitated. 
On the first point, the Land Court was clearly right in interpreting the 
Clydesdale Bank decision as it did and in following it. The considerations 
that in the Clydesdale Bank case invalidated the lease at the outset had the 
same effect when they arose during its currency. In particular, on the 
tenant’s acquiring pro indiviso ownership, the greater right of ownership 
absorbed and extinguished the lesser right of tenancy22 and the now pro 
indiviso proprietor thereupon became immune from eviction at the hands 
of his fellow proprietors.23 On the second point, the lease, when entered 
into, was a valid lease of an agricultural holding that conferred on the 
tenant security of tenure by statutory relocation on the expiry of the 
contractual term;24 restricted the landlord’s opportunities to serve notice to 
20  2012 SLCR 189. 
21  In relation to the distinction, the court said this: “We accept that there is a tract of 
authority which would support the view that a servitude should not be regarded as 
extinguished by operation of confusion except in the case of a sole proprietor coming 
into possession of both dominant and servient tenements in the same capacity. It 
may well be that, in relation to servitudes, the position is different where there are 
co-proprietors. But we are satisfied that nothing in the material relating to servitudes 
can prevail by analogy against the direct weight to be given to the views expressed in 
the context of leases in the Clydesdale Bank case.” (Serup v McCormack (n 20) at para 44)
22  Clydesdale Bank (n 1) Lord Clyde at 61A-B.
23  Price (n 15).
24  Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1949 (the 1949 Act), s 3 (which applied at the date 
of the lease) and Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1991 (the 1991 Act, s 3) (which 
applied when the lease was extinguished).
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quit;25 and created the prospect that the tenancy could be continued under 
the same statutory provisions in the hands of an acquirer after the tenant’s 
death.26 These considerations plainly ruled out the idea that the tenancy 
was not extinguished but instead went into a state of suspended animation 
in which it would remain until the uncertain day when the tenant should 
cease to be a pro indiviso proprietor. 
E.  The Personal Right Theory
Catherine Bury and Douglas Bain have recently published a stimulating 
article in which they question the soundness of the Clydesdale Bank decision 
and advance a theory that a lease that does not confer a right in rem upon 
the tenant may nevertheless be validly constituted among pro indiviso 
proprietors.27 They describe this as the “non-real personal lease.”28 They 
argue that since the House of Lords accepted in the Clydesdale Bank case that 
the contract was a valid contract between the proprietors for the occupation 
and management of the land by one of their number, that contract should 
have been recognised as in substance a personal lease. Such a lease 
qualifies as a lease to which the agricultural holdings legislation applies 
and should therefore have been held to confer the security of tenure that 
was unsuccessfully claimed by the appellant. I shall refer to this as “the 
alternative theory.” 
In briefest outline the conclusion of the alternative theory is that it is not 
necessarily a requirement for the protection of the Agricultural Holdings 
(Scotland) Act 1991 that the lease should confer a real right. Therefore, 
a contract of the kind considered by the House of Lords to be a valid 
occupation and management contract may qualify as a personal lease that 
is protected under the 1991 Act. 
This theory therefore raises the two fundamental questions to which 
I have referred. On the first, the essential issues are whether, despite the 
Leases Act 1449, the common law personal lease survives in Scots law; 
and, if so, whether it can attract the protection of the agricultural holdings 
legislation. On the second question, the essential issue is whether, although 
the contract in the Clydesdale Bank case did not confer on the purported 
25  1949 Act, ss 24-27;1991 Act, s 21.
26  Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, s 16.
27  C Bury and D Bain, “A, B and C to A, Revisited” 2013 Juridical Review 77.
28  Bury and Bain (n 27), 82-86.
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tenant the right in rem of tenancy, since he already had a right in rem as 
a proprietor, the contract was nonetheless a valid contract the effect of 
which was to confer on the appellant a personal lease, and in consequence 
the protection of the agricultural holdings legislation. The success of the 
alternative theory depends on there being favourable answers to both 
questions.
F.  The Nature of the Tenant’s Right in the Contract of 
Lease
(1) The common law
The common law adopted the general principle of the Roman law that the 
right of the lessee in the contract locatio conductio was prestable against the 
lessor, but not against a subsequent owner. The locus classicus in Stair is as 
follows:29
A tack of itself is no more than a personal contract of location, whereby land, 
or any other thing having profit or fruit, is set to the tacksman for enjoying 
the fruit or profit thereof, for a hire, which is called the tack-duty; which 
therefore did only oblige the setter and his heirs, to make it effectual to the 
tacksman, but did not introduce any real right, affecting the thing set, and 
carried therewith to singular successors; but so soon as the thing set ceased 
to be the setter’s, the tack could only defend the tenant till the next term of 
removing.
At common law, therefore, the lessee had only a right of action against 
the lessor and his representatives to be maintained in possession for the 
duration of the lease. Since feudal law did not allow a right in land to be 
effectual against singular successors of the proprietor without sasine, the 
tenant had no protection against them and could be removed from the 
tenancy with ease. 
In that state of the law, conveyancers attempted to secure the tenant’s 
vulnerable position in relation to a singular successor of the landlord by 
drawing on the analogy of sasine and conferring on the tenant a simulated 
form of infeftment for the purpose of creating a real right. This procedure 
is described with derision by Paton and Cameron as a “specious form of 
29  Stair, Inst 2.9.1-2; 1.15.4. The first edition is to similar effect cf Stair, Inst (1st ed) 1.29.1-2.
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charter and sasine.”30 It was not, and could not be, a true infeftment since 
the tenant’s right was that of temporary occupation only.31 
(2) The emergence of the right in rem
The Leases Act 1449
The Leases Act 1449 was passed with the specific purpose of correcting the 
weakness in the law that left the agricultural tenant defenceless to removal 
by a singular successor of the landlord. 
The Act, in the Glendook version quoted by Rankine,32 provided as 
follows:33
It is ordained for the safetie and favour of the puir people that labouris the 
ground, that they, and all utheris that hes taken or sall take landes in time 
to cum fra lordes, and hes termes and zeires thereof, that suppose the lordes 
sell or annaly that land or landes, the takers sall remaine with their tackes, 
unto the ischew of their termes, quhais handes that ever thay landes cum to 
for siklike maill as they tooke them for.
Although the Act was introduced at the instance of James II to remedy the 
injustice of the eviction of labourer tenants at the will of the landlord, its 
scope was not limited to the “puir people that labouris the ground.” It 
extended to “all utheris.” 
30  G C H Paton and J G S Cameron, The Law of Landlord and Tenant in Scotland (1967) 3.
31  “Of old, it was usual to sanction the right of the tenant by infeftment, and by that means 
he held under the real right of infeftment what is now held by mere acquisition of the 
subject” (Hamilton v Hamilton (1845) 8 D 308, Lord Jeffrey at 312).
32  A Treatise on the Law of Leases in Scotland, 3rd edn (1916) 132.
33  Leases Act 1449. In Mountain’s Trs v Mountain 2013 SC 202, the First Division preferred 
the text given in the Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707, namely
“Item it is ordanit and statute that for the saueritie and favour of the pure pupil that 
laubouris the grunde that thai and al uthiris that has takyn or sal tak landis in tym 
to cum fra lordis and has termes and yeris tharof, that suppose the lordis sel or analy 
thai landis, that the takaris sall remain with thare takis one to the ische of thare termez 
quhais handis at evir thai landis cum to for sic lik male as thai tuk thaim of befor.”
A modern version of the text is as follows: 
“For the security and benefit of those who work upon the land, it is decreed that they 
and anyone else who have rented or who shall rent lands from landlords for a fixed 
term shall remain entitled under their leases until the ish [termination date] thereof, 
nowithstanding that their landlord has sold or alienated the land, and irrespective of 
the identity of the transferee of the land, for the same amount of rent as was initially 
agreed.” (Hugo and Simpson, “Lease” in Zimmermann, Visser and Reid (eds), Mixed 
Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland and South 
Africa (2005) 307.
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In the Ius Feudale, Craig interprets the 1449 Act as having conferred on 
the tenant a real right:34 
Again, a covenant sometimes appears in a tack whereby the lessor undertakes 
that he will not remove the tenant from his holding. Such a covenant is 
however personal to the lessor who enters into it; and although the original 
grantor of the tack (being owner of the subject at the time he granted it) is 
bound by his obligation not to remove the tenant, the covenant loses its 
force on a change of ownership and cannot be enforced against a singular 
successor. As has been seen, the opposite rule applies to a tack covenanted 
to endure for a fixed term of years, for such a tack confers a real right on the 
tenant and affects the subject itself, especially when (as I have explained) 
possession has followed upon it. 
Stair,35 Erskine36 and Bell37 are to the same effect. Bankton is to similar 
effect;38 but Kames adheres to the view that a tack is a mere personal right 
that was not made real by the 1449 Act.39
Mackenzie describes the effect of the Act in the following way:40
Tacks which before this Act were only personal rights are by this Act 
made real rights … Possession is the same thing to tacks that sasines are to 
alienations: and of old some tacks had sasines or instruments of possession: 
but neither was necessary nor is now usual. And the reason why they used 
sasines then, being to make the tack real, and to defend against singular 
successors; this was no more used after the Act of Parliament by which 
possession makes a tack a real right.
In consequence of the 1449 Act the practice of taking sasine on a lease fell 
into disuse in the 15th century. Mackenzie’s confident interpretation of the 
Act goes to the heart of the matter. 
The nineteenth century controversy 
The words of Sir George Mackenzie are a useful preface to the controversy 
that preoccupied the Court of Session as to the effect of the 1449 Act on the 
nature of the tenant’s right. In the early nineteenth century the nature of 
34  Ius Feudale, 2.10.9 (trans Lord Clyde (1934)).
35  Stair, Inst (1st edn), 2.9.4 and 7. 
36  Erskine, Inst 2.6.25. 
37  Bell, Principles §1177.
38  Bankton, Institute, 2.9 (1752).
39  H H Kames, Elucidations respecting the Common and Statute Law of Scotland (1777) 8-9.
40  G Mackenzie, The Works of that Eminent and Learned Lawyer, Sir George Mackenzie of 
Rosehaugh (1716) vol 1, 188-89.
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the tenant’s right became the subject of judicial controversy in the context 
of commercial leases.41 The controversy was precipitated by the attempt 
by conveyancers to secure a debt over the debtor’s tenancy by having the 
debtor assign the tenancy to the creditor and by the creditor’s granting a 
sub-tenancy to the debtor. If the debtor’s tenancy conferred only a right 
in personam under such an arrangement, the assignation would effectively 
transfer the lease to the creditor upon intimation of it to the landlord; 
whereas if the tenancy conferred a right in rem, the creditor’s right to the 
tenancy would be perfected only upon his taking possession. 
At that stage, the preponderant view of the writers was that the 1449 
Act conferred a real right of tenancy.42 In a lecture prepared for delivery 
in 1821-1822 Baron Hume described the far-reaching effects of the statute. 
Having expounded the principle that the lease, in its native and proper 
character, is a matter of personal contract, he describes the lease as a sort 
of estate or real interest in the tenant. This, he says, is a new and foreign 
character bestowed by the 1449 Act and is the oldest ordinance to that 
purpose in the law of any country of Europe.43
Inglis v Paul
Inglis v Paul44 brought the controversy into the open. In that case a sub-
tenant assigned his sub-tenancy to a bank in security of a cash-credit. 
Two days later, the assignation was intimated to the principal tenant, but 
not to the sub-sub-tenant who occupied part of the subjects. The bank 
did not enter into possession. About two years later, the sub-tenant was 
sequestrated. The bank thereupon intimated the assignation to the tenants 
of the property and required that they should pay the rents to the bank. 
Thereafter the trustee was elected and was granted decree of adjudication. 
The resulting competition between the assignee of the sub-lease, who had 
failed to take possession of the subjects, and the sub-tenant’s trustee in 
sequestration was considered by the whole court. 
41  The principal cases on the point and the origins of the Registration of Leases (Scotland) 
Act 1857 were usefully reviewed by W Guy, “Registration of Leases” (1908-1909) 20 
Juridical Review 234, 239.
42  J Balfour, Practicks (1754) 200; Craig, Jus feudale 2.10.2-10; Stair, Inst 2.9.2; Mackenzie, 
Institutions 2.6.5 and Observations 37; Erskine, Inst 2.6.23; Bankton, Institute 2.9.1; W 
Ross, Lectures on the practice of law in Scotland (1792) vol 2, 476; Bell, Commentaries 1.65.
43  G Campbell H Paton (ed), Baron David Hume’s Lectures 1786-1822: Volume IV (1952) 73.
44  (1829) 7 S 469.
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The view of Lord Justice Clerk Boyle and seven other judges on the 
point was as follows:45
The rule of law is, that rights are completed by delivery. In feudal subjects, 
this is accomplished by sasine or symbolical delivery; and in subjects which 
do not admit of sasine, by giving natural or civil possession. Tacks, in one 
respect, are personal; and in another, real rights. In a question between the 
landlord and the tenant or his assignees, they are personal rights; therefore, 
in a competition between two bona fide and onerous assignees, the landlord is 
bound to prefer him who first intimates his assignation (which is the way of 
completing a personal right) and to put him in possession accordingly. But, 
in a question with the singular successors of the landlord and the tenant or 
his assignee, a tack is a real right by force of the statute of 1449; and therefore 
it is incomplete, unless possession, natural or civil, has been attained. 
Lord Balgray agreed that the bank’s case failed for want of possession. He 
accepted that until possession followed on the assignation of the lease, 
the title of the assignee was not secure; but he rejected the idea that the 
assignation was not perfected by intimation to the landlord, but only by 
possession. Assignation of the lease, although quite complete as to title, 
might be defeated and disappointed by allowing the cedent to remain in 
possession. The assignee thereby exposed his right to danger and risk. But 
in the view of Lord Balgray, the question was not what was necessary to 
complete the assignee’s right to the tenancy. The decision depended on 
different principles. This was his view:46
It was constantly to be kept in mind, that a lease by the law of Scotland 
was nothing but a personal right. It was a bona fide contract for the use of 
land or other subject, as laid down by the civil law. It was very true that the 
Scotch act 1449 bestowed, from public utility, a peculiar privilege on those 
who held leases of heritable subjects, that they should be protected in the 
possession of their subjects against all persons till the contract expired, if 
they were in the actual possession. This was an exception from the general 
rule, and a privilege bestowed; but it altered not the nature of the right. 
To say that a lease is a real right, is a most egregious mistake in point of 
law. No doubt it is effectual against singular successors, and it descends to 
heirs; but this arises from other extrinsic and adventitious circumstances, 
totally distinct from the true legal nature of the right. Being a personal right, 
a lease naturally becomes the subject of assignation; and that assignation 
is perfected by intimation to the landlord or author from whom it flows, 
45  Inglis (n 44) at 473.
46  Ibid at 474.
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or acknowledgment by them, provided always he has originally bestowed 
the right of conveyance. Abstractly, therefore, the assignation of a lease is 
perfected, and must be perfected, by intimation to the landlord. It requires 
intimation to no other human being. So much is this the case, that suppose 
a number of intimations were made to a landlord, and it is required of him 
to give possession, he is bound to deliver it to the first intimated assignation. 
No authority can be pointed out in the law of Scotland to the contrary.
In this view Lord Balgray was supported by his First Division colleagues 
Lord Craigie and Lord Gillies, who expressly dissented from the majority 
view that the assignee acquired right to the tenancy of the subjects only by 
taking possession.47 
Brock v Cabbell
A year later the point came up again in Brock v Cabbell48 and was considered 
by a court of 15 judges including all 12 of the judges who had taken part in 
Inglis v Paul. The point arose in similar circumstances. The tenant granted 
an assignation of the tenancy in security to a bank. The assignation was 
intimated to the landlord. The bank thereupon sub-let the subjects to the 
former tenant who remained in possession and paid the rents. The bank at 
no time thereafter entered into possession. The competition was between 
the bank and the trustee in bankruptcy of the former tenant. In that context, 
the lease controversy inevitably returned. 
The Lord President and five judges, four of whom had been in the majority 
in Inglis v Paul, gave the majority opinion. It begins in uncompromising 
terms:49
It is a general rule in the law of Scotland, that possession, natural or civil, is 
necessary to complete the transference of a real right. A tack is a real right, 
by force of the statute 1449, in a question been assignees and adjudgers 
from the tenant; and to that case, therefore, the general rule applies. This is 
vouched by the concurrent authority of every institutional writer, and by an 
uninterrupted series of decisions for more than two centuries.
Lord Fullerton concluded that the lease became:50
... in virtue of the statute 1449 a real right, a character uniformly assigned to 
it by our institutional writers and confirmed by a series of decisions which 
it is impossible now to disturb.
47  Inglis (n 44) at 474.
48  (1830) 8 S 647.
49  Brock (n 48) at 652.
50  Ibid at 661.
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The conclusion of the majority was that since the bank had never taken 
possession of the land after the assignation, the assignation/sub-tenancy 
arrangement was “a collusive device to create a latent security over a real 
right, without change of possession.”51
Lord Gillies again allied himself with Lord Balgray, concurring in the 
result advocated by the majority but challenging the general propositions 
that I have quoted. Their position was succinctly expressed as follows:52
We consider a lease to be a right of an anomalous nature. Its creation and its 
transmission are to be regulated as if it were, what it truly is, a personal right. 
We, therefore, cannot affirm that it is the law of Scotland that an assignation 
of a lease duly intimated is per se an imperfect right, unless followed by 
natural or civil possession.
The usually taciturn Lord Craigie delivered an erudite opinion, lengthy by 
the standards of the day, that has not attracted academic attention. In it the 
true point of division clearly emerges. The opinion gives us an insight into 
the mind of a conveyancer who, even four centuries after the 1449 Act, was 
still influenced by the spirit of the Roman law. 
Lord Craigie’s opening statement makes his position clear. He quotes 
the 1449 Act and immediately concludes from the wording of it as follows:53
Thus it appears, 1. That, by the common law, the landlord or proprietor of 
lands could not effectually grant a lease to endure beyond the period of his 
right. 2. That the extension of the right of the tenant by positive statute, and 
in express deviation from the common law, is confined to the case of buyers 
or singular successors in the property of the lands.
He then makes the claim that that is how in practice the 1449 Act has been 
understood. He cites three cases in which the tenant’s right does not prevail 
against third parties who acquire the landlord’s interest; namely where the 
land falls into the hands of the superior by virtue of a feudal casualty; or 
in the case of a lease granted by a wadsetter when the right of reversion 
has been exercised; and in the case where the right of the lessor has been 
set aside. In all of these cases, he says, the current leases flowing from the 
landlord are of no effect for ensuring possession to the lessee.
At this point, Lord Craigie has to face the fact that nearly all of the 
writers take a different view. This is his untroubled response:54
51  Brock (n 48) at 653.
52  Ibid.
53  Ibid at 654.
54 Ibid.
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It is the more necessary to attend to this, because in many of the books of 
authority there are expressions from which it has been inferred, that, by the 
statute, leases had become real rights, and that they could not in any case be 
effectual to third parties, unless followed with natural and actual possession. 
The very opposite proposition, as it humbly appears to me, is the true one.
Lord Craigie then emphasises that, properly speaking, a lessee of lands 
has no right to the lands. He has only a right of possession. Therefore his 
possession must be governed by the properly attested agreements between 
those who have an interest in it.55 
As matters stood after 1830, the clear division of opinion on the 
controversy had been resolved in favour of the strong majority view that 
the right of the lessee was a real right. In that respect, the court was at one 
with the writers. After Brock v Cabbell the real right theory was not to be 
challenged for nearly forty years. 
By 1838, the Third Report of the Law Commissioners in Scotland, of 
whom George Joseph Bell was one, expressed the view that the law 
respecting the effect of the 1449 Act on the rights of singular successors in 
the land was well settled by the statute and by a long series of decisions 
making the possession of the tenant serve the purpose of sasine on the lease, 
to the effect of conferring a real right independently of any record.56 The 
Law Commissioners recommended57 that it should be possible for a tenant 
to create a security over his lease by an assignation that would be recorded 
in a public register, the register being a form of publication that would make 
the creditor’s security effectual.58 In due course the Registration of Leases 
(Scotland) Act 1857 provided that the registration of a long lease, would 
make the tenant’s right valid against singular successors of the landlord,59 
the act of registration having the same effect as entry into possession 
had been held to have in the case law;60 and that on being recorded the 
55  We can leave the opinion at this point because his Lordship then turns to questions of 
assignation. 
56  Third Report of the Commissioners, Conveyancing 13 January 1838 (HMSO: London) 
xl. The report also states in more general terms not limited to agricultural leases, that 
“in order to the constitution of a real right in land, or other heritable subject, whether 
absolute, conditional, irredeemable, or in security, the law requires symbolic delivery 
of possession, or sasine, as it was termed, of which the only evidence is an instrument 
prepared and authenticated by a notary-public.”(ibid, xxiii)
57  Commissioners, Conveyancing (n 56), 52.
58  Ibid.
59  1857 Act, s 2.
60  Ibid, s 16.
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assignation of the lease in security constituted a “real security” over the 
lease.61
In 1845 the real right issue arose obliquely in Hamilton v Hamilton62 
in relation to an agricultural lease that did not contain a conventional 
irritancy. The question was whether the landlord could nevertheless 
irritate the lease for the tenant’s failure to implement certain obligations 
ad factum praestandum. In finding against the landlord on that point, two of 
the majority judges, Lord Mackenzie and Lord Jeffrey, expressly relied on 
the consideration that the tenant had acquired a real right by entering into 
possession of the land. They held that such a right could be terminated by 
irritancy only where the irritancy was expressly warranted by a statutory 
or a conventional provision. 
In 1867 in Campbell v McKinnon63 Lord Kinloch in the Outer House took 
the view that a lease conferred only a personal right. The Inner House 
overturned his judgment. In the leading opinion Lord Curriehill described 
the principle that possession under a lease conferred real rights on the 
tenant as “trite law.”64 The judgment of the Inner House was affirmed by 
the House of Lords,65 where Lord Westbury said that the effect of the 1449 
Act was that upon entry to the land the lessee’s right became real.66
Only a year later, the question arose again in Edmond v Reid.67 In that 
case an agricultural tenant was bound by a residence clause. She indicated 
her intention not to reside on the farm. There was no irritancy clause in the 
lease. The landlord concluded for declarator of the existence of the tenant’s 
obligation to reside and, if the tenant should fail to reside, for decree that 
she had forfeited all right to possession of the farm. 
The action was defended on the ground inter alia that the landlord 
was not entitled to a declarator of forfeiture since there was no irritancy 
clause to support it. In pursuing that defence, counsel relied on Hamilton v 
Hamilton68 for the submission that “a lease was a real right. Non-residence 
did not create an irritancy, and there was no conventional irritancy.”69 On 
being pressed by the court to make her intentions clear, the tenant lodged a 
61  1857 Act, s 4.
62  (1845) 8 D 308.
63  1867 5 M 636 at 644.
64  Campbell (n 63) at 649. 
65  sub nom Campbell v McLean (1870) 8 M (HL) 40.
66  Campbell (n 63) at 46.
67  (1871) 9 M 782.
68  Hamilton (n 30).
69  Edmond (n 66) at 783
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minute that was construed as a judicial declaration that she would not fulfil 
the residence condition. 
In the leading opinion, Lord Justice Clerk Moncreiff took the line that 
the landlord was not seeking declarator of irritancy at all, because the 
conclusions were “entirely for the future” and related solely to the effect 
of a subsequent refusal by the tenant to fulfil the conditions of the lease. 
He then turned to the real right issue. He said that he did not question the 
“doctrine” in Hamilton v Hamilton70 that a lease conferred a real right on the 
tenant; but in his view the lease was nevertheless a mutual contract and 
was subject to the principle that no-one could take the benefit of the lease 
and at the same time repudiate its conditions. He followed the decision in 
Drummond71 where the court had held that although a residence clause was 
not fenced with a power of irritancy, the contract would necessarily come 
to an end if the tenant should put it out of his power to fulfil the conditions 
of the lease. On that point, the Lord Justice Clerk relied on Hamilton v 
Hamilton in holding that the tenant’s declared inability or unwillingness to 
fulfil the lease constituted a renunciation. 
The other three judges concurred in the result; but the submission for 
the tenant, and the Lord Justice Clerk’s support for the decision in Hamilton 
v Hamilton, provoked Lord Cowan and Lord Neaves. While both were 
content to decide the case on the basis of the tenant’s declared intention not 
to observe the residence clause, neither was prepared to accede to the real 
right theory. Lord Cowan put the matter as follows:72
The argument of the defender was founded on a fallacy. He said a lease 
was a real right, and to be assimilated to a feu-right. That is not its nature. A 
contract of lease is a mutual contract, and although, under the statute 1449, 
with some of the privileges of a real right, it does not substantially differ 
from a mutual contract.
Lord Neaves’ view was as follows:73
The defenders’ counsel was in error when he argued that a lease was the 
same in character as a feu-contract. It is no doubt an heritable contract, on 
account of its being for a tract of future time. That is a totally different matter 
from its being a real right. 
70  Hamilton (n 31).
71  1806, Mor app Tack, No 6.
72  Edmond (n 67) at 785.
73  Ibid.
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The Act of 1449 was for the benefit of the poor people who laboured the 
ground. It prevented the vendees of the lessor from turning out the lessee. It 
declares the right followed by possession to have that effect, but that is not 
making it, properly speaking, a real right.
These dicta are the starting point for the alternative theory.
A decade later, in his Lectures on Conveyancing,74 Montgomerie Bell 
concluded that leases at an early period were raised to the position of real 
rights, conferring a title of possession preferable to that of purchasers and 
creditors whose rights were subsequent to the date when possession was 
taken under the lease.75 
(3) Twentieth century developments
The state of the law on the nature of the tenant’s right in the early twentieth 
century is summarised in Rankine’s conclusion that leases, originally and 
in their nature merely personal contracts, were in certain cases converted 
into real rights by the 1449 Act “as liberally construed by the Court.”76 That 
can fairly be said to be the starting point for the modern expositions of the 
law on the nature of the tenant’s right. 
The question arose again in 1949 in Millar v McRobbie.77 In December 
1947 the then proprietors of an arable farm granted the defender a 14-year 
lease with entry at Whitsunday 1948. The lease conditions provided for 
the customary sequence of handover arrangements by which the incoming 
tenant would have access to parts of the land from 1 March 1948 for the 
purpose of sowing and by which, in due course, the tenant would have 
access after his waygoing to reap his final crop. Thereafter the landlords 
sold the farm to the pursuer with entry at 29 February 1948. The defender 
duly took access to the land under green crop between late March and early 
May and during that period prepared and sowed the ground. The pursuer 
then had the defender interdicted from entering on the land on the plea that 
the lease was not binding on him as a singular successor of the landlords, 
the defender not having taken entry to the land in terms of the lease. 
74  M Bell, Lectures on Conveyancing, 3rd edn, vol 2 (1882).
75  Bell, Lectures (n 74) 1197.
76  Rankine, Leases, 3rd edn (n 32) 132. This is the authoritative edition published in 
February 1916.
77  1949 SC 1.
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In the appeal of the defender to the Inner House, counsel for the defender 
did not argue that his right in personam against the former proprietor 
was good against the singular successor. Instead, he argued that he had 
been in possession of part of the land from March onwards and that that 
limited possession was sufficient to confer on him the protection of the 
1449 Act. The First Division refused the appeal by distinguishing between 
the possession that would have followed from entry at the specified date 
and the anticipatory or deferred occupation of certain parts of the land by 
which the agricultural cycle was maintained.78 
The significance of this case is that it established that the theory that the 
tenant has a right in rem, and that the right is made effective by the taking 
of possession, was firmly part of the law of Scotland. That is clear in Lord 
President Cooper’s opening statement:79
It has been well settled for centuries that possession under a lease is the 
equivalent of sasine in relation to feudal property. Without possession 
the tenant is merely the personal creditor of the lessor. By entering into 
possession the lessee publishes to the world in general, and to singular 
successors in particular, the fact of his lease, and since the practice of taking 
sasine on a tack fell into disuse in the 15th century, no substitute has been 
recognised by our law for possession except registration of long leases 
under the Act of 1857.
In view of the classic statement of Lord Kinloch in Wight v Earl of Hopetoun80 
which was affirmed by the House of Lords,81 that a lease of that kind ran from 
Whitsunday to Whitsunday, notwithstanding handover arrangements, the 
decision in Millar v McRobbie was inevitable. It is significant however that 
neither the arguments of counsel nor the opinions of the judges make any 
reference at all to the nineteenth century controversy.
The decision in the Clydesdale Bank case further affirmed that the tenant’s 
entry into possession conferred the real right.82
78  Lord President Cooper at 6-8.
79  Millar (n 77) at 6.
80  (1863) 1 M 1074 at 1099. 
81  Wight v Earl of Hopetoun (1864) 2 M (HL) 35.
82  In the most recent consideration of the 1449 Act and of s 85(1) of the 1991 Act, the 
First Division took that proposition for granted (Mountain’s Trs v Mountain 2013 SC 202, 
Lord President Gill at para [10]).
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G.  Conclusions
(1) The personal right theory
Two influences underlay the minority view in this extended controversy. 
First, the Roman law in which a lease of land, as part of the wider contract of 
hire, conferred on the lessee only a right in personam against the lessor; and 
second, the strict feudal theory on which sasine endowed the proprietor 
with rights of ownership that were valid against all comers. 
The essence of the argument for those judges who held to the personal 
right theory was simple. The tenant under the Roman contract locatio 
conductio had a right in personam, against the lessor only, to be maintained 
in possession. The purpose of the 1449 Act was to protect the tenant against 
removal by the landlord’s singular successor. On that view, there was an 
interpretation of the 1449 Act that dealt with the perceived mischief in a 
perfectly intelligible way without the need to confect a right in rem; namely 
that the Act protected the tenant’s right in personam by making it prestable 
against the singular successor. In this way the 1449 Act secured the tenant’s 
position against the singular successor,83 with minimal change to the 
existing law, while remaining true to its civilian roots. 
To those who held the minority view, the analogy between the taking of 
sasine under a disposition and the taking of possession under a lease was 
at best an imperfect one. To them, the taking of possession was only the 
palest shadow of sasine. The idea that the mere taking of possession could 
confer a right in rem was heresy. 
This line of argument came naturally to judges who were steeped in 
the principles of the Roman law and of feudal conveyancing. To them the 
taking of sasine was a significant juristic act by which the fullest rights 
of ownership were conferred and publicly acknowledged. The private 
act of taking possession under a private contract that endowed the lessee 
with, at most, subordinate and temporary rights in the subjects could not 
meaningfully be equiparated with sasine. 
But this view failed to win the day. The liberal construction to which 
Rankine referred was favoured by most of the writers from earliest times 
and has had a secure place in the case law for the last two hundred 
83  As Lord Neaves explicitly held (cf Wilson v Mann (1876) 3 R 527 at 532).
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years. The obiter dicta of two judges in Edmond v Reid are the last judicial 
statements to have been made in support of the personal right theory. It 
is perhaps a criticism of the alternative theory that in wresting these dicta 
from that single case, Bury and Bain have failed to place their theory in its 
full historical context. 
Over time, the 1449 Act has come to be accepted as (1) conferring a 
right in rem on the tenant in a contract that meets the requirements of a 
valid lease; and (2) applying to leases of subjects of all kinds.84 Although 
the 1449 Act specifically refers to “lands,” the courts have interpreted it as 
applying also to residential dwellings, minerals, quarries, ferries, harbours 
and salmon fishings.85 
In their critique of the Clydesdale Bank case, Bury and Bain suggest 
that because the contract between the pro indiviso proprietors was held 
not to be a true lease, nevertheless because it regulated the terms upon 
which the defender would occupy and farm the subjects, it qualified as a 
personal lease and fell within the definition of “lease” in section 85(1) of the 
Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1991. 
Even on the assumption that the contract in the Clydesdale Bank case 
was a valid contract between the pro indiviso proprietors for occupation and 
maintenance of the farm, there is, I think, a flaw in this line of argument. 
If I am right in my interpretation of the twentieth century authorities, it 
is beyond any reasonable challenge, in my view, that in the modern law 
of Scotland a contract of lease that meets the essential requirements that 
were agreed and re-stated in Gray v Edinburgh University86 confers a right 
in rem on the tenant. On the other hand, if the contract fails to meet those 
requirements, it is not a lease at all. 
The argument for the survival of the common law form of personal lease 
suggests that such a lease may attract the protection of various statutory 
regimes and, in particular, when it is a lease of agricultural land will be a 
“lease” within the definition of that term in section 85(1) of the Agricultural 
Holdings (Scotland) Act 1991. 
For the reasons that I have given, I conclude that the common law 
personal lease is no longer part of the law of Scotland. But even if it were a 
84  Waddell v Brown 1794 M 10309; Campbell v Mc Kinnon (1867) 5 M 636, Lord Deas at 651.
85  Waddell (n 84); McArthur v Simpson 1804 M 15181; Pollock, Gilmour & Co v Harvey (1828) 6 
S 913; Clerk v Farquharson 1799 M 15225; Lumsden v Stewart (1843) 5 D 501; Gentle v Henry 
1747 M 13804.
86  1962 SC 157.
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valid form of lease, the question whether it fell with any particular statutory 
regime would depend on the relevant legislation. For example, it may be 
that under the Housing (Scotland) Acts a party may be deemed to be a 
tenant even if he holds under a form of tenure that is not a lease at all.87 
That however does not advance the argument. 
On the assumption that a contract of the kind considered in the 
Clydesdale Bank case were to constitute a personal lease, such a lease would 
not necessarily come within the special definition of “lease” in section 85(1) 
of the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1991.88 Ex hypothesi a personal 
lease is good only against the lessor. It cannot therefore fit into the scheme 
of the 1991 Act where every lease to which the Act applies is subject to a 
statutory form of annual relocation89 after the expiry of the contractual term 
and is good against any subsequent landlord of the holding. Moreover, the 
wideness of the definition of “landlord” in section 85(1) of the 1991 Act is 
such that the landlord may be a person who is not vested in the ownership 
of the land. The definitions of landlord and tenant in section 85(1) apply, of 
course, only for the purposes of the 1991 Act. 
In any event, the results of the alternative theory would be incongruous. 
If a pro indiviso proprietor were to acquire a purported personal lease 
of agricultural land granted by his co-proprietors, his co-proprietors 
would not qualify as the “landlord” in terms of section 85(1) of the 1991 
Act because under that definition all persons having a share in the title 
to the land constitute the landlord. Even if it were possible for the lease 
to be granted by the co-proprietors including himself, the lease would 
be unworkable. By reason of the rights of every individual pro indiviso 
proprietor that are inherent in his ownership, and by reason of the 
principle of unanimity to which I have referred, the appellant – on that 
hypothesis – could prevent inter alia the service upon him of any notice to 
quit under section 21 of the 1991 Act, any notice for a review of rent under 
section 13, any demand to remedy fixed equipment under section 22 and 
any application for a certificate of bad husbandry under section 28. That 
would be an unreasonable result. 
87  As Bury and Bain (n 27) submit at their footnote 29 under reference to Kinghorn v Glasgow 
DC 1984 SLT (Lands Tr) 9; and Andrew v North Lanarkshire Council 2011 Lands Tribunal, 
available at http://www.lands-tribunal-scotland.org.uk/decisions/LTS.TR.2010.10.html 
88  Or for that matter qualify as one of the limited duration tenancies introduced by the 
Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003.
89  1991 Act, s 3.
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One other aspect of the case for the alternative view is the suggestion 
that in the Clydesdale Bank case the House of Lords failed adequately to 
consider what constitutes one of the cardinal elements of a lease, namely a 
rent. The suggestion is that their Lordships took too narrow a view of rent 
as being a payment of money, there being wide definitions of rent given 
by the writers which comprehend a non-pecuniary consideration. This 
again seems not to advance the argument. No-one would dispute that the 
cardinal element of rent covers payment in money’s worth; but the judges 
of the House of Lords were dealing with a contract which, whatever its 
substance or validity, purported to provide for payment of a money rent. 
(2) The pro indiviso proprietor issue
The discussion as to the nature of the tenant’s interest in a lease may in 
the event be futile if the contract in the Clydesdale Bank case was invalid on 
other grounds. To succeed in the alternative theory its proponents must still 
establish that a personal lease created by several pro indiviso proprietors in 
favour of one of their number is a valid contract. In my view, if the personal 
lease known to the Scottish common law had survived to the present day, 
the arrangement between the pro indiviso proprietors in the Clydesdale Bank 
case could not have been such a contract, for the good and sufficient reason 
that it is not possible for a party to be both creditor and debtor in a contract. 
The logic of this principle is recognised as a general principle of the law 
of contract.90 In the specific case of leases the principle is established by a 
powerful tract of authority in cases such as Price v Watson91 and Kildrummy 
(Jersey) Limited v IRC.92 These authorities were reviewed and affirmed by 
the House of Lords in the Clydesdale Bank case. 
Although the principle can be securely rested on logic, it is also justified 
by a consideration of the consequence identified in Price v Watson,93 namely 
that the so-called tenant, as a pro indiviso proprietor, has rights of ownership 
over every inch of the subjects of let and would therefore be secure against 
eviction.94
In this discussion I am considering only the case where pro indiviso 
proprietors grant a purported lease to one of their number. In the Clydesdale 
90  W M Gloag, The Law of Contract, 2nd edn (1929) 4; Church of Scotland Endowment 
Committee v Provident Association of London Ltd 1914 SC 165. 
91  1951 SC 359. Cf also Denholm’s Trs v Denholm 1984 SLT 319; Bell’s Exrs v Inland Revenue 
1986 SC 252; Barclay v Penman 1984 SLT 376.
92  1991 SC 1.
93  1951 SC 359.
94  Bell, Principles §1072; Erskine, Principles 2.6.53.  
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Bank case, in both the Inner House and the House of Lords, the court was 
referred to the Outer House decision in Pinkerton v Pinkerton.95 That was 
an example of the converse case where an individual granted a lease to 
four joint tenants of whom he was one. Neither court found it necessary 
to consider the validity of such a contract. In my view, it is irrelevant to 
the present discussion; but it may be that the judgment of Lord Mackay of 
Clashfern in that case is not the last word on that subject. 
Bury and Bain seek support for their argument in a statement of Lord 
Johnston in Higgins v Assessor for Lanarkshire,96 a case where the pro indiviso 
proprietors let the subjects to one of their number, namely:97
That [the tenant] could be ejected by his co-proprietors I have no doubt. Qua 
tenant, he could not avail himself of his rights as co-proprietor pro indiviso 
to resist removal at the instance of his co-proprietors … that fact does not 
enable him to maintain himself in possession qua tenant till he is removed 
with his own consent.
Higgins v Assessor for Lanarkshire was a case about valuation for rating. The 
question was whether the rent passing under the lease was a true indicator 
of the annual value of the subjects on the statutory valuation hypothesis. 
For the answer to that question, it did not matter whether the lease was 
valid or not. The issue of the validity of the lease was not raised by either 
party to the appeal and none of the judges considered it. Lord Johnston’s 
statement, which was plainly an obiter dictum, simply assumed the validity 
of the lease. That dictum was referred to in the Clydesdale Bank case both in 
the Inner House and in the House of Lords. Neither court considered it to 
have any persuasive value.
All of these points are raised to support the general contention that the 
House of Lords while ruling out the validity of the contract as a lease by 
pro indiviso proprietors to one of their number, nevertheless upheld the 
validity of it as an occupation and management contract and, by extension, 
a personal lease. This is the key element in the alternative theory; but it may 
be a step too far. 
The House of Lords authoritatively confirmed the now uncontroversial 
point that the pro indiviso proprietors of land are entitled to agree among 
themselves that one of their number will have sole occupancy of the land 
and to agree on the terms and conditions on which he will occupy it. Such 
terms and conditions could include, for example, the payment by the 
95  1986 SLT 672.
96  1911 SC 931.
97  Higgins (n 96) at 934.
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occupying proprietor to the others of a sum reflecting their share of the 
rents that would have been received if the land had been let to a third party; 
or the payment of a sum representing a proportion of the net profits of the 
occupier’s farming enterprise; and the payment by them to the occupier, at 
the termination of the contract, of their share of the value of the occupier’s 
improvements. 
In this way, the contract could achieve a similar result to that which 
would have applied if the land had been let to a third party. However, in 
such a contract, the parties would be, on one side, the occupier and, on 
the other side, the other pro indiviso proprietors. The contract in this case 
was between different parties, namely, on one side, all of the pro indiviso 
proprietors and, on the other, one of the three qua individual. The judges 
of the House of Lords regarded the purported lease document as being in 
itself a valid contract by which the pro indiviso proprietors regulated the 
occupation and management of the land. Those statements were plainly 
obiter. In my view, they are unsound. Since the contract was between 
all three proprietors and one of their number, it failed as a contract for 
occupation and management on the same logic on which it failed as a lease. 
This objection could be dismissed as raising a mere matter of form. But 
the objection goes beyond that. The contract bore to be, and was intended 
to be, a lease. I cannot understand how, as the judges of the House of 
Lords seem to have implied, it fell to be read as being what it did not bear 
to be, and was not intended to be; namely, a contract between all three 
pro indiviso proprietors contracting as such inter se. It would seem to be 
an extraordinary interpretation of the purported lease that the parties to 
it, having reached consensus on the creation of a lease over the subjects, 
however mistakenly, should be held to have had the common intention of 
creating a contract of an entirely different kind. 
Furthermore, if the purported lease could have been so regarded, I 
cannot see how intelligible terms could have been read into it. The contract 
was intended to make the appellant tenant of the land, and as such vested 
in the rights conferred by the contract and subject to the duties that it 
imposed; but subject also to the provisions of the 1991 Act and related 
statutes such as the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964. I fail to see how the 
contract could be read as having entirely different consequences for the 
appellant qua owner in occupation. On that view, therefore, I conclude 
that the appellant in the Clydesdale Bank case acquired neither a right in 
rem to occupy the land qua tenant, nor a right in personam to the exclusive 
occupation of it qua proprietor. 




We are all accustomed to how heritable property transactions work – and 
sometimes do not work. If we were creating a property transfer system from 
scratch today, what would it look like? Indeed, how might a conveyancing 
system operate in, say, 2050? Is it too fanciful to suggest that transactions 
will be carried out electronically from start to finish with electronic 
paperwork, electronic examination of title and a clean and accessible Land 
Register holding all information relative to land and property in Scotland 
with experienced property lawyers advising clients on the important 
aspects of the transaction assisted by trained legal executives? This essay 
aims to look at the conveyancing process as we know it with a view to 
assessing how close we are today to that vision becoming a reality.
B.  Conveyancing Past and Present
Prior to the enactment of the Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) 
Act 1970, the Land Tenure Reform (Scotland) Act 1974 and prior to the 
Land Registration (Scotland) Act 1979, there had been very little change in 
conveyancing law and practice. Indeed, the pace of change could be said 
to have been somewhat glacial. The combined effect of the aforementioned 
statutes was radical given the introduction of inter alia the Standard 
© Stewart Brymer, CC BY 4.0 http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0056.14
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Security; redemption of feu duty on sale; and registration of title. The first 
two statutes were the result of earlier analysis of Scots property law by the 
Reid, Henry and Halliday Reports.1 
There was little further in the way of legislative intervention in the 
area of property law until 2000. That was not to say that the Scottish Law 
Commission was not busy however.2 The result was the enactment of the 
Abolition of Feudal Tenure Etc. (Scotland) Act 2000; the Title Conditions 
(Scotland) Act 2003; and the Tenements (Scotland) Act 2004 which all came 
into force on the Appointed Day.3 If there was ever a significant date in 
Scots property law, that was it. We are now some ten years on from the 
Appointed Day and the Scottish Law Commission has completed another 
highly regarded review of registration law and practice.4 The 1979 Act 
has been criticised over the years, most notably when it was described as 
having, “all the intellectual sharpness of a mashed potato,”5 but the fact of 
the matter is that the Act has worked and solicitors and the public generally 
have benefited from registration of title. The time was right for a complete 
overhaul of the system however. This resulted in the enactment of the Land 
Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012 (“the 2012 Act”), Part 10 of which6 
came into force on 11 May 2014 by virtue of The Electronic Documents 
(Scotland) Regulations 2014.7 These Regulations were introduced under 
the 2012 Act, the balance of which came into force on 8 December 2014. The 
Regulations prescribe the requirements for electronic signatures that will 
allow documents covered by the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 
1995 (“the 1995 Act”), with the exception of Wills and other testamentary 
writings meantime, to be signed by applying a suitable electronic signature 
and thus be both legally valid and self-proving. This means that contracts 
1  Registration of Title to Land (Cmnd 2032: 1963) (“Reid Committee Report”); Registration 
of Title to Land (Cmnd 4137: 1969) (“Henry Committee Report”); and Conveyancing 
Legislation and Practice (Cmnd 3118: 1968) (“Halliday Committee Report”). See also 
Land Tenure in Scotland: A Plan for Reform (Cmnd 4099: 1969) (the White paper) and Land 
Tenure in Scotland: A Plan for Reform (1972) (the Green paper).
2  Report on Abolition of the Feudal System (Scot Law Com Report n 168, 1999); Report 
on the Law of the Tenement (Scot Law Com Report n 162, 1998) and Report on the law 
of Real Burdens (Scot Law Com Report n 181, 2000).
3  28 November 2004.
4  Report on Land Registration (Volumes 1 and 2) (Scot Law Com Report n 222, 2010)
5  Discussion Paper on Land Registration: Void and Voidable Titles (Scot Law Com DP n 125, 
2004) para 2.24.
6  s 96 to s 100.
7  See Registers of Scotland Electronic Documents (Scotland) Regulations Consultation 
Report. 
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for the sale, purchase and leasing of land and property can be completed 
electronically instead of in writing with a “wet” signature being applied 
thereto. For more on this, see below.
There has been considerable change in the practice of conveyancing 
during the past 45 years. There will be some who argue that these changes 
have not had any major effect on the practice of conveyancing and, in any 
event, that the profession has adapted to change and will continue to do so. 
That may well be the case. Nevertheless, in a lecture given in 1998, Professor 
Robert Rennie said: “Some conveyancing solicitors look back to the past 
with nostalgia and forward to the future with a degree of trepidation.” It 
is suggested that the full implications of the 2000, 2003 and 2004 Acts have 
not yet been felt and, when combined with the enabling provisions of the 
2012 Act, the changes to Property law and Conveyancing law and practice 
in particular will be significant. There are those who believe that any change 
is unwelcome. The combined effect of the pace of change in today’s society 
and developments in IT over the past 30 years dictate against that view being 
an acceptable position however. The World Wide Web was only created 
in 19908 and look at the effect that that has had on our lives. Who would 
have predicted that? These developments are exponential and all-invasive 
in every aspect of our business and personal lives. Is there any reason why 
conveyancing should be immune from such changes? I suggest not. 
In a thesis written in 1989, Ian Burdon, then with Registers of Scotland, 
concluded that:9
The present millennium began with feudalism and reliance on the literacy 
of the clerical elite. The vision of the beginning of the next millennium is 
of an automated land registration system alongside a fully integrated 
digital information system, unencumbered by those administrative and 
bureaucratic structures which serve only to impede the public.
In the preface to our book entitled “Conveyancing in the Electronic Age,”10 
Robert Rennie and I stated that we hoped that there was considerable 
future potential for Scotland to develop land registration coverage with 
additional content that meets the needs of a much more informed and 
information-hungry society. That is precisely what is now happening 
with the 2012 Act and the Scottish Government’s desire to see the whole 
8  J Ryan, A History of the Internet and the Digital Future (2010) 107.
9  I Burdon, Automated Registration of Title to Land: A report for the Government Study 
Fellowship (1998).
10  R Rennie and S Brymer, Conveyancing in the Electronic Age (2008).
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of Scotland on the Land Register during the course of the next 10 years.11 
That may be seen as an ambitious target by some,12 but is there any reason 
why such an objective cannot be achieved? The political will exists and 
Registers of Scotland have shown how responsive they can be in embracing 
all the statutory obligations on them under the 2000 and 2003 Acts and also 
under the 2012 Act. The Keeper’s challenges are considerable but there is an 
enthusiastic and well-informed team in Registers that is engaging with its 
stakeholders and can see the potential that exists. The benefits of the Land 
Register being completed are social and economic as well as political and 
it is appropriate that we consider the benefits that this may bring. Change 
is all around us and it is suggested that it is better being involved in the 
change process rather than being outside the tent looking in. Life without 
change would mean that there would never be any progress.
So, what are the changes introduced by Part 10 of the 2012 Act and how 
will those changes impact on conveyancing law and practice?
(1) 2012 Act ss 96-100 (“Part 10”)
Credit for what has been a formidable piece of work in the shape of the 
2012 Act must go to the Scottish Law Commission and to Professors George 
Gretton and Kenneth Reid in particular. The profession is indebted to these 
two individuals. They have played a pivotal role in reforming the Scots law 
of property over the past 35 years while, at the same time, retaining the 
underlying principles established over the last 400 years. Credit must also 
go to the Registers of Scotland and to the Scottish Government for having 
the vision to progress the statutory timetable through a period of economic 
uncertainty. 
Part 10 makes changes to the 1995 Act so as to make digital execution 
equivalent to a traditional “wet” signature. In essence, it e-enables all the 
documents referred to in s 1(2)(a) of the 1995 Act. Digital signatures are, 
of themselves, not new of course as the profession has had experience of 
using the whe undertaking transactions involving Automated Registration 
of Title to Land (“ARTL”). 
11  Registers of Scotland, Completion of the Land Register, Public Consultation (2014) paras 
8-15, available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0045/00451087.pdf and Report 
of the Land Reform Review Group: The Land of Scotland and the Common Good 
(2014) para 24 ff, available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0045/00451087.pdf
12  “Target Set to Register all of Scotland’s Land” Scottish Legal News, 27 May 2014.
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ARTL was introduced in 200613 when an Order made changes to the 1995 
Act for the purposes of ARTL. The introduction of this change by secondary 
legislation under s 8 of the Electronic Communications Act 2000 came about 
following a Joint Opinion of the so-called Professorial Panel (Professors 
Brymer, Gretton, Paisley and Rennie – Professor Reid being excused given his 
then role with the Scottish Law Commission) which was delivered to the then 
Keeper of the Registers of Scotland (“RoS”) in April 2003 and later published 
in the Juridical Review.14 Digital execution under ARTL was a necessary first 
step. Originally, it was proposed that a digital signature would still require 
to be witnessed in order to be probative. The view of the Professorial Panel 
was that the conferring of probative status on an unwitnessed deed was 
beyond the scope of a Section 8 Order. However, there is no requirement 
on the Keeper to only accept probative deeds in respect of land registration 
applications. Accordingly, the unanimous view in the Joint Opinion was that 
the Keeper was perfectly entitled to accept a digitally executed deed without 
the need for that deed to be probative. Authentication by way of a digital 
signature which is validated by a third party gives the degree of security that 
is required for those placing reliance on such deeds. 
The 1995 Act was suitably amended and in his annotations to the amended 
1995 Act,15 Professor Kenneth Reid indicated that in the case of electronic 
documents, the distinction between probative and non-probative deeds was 
abandoned. ARTL was subsequently introduced and is still in use today16 
– although not as widespread as originally envisaged. There are a number 
of reasons why this is the case, the principal and somewhat non-technical 
explanation being that its operation is somewhat “clunky” and in need of 
an overhaul. In truth, ARTL was not embraced fully by conveyancers and 
was not widely used in transactions other than remortgages, Improvement 
Grants and certain Charging Orders. Such an overhaul will be undertaken 
and an upgraded version of ARTL will be launched by RoS (Registers 
of Scotland) in due course. This is also permitted under Part 10. In the 
words of Gilbert, it is easy to “carp and criticise” about anything in life 
and developments in the law and practice are no exception.17 In the case of 
ARTL, however, one would do well to reflect on just how ground-breaking 
13  The Automated Registration of Title to Land (Electronic Communications) (Scotland) 
Order 2006 (SSI 2006/491) (“the 2006 Order”). 
14  2005 JR 201.
15  K Reid, Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 (1995).
16  Over 91,000 transactions to date (as of 31 October 2014).
17  The Pirates of Penzance; or, The Slave of Duty.
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the system was and what other benefits it will bring when upgraded as 
part of the move towards Scotland having a fully digitised Land Register. 
Could ARTL have been introduced in a different manner? With the benefit 
of hindsight, this is undoubtedly the case. It is hoped that ARTL Mark 2 
will be introduced and that practice will develop as a result of demand 
from the profession. That will occur once all the other building blocks for 
digital transactions are in place and we see that purchasers, sellers and 
lenders want to transact in this way. That will complete the change process 
which will begin after the Designated Day for the 2012 Act when a large 
number of services will be provided by RoS in an electronic manner. 
(2) What is a Digital Signature?
The term “digital signature” is in many ways a convenient tag for the 
authentication of a document by electronic means. There are many 
variations including machines that allow a signature to be traced which 
then appears on a screen. Indeed, such systems could have been adapted for 
use in such a way that an electronic signed deed could have accompanied 
an ARTL application. That is not what would be regarded as a digital 
signature in a technological sense however. The crucial element is not the 
digital signature itself but the digital certificate which provides the security 
for the adhibition of the signature and which thus underpins same. In strict 
technological terms, the certificate is used to create the digital signature 
which is a product of the actual document and the digital certificate 
together. This detail is suitably encrypted and lies behind the signature.
In the ARTL system, the digital certificates comply with the X509 
standard.18 As a general rule, the longer the length of cryptographic keys, 
the stronger the encryption. For example, a 20BIT key is twice as strong 
as a 19BIT key and so on. A digital signature with a robust encryption 
such as the ARTL digital certificate is therefore very secure and one might 
remember that in the not so recent past, a digital certificate with a key 
length of over 56BITs was classed as a military weapon for export purposes 
and special licences were required. What is important is the strength of the 
digital certificate. In other words, not every digital signature can be used 
in the knowledge that it is secure. Put simply, a cheap digital signature 
obtained on the internet on a credit card payment is never likely to be 
acceptable for the processes envisaged by Part 10 because the digital 
18  See J R Vacca, Computer and Information Security Handbook (2008) 436 ff.
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certificate which is used to adhibit the digital signature is simply not secure 
enough. Any digital signature has to be one which is backed by a digital 
certificate trusted by people in a business and commercial context. It is not 
just the technological content that is important. Of particular importance 
for property lawyers given the uses to which a digital signature is to be put 
in conveyancing transactions is the identity check which is made by the 
provider of the digital certificate before that certificate is issued.
As mentioned above, in a very basic sense, an electronic signature could 
be simply a name at the end of an email or an image of a person’s written 
signature added to an electronic document. Neither of these would meet 
the terms of the requirements set out in the Regulations. An advanced 
electronic signature is uniquely linked to the signatory and is capable of 
identifying the signatory. It is created using systems that the signatory 
can maintain under his/her sole control. This, by necessity, means that the 
digital signature will only be processed by a certification authority after 
robust security and ID checks are carried out. An advanced electronic 
signature will, however, require a certification authority19 to have verified 
the identity of the individual using same however. 
For an electronic signature to become an advanced electronic signature 
it must be:
(i)  uniquely linked to the signatory; 
(ii)  capable of identifying the signatory;
(iii)  created using means that the signatory can maintain under their sole 
control; and
(iv)  linked to the data to which it relates so that any subsequent change of 
the data is detectable. 
An advanced electronic signature has more significant value than an 
electronic signature: it guarantees the integrity of the text, as well as the 
authentication. The juridical value it has is for integrity: one is sure the text 
received is the same that was sent, and that no hacker has changed it. 
The only practical way to meet these requirements is to use the technology 
called Public Key Infrastructure (“PKI”). PKI is the technology that 
provides a solution for secure electronic signatures. The key components 
are the digital certificates that form part of the signature. These allow for 
the validity of an electronic signature and the identity of the signatory to be 
19  See below.
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authenticated. The electronic signature and the digital certificate are both 
provided by the certification service provider. The electronic signature 
that incorporates the digital certificate is usually held on a chip embedded 
within a pin protected smart card that the signatory can maintain under 
their sole control or held remotely and securely by a third party.20 
The authentication of a deed or a missive by a person using a digital 
signature operates within PKI. There are two mirror aspects of digital 
signatures. From the point of view of the party who holds the signature 
no-one else must be able to use it. However, from the point of view of the 
party who is to receive and rely on the document authenticated by a digital 
signature, there must be a method of verifying that the document has, 
indeed, been digitally signed. The technology is complicated as one might 
expect but it essentially operates on the basis of a private key and a public 
key. The private key is held by the holder of the digital signature and is 
not made known to the other party who is to receive the digitally signed 
document. The public key on the other hand is available to the recipient of 
the document and that party uses the public key to verify simply that the 
document in question has been authenticated by the digital signature. A 
PKI infrastructure employs advanced encryption techniques. It is obvious 
that there must be a closed, robust and secure environment in which 
solicitors can interact with each other and indeed, interact with the Land 
Register and other bodies with a view to processing electronic dealings 
free from any interference by any unauthorised outsiders. Referring once 
again to the ARTL system, the PKI created for the Land Register is a closed 
tactical public key infrastructure. This means that the digital certificates 
were/are issued to licensed ARTL users only and cannot be used for any 
purpose other than for the purposes of the ARTL system. 
A significant step forward was made on 11 May 2014 when the Electronic 
Documents (Scotland) Regulations 2014 (“the 2014 Regulations”) came into 
force. The Regulations are a small but very important step that will help 
facilitate conveyancing in Scotland to be carried out electronically. The 2014 
Regulations were made under powers that were inserted into the 1995 Act 
by the 2012 Act. The 2014 Regulations allow legal documents that the 1995 
Act specifies must be in writing (other than wills and other testamentary 
writings at present) to take an electronic form and be legally valid.
20  See below.
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The 2014 Regulations provide that electronic versions of legal documents 
governed by the 1995 Act can be legally valid if they are signed by using what 
is termed an “advanced electronic signature.” For a document to obtain the 
presumption that it is has been signed by the granter, and to become self-
proving, it must be signed using an advanced electronic signature, and that 
signature must be certified using a “qualified certificate.” 
The terms “advanced electronic signature” and “qualified certificate” 
used in the 2014 Regulations are defined in the Electronic Signatures 
Regulations 2002 (“the 2002 Regulations”), a piece of Westminster legislation 
that adopted into UK law Directive 1999/93EC of the European Parliament 
and Council on a Community framework for electronic signatures. 
Advanced electronic signatures are issued by what is termed a 
“certification authority.” For an electronic document to become self-proving, 
the documents must be signed using an advanced electronic signature that 
is certified using a qualified certificate. The 2002 Regulations prescribe that 
a qualified certificate must contain:
(i)  an indication that the certificate is issued as a qualified certificate;
(ii)  the identification of the certification-service-provider and the State in 
which it is established;
(iii)  the name of the signatory or a pseudonym, which shall be identified as 
such;
(iv)  provision for a specific attribute of the signatory to be included 
if relevant, depending on the purpose for which the certificate is 
intended;
(v)  signature-verification data which corresponds to signature-creation 
data under the control of the signatory;
(vi)  an indication of the beginning and end of the period of validity of the 
certificate;
(vii)  the identity code of the certificate;
(viii)  the advanced electronic signature of the certification-service-provider 
issuing it;
(ix)  limitations on the scope of use of the certificate, if applicable; and
(x)  limits on the value of transactions for which the certificate can be used, 
if applicable.
The Law Society of Scotland is currently in the process of introducing an 
electronic practising certificate or Smartcard which will contain within it 
a secure digital signature that meets the requirements for an advanced 
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electronic signature that is certified using a qualified certificate.21 These 
Smartcards will give Scottish solicitors the ability to benefit from the 2014 
Regulations and sign legal documents electronically. This is being achieved 
by way of a phased roll-out which commenced in Summer 2014.
Trust is a key element of every PKI infrastructure. Under the ARTL 
system, the procedure for obtaining a Digital Signature began with a 
personal visit by Land Register staff in order to validate the identities of 
those people who were to act as local registration authorities in face to face 
meetings. A similar certification process is being undertaken by the Law 
Society and that is exactly as it should be in order to ensure that public 
confidence in the system is maintained.
As far as general practice is concerned, it might well be prudent for 
solicitors to incorporate authority from clients in Terms of Business to the 
effect that the client authorises their solicitor to sign missives and any other 
permitted document, electronically on his/her behalf. No such authority 
is given under current practice when adjusting missives, of course, but it 
is good practice at the moment to seek authority from one’s client before 
issuing an offer or formal missive. It therefore makes sense to add a simple 
provision to this effect in Terms of Business.
The full effects of the change to digital signatures will not be harnessed 
until a secure electronic document exchange facility is available. That has 
been talked about for some time. The reality, however, is that such document 
exchange facilities already exist. The stockbroking community, among 
others, is well versed at dealing in this way. This is a natural progression 
for conveyancing and the sale/purchase of heritable property generally. It 
is envisaged that this will be a secure online portal or platform on which 
solicitors can communicate in a secure manner with other solicitors, 
lenders, RoS, Revenue Scotland and, indeed, their clients. Once there is 
a single national missive and standard styles of common conveyancing 
documents22 there will be a greater opportunity for solicitors to focus on 
being a trusted adviser in the process which, in time, will hopefully see the 
Scottish system of conveyancing retain its uniqueness. There is, at present, 
a trend towards us having a conveyancing system that is, to all intents and 
purposes, the same as that which operates in England and Wales, with 
21  The Law Society of Scotland, “Introducing the Smartcard,” available at www.lawscot.
org.uk/smartcard 
22  See below.
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exchange of contracts and chains of transactions becoming the norm. There 
is an opportunity now to reverse this trend. 
(3) The need for client confidence
As mentioned above, The Law Society of Scotland Smartcard initiative 
will not have full coverage until October 2015. Commercial solutions 
are believed to be available however. One such solution is the Yooseful 
Technology Property Manager™ product.23 This product is registered 
under a certification authority through Entrust.24 To become a certification 
authority, an organisation must seek accreditation under the T Scheme.25 T 
Scheme was initially established to provide a voluntary approval scheme 
for providers of the cryptographic elements necessary to underpin the 
use of digital signatures. This is because Government wishes people and 
organisations to have trust in e-commerce. The digital certificate can be 
embedded in a mobile phone or in a card and card reader as the case may 
be and can be used on a “pay as you go” basis. There are benefits of other 
“wrappers” offered by the providers of the digital signature e.g. indemnity 
insurance etc.
In essence, it is envisaged that the net effect will be a streamlining of the 
conveyancing process and thus satisfying the desire for the legal profession 
to remain as effective gatekeepers of sale and purchase transactions. People 
want to communicate electronically – and many do it already without fully 
appreciating the inherent risks that exist when transacting in an insecure 
manner. They are used to it and expect instant responses. Secure email 
exchange would be much better so that transactions are safe. It is therefore 
imperative that there are robust safeguards in place in order that the sale 
and purchase process can operate smoothly and hopefully help minimise 
delay and loss. This will be achieved by removing uncertainty with regard 
to undelivered or intercepted emails; missing deeds; delay in conclusion of 
missives etc. In what way is that not a good thing?
For the Law Society Secure Digital Signature to be used effectively in 
a conveyancing transaction, it will require to be integrated with a firm’s 
case management software and other systems. That may not be as simple a 
23  For more information see Yooseful Technology Limited’s website available here: www.
yoosefultechnology.com
24  For more information see Entrust®, Inc.’s website available here: www.entrust.com 
25  For more information see the Scheme Limited’s website available here: www.tscheme.
org 
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process as it sounds and discussions are underway with case management 
software providers with a view to smoothing integration. Perhaps there is 
an opportunity for the Law Society to offer a branded secure dealing room 
or portal to its members as a way to effectively host the platform on which 
secure transactions can be carried out?
Digital signatures based on digital certification provided by a 
certification authority allow parties to rely on the validity of the signature. 
In simple terms, if you trust the certification authority, then you can 
trust the digital signature. The digital signature will be legally valid and 
admissible as evidence of the authenticity and integrity of the electronic 
communication. It will hopefully also speed up the process of concluding 
missives, and remove problems encountered with regard to delivery of 
letters concluding the bargain etc.26 
As with any change in the way things are done, it will take time for digital 
signatures to become the norm. Put simply, we tend to trust that which we 
know. I am confident that practice will evolve quickly, however – especially 
among the younger members of the profession. Why should we and our 
clients not benefit from a secure way in which to sign and exchange contracts 
and documents? “Early adopters” will have an opportunity to develop their 
practices further by embracing this exciting, and entirely logical development. 
Any system, whether in ARTL or in the exchange of missives or the 
signing of documents in a manner designed to replicate as nearly as possible 
the existing paper-based systems, must be based on client confidence. For 
so long as members of the public do not have digital signatures of a type 
that meet the prescribed requirements, the essential underlying element 
will be the authority given by a client to his/her solicitor or other agent to 
sign for them using a digital signature. From a policy and security point of 
view, the holding of a digital signature should be with an individual rather 
than by a firm or limited liability partnership as a whole as the latter would 
render the system less secure. There are, however, already developments 
which might result in the use of digital signatures being extended to any 
transaction concluded over the internet. This involves the use of a biometric.27 
A biometric solution uses physiology to reinforce the link between the person 
applying the digital signature and the signature itself and is, perhaps, where 
we will end up as further technological advances are made. 
26  See Park, Petitioner 2009 SLT 871.
27  See L Reid and M Bromby, “Beyond the Chip and PIN” 53(7) JLSS (2008) 50.
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Change will happen and it is suggested that it makes logical sense 
for the whole sale and purchase transaction to be able to be competed 
electronically from start to finish. Conveyancing Case Management 
systems are now widely used and it is envisaged that changes to these 
systems will increasingly make use of the technological developments that 
exist, especially when, as is the case with Part 10, these are underpinned 
by legislation. It is essential however that all new systems are introduced 
with care and attention especially with regard to the importance of client 
confidence therein. It is this that gives the solicitor an opportunity to remain 
central to the sale and purchase process as a “trusted adviser.”
C.  Conveyancing Future
(1) National Land and Property Information database
An essential requirement for an efficient system of transferring ownership of 
heritable property is the accuracy and availability of information relative to 
the property being sold and, indeed, neighbouring properties. It is essential 
that searches of local authority and other records are undertaken prior to 
the purchase of a property. Unfortunately, however, the quality of records 
and practices differ from local authority to local authority. This results in 
uncertainty and increases the potential for error and loss.28 There are some 
examples of very good practice in local authorities. One such is the City of 
Edinburgh’s planning and building standards portal.29 Even that system 
still has its gaps however e.g. plans are not available in all instances and 
all current systems suffer from the lack of a uniform addressing database. 
It is nevertheless an example of what can be achieved. The introduction 
of the National Gazetteer as a result of a collaboration among 32 local 
authorities in Scotland was a significant step forward with each property 
being allocated a Unique Property Reference Number (“UPRN”). There is 
considerable potential in grouping all relevant data from both public and 
private sources around the UPRN. 
Up to date and readily accessible information on land and property is 
at the very core of the conveyancing service. It has been argued for many 
years that it is nonsensical for solicitors to have to have recourse to multiple 
28  See Runciman v Borders Regional Council 1998 SLT 135.
29  This is available at https://citydev-portal.edinburgh.gov.uk 
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data sets, some of which may not be comprehensive in their coverage or, 
indeed, be current. This is not in the best interests of either buyer or seller. 
Why should they be put at risk? It must surely be the case that in today’s 
information-based society that all relevant data on land and property is 
held in a comprehensive and easily searchable database. This initiative 
may well be the catalyst for reform that has been required. Without it, the 
existing systems would grind on with little or no appetite for change. It is 
suggested that the availability of relevant information which is accurate 
and comprehensive, can be properly interpreted and can be relied upon 
and is readily accessible is not only consistent with the aims of Government 
as far as efficiency is concerned, but is also necessary as part of the Scottish 
Government’s commitment to improve the supply of information for 
people when making a decision about buying and selling a home. The 
benefits of a national portal containing all information relative to land and 
property (other than title information) are significant and are achievable 
given the political will to do something about the present unsatisfactory 
nature surrounding the supply of information relative to land and property. 
Why should this be tolerated in this day and age when it can be avoided?
There have been a number of recent developments which have the 
potential to significantly improve the way in which information about 
Scotland’s land and property is managed and made available. A number 
of inter-related initiatives are being, or are about to be, launched, which 
together with new governance arrangements, suggest that the original 
aims of the Scottish Land Information Service (“ScotLIS”) may finally be 
realised.
In 2001, those involved with the ScotLIS project30 produced the following 
statements of intent:
The ultimate aim of the ScotLIS project is that of providing an integrated data 
set where the user obtains information from a range of providers by means 
of a single search enquiry. This will be facilitated by means of a gazetteer 
… The extent to which data from different suppliers will be integrated will 
be determined in the course of the ScotLIS pilot and through the ongoing 
development of the service.
ScotLIS never progressed beyond the pilot stage for a number of reasons, 
mainly to do with the available technology at the time, but also due to the 
way in which the organisations involved viewed their own information. 
30  See http://brymerlegal.blogspot.se/2012/03/joined-up-land-and-property-information.
html
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Since then, a number of significant events have occurred including 
legislative change and most markedly the economic downturn which has 
led to serious review of the way in which the public sector will require to 
deliver services in future.31 
In December 2009, Scottish Ministers signed the European INSPIRE 
Directive which places an obligation on them to publish information on a 
number of spatial data themes which contain environmental data. Those 
themes directly related to land and property are Addresses, Geographic 
Names, Cadastral Parcels and Buildings and the Directive explicitly 
specifies what information is required to be published and how this must 
be done using web services. This was a very important step on the road to 
the goal of joined-up property information.
In 2010, a joint venture was established between the Local Government 
Association and the Ordnance Survey to deliver a National Address 
Gazetteer for England and Wales by working collaboratively to combine the 
best features of the National Land and Property Gazetteer and Ordnance 
Survey address products. This provided for the inclusion of One Scotland 
Gazetteer data into the National Address Gazetteer. 
The Scottish Government also established a Spatial Information Board 
with the remit to implement the Scottish Spatial Data Infrastructure/
INSPIRE Directive requirements. The Board’s membership is drawn from 
senior officers from Scottish Government, NDPBs, SOLACE, NHS, AGI 
Scotland, Edina and the Registers of Scotland. The Board reports to a 
National Board overseeing public sector reform in Scotland. Five theme 
groups were established under the Board, with one of these having the 
remit for Land, Property and Addresses, which include Geographic 
Names and Buildings and there is a clear reporting structure for land and 
property related information to Ministerial level. This was one of the key 
components missing from ScotLIS in 2001, as well as the links to other 
geospatial initiatives.
Scotland is well placed to develop a land and property infrastructure 
which will be capable of supporting greatly improved services, including 
e-Conveyancing and improved asset management. 
Unifi Scotland32 is a think tank that was established a number of years 
ago to look at ways of improving access to and use of data on Land and 
Property with a view to having a government-backed definitive source 
31  For a more detailed review of the background to ScotLIS see S Brymer, “National 
Gazetteer for Scotland” (2008) 97 Greens Property Law Bulletin 1-3.
32  See http://www.unifiscotland.com/
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of information. Its membership includes representatives from The Law 
Society of Scotland, the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, RoS, the 
Council of Mortgage Lenders, Ordinance Survey private search companies 
and representatives of local and national government. The focus of Unifi is 
to enhance the accessibility, quality and reliability of property information 
and, in turn facilitate the quicker completion of property transactions. 
In essence, Unifi seeks to improve the current system. The progressive 
availability of location-based information and the ability to usefully link 
various sources of this through definitive addressing and intelligent 
mapping provides the means to improve decision making, smarten 
traditional ways of working and draw significant value in a way that has 
not been possible before. Hopefully all stakeholders will be convinced of 
the considerable savings that will be achieved and we can move quickly 
towards converting this vision into a reality.
(2) Comparative example
It is usually the case that someone, somewhere will have done, or is 
thinking of doing, that which you are considering. Legal systems are no 
different. One of the attributes of Scots law over the years is the way that 
it has adapted and learned from other jurisdictions. That has been hugely 
beneficial and the study of comparative law can bring significant benefits. 
One such benefit may be capable of being found in Norway where an 
innovative land information project has already been introduced by the 
Norwegian Land Information company.33 In Norway, the majority of 
municipalities have pooled their information on land and property with 
the Norwegian Land Information company, Ambita AS. This information 
is held digitally and is accessed on a “pay as you go” basis. Considerable 
benefits have accrued both for local government and for those who 
rely on the information. It is hoped that it might be possible for a pilot 
study of such a project to be undertaken in Scotland. This would require 
collaboration among local authorities, utility companies and the holders of 
other information on land and property.
The property information portal in Norway is called INFOLAND and it 
serves as an inter-operable cooperation between public and private sector, 
collecting layers of information necessary to the various stakeholders in 
the property segment, be they a private citizen, mortgage lenders and 
33  For more information see Ambita AS’s website at www.ambita.com. 
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credit institutions, property solicitors, surveyors, contractors and others. 
The INFOLAND portal connects information from the planning and 
property departments of the municipalities in addition to information 
developed on the back of this from private sector search companies and 
other government bodies such as environmental offices, Ordnance Survey 
and others. The principle behind the portal is simple. A one-step search for 
a property in question and all information relevant to the request is made 
available. The supplier (the local authority or another information provider 
in the portal) provides the necessary information either immediately as a 
pdf to be downloaded or to an email address or – in the case of non-digital 
documents – to a specified postal address. The simplicity of the portal’s 
front-end function for the searcher covers a multitude of layers that also 
entail an administration statistic allowing the supplier to follow requested 
transactions. In the case of payments, a simple arrangement that allows for 
subscription or for credit card payments is also made available. 
In short, the INFOLAND portal has functioned as a single one-stop-
shop for all layers of property information in Norway since its launch in 
1998 in Stavanger. It provides efficient and timesaving access to information, 
thereby saving money and speeding up Norwegian property transactions. 
It is hoped that the same result can be achieved in Scotland.
(3) Lender Exchange
Changes are also currently being made by a number of mortgage lenders 
with the introduction of Lender Exchange34 by Decision First Limited, a 
joint venture company between Decision Insight Information Group and 
First Title plc. Individual lenders have been communicating their positions 
to solicitor firms on their lending panels. 
Lender Exchange is a web portal which aims to address the issue of 
multiple lenders seeking similar information from solicitors in order to 
better manage their panel systems. The aim is to reduce costs and the 
administrative burden on solicitor firms while also helping the mortgage 
lenders minimise fraud and negligence through due diligence. 
Information is gathered by Decision First and a fee is paid based on 
the size of the firm. Once in the system, the information need not be 
further updated unless there is a change to individual details such as an 
34  For more information see Decision First Limited’s website at www.lenderexchange.
co.uk 
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amalgamation, a finding of professional misconduct etc. The obligation 
will be on the firm to advise of changes. Leading the way with Lender 
Exchange are Santander, Lloyds Banking Group and RBS, but the system is 
open to all mortgage lenders who wish to participate.
Lender Exchange is being promoted by mortgage lenders – not the 
Council of Mortgage Lenders.35 Lender Exchange is designed to allow 
lenders to communicate better with solicitors on their panels by electronic 
means rather than the present outdated requirement that fax be used. An 
added benefit might be that solicitors could also be able to communicate 
in a secure manner with other solicitors on the portal, thus creating a 
secure dealing room of the type mentioned above on which conveyancing 
transactions can be carried out. This would be a good example of solicitors 
and lenders working together, irrespective of any decision with regard to 
separate representation. This would be a positive step forward but it is 
dependent upon Lender Exchange being operated in a manner which is 
seen to be fair to all concerned.
(4) Law Society Working Party on the Future of Conveyancing
Following the Law Society AGM in 2013, a Working Party was established 
to consider various issues affecting the residential property sector. The 
Working Party is made up of practitioners and others with interest in the 
residential property sector and it has managed a full meeting each month 
since July 2013. Various strands worthy of investigation were identified 
which, taken together, should enhance the way property transactions are 
undertaken. These include:
(i)  Standard Missives
(ii)  Standardised Documentation
(iii)  Secure dealing room or portal
(iv)  Quality Badge for Conveyancers
The Working Party believes there is a clear role for a vital, progressive 
legal profession assisting consumers in the sale and purchase of residential 
property and that solicitors should seek to remain at the core of that process. 
That goal is best achieved however by the Law Society leading the change 
process from the front for the benefit of its members and citizens alike. In 
35  For more information see the Council of Mortgage Lender’s website available here 
www.cml.org.uk. 
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so doing, the Law Society is following the lead of countries like Denmark 
where solicitors made fundamental reforms to the way their role in the 
house buying/selling process operated following the removal by the Danish 
Government of the solicitors’ monopoly in conveyancing. They now have 
a thriving property profession and we can usefully learn lessons from their 
experience.
(5) The Digital Home
With registration happening automatically following completion of an 
electronic process, there will, in future, be no physical delivery of title 
deeds. Settlement will therefore become truly symbolic with the keys 
being the focal point – for as long, of course, as keys are still required. 
We will have therefore come full circle and are effectively taking sasine! 
A fully integrated electronic security system covering the property and 
operated by a personal PIN is already a reality. Who is to say how this 
will develop? It is conceivable that all information relative to a property 
could be stored in a memory chip embedded in the property itself perhaps 
in the form of an In Home Display. This could be a register of all repairs 
and improvements carried out – including all local authority and other 
permissions in respect of the works. This would be an up to date record 
and would replace the Property Questionnaire as part of the Home 
Report. Until that time however, the keys and supporting documentation 
such as consents, guarantees, permissions and others will be delivered at 
settlement. These are important documents and have to be kept safe and 
it is suggested that these should also be recorded electronically in much 
the same way as a car log book is maintained.
D.  So How Does the Vision Become a Reality?
We are already quite far along the road towards conveyancing transactions 
being completed electronically. As mentioned above, there are already 
companies that have developed software which can be utilised to enable 
agents and solicitors to collaborate, share property information and 
digitally sign and exchange property contracts. 
The 2012 Act will also further enable electronic registration of title 
in the registers under the management and control of the Keeper of the 
Registers of Scotland. Additional regulations under the 2012 Act will 
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follow which will e-enable ARTL Mark 2 and other such developments. 
It is envisaged that this will be by way of a process of evolution rather 
than revolution however. Practitioners will be given the opportunity to 
get used to accessing the registers electronically and the move towards 
a comprehensive ARTL process will thus evolve over time. That time 
period is finite however. The road map to digital conversion is being 
prepared.
Over a period of time, the Land Register will be cleansed of real 
burdens that are no longer valid and subsisting. This will be achieved 
by solicitors informing the Keeper of their judgment in this regard. Once 
done, the Land Register will be transparent and fully accessible. This, of 
course, also fits with the stated aim of Government to have all Scotland 
mapped and registered in the Land Register by 2024.
It is suggested that the electronic genie is out of the bottle and we have 
been afforded a glimpse of the future. We have a chance to shape that 
future however. Is it to be one where the solicitor remains central to the 
process? I do not see why not. Changes in working practices and, more 
importantly, in attitudes, will be required however. Conveyancing is a 
service and we all like to receive good service. Most solicitors provide a 
very good service and it is suggested that it is now time to focus on how 
to implement these changes and re-design our businesses accordingly. 
The heady days of the property boom have passed. During that period, it 
was almost too easy to make money from buying and selling property for 
clients. Looking forward, we must surely focus on quality of service and 
the trusted adviser concept as a means to providing a better service to 
our clients. I suggest that the effective introduction of changed working 
practices will assist that goal rather than hinder it. 
Once available, e-Conveyancing (in its fullest extent) will make 
property transactions cheaper and quicker to complete. Such a facility 
may not speed up the negotiation of missives which, on many occasions, 
for many often oblique reasons can become very lengthy. It might just 
act as a catalyst however and we might get back to a situation last seen 
in the 1970s when missives were often concluded in a short period of 
time and often on a de plano basis. To become a reality however, there has 
to be a will on the part of everyone involved in the process to embrace 
the necessary changes and make it happen. The fact of the matter is that 
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clients will expect change and for transactions to be processed in the most 
efficient way possible. Those who do embrace change once the necessary 
safeguards are in place should gain a competitive advantage over their 
rivals.
The digital clock is ticking…

15. Islamic Mortgages 
Professor George Gretton
A.  Theory, Practice and Fun
In most countries property law is, or at least is seen as being, dry and dull. 
And in most countries links between property law theorists and property 
law practitioners are weak. Not so here. Far from being dry and dull, 
property law in Scotland is, and is seen as being, exciting, fun and often – 
in a good sense – funny (thanks, Robert) funny. Strong links exist between 
theory and practice (thanks again, Robert). This paper has no laughs, but 
has something in it of practice and theory.
B.  Introduction
I hesitate to write on Islamic mortgages for a good reason: I am unqualified 
to do so. To be qualified one would need to unite three qualities: knowledge 
of property law, knowledge of Shari’a1 law, and knowledge of what is 
happening in practice. I have some of the first, but little of the second or 
third. So why this paper? 
The main answer is that – as far as I can see – there is hardly anything 
published on the subject. There is a large literature on Islamic finance, all 
of which mentions the Islamic mortgage, but none of which seems to get 
1  Variously transcribed into the Latin alphabet. Other forms are “Sharia,” “Shari’ah,” 
“Sharia’a” and “Shariah,” where English is the destination language, and yet other 
forms for other destination languages, such as French Charia or Chari’a, or German 
Scharia or Schari’a. 
© George Gretton, CC BY 4.0 http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0056.15
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down to brass tacks – at least as far as the legal systems of the UK are 
concerned. The two standard English texts on mortgage law pass over the 
subject in complete silence.2 The Scottish monographs are silent. If there is a 
periodical literature I have not found it, though there is one exception, and, 
to boot, a Scottish exception: Graham Burnside has written on the subject.3 
I find this paucity of discussion odd. Someone needs to do something. 
Islamic mortgages are not common in Scotland (less common, I think, than 
in England) but they are not unknown.
A subsidiary reason is that the internet is full of nonsense on the subject. 
Of course, the internet is full of nonsense on every subject, but with most 
subjects one can, with a bit of effort, navigate to reliable sources. Not so, as 
far as I can see, with Islamic mortgages in the UK context. Even seemingly 
respectable sites have dubious material. Here for instance is The Guardian 
on 29 June 2008:4
Imagine a mortgage lender who allows you to take all the increase in the 
price of your home when you sell, but is prepared to share any loss if the 
property has fallen in value. Such a deal may seem too good to be true 
in the current property market, but it is exactly what a handful of banks 
specialising in Islamic home loans are offering.
Is that really true? I don’t want to target The Guardian, and quote it here 
precisely because it is usually a respectable source, but here it goes again, 
on 29 October 2013, under the intriguing heading “Facts are sacred”:5
Islamic finance is all about sharing risk between financial institutions and 
the individuals that use them. To do that, the two parties are tied into a 
longer-term relationship with each other that is supposed to shift incentives 
and avoid cut and run financial deals. So, for example, sharia-compliant 
mortgages mean that the bank and the borrower share the risks of repayment 
rather than charging any form of interest.
Hmmm.
2  W Clark (ed), Fisher and Lightwood’s Law of Mortgage, 13th edn (2011) (at the time of 
writing, a 14th edition is in the offing, but is not yet available to me); I Clarke (ed), 
Cousins on the Law of Mortgages, 3rd edn (2010).
3  “Unveiling the Islamic Mortgage” 2005 JLSS Dec/58; “Islamic Finance: A Scottish Lead?” 
2009 JLSS Aug/56.
4  H Qureshi, “Sharia-compliant mortgages are here – and they’re not just for Muslims," 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/money/2008/jun/29/mortgages.islam
5  M Chalabi, “Islamic finance for beginners," available at http://www.theguardian.
com/news/datablog/2013/oct/29/islamic-finance-for-beginners. “Facts are sacred” is 
a heading used in the Guardian’s “datablog," in reference to C P Snow’s aphorism 
“comment is free, but facts are sacred."
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So: despite my lack of qualifications for the subject, and conscious of 
the inadequacies of what follows, I offer some thoughts on the Islamic 
mortgage, mainly with reference to Scots law. Lastly by way of throat-
clearing, the subject is larger than could be covered in a short paper such as 
the present. Indeed, it would be a good subject for a PhD. But half a loaf is 
better than no bread.
C.  Prohibition of Interest
Judaism forbade interest, and that prohibition was received into its two 
daughter religions, Christianity and Islam.6 In Christian countries the 
prohibition was generally accepted not only as a religious rule but also as a 
matter of positive law. Eventually, however, the legal ban was abandoned 
everywhere, though at different times in different countries.7 In Scotland 
the ban ended with the Reformation (1560).8 Turning to Islamic countries, 
in some (for example, Turkey) the law now permits interest: in those 
countries that accept Shari’a law as part of positive law, interest is legally 
impermissible. Pious Muslims, and Muslim organisations, seek to avoid 
interest, whether as debtors or as creditors.9 Some non-Islamic financial 
institutions also offer what they claim to be Shari’a-compliant financial 
products. Such products will usually have been given the approval of a 
Shari’a-compliance board composed of experts in Islamic theology.
The question is not whether interest should be limited to reasonable 
levels.10 In Shari’a, all interest, reasonable or unreasonable, is forbidden. 
What is forbidden is not the lending of money, but interest: loans are 
6  There are also roots in Greek philosophy, especially Aristotle. 
7  For an illuminating history of the European position from Roman to modern times see 
R Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations (1996) 166-77.
8  I know of no legislation lifting the ban. What happened at the Reformation was that a 
number of canon law rules, which had been accepted as part of the common law, were 
simply abandoned, other examples being the celibacy of the clergy and the prohibition 
of divorce. The first statute on the law of interest that I know of was the Act 1587 c 52 
(APS iii 451 c 35) providing that the maximum lawful rate of interest was to be 10%. The 
Act expressly said that its provisions were not applicable to transactions entered into 
before its date. Thus between 1560 and 1587 interest was permitted and there was no 
maximum lawful rate. As far as I know the history of the subject (in Scotland) has never 
been fully studied.
9  Though in practice many Muslims do in fact borrow and lend at interest.
10  Legal limits on interest rates have been and remain common. For instance in the Roman 
Empire the maximum permitted rate was 12%. For a study of the current situation, see 
U Reifner, S Clerc-Renaud, and R A M Knobloch, Study on Interest Rate Restrictions 
in the EU: Final Report (2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
finservices-retail/docs/credit/irr_report_en.pdf
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permissible so long as they are at zero interest. Nor is there any objection, 
in the Islamic tradition, to security for a loan. For example, there would be 
no objection to X lending Y money, secured by standard security – so long 
as the loan is interest-free. And there’s the rub: whilst loans between friends 
and relatives are commonly interest-free, in the world of commerce no one 
will lend without a return. Indeed, to lend without a return is to transfer 
net value from lender to borrower: it is like a donation. Achieving a return 
without using interest is the challenge for Islamic finance, and various 
workarounds have been developed. (As they were in medieval Europe.11) 
How Muslims and Muslim organisations deal with the fact that interest 
often runs on debts by force of law,12 I do not know, but that is another story.
(1) Other rules
Islamic theology imposes other restrictions, too, such as the prohibition 
of contracts involving uncertainty or speculation. Thus conventional 
insurance is forbidden, though as with interest there exist workarounds, 
which achieve by the back door what cannot be achieved through the front 
door. Another theological principle is that one transaction cannot be made 
conditional on another.13 I do not understand, and so cannot explain this 
principle, but its influence is evident.
D.  Circumventing the Prohibition
A workaround involves structuring the transaction as something other than 
a contract of loan. Some other type of contract has to be identified, to bring 
about the actual results of a loan contract. The three main workarounds14 
are to structure the transaction as (i) a contract of lease, this being called 
ijara, or (ii) a contract of sale, this being called murabaha, or (iii) a contract 
11  The parallels are striking. In medieval Europe the ban on interest was circumvented 
easily, just as it is in the Islamic tradition. 
12  There is a body of law (some of it common law and some of it statutory) whereby 
interest can run where a debt is not paid when due, including (but not limited to) 
such matters as judicial interest, interest on overdue tax, and the Late Payment of 
Commercial Debts (Interest) Act 1998. 
13  Whether this is a separate principle, or an aspect of the previous principle, I do not 
know.
14  One comes across references to other Arabic terms, but it may be (I do not know) that 
all such other terms boil down to one of the three mentioned in the text.
 Islamic Mortgages 305
partnership, this being called musharaka.15 Before looking at these, a few 
words on terminology.
(1) Terminology: “mortgage,” “debtor,” “lender”
Although the terms “Islamic mortgage” and, less commonly, “Halal 
mortgage” are in standard use, lenders offering these products tend to prefer 
the term “home purchase plan,” no doubt because the term “mortgage” 
suggests the existence of a contract of loan. (Still, the term “home purchase 
plan” does not work well, because it suggests that the finance is available 
only for house purchase. In fact it is also available where a person already 
owns property and wishes to raise money on the back of it.) For the same 
reason, the terms “debtor/borrower” and “creditor/lender” tend to be 
avoided. This is easily achieved, by using such terms as “the customer,” 
“the bank” etc. In this paper, however, this terminology is not adopted.16
(2) Workaround (i): ijara
In the first type of workaround, ijara, the lender acquires the property 
and leases it to the borrower for the mortgage term, such as 25 years. The 
contract confers on the borrower a right to acquire ownership at the end 
of the term. In short, the arrangement is one that, for moveables, would 
be called hire-purchase, though this analogy seems never to be remarked 
upon.17 Whether this method has been used to any extent in Scotland I do 
not know, but it is common in England. The entry in HM Land Registry 
shows the lender as owner, and shows the borrower as holding a registered 
lease.18 The lease is usually charged to the lender by the borrower, but one 
may wonder how much this really adds to the lender’s security, given that 
the lender has in any event the fee simple, coupled with all the rights of a 
landlord if a tenant is failing to pay the rent.
The “rent” covers both the interest and the capital payments. The rent 
does not relate to the value of the property, as would be the case in a genuine 
15  These three terms are variously transliterated.
16  And for convenience in this context I use the term “mortgage” even though it is not the 
right term for Scots law. I beg forgiveness.
17  Hire purchase is itself a workaround, arising from a different cause, namely the 
inadequacy of chattel mortgage law in England, and its complete absence in Scotland.
18  Except in the unusual case of a very short-term mortgage, where the lease term will be 
too short to be registrable.
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lease. For instance, a buyer who puts down a 50% deposit on the property 
would be paying less rent than a buyer of an identical property who puts 
down only a 30% deposit. The rent is reviewed periodically, but not in line 
with the changing value of the property, as would happen with a genuine 
rent, but in line with changing market interest rates. Typically the “rent” is 
linked either to LIBOR19 or to Bank of England lending rate. The aim is to 
achieve, as closely as possible, the effects of a conventional mortgage.
(3) Workaround (ii): murabaha
In the second type of workaround, murabaha,20 the lender buys the property 
and then immediately resells it to the borrower at a higher price, the price 
to be paid in instalments over a period of years. (15 years seems to be a 
common period for this kind of mortgage.) For instance, the property is 
bought by the lender for £200,000, and immediately resold to the borrower 
for £300,000.21 (The difference depends partly on the length of the mortgage 
term and partly on market interest rates at the time of the transaction.) 
This latter price is paid in instalments. At the end of the mortgage term, 
the lender conveys title to the borrower. The “price” is in reality, though 
not in name, a mix of two elements: capital repayments and interest. One 
drawback to this scheme is that the interest rate is non-variable, for the 
re-sale price is fixed at the outset. 
I have said that there is first a transfer by the original seller to the lender, 
and a later transfer by the lender to the borrower. But one could imagine 
a modified structure, whereby there are at the outset two transfers, one 
by the original seller to the lender, followed (perhaps the next day) by the 
transfer by the lender to the borrower, coupled with a mortgage back to 
the lender by the borrower. But whether this happens at all in practice I do 
not know. Finally, while this type of mortgage is used in England, I am not 
aware that there has been any use of it in Scotland.
19  London Interbank Offered Rate.
20  Also transliterated as murabahah.
21  This paper is about private law, not public law, but it may be noted that double tax 
is not payable: Land and Buildings Transaction Tax (Scotland) Act 2013 sch 7. These 
provisions reproduce ss 71A-73AB of the Finance Act 2003, the latter remaining in force 
south of the border. The exemptions apply not only to murabaha mortgages but to any 
Islamic mortgage involving double transfer.
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(4) Workaround (iii): musharaka
The third type of workaround is the musharaka,22 and this is of particular 
importance because my impression is that it is the main form in use in 
Scotland.23 The word means “partnership,” and the broad idea is that 
borrower and lender own the property as partners. It is, however, not a 
partnership in any sense of that term known to Scots (or English) law. Thus 
it is not a partnership at common law, or under the Partnership Act 1890, 
the Limited Partnerships Act 1907, or the Limited Liability Partnerships 
Act 2000. In what sense it could be described as a partnership in any sense 
of that word is not easy to see. Nevertheless this arrangement is marketed 
as being a partnership.
The only form that seems to be used in the UK is the “diminishing 
musharaka,” in which borrower and lender in some sense (see below) co-own 
the property, and the borrower buys the lender’s shares over a period of 
time, eventually ending up with 100%. In the meantime the borrower pays 
the lender interest on the diminishing balance, this interest taking the 
nominal form of rent. As in a conventional “repayment mortgage,” the 
borrower’s periodical payments to the lender include both capital and 
interest, the latter being named rent. As with the ijara mortgage, the rent is 
kept under regular review, and is linked to LIBOR or to Bank of England 
rate. The diminishing musharaka mortgage seems to be the main form of 
Islamic mortgage in use in Scotland.
Transferring a slice of ownership from lender to borrower every month 
or quarter or year would be awkward and expensive, and whilst numerous 
websites say that that is what happens, I am sceptical. The diminishing 
musharaka is the only type of Islamic mortgage where I have been able to 
study the documentation in detail. I am very much obliged to the Islamic 
Bank of Britain plc, which seems to have the main share of this area of 
finance in Scotland, for providing me with that documentation. What 
happens (at least under the IBB’s Scottish documentation) is that the 
property is held by the debtor as trustee, and the borrower and lender 
have beneficial interests under the trust. As the borrower gradually repays 
22  Also transliterated as musharakah.
23  I am most grateful to the Islamic Bank of Britain plc for providing me with its full style 
documentation for Islamic mortgages in Scotland. 
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the lender, the beneficial shares change, until eventually the borrower 
has a 100% share of the beneficial interest. As in the other types of Islamic 
mortgage, the regular payments are in substance payments of capital plus 
interest. The interest is called an “occupancy payment.” There is a standard 
security over the property in favour of the bank. Though this is granted by 
the debtor as trustee (for title is held as trustee) it secures the obligations 
owed by the debtor as an individual. Thus in property law terms, this has 
the same structure as a conventional standard security: ownership held 
by the borrower, and a subordinate real right of security is held by the 
lender. Once the borrower has acquired 100% of the beneficial interest, the 
bank discharges the standard security. Of the three types, the diminishing 
musharaka comes the nearest to being the same as a conventional mortgage 
in everything but name.
In England, by contrast, it seems that title is usually vested in the lender, 
with the lender then granting a lease to the borrower in respect of the 
lender’s beneficial share of the property. The difference between this and 
ijara is perhaps not clear to those not expert in Islamic theology.
E.  Shared Risk?
It is commonly said that in Islamic finance there must be risk-sharing. 
This statement as such is not very informative, since in all finance there 
is risk-sharing: in a conventional loan, the borrower runs the risk of not 
being able to pay, with unfortunate consequences, and the lender runs 
the risk of not being paid, also with unfortunate consequences. “Sharia-
compliant mortgages mean that the bank and the borrower share the risks 
of repayment rather than charging any form of interest.”24 As far as I can 
see that is not true. If the borrower defaults, the bank sells the property 
and takes what is due. If there is a shortfall, the borrower remains liable. 
I cannot be sure that this is universally the position: that would require 
more research than I have been able to undertake. But it may be noted 
that the more a financial deal protects the borrower, the more expensive 
it is going to be.
It seems that in an Islamic mortgage the lender and borrower are 
supposed to share the burden of maintenance, presumably on the basis 
of risk-sharing. But again this can be circumvented. For instance in the 
24  See above.
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IBB documentation, the borrower is bound to maintain the property, and 
the bank the binds itself to pay the borrower the “service change amount” 
(defined as “the expenses incurred by you in providing the services” – that 
is, maintaining the property). But at the same time any such amount is 
automatically met by a “supplemental occupancy payment” due by the 
borrower to the bank, which is of precisely the same amount.25 There is also 
an obligation on the borrower to insure the property. (How that fits in with 
the prohibition of insurance in Shari’a law I do not know.)
F.  The 20-Year Issue
The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 1974 provided that residential leases could 
not be for longer than 20 years.26 That is a problem if an Islamic mortgage 
involves a lease, as in the ijara, and the term of the loan is over 20 years. How 
significant the problem is depends to some extent on how one interprets 
the rather complex provisions of the 1974 Act. It seems that the rule has in 
fact been a reason why there has (as it seems) been little attempt to use ijara 
mortgages in Scotland, though it should be noted that the rule in the 1974 
Act does not affect non-residential property. In the IBB documentation 
for “diminishing musharaka” the interest is labelled not “rent” but an 
“occupancy payment” and one imagines that the 1974 Act is the reason for 
that terminology. Whether such words make any difference is perhaps 
open to debate: for instance in an English case in 1985 the House of Lords 
held that language designed to prevent an agreement being characterised 
as a lease will fail in its purpose if the agreement is in reality a lease.27 There 
is an irony here: in the 1985 case an arrangement that was in reality a lease 
was being dressed up in the documentation as not being a lease: in (some 
types of) Islamic mortgages what is in reality not a lease is being dressed 
up in the documentation as being a lease. Although one might speculate 
as to what would happen if a court were to say that “occupancy payment” 
means rent, with the result that the 1974 Act is engaged, that is surely 
unlikely since (unlike the 1985 case) the underlying intention of the parties 
is not a tenancy anyway.
25  This is, at least, how I understand the documentation. The documentation is sometimes 
unclear to me, but the same is true of the documentation for conventional secured loans.
26  Sections 8-10. Some exceptions were introduced by the Housing (Scotland) Act 2010 s 
138 but the basic rule remains. It may be added that the 1974 Act did not apply to pre-
existing leases.
27  Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809.
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The period of 20 years crops up quite often in property law, and one 
such instance is the rule that a standard security is redeemable after 20 
years regardless of the terms of the agreement.28 It is occasionally suggested 
that this rule might have negative consequences for Islamic mortgages, but 
in fact the rule has no greater significance for Islamic mortgages than it 
does for conventional mortgages,29 and accordingly nothing more will be 
said here.
G.  The “Lease between Co-owners” Issue
If property is co-owned, it cannot be leased to one of the co-owners.30 
Whilst this is a background issue worth noting, its importance for Islamic 
mortgages is probably limited. In the first place, in Islamic mortgages it 
does not seem that the property is in fact co-owned between borrower 
and lender (despite what one reads on the internet): as far as I can see 
title is always held (in Scotland at least) either by the borrower (solely) or 
by the lender (solely). In the second place, the rule does not prevent an 
arrangement whereby one co-owner has exclusive occupation, paying the 
others a periodical sum in return. That is perfectly possible: the rule merely 
says that such an arrangement is not a lease. Finally, it is perhaps open to 
debate how the rule would work out if something called a “lease” were to 
be entered into between those holding the beneficial interest under a trust. 
But as has been said, that seems to be rare or unknown in Scottish Islamic 
mortgages.
H.  The “Only by Standard Security” Issue
In the years before 1970, the usual way of securing a loan over heritable 
property was the “ex facie absolute disposition.” Here title was vested in 
the lender, and the debtor’s right was a contractual: to occupy the property, 
and, after paying off the loan, with interest, to have the property conveyed 
to him/her. In the language of Roman law, this was fiducia cum creditore. 
28  Land Tenure Reform (Scotland) Act 1974 s 11. The Housing (Scotland) Act 2014 s 93 
confers power on the Scottish Ministers to alter this period.
29  That is also the view of the Scottish Government. See Scottish Government, Consultation 
on Proposals to Exempt Certain Heritable Securities from the “20 Year Security Rule” 
(2014), available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0046/00461603.pdf
30  Clydesdale Bank v Davidson 1998 SC (HL) 51.
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The arrangement could happen in either of two ways. In the first place, 
Donald Debtor might own the property and then convey it to a lender. 
In the second place, and this was commoner in practice, it was used as 
acquisition finance: Donald Debtor wanted to buy a house, and would 
conclude missives, but would direct the seller to convey, not to him, but 
to his lender. 
There was thus a gap between substantive reality (debtor = in reality 
owner, bank = in reality merely secured lender) and legal reality (bank = 
owner, debtor = contractual occupier). This came to be seen as undesirable. 
The Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970 did two things.31 
First, it created a new form of heritable security, the standard security. 
Secondly, it banned the ex facie absolute disposition. The reform took 
root. Standard securities remain with us to this day, and ex facie absolute 
dispositions are now just a memory for the old and not even a memory 
for the young. As a result, few today remember the prohibition. The 
prohibition is phrased briefly:32
A grant of any right over land or a real right in land for the purpose of 
securing any debt by way of a heritable security shall only be capable of 
being effected at law33 if it is embodied in a standard security. Where for 
the purpose last-mentioned any deed which is not in the form of a standard 
security contains a disposition or assignation of land or of a real right in land, 
it shall to that extent be void and unenforceable...
This prohibition seems to strike at some types of Islamic mortgage, where 
heritable property is granted in security of a debt, otherwise than by standard 
security. An argument could be set up that the statutory prohibition affects 
only grants by debtor to creditor, and that grants by a third party to the 
creditor are unaffected, which would be the state of affairs, for the ijara and 
the murabaha, in acquisition finance, i.e. where Donald Debtor is seeking to 
buy property and asks the seller to convey to the bank. This is not the place 
31  To speak of just “two things” is of course to oversimplify.
32  Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970 s 9(3) and part of (4). It is quoted 
here in its amended form. The contrast between the brevity of this prohibition and the 
prolixity of the 1974 prohibition of long leases over residential property is striking.
33  Though not pertinent to this paper, I cannot resist mentioning that these two words (“at 
law”) have always puzzled me. Presumably they were included for some purpose. At 
law – as opposed to what? Equity? This is not entirely a joke. Note that the passage says 
“at law” not “in law.” English equity lawyers use the contrasting terms “at law” and “in 
equity.”
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to discuss that argument;34 I will only mention that in 1970 it was taken for 
granted that the statutory prohibition applied to both types of case, with 
the result that the ex facie absolute disposition wholly disappeared. 
The issue is most serious for the ijara: this seems to be exactly the sort of 
thing that the section 9 prohibition was aimed at. As for the murabaha, the 
argument is a good deal weaker, because although the property is conveyed 
to the creditor, it is then immediately conveyed to the debtor. What about 
the diminishing musharaka? If the typical English form were adopted, 
whereby title is vested in the bank, the section 9 prohibition would seem 
to apply, but, as mentioned, this form does not seem common in Scotland. 
Might the section 9 prohibition apply to the form described above, used 
in Scotland? The property itself is not granted to the bank in security of a 
debt, so probably the section 9 prohibition is not engaged. However, the 
wording of the section 9 prohibition is broad, and could be read as covering 
even the grant, by way of security, of even a beneficial share of property. 
It might be said that the section 9 prohibition is irrelevant to Islamic 
finance, because the section 9 prohibition is about security for loan finance, 
and Islamic mortgages do not use the contract of loan. That argument 
does not work. Section 9 is not tied to loans but to “debt,”35 and all Islamic 
mortgages use debt.
Finally on this subject, the section 9 prohibition is not some quirky fossil 
rule. There is a strong argument of public policy in its favour: that for the 
owner of heritable property to be the party that is in reality merely a lender, 
is an unacceptable subterfuge: the transaction should show its face.
I.  The Consumer Protection Issue
Consumer protection is one of the themes of modern law. Consumers 
are protected36 in credit transactions, in tenancy agreements, in standard 
securities and in many other areas. In a conventional mortgage, consumers 
are protected in a number of ways, including the provisions of the 
Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) 1970, as amended over 
34  Discussion of section 9 would take a paper to itself. It is curious that, as far as I know, it 
has never been subject to any published examination in detail. Furthermore, the report 
that led to section 9 said rather little about it. (Report on Conveyancing Legislation and 
Practice (Cmnd 3118: 1966), chaired by Robert’s great predecessor, Jack Halliday.)
35  Defined in the broadest way: s 9(8)(c).
36  The quality of the protection is of course open to debate, but that cannot be discussed 
here.
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the years. Are Islamic mortgages subject to the same level of consumer 
protection as conventional mortgages? In the case where title is vested in 
the debtor, and the creditor’s enforcement rights are based on a standard 
security, the answer would seem to be affirmative. But in those structures 
where title is held by the lender,37 consumer protection is weakened. The 
modern law on protecting mortgage debtors is based on the assumption 
that what is involved is a standard security.38 If there is no standard 
security, and title is held by the bank, the consumer protection provisions 
are not engaged. If the structure is that of an ijara mortgage, the creditor has 
title and the debtor has a lease; that may engage the consumer protection 
provisions of lease law, but the protections are not the same. In murabaha it 
is not apparent to me that there would be any protection at all, apart from 
generic consumer credit protection.
J.  Second Mortgages
Property can be encumbered by more than one standard security. Indeed, 
there is in theory no limit to the number that can be granted, though I do not 
recall ever having seen more than four. Subject to one or two qualifications, 
they rank by order of creation of the real right, which is to say by date 
of registration. There is no conceptual difficulty about multiple standard 
securities, for the groundwork lies in the theory of property law that we 
have inherited from the civilian tradition: the grant of a subordinate real 
right leaves ownership where it was. One of the drawbacks of the old ex 
facie absolute disposition was that second mortgages were problematic. A 
workaround was created whereby the debtor’s personal right to a future 
conveyance (after paying off the loan) was assigned by way of security. 
The same problems, and indeed perhaps even more intractable, would 
arise for Islamic mortgages where title is held by the lender. Whether some 
workaround would be possible, I do not know. If it is not possible, that is a 
negative. If it is possible, it would inevitably be artificial and cumbersome, 
as was the case with the old ex facie absolute disposition.39 Even where 
37  Structures that may fall foul of the section 9 prohibition (see above).
38  Much the same is true I think in English law.
39  Given the problems with the old ex facie absolute disposition, it may be wondered why 
it was in such common use until 1970. The short answer is that although there were 
alternatives, whereby the creditor had a subordinate real right and the substantive 
owner was also the legal owner (as in a standard security), these alternatives had 
significant technical disadvantages.
314 The Future of Property Law
title is not held by the lender, there would be problems. Thus in the IBB 
diminishing musharaka the registered owner is the debtor but qua trustee, 
the beneficial interest being divided between debtor and lender. How one 
could pin a second mortgage on to that I am is unclear to me.
K.  Insolvency Risk
In a conventional mortgage, the possible future insolvency of the creditor 
is not a risk for the debtor. If Donald Debtor borrows £100,000 from the 
Bank of Unst, Fetlar and Yell,40 secured by standard security, and in the 
next financial crisis the bank becomes insolvent, and, like Lehman Brothers, 
is allowed to collapse, Donald Debtor is not sucked into that collapse, 
because he owns his property. That is one of the benefits of the system of 
subordinate real rights. But if property is owned by Bank of Unst, Fetlar 
and Yell, Donald has a problem.41 The subject is complex, involving, among 
other things, the question of whether Donald can successfully argue that 
the bank owns the property as implied, or as constructive, trustee. That 
issue would require a whole paper to itself. I merely note it here as another 
example of the problems that may arise from adopting an artificial structure.
L.  Impediments?
Holyrood:
S2W-16368 – Brian Adam (Aberdeen North) (SNP) (Date Lodged Tuesday, 
May 10, 2005): 
To ask the Scottish Executive whether any impediments exist in Scots law 
to the provision of Islamic mortgages and, if so, what action it will take to 
remove these.
Answered by Hugh Henry (Thursday, May 19, 2005): 
The Scottish Executive is not aware of any impediment in Scots law which 
prevents the provision of Islamic mortgages.
40  Actually too good a name to waste of a mere bank, I’m sure you’ll agree, Robert. In 
future this will be a law firm. Everyone who knew them agrees that Messrs Unst, Fetlar 
and Yell (all LLB (Glas)) not only had a sound knowledge of the law of Scotland, but 
were shrewd men of business, whose success in legal practice was affected neither by 
Mr Unst’s occasional grumpiness, nor by Mr Yell’s excitable disposition.
41  Which, however, is not the case for the IBB Scottish mortgage.
 Islamic Mortgages 315
An answer that has the merit of brevity. Given what has already been said 
in this paper, there is no need here to discuss the answer substantively, but 
something should be said about the question. “Impediment”? The word 
suggests something undesirable. Someone (such as myself) with the view 
that Islamic mortgages, when compared with conventional mortgages, 
might be undesirable, would not use such language. 
M.  Conclusion
Islamic mortgages aim at the same practical reality as conventional 
mortgages. Different words are used, to conceal the reality. That, at least, 
is how it seems to me. If interest-bearing mortgages are a bad thing, then 
Islamic mortgages are a bad thing, for Islamic mortgages are, apart from 
the wrapping, interest-bearing mortgages. But if, on the other hand, 
interest-bearing mortgages are not a bad thing, then it is better that they 
should be done in an open manner, and not by artificial means, producing 
both complexity and pitfalls. And finally, whilst I am no expert in Islamic 
theology, I note that those who do have such expertise frequently criticise 
Islamic mortgages as being mere shams.42 What they say (albeit that I do 
not subscribe to Islam) makes more sense to me than the promotional 
brochures and videos of the institutions that offer what they call Shari’a-
compliant finance, brochures and videos that the mainstream media and 
politicians should have a slightly more critical attitude towards.
42  Here is a sample: (i) http://www.islamicawakening.com/viewarticle.php?articleID=1291; 
(ii) http://sunnahonline.com/library/contemporary-issues/115-islamic-ijara-mortgages-
by-hsbc-and-other-banks; (iii) http://www.islamicmortgages.co.uk/index.php?id=258; 
(iv) http://www.islamicparty.com/commonsense/hlmort.htm

16. Completion of the Land 




Scotland can lay claim to the world’s oldest, still running, public property 
register. Dating from 1617,1 the Register of Sasines has witnessed the 
industrial revolution, the extension of the franchise and the spread of 
property ownership. It is a real success story; the authors of the Act got 
it right first time, and deed registration became a concept which was 
subsequently adopted, in various guises, across the world.
Scotland also has one of the most recent land registration systems 
by international standards. The Land Register was a late introduction 
to Scotland: the Land Registration (Scotland) Act 1979 (“the 1979 Act”) 
commenced in 1981, albeit only for the operational county of Renfrew.2 
It took a further 22 years before the Land Register was extended to all 
registration counties in Scotland.3 The 1979 Act has enabled the registration 
1  Registration Act 1617.
2  Land Registration (Scotland) Act 1979 (Commencement n 1) Order 1980, SI 1980/1412.
3  The Land Registration (Scotland) Act 1979 (Commencement n 16) Order 2002, SI 
2002/432, brought on to the Land Register the registration counties of Banff, Moray, 
Nairn, Ross and Cromarty, Caithness, Sutherland and Orkney and Zetland.
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of over 1.5 million properties in Scotland but it has not been without 
challenge or criticism.
One commentator scathingly described the Act as “having all the 
intellectual sharpness of mashed potato.”4 Consequently, within 12 years 
of the 1979 Act operating throughout Scotland (though doubts persisted as 
to whether or not it also extended to Scotland’s seabed as well as its land), 
it has been reformed and replaced, subject to transitional provisions, by the 
Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012 (“the 2012 Act”).
One of the key policy aims that lay behind the 2012 Act was enabling 
the completion of the Land Register. No timescale for completion was 
provided in the Act, though the Economy, Energy and Tourism Committee 
recommended the “setting of a target and interim targets, even if 
aspirational, on the face of the Bill.”5 This was not an approach that found 
favour with the Minister responsible for the Bill.6 However, other factors 
have subsequently influenced Scottish Ministers to set a timescale for 
completion. 
In May 2014 the final report of the Land Reform Review Group was 
presented to Scottish Ministers.7 Established by the Scottish Government 
in May 2012, the ground had a remit to consider a broad spectrum of land 
reform issues. One of the areas it considered was coverage of the Land 
Register and it recommended that:8
…the Scottish Government should be doing more to increase the rate of 
registrations to completion of the Register, a planned programme to register 
public lands and additional triggers to induce the first registration of other 
lands.
Following consideration of that report, Paul Wheelhouse MSP, the Minister 
for Environment and Climate Change, made the following announcement:9
Along with my colleague Enterprise Minister Fergus Ewing, I have asked 
Registers of Scotland to prepare to complete land registration within 10 
years, with all public land registered within five years.
4  Professor George Gretton commenting on Kaur v Singh: see 1997 SCLR 1075 at 1085.
5  Scottish Parliament Official Report, Economy, Energy and Tourism Committee, 6 Mar 
2012, col 58.
6  Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Bill: Economy, Energy and Tourism Committee Stage 
1 Report – Scottish Government Response (2012).
7  Land Reform Review Group, The Land of Scotland and the Common Good (2014).
8  Para 32.
9  Scottish Government, “Target Set to Register all Scotland’s Land” (news release), 25 
May 2014.
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So, some 33 years since land registration was introduced to Scotland, we 
now have a target for completing the Land Register by the end of 2024. This 
essay seeks to offer a definition of completion, considers the contrasting 
approaches to completion under both the 1979 Act and the 2012 Act, 
compares these with the English and Welsh experience and asks whether 
or not the legal tools exist to enable completion within the ten year target.
B.  The Case for Completion
Setting aside discussion over the timescale for completion, the suggestion 
that a completed Land Register is desirable is likely to be met with general 
approval. That was certainly the emphasis of the evidence provided to 
the Economy, Energy and Tourism committee. They reported that there 
“was overwhelming support from witnesses for a Land Register that is 
reliable, secure and accessible and for the eventual closure of the Register 
of Sasines.”10
The arguments in favour of a completed Land Register have been well 
rehearsed in recent years. The Scottish Law Commission (SLC) succinctly 
stated that “the short answer is that the Land Register is better than the 
Register of Sasines”11 and then detailed why this was so. Similarly the 
Consultation Document on completion of the Land Register12 (“the 
completion consultation document”) lists the benefits. Indeed, glancing 
south of the Border, the website of Her Majesty’s Land Registry (HMLR)13 
also lists near identical reasons why registration in the Land Register and 
the aim of a completed register is so desirable. So, what are the reasons?
The completion consultation document sets out four compelling reasons: 
transparency, cost, efficiency and national asset. Transparency is self-
evident. A map-based register of title to land makes for simple interrogation 
and so provides ease of access to information on who owns Scotland. That, 
in turn, reduces the costs associated with examination of titles: it takes less 
10  Scottish Parliament, Official Report, Economy, Energy and Tourism Committee, 6 Mar 
2012, col 19.
11  Scottish Law Commission, Report on Land Registration (Scot Law Com n 222, 2012) vol 
1 para 33.17.
12  Registers of Scotland, Completion of the Land Register Public Consultation (2014). 
13  Land Registry, Practice Guide 1: First Registrations (2003) para 1.2, available at http://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/first-registrations/practice-guide-1-first-
registrations. One additional advantage they list is making large holdings of land and 
portfolios of charges more readily marketable. 
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time and effort to examine an entry on the Land Register than it does if a 
property is held under title deeds on the Sasine Register. Added to this, the 
SLC has highlighted14 the growing issue that some younger conveyancers 
may not have the requisite knowledge of the workings of Sasine titles.
For a country of Scotland’s size, it is inefficient to have two property 
registers. The Land Register makes it easier to transact with property, 
which in turn, facilitates the property market and makes Scotland attractive 
to foreign investment. At a macro level, transparency, ease of access and 
the guarantee of title adds value to the economy. That fits with the final 
reason provided by the completion consultation document for a completed 
Land Register being a national asset. Knowing who owns Scotland and 
having access to that information supports those public and private bodies 
and companies whose administrative and business activities require 
use of accurate title information. The Land Reform Review Group also 
commented15 on the difficulties of having an informed discussion on land 
reform and land use in the absence of comprehensive information on land 
ownership in Scotland.
Though there is general consensus that a completed Land Register 
would be an unqualified positive for Scotland, the fact the journey to that 
end is set against the backdrop of a near 400-year old deeds register is 
to our advantage. It is more helpful to have two property registers than 
to simply have one incomplete Land Register. If a property is not on the 
Land Register, there is a very high chance it will rest on deeds in the Sasine 
Register. In short, except for an indeterminate but expected low volume of 
properties not on either register, it is generally possible, albeit at times with 
difficulty, to identify the title deed or potential title deed that relates to an 
area of land. 
Contrast that with England and Wales. There is one national property 
register, Her Majesty’s Land Register (“HMLR”), but it is not yet complete. 
Approximately 15% of the land mass of England and Wales is not on 
HMLR.16 Tracking information on non-registered land is anything but 
straightforward; there may be some information in local registers or there 
may simply be no information available. So, as much as there are solid 
reasons for completing Scotland’s Land Register, we should recognise that 
14  Scottish Law Commission, Report on Land Registration (n 11) vol 1 para 33.18.
15  Land Reform Review Group, The Land of Scotland and the Common Good (n 7) Ch 23.
16  HM Land Registry, Annual Report and Accounts 2013/14 (2014) 43.
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other jurisdictions with incomplete Land Registers may look at us with 
envy over the continuing safety net that an old deeds register can provide. 
C.  What Constitutes Completion?
In being asked to complete the register within ten years, it is clearly 
essential that the Keeper sets out what this entails. This allows progress 
to be monitored and expectations to be managed. There are various 
interpretations that can be suggested. 
First, completing the Land Register could be viewed as achieved when 
the Sasine Register is closed to new deeds of any type. RoS estimates that 
there are some 1.1 million property titles17 remaining in the Sasine Register. 
The rate at which titles transfer from the Sasine Register to the Land 
Register has averaged at an annual rate of 40,270 first registrations over 
the last ten years.18 On the designated commencement day for the 2012 Act, 
8 December 2014 (“the designated day”), the Sasine Register closed to all 
dispositions. Over the last ten years, an average of 22,850 dispositions have 
been recorded each year in the Sasine Register.19
The 2012 Act contains powers under section 48(2) and (3) which, if used 
in full, could have the effect of closing the Sasine Register to all deeds. The 
mechanics and practicalities of this are discussed later. Of course that would 
not make the Sasine Register redundant; it would simply up the pace with 
which properties transfer on to the Land Register. In 2013-14 some 35,000 
deeds were recorded in the Sasine Register, affecting an estimated 25,000 
different properties and interests in land.20 Notwithstanding the increased 
pace with which properties would move on to the Land Register, the fact 
remains that the two property registers would continue to co-exist for 
potentially many decades. So, closure of the Sasine Register to new deeds 
would not equate with a completed Land Register.
Secondly, taking the first interpretation a step further, completion 
could be viewed as achieved when all properties and interests held on title 
deeds recorded in the Sasine Register are brought on to the Land Register. 
Unquestionably that would be a significant achievement, as it would enable 
the Sasine Register to take a well-earned retirement amongst Scotland’s 
17  Registers of Scotland (RoS) estimates, current as of November 2014. 
18  Based on Land Register intake figures from April 2004-March 2014.
19  Sasine Register Minute Book entries April 2004-March 2013.
20  Sasine Register Minute Book April 2013-March 2014.
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national archives. However in terms of Scotland’s new Cadastral Map 
there would still be gaps. In land registration parlance, there would still be 
tracts of land without a red edge delineating ownership boundaries. There 
would still be unregistered land and so the Land Register would not be 
complete. 
Thirdly, the most comprehensive interpretation of completion 
combines interpretations (i) and (ii) and seeks to add to that the remaining 
unregistered land. That would provide a complete cadastral map for 
Scotland reflecting ownership of land, identifying long leases over land and 
also detailing ownership of separate tenements in that land. It is currently 
impossible to ascertain the full extent of land that does not fall within either 
the Land Register or the Sasine Register. Within RoS we have anecdotal 
knowledge of some such land, for example the original land holdings of St 
Andrews University and some City of Edinburgh Council land holdings 
in Edinburgh’s Old Town. The full extent of unregistered land will only 
become apparent when all properties and interests held on title deeds 
recorded in the Sasine Register are in turn registered in the Land Register. 
Much of this land will have seen ownership transferred via charters and 
deeds that were executed prior to the establishment of the Sasine Register. 
It is also possible that some of this land will have been gifted as common 
good land, may be undivided commonty or may, if never alienated, remain 
with the Crown.
It is also inevitable that some of this notionally unregistered land will 
ultimately trace back to titles on the Sasine Register that were considered 
to have previously transferred to the Land Register. This is not surprising; 
aside from the difficulties in interpreting often vague Sasine deed 
descriptions, the prescribed application form21 for a first registration under 
the 1979 Act invites the applicant to advise if they will accept the Land 
Register boundaries reflecting the occupied extent where that is less than 
the legal extent as set out in the deeds. Whilst this provision can often 
resolve what would otherwise be a boundary issue with a neighbouring 
property that also includes the same area within its title deeds, there are 
instances where slithers of land excluded from Land Register titles will not 
fall into any other titles.
An applicant may choose not to include land outwith their physical 
boundaries (fence, hedge etc.) within the Land Register title. This may 
21  Land Register (Scotland) Rules 2006, SSI 2006/485, r 9(i)(a) (Part B question 2(a)).
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satisfy the expectations of a purchaser in a first registration transaction but 
it does mean that the seller may remain, unwittingly in most cases, the 
owner of the excluded interest. It is not uncommon for such slithers to 
be considered abandoned and unused by anyone or to be possessed as 
part of a neighbouring property extent without being contained within the 
legal title for that property. Identifying and resolving these unintended 
consequences of the operation of land registration under the 1979 Act will 
be challenging, though it may be that the new 2012 Act provisions for 
prescriptive claimants22 will provide a vehicle for bringing some of these 
strips of land on to the Land Register. 
The completion consultation document sets the bar high. It favours the 
comprehensive interpretation. It is noted that even if this point is achieved, 
the cadastral map will not remain unchanged; it is a living map and 
registered extents will change to reflect sub-divisions and amalgamations 
of property.
D.  Completion: Achievable or Unattainable?
All three of the above possible interpretations talk in terms of absolutes 
when considering what could constitute completion. The question that 
arises is whether or not it is practical to talk in terms of absolutes or is that 
an aspiration that is simply too high. The answer depends in large part on 
whether or not legal powers exist to enable completion or not. If the legal 
powers do exist, and there is a political commitment to maximising the 
use and effect of those powers, then absolute completion is not a forlorn 
aspiration. Equally, starting from a position whereby legal powers on their 
own would not be sufficient to achieve completion would suggest that any 
target ought to be more modest.
(1) England and Wales: the comprehensive register
There has long been an unsubstantiated anecdotal view amongst RoS 
registration staff that HMLR must be near completion. That view was 
informed by two factors (three if you include the absence of any research): 
first, the awareness that the Land Register stems from 1862,23 and secondly 
the application of a little relative mathematics. The argument runs that if 
22  Land Registration etc (Scotland) Act 2012, ss 43-45.
23  Land Registry Act 1862.
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the Land Register has been in existence for over 150 years, it must be near 
complete if our own Land Register has 58%24 of properties on it after a mere 
33 years. Set in the context of a pub quiz for land registrars, it is doubtful 
if many would correctly answer 54.5% if asked to estimate the end March 
200625 figure for land mass coverage of England and Wales. Clearly, our 
view has been wrong.
It has taken a considerable period of time for their Land Register to 
gain traction. Although the Land Registry Act 1862 established a land 
register for England and Wales, it did not back its introduction with any 
element of direct or indirect compulsion. Consequently, by 1868, only 507 
titles were registered. The need for compulsion was recognised, albeit in 
a less than robust fashion by the Land Transfer Act of 1897; local counties 
could still veto the introduction of compulsory registration.26 As a result, 
adoption was slow.27
Compulsion was to the fore in the Land Registration Act 1925, as 
provision was made for the Sovereign, by Order in Council, to make 
registration following a sale compulsory in any area.28 It is reported that 
forecasts at the time suggested that compulsory registration would be 
extended to all areas by 1955. This was not to be and the remaining 14 areas 
were not brought within the ambit of the Land Registry until 1 December 
1990.29 At this point there were some 12.7 million registered titles whereas 
now there are some 23.8 million.30 Before the introduction of computer 
mapping the Land Registry was not able to work out the percentage of 
land registered. So, the fully-operational English and Welsh Land Register 
is only some 13 years ahead of our own wholly-operational Land Register. 
HMLR do now have a considerably more comprehensive range of legal 
triggers for registration, referred to under section 4 of the Land Registration 
24  Registers of Scotland, Completion of the Land Register Public Consultation (n 12).
25  Land Register, Annual Report and Accounts 2005/06 (2006) 14.
26  Under s 20(5)-(6), the Registry had to give 6 months’ notice to the council concerned 
and if within 3 months the Council held a meeting with at least two thirds of councillors 
present that rejected compulsory registration, then the order could not be made.
27  In 1899 London County Council became the first area to adopt compulsory registration 
following a sale. An attempt to pass a motion to prevent this under s 20(6) was defeated 
by 73 votes to 35 (The Times, 16 Feb 1898).
28  Land Registration Act 1925 s 120.
29  Registration of Title Order 1989, SI 1987/1347, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
uksi/1989/1347/contents/made. These were the districts of Babergh, Castle Point, Forest 
Heath, Leominster, Maldon, Malvern Hills, Mid Suffolk, Rochford, St Edmundsbury, 
South Herefordshire, Suffolk Coastal, Tendring, Wychavon and Wyre Forest.
30  HM Land Registry, Annual Report and Accounts 2013/14 (n 16) 11.
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Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”) as the “requirement of registration.” The 
approach under section 4 is to specify a comprehensive list of events, on the 
occurrence of which the title must be registered. In contrast to Scotland, the 
2002 Act specifies that registration must occur within a specified time limit; 
namely two months from the date on which the trigger event occurred.31 
The penalty for non-compliance is severe: the transfer or grant or creation 
becomes void “as regards the transfer, grant or creation of a legal estate.”32 
So trigger events will result in registration.
As in Scotland, the triggers that generate large volumes of registration 
applications are the transfer of a freehold estate or a lease for valuable or 
other consideration or by way of gift. A lengthy list of other triggers is 
provided for, some of which have proved to be significant in generating 
registration and countering circumstances where registration may 
otherwise be avoided. As an example of the former, compulsory registration 
applies on the creation by the owner of an estate in unregistered land of a 
protected first legal mortgage33 unless it is a mortgage of a lease with no 
more than seven years to run. (A protected first legal mortgage is defined 
as one that, on creation, ranks in priority ahead of other mortgages affecting 
the mortgaged estate).
The latter is illustrated by the requirement for registration on what is 
termed an assent, including a vesting assent.34 So the transfer by a trustee 
or executor to a beneficiary would necessitate registration; this is aimed 
at countering the situation that occurs in Scotland whereby properties 
can pass through generations of the same family without any impact 
on the property registers. Because of the way in which HMLR captures 
management information it has not been possible to obtain accurate figures 
to illustrate the impact of these triggers. Discussion with senior HMLR staff 
suggest both have had a major affect in triggering registration.35
There are two other legal vehicles open to HMLR to further completion. 
The Lord Chancellor may “add to the events on the occurrence of which 
the requirement of registration applies such relevant event as he may 
31  Land Registration Act 2002 s 6.
32  2002 Act s 7(1).
33 Ibid s 4(1)(g).
34  Ibid s 4(1)(a)(ii).
35  John Peaden, Director of Operations. A sampling survey on first registration cases 
marked off on 1 September 2014 from Birkenhead, Coventry, Croydon, Durham, Fylde, 
Gloucester, Hull, Leicester, Nottingham and Peterborough offices showed that 11% 
were triggered by the assent provision.
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specify in the order.”36 To date this power has been used once37 to extend 
compulsory registration to partitions and most deeds of appointment of 
new trustees. The only other legal tool available to HMLR is to promote 
voluntary registration and this has been used with effect.
In 2002, HMLR adopted as part of its corporate strategy the achievement 
of a “comprehensive register.”38 It was explained that a comprehensive 
land register:39
…will include the majority of freehold land forming the surface of England 
and Wales. The register need not necessarily include leasehold land 
although we would expect to register those leasehold interests where the 
leasehold interest is a valuable interest. The register need not include the 
seabed and the foreshore. Land where the owner cannot be identified 
and roads, rivers, and other physical features where ownership is not 
determined by registration. Also, rent charges and certain rights that can be 
registered (such as the right to fish or hold a market) need not be included 
in the comprehensive land register. However, we would still encourage the 
registration of all these Interests.
The choice of the term “comprehensive” reflected the challenge of 
completion and the acknowledgement that although the legal framework 
for determining when registration was compulsory was extensive, it would 
not by itself lead to all properties being registered and to achieve a significant 
increase in the properties and land mass on the Land Register other steps 
would be necessary. Those steps subsequently centred around a marketing 
campaign to promote and encourage voluntary registration. Incentives 
in the form of a lesser registration fee (25% reduction) and partnership 
working whereby Land Registry staff were embedded in organisations to 
help prepare applications were offered. That campaign ran until 2012, when 
the decision was taken not to actively market voluntary registrations. The 
workforce in HMLR had been reduced to match registration intakes and 
an assessment of the costs against the benefits of registering the remaining 
land mass was considered too high. The decision was taken to allow the 
trigger provisions to bring on the remainder of unregistered properties, 
though voluntary registration would still be available. 
36  Section 5 of the 2002 Act allows s 4 to be amended.
37  The Land Registration Act 2002 (Amendment) Order 2008, SI 2008/2872 which came 
into force on 6 Apr 2009. Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2008/2872/
introduction/made
38  See the 10 year Strategic Plan included in HM Land Registry, Annual Report and Accounts 
2002/03 (2003).
39  HM Land Registry, Public Consultation – The Comprehensive Land Register (2007) 10.
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The voluntary registration campaign was a success. By end March 2012, 
some 23.3 million registered titles existed, accounting for some 79% of 
the English and Welsh land mass.40 Notwithstanding that achieving the 
comprehensive register is no longer part of their corporate strategy, the 
land mass coverage has continued to grow; by end March 2014, some 84.3% 
had been registered.41 HMLR’s experience was positive and demonstrates 
that Scotland is perhaps sitting on an as yet untapped demand for voluntary 
registration. The volumes of voluntary and compulsory first registrations 
since 2007 are set out in the table below.42
Year Voluntary FR Comp FR Percent Voluntary
2007-08 94,879 235,492 28.7%
2008-09 205,201 166,767 55.2%
2009-10 125,307 148,333 45.8%
2010-11 91,037 144,065 40.4%
2011-12 58,945 127,328 31.6%
2012-13 51,001 126,108 28.8%
2013-14 39,002 129,626 23.1%
Total 665,372 1,077,719 38.2%
(2) Scotland: aiming for the complete Land Register
The focus of the 1979 Act was not on a completed Land Register. More 
immediate concerns were to the fore, such as introducing land registration 
to a jurisdiction where the Register of Sasines, and all the conveyancing 
practices associated with it, had been largely unchanged for some 360 years. 
The focus was rightly on introduction and not completion of the Land 
Register, a sentiment strongly to the fore in the earlier Reid and Henry 
Committee Reports.43 Notwithstanding that those reports acknowledged 
40  Land Registry, Annual Report and Accounts 2011/12 (2012).
41  HM Land Registry, Annual Report and Accounts 2013/14 (n 16).
42  Figures provided by HMLR and derived from annual reports.
43  Registration of Title to Land in Scotland (Cmnd 2032: 1963) (“the Reid Report”) and Scheme 
for the Introduction of Registration of Title to Land in Scotland (Cmnd 4137: 1969) (“the 
Henry Report”).
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the benefits of land registration they were both heavily influenced by the 
possible inconvenience that introduction could bring to those transacting 
with property and to the Keeper:44
To prevent dislocation of the work of the Keeper and his staff we suggest 
that the only practicable scheme is to begin introducing registration of title 
in one Division and then extend it to other Divisions from time to time as 
circumstances permit. We regard it as impracticable to require the titles of all 
properties in a Division to be registered within a limited time. We think that 
the best method would be to make registration of title compulsory on the 
first transfer for onerous consideration of any property within a designated 
Division, and to permit registration of title of any property within such 
Division at any other time if the owner applies for it.
In favour of such an approach, the committee cited two reasons:45
We do not think it would be reasonable to require an owner to incur the 
expense of registration except on such a transfer, when the title of the 
property will have to be examined in any event, and therefore the additional 
expense involved in registration of title will be small. Secondly, it would 
unduly increase the work of the staff in the Register House to require 
compulsory registration of title on other occasions.
The Henry Committee reached a similar conclusion.46 History has shown 
that their concerns were not overstated: extending land registration to all of 
Scotland, provisionally timetabled for nine years, ultimately took some 22. 
This elongated timescale, and the associated build-up of first registration 
casework that accompanied it, has done much to influence the scepticism 
with which a number of practitioners view the target of completion within 
ten years. 
The 1979 Act approach generally aligns with what were then the main 
routes on to the Land Register in England and Wales, namely a transfer 
for valuable consideration, grant of lease, or through the Keeper accepting 
a request for voluntary registration. One notable difference with the 
approach to registration in England and Wales is that the 1979 Act did not 
make any provision for a time period within which registration should 
take place after the occurrence of a particular trigger event. Consequently, 
registration is prima facie optional; section 2(1) provides that an unregistered 
interest in land “shall be registrable.” 
44  Registration of Title to Land in Scotland (n 43) para 91.
45  Ibid.
46  Scheme for the Introduction of Registration of Title to Land (n 43) para 11.
 Completion of the Land Register: The Scottish Approach 329
There is of course a sting in the tail should registration not be sought, 
for in the absence of registration no real right will be obtained. As the 
commentary to the Registration of Title Practice Book narrates, “the 
compulsitor is that there shall be no real right without registration.”47 
There are other factors driving the time frame in which registration ought 
to occur: limited company standard securities over registered land require 
registration in the Land Register before they can be registered in the Register 
of Charges.48 The protection afforded by letters of obligation and the new 
advance notices49 in effect set a time-frame within which registration will, 
in the main, occur.
Requests for voluntary registration were permissible under the 1979 
Act50 and the Keeper was given the discretion on whether or not to accept 
such a request. The criterion by which the Keeper should consider such 
a request is that of expediency. In practice, for the period from 1981 
through to the mid-2000s that criterion was tightly applied and voluntary 
registrations were rare. The emphasis was very much on the impact such 
a request would have on the Keeper and not on the needs of the applicant. 
As the Practice Book51 explains: “the Keeper does not normally accept 
voluntary registrations unless there are obvious benefits to him.” The 
main source of voluntary registrations related to transfers of a half pro 
indiviso share in a Sasine title. In those circumstances the Keeper would 
encourage voluntary registration of the remaining half share. The only 
other circumstance in which the Keeper would regularly accept a request 
was in connection with a builder or developer’s title for which individual 
plots were about to be sold.
The reason for the reluctance to accept requests was simple: RoS was not 
coping with the volume of trigger-based registrations and did not want to 
add to the time it would take to complete those registrations. The Keeper’s 
position began to change in the mid-2000s. There was growing acceptance 
that the balance of convenience was tipped too heavily in favour of the Keeper. 
A more relaxed and encouraging approach developed and culminated in a 
joint article52 by the current Keeper and Fergus Ewing MSP, the Minister for 
47  Registration of Title Practice Book, 1st edn (1981) para C02.
48  Companies Act 1985 s 410.
49  Section 58(1) of the 2012 Act provides an advance notice has effect for the period of 35 
days.
50  1979 Act s 2(1)(b).
51  Registration of Title Practice Book, 2nd edn (2000) para 2.9.
52  F Ewing and S Adams, “All aboard the Land Register,” 17 Oct 2011, available at http://
www.journalonline.co.uk/Magazine/56-10/1010324.aspx
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Energy Economy and Tourism, heralding an effective open door policy. The 
exceptions to that are limited and relate in the main to ongoing litigation 
affecting the property to which the request relates. In the last four years, RoS 
estimate that the volume of voluntary registrations has been in the region 
of 2000 applications per annum: about 4% of the overall volume of first 
registrations. That of course compares poorly with the volume of voluntary 
applications received by HMLR. The open door policy has been supported 
by some targeted marketing of voluntary registration, mostly around 
commercial and residential developers and large private estates. 
The 1979 Act was not wholly oblivious to the future. The Act states that 
Ministers may provide:53
…that interests in land of a kind or kinds specified in the order… shall be 
registered; and the provisions of this Act shall apply for the purposes of 
such registration with such modifications, which may include provision as 
to the expenses of such registration, as may be specified in the order.
The provision has not been used. Commentary in the Practice Book 
describes this provision somewhat dramatically as “machinery for the 
elimination of the Register of Sasines.”54 In a nod to the current discussion 
on funding completion, the then Government did indicate the costs of 
closing the Sasine Register would, other than in trigger situations, be borne 
by the public purse.55 
The problem with the 1979 Act approach is that it allowed for no middle 
ground. Triggers for registration were set in the legislation and no provision 
was made for the addition of further triggers. Instead, section 2(5) allowed 
Scottish Ministers to provide that at a certain point in time those remaining 
unregistered properties would be registered by the Keeper. Finding an 
explanation as to how this provision would work in practice is challenging. I 
am unaware of any detailed discussions within RoS as to its use and there were 
no plans to suggest to Ministers that it be used. Mindful of the costs associated 
with section 2(5), the Scottish Executive did suggest in 1999 that consideration 
of its use would be appropriate when most properties in a registration county 
had been registered through sale.56 It indicated that would be the case after 10 
to 15 years of land registration. That was an overly optimistic assessment of 
the pace of completion. In the event, the gap from a limited set of triggers to 
committing to full registration was considered a leap too far.
53  1979 Act s 2(5).
54  Registration of Title Practice Book, 1st edn (n 47) para C16.
55  HC Debs, First Scottish Standing Committee, 27 Mar 1979, col 13.
56  Scottish Executive, Land Reform: Proposals for Legislation (E/1999/1), Para 6.3.
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Without question, the 1979 Act has advanced completion. In just under 
34 years, some 1.5 million property titles have been registered, estimated at 
roughly 58% of all properties within Scotland.57 This is a not inconsiderable 
figure given that it was April 2003 before all of Scotland was operational 
under the Act. For the registration counties that were first on to the 
Land Register, the title coverage is way in excess of the Scottish average; 
Renfrew stands at 76% and Dumbarton at 74%.58 More recent converts to 
the Land Register, particularly those predominantly rural counties, have 
much less coverage. Both Ross & Cromarty and Caithness have fewest 
titles registered: an estimated 36%.59 This is not surprising. Properties in 
the more economically active and densely populated urban areas change 
hands more frequently than properties in rural areas. 
Under the 1979 Act triggers for registration, completion would simply 
not be achieved. Some properties never change hands and some transfer 
for no consideration. RoS forecast that registration counties would peak at 
around 90% title coverage based on the 1979 Act triggers.60 Achieving 90% 
coverage would vary from registration county to registration county:
Projected completion rate with no changes
57  Registers of Scotland, Completion of the Land Register Public Consultation (n 12) para 16.
58  RoS, figures accurate to end Mar 2014. 
59  Idem.
60  Registers of Scotland, Completion of the Land Register Public Consultation (n 12) para 26.
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Between now and 2030. RoS forecast that only five registration counties 
would potentially exceed 90% title coverage. The majority of counties 
would take to 2060 to see 90% title coverage and for some of the more rural 
counties, such as Ross and Cromarty and Banff we could be waiting for up 
to 100 years and more. In short, completion would simply not happen and 
therein lies the driver for the changes introduced by the 2012 Act. 
(3) The 2012 Act
The 2012 Act takes a markedly different approach to the bringing of 
properties on to the Land Register as compared with the 1979 Act. Not only 
does the Act provide the technical tools to further the goal of completion 
but underlying those technical provisions is a strategy to direct their use. 
The 2012 Act approach to registration moves away from the approach 
under the 1979 Act of listing transaction types the occurrence of which will 
require registration. Instead it lists those deeds to which the Register of 
Sasines is closed; the effect being that they must be registered in the Land 
Register.61 
In an Act concerned with completion one might suspect that the list 
would be extensive. On the contrary it is brief. On the designated day 
the specified deeds to which the Sasine Register is closed number three; 
disposition, lease and assignation of lease. The door to the Sasine Register 
is left slightly ajar for those dispositions where recording in the Sasine 
Register is necessary for purposes of dual registration under the Title 
Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003.62 Registration remains voluntary but as 
under the 1979 Act a real right cannot be acquired otherwise.63
The 2012 Act approach to registration makes no distinction between 
a disposition for value and a disposition for no consideration or value. 
Notwithstanding the additional 8500-10000 new registrations that RoS 
forecast will be generated by this approach, the impact on completion 
is marginal. The following table suggests that registration counties will 
achieve 90% completion earlier than would otherwise be the case but not 
significantly earlier.64 Achieving 90% completion rates across Scotland 
would still take until the 22nd century. As under the 1979 Act, and indeed 
as is the case in England and Wales, some properties and interests will 
61  2012 Act s 48(1).
62  Ibid s 48(6).
63 Ibid s 48(1).
64  RoS, Business Planning Forecast May 2014.
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simply not change hands and so this new registration requirement will not 
deliver completion.
Projected impact of the 2012 Act
There is one further legislative change that the 2012 Act introduced that 
will aid completion, both in a direct and an indirect way. That change 
concerns leases. Leases are by their nature temporary. Under the 1979 Act, 
they enter the Land Register and then, at the end of their life, the associated 
entry on the Land Register is removed. The 2012 Act sets different legal 
requirements around leases and those requirements aid completion. It will 
no longer be possible to register a lease, a sub-lease or an assignation of 
an unregistered lease unless the plot of land to which the deed relates is 
also registered. Where the plot of land is unregistered, an application to 
register such a deed will induce registration of the owner’s plot; termed 
“automatic plot registration.”65 On its own this will not have a major impact 
on completion – over the last ten years RoS has registered an annual average 
of 945 leases.66 Where it will have more impact is on making landlords 
consider whether or not it would be more practical to voluntarily register 
65  Automatic plot registration is required by the operation of sections 24, 25 and 30 of the 
2012 Act.
66  RoS, Business Planning figures for the period January 2004-December 2013. From 1 
January to 11 November 2014 some 1664 leased have been registered. The increase is in 
the main due to leases of airport car parking spaces.
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all their land rather than simply the area affected by the lease. As a driver 
of voluntary registration, the impact of automatic plot registration could be 
significant, for it is only through voluntary registration that a landlord can 
retain control of the registration process for his or her land. 
The 2012 Act brings about no immediate changes as far as applications 
for voluntary registration are concerned. The Keeper’s discretion to accept 
or refuse such an application remains as does the test of expediency. So too 
does the Keeper’s open door policy to voluntary applications. However, the 
Keeper recognises that more will be required than simply having an open 
door to voluntary applications if the ten year completion target is to be met. 
The volume of voluntary applications will have to increase substantially 
and the challenge for realising that will rest with the Keeper. Voluntary 
registration will have to be actively marketed and the Keeper will need to 
employ a range of different arguments to different sectors in aid of this. 
For some, the existence of the automatic plot registration provisions may 
offer an inducement to register; for others having certainty and assurance 
as to legal boundaries may be important: and for the wider public sector 
the catalyst to register will be the target set by Scottish Ministers to register 
such land within five years. It is the Keeper’s understanding that the vehicle 
for this is voluntary registration.
Set against the benefits of voluntary registration will be cost. Costs will 
be a factor for many who are open to considering voluntary registration; 
the Keeper acknowledges this and the completion consultation document 
sought views on an appropriate level of financial incentivisation. Registration 
fees are only part of the overall costs; there will, in most cases, be legal costs. 
However, as the successful HMLR experience has demonstrated, costs are 
not an absolute barrier. The outcome of the consultation is not yet known. 
The need to promote voluntary registration means that the legal 
discretion the Keeper has to refuse a request for voluntary registration 
is likely to prove theoretical rather than real. The 2012 Act gives Scottish 
Ministers the power67 to prescribe an end to that discretion and it is thus 
perhaps no surprise that the Keeper favours its removal.68 There are 
other strong legal reasons for ending that discretion and those reasons 
derive from the strategy for completion that the Act gives effect to. The 
completion toolkit set out in section 48 includes the power for Scottish 
Ministers, after due consultation with the Keeper and other appropriate 
67  2012 Act s 27(6).
68  Registers of Scotland, Completion of the Land Register Public Consultation (n 12) para 30.
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persons, to close the Sasine Register to standard securities on a county-
by-county or all-Scotland basis. Closure of the Sasine Register in this way 
will create additional “triggers” that will increase the number of properties 
having their first registration onto the Land Register. Before this power can 
be enabled, section 48(7) requires that the Keeper’s discretion to refuse an 
application for voluntary registration be removed. 
The reason for this is perhaps best explained by an example. If the 
Sasine Register is closed to a standard security, the creditor’s rights under 
the security can only be made real through registration of the security in 
the Land Register. To enable registration of the security, there must be 
a Land Register entry for the property. Thus, the property to which the 
security relates must be registered in the Land Register either before or at 
the same time as the security. As there is no statutory trigger for this the 
proprietor must apply for voluntary first registration in the Land Register. 
This power is helpful. Based on 2013-14 Land Register intake figures, some 
6000 standard securities fell to be recorded in the Sasine Register. The 
table below shows the projected effect the addition of this provision to the 
completion armoury would have.69
Projection completion rate inclusive of 2016 standard security changes
69  RoS Business Planning, May 2014.
336 The Future of Property Law
The practicality of closing the Sasine Register to standard securities and 
other deed types has to be considered, and was one of the areas of focus 
in the completion consultation document. Certain standard securities are 
already a trigger for registration in England and Wales. That suggests that 
the market can accommodate the additional work associated with the 
registration of the property. In the commercial arena, the Keeper has noted 
that there is an increasing number of requests for voluntary registration 
arising from the unwillingness of certain lenders to make high end loans 
in the absence of a Land Register title. In any event, the fact that standard 
securities are dealt with specifically on the face of the 2012 Act reflects 
the Scottish Parliament’s view that at some point consideration should be 
given to closing the Sasine Register to them; the issue is one of timing as 
opposed to principle. 
Closing the Sasine Register to other deed types is more problematic 
and this is reflected in the completion consultation document. Many 
of the deeds recorded in the Sasine Register are drawn up and granted 
by a body other than the proprietor; the most common being discharges, 
improvement grants, and charging orders and the incentive to apply for 
voluntary registration does not exist in the same way as with a standard 
security. Although it is possible for automatic plot registration to be used 
in such cases to do so would raise a number of practical difficulties for the 
parties and the Keeper which do not exist for leases and assignations of 
leases. 
To rely on voluntary registration in the same way as is envisaged should 
the Sasine Register be closed to standard securities is more complicated 
and less practical. It could also lead to less transparency; if the debtor had 
to voluntarily register his or her property before being able to register 
a discharge it may be that such deeds would simply not be registered. 
Registration would only be necessary at the next transfer of the property 
or if a fresh standard security was required. Care would also need to be 
exercised to ensure such a provision would not cut across other policy 
initiatives or the ability of, for instance, local authorities who may wish to 
register a charge over a property. Consequently closing the Sasine Register 
to other deed types would require to be supported by the immediate Keeper 
induced-registration (KIR) of the property that is to be subject to the deed. 
The Keeper’s view70 is that closing the Sasine Register to other deed types is 
70  Registers of Scotland, Completion of the Land Register Public Consultation (n 12) para 27.
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best left until the volume of remaining properties is of a manageable scale 
to allow for a prior KIR; indeed it if KIR is to be aggressively used it may be 
that this provision will never be used as it may have the effect of running 
counter to a planned programme of KIR.
The crucial point is that the 2012 Act provides for the practical closure 
of the Sasine Register to an increasing range of deed types at some future 
point; a necessary pre-requisite for completion of the Land Register though 
not in itself actually delivering completion. For that to happen, there 
requires to be a subsequent transaction affecting a property held on title 
deeds in the Sasine Register in order to trigger registration in the Land 
Register. For most properties, there will eventually be a transaction but 
the point at which that transaction occurs could be well in to the future. 
Additionally, there will remain a percentage of properties that remain off 
the Land Register radar. If completion is to happen in a timescale other than 
that determined by the natural pace of the property market, the remaining 
unregistered properties need to be identified and brought on to the Land 
Register. Identification of land not on the Land Register is straightforward. 
If it has not been mapped and accorded a title number under the 1979 Act 
(cadastral unit number under the 2012 Act) then quite simply it has not 
been registered.
In order that this land can then be registered, the 2012 Act gives 
the Keeper the power to undertake KIR.71 This power, active from the 
designated day, allows the Keeper “to register an unregistered plot of land 
or part of that lot.” No application for registration is required and nor is 
the involvement or consent of the owner required though the Keeper must 
notify the owner upon completion of registration. So is KIR the answer to 
the question of whether or not completion is feasible?
It is unquestionably a large part of the answer. It cannot assist with 
those properties whose titles are not on the Sasine Register but, in principle, 
it can aid identification of those properties as they will be the gap areas 
left in a registration county once KIR has been completed. But just how 
practical is KIR? The SLC are relatively positive about it:72
The draft Bill accordingly makes provision for the final completion of 
the Register. The Keeper would simply be empowered to register any 
unregistered property. In practice, the Keeper would usually have enough 
71  2012 Act s 29.
72  Scottish Law Commission, Report on Land Registration (n 11) vol 1 para 33.49.
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information to make up the title sheet – information about boundaries, 
information about the identity of the owner, and information about any 
subordinate rights to be entered in the C and D sections as encumbrances or 
in the A section as pertinents. After all, when a title is registered in the Land 
Register, it is not (with very rare exceptions) moving out of the private realm. 
Title is already in another of the Keeper’s registers – the Register of Sasines.
There are two key phrases in this statement: “final completion” and 
“usually have enough information.” With a ten-year completion target, KIR 
will have to be used extensively. The completion consultation document 
envisages that through market growth, use of increased triggers, and the 
commitment to register public land, some 88% of Scotland’s property 
will be registered by end 2024.73 By the Keeper’s reckoning, that leaves 
some 275,000 potential property titles (though some titles will inevitably 
include multiple properties) that require to be brought on to the register by 
voluntary registration or KIR. Even if the appetite for voluntary registration 
grows to levels experienced in England and Wales at the height of their 
marketing campaign, some 150,000 or more potential titles will require to 
be tackled under KIR. Consequently the use of KIR will not be limited to 
completing the final parts of the cadastral map jigsaw; it will require to 
play a much more extensive role. 
The critical question is whether or not the KIR powers lend themselves 
to be used in such an extensive manner. The answer will largely be 
determined by the information available to the Keeper. The extent to which 
the Keeper will have enough information, and what can be done when she 
does not, was the focus of the KIR section in the completion consultation 
document. For urban residential properties stemming from common routes 
of title, the Keeper is more likely to have sufficient information as she 
has already carried out pre-registration title examination and, for a large 
number of these properties, has pre-mapped them. Fortunately, in terms of 
absolute numbers, these properties will form the majority of the titles that 
KIR will seek to register. The completion consultation document notes that 
there are 700,000 such property titles.74 This does not mean that KIR will be 
straightforward but the challenges ought to be limited to issues other than 
mapping. Rural and commercial properties will be less straightforward, as 
indeed will be titles to minerals and other separate tenements of land, and 
73  Registers of Scotland, Completion of the Land Register Public Consultation (n 12) para 19.
74  Ibid para 18.
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will present a range of issues, not least the challenge of identification and 
mapping on to the cadastral map.
The challenge with KIR stems in large part from the absence of any active 
transaction and the associated involvement of legal professionals tasked 
with examining title, obtaining pre-registration reports, interacting with 
the parties and being clear as to what is to be presented for registration. The 
completion consultation document highlights areas around identification 
of the legal boundaries, establishing who the owner is and clarifying the 
encumbrances that affect a property, but also acknowledges that other 
legal and practical issues will undoubtedly emerge. 
For a map-based Land Register, identifying and plotting the legal 
boundaries of a property on to the cadastral map is essential. Identification 
is the starting point for any KIR and will be the determining factor 
in assessing the ability of KIR to enable completion. The 2012 Act 
acknowledges that under KIR, the Keeper may not always be able accurately 
to identify the legal boundaries.75 This alludes to the challenge of Sasine 
deeds, particularly older deeds and deeds relating to properties in rural 
areas where descriptions can be as general as “all and whole the farm and 
lands of hightae.” Such a description would not meet the Keeper’s deed 
plan criteria and so, in 2012 Act parlance, the conditions of registration 
would not be met. Yet the expectation is that KIR will overcome such 
technical difficulties. When the Land Register nears final completion, the 
challenge may be less as the entries already on the Land Register may offer 
a sufficient guide to the legal boundaries of the remaining unregistered 
properties. Where the volume of properties to be dealt with by KIR is large, 
the help offered by existing Land Register entries is less useful. The Keeper 
will have access to a range of old county series maps and more up-to-date 
Ordnance maps as well as any neighbouring registrations to assist in the 
mapping but this may not be sufficient in all cases to enable the boundaries 
to be plotted with absolute certainty. 
The reality is that general descriptions could lead to the Keeper under- 
or over-mapping the extent of the property. If the extent is under-mapped, 
the proprietor will become aware when the Keeper notifies them with 
details of the registration, as is required. If the extent is over-mapped, the 
2012 Act provides a general exception to the Keeper’s warranty the effect 
of which is that the “over-registration” is not warranted. The owner or a 
75  2012 Act s 74(3)(a)(ah).
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third party with title and interest would be able to apply for rectification. If 
it is under-mapped, the registered proprietor will not have lost their land. 
It will remain in the Sasine Register and the assumption is that they would 
seek to rectify their title to include the omitted land. A technical solution 
is one thing but if such problems were to become commonplace there is a 
risk that KIR could be brought in to question. The same argument applies 
to the solution the 2012 Act offers in relation to problems identifying the 
proprietor;76 these provisions resolve practical problems but there is as yet 
no clarity on the extent to which they would need to be used.
Notwithstanding that the 2012 Act seeks to provide statutory solutions 
for certain issues, the Keeper is mindful of the impact of the application of 
those solutions on those who own the properties in question. The challenge 
for the Keeper is to ensure KIR works in practice, to be transparent as to 
its use and ensure that its widespread adoption does not undermine the 
credibility or integrity of the Land Register. The completion consultation 
document emphasised that considerable more analysis and public 
discussion is required around the use of KIR. The Keeper proposes a series 
of pilot exercises to inform KIR, followed by a further public consultation 
focusing on the options for using KIR to enable completion. The proposed 
pilots will, in part, inform whether or not the 2012 Act provides a sufficiently 
flexible and robust basis for accommodating all possible title scenarios. 
(It is possible that the pilots will highlight issues that may benefit from a 
legislative solution.) At present it is not practical to draw firm conclusions 
other than to acknowledge that the ten-year completion target will require 
the extensive use of KIR. 
(4) Will completion happen in ten years?
It is clear the road to completion will be well advanced. Market activity, 
the commitment to register public land, the proposed closure of the Sasine 
Register to other deed types and the continuing use of voluntary registration 
will all contribute to advancing completion. As indicated previously, the 
Keeper estimates that this would result in some 88% of property titles being 
registered. Indeed, the more active the property market, the less challenging 
and costly the task of completion. A return to the boom years of the mid 
2000s, where the annual intake of first registration applications exceeded 
50,000 per annum, would have a marked impact on the ease of completion 
76  2012 Act s30(5).
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and would reduce the dependency on both voluntary registration and 
KIR. However, achieving absolute completion, in the sense that every area 
of land or separate tenement of land, be it large or small, is on the Land 
Register with an identified owner is unlikely. There are a number of areas 
of challenge.
The main area falls around the many political considerations that have 
to be overcome. This essay does not focus on them; it acknowledges that 
there are cost issues for public bodies, resource allocation considerations 
for Scottish Ministers, the need for the legal marketplace to grow and 
accommodate the demand for legal resource, the need for continued 
political commitment and, of course, the flexibility of RoS to manage an 
unprecedented growth in applications. In many ways, these will be the 
determining factors but they are beyond the scope of an essay that is 
focused on whether or not the technical tools exist to enable completion 
within the ten-year target. 
A key challenge will be those properties that are not held on titles 
recorded in the Sasine Register. These are largely unquantifiable. The 
ones that are known can be targeted for voluntary registration or could 
potentially form the subject matter of a KIR, based on working in tandem 
with the owner to register the land. Inevitably, many of these areas will 
only come to light as the Land Register nears completion. Strategies for 
dealing with those areas will need to be formulated and one senses that the 
matter may end up being the subject of further public consultation. 
Linked to this are those areas of ground that unwittingly remain on 
titles recorded in the Sasine Register. As discussed previously, the 1979 
Act encouraged this behaviour. Identifying these title issues will similarly 
only be practical once completion nears but resolving them may prove 
time consuming and resource intensive. On a pure cost versus benefit 
ratio, consideration will have to be given as to whether or not the cause 
of transparency is sufficiently aided by resolving the ownership question 
for these areas. A variation of this challenge relates to mineral titles. There 
are very few mineral titles in the Land Register. The majority of entries 
for property on the Land Register will note that the minerals have been 
reserved but will offer little guidance on where title rests. In some cases, 
the mineral title will rest on deeds recorded in the Sasine Register, though 
some will not, but identifying title will not necessarily be straightforward. 
The use of voluntary registration needs to become much more frequent 
than is the case currently and needs to extend beyond public bodies. The 
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HMLR experience suggests that there is a market for voluntary registration; 
the challenge is to tap that market. The benefits of registration can be extolled, 
support from RoS can be offered and for some this will be sufficient. The 
Keeper is already reporting an upsurge of interest and joint initiatives based 
around the use of voluntary registration is progressing with a number of 
landowners and other bodies with significant landholdings. Somewhat 
perversely, one factor that may dissuade some property owners is that of 
KIR. Quite simply, KIR is free, voluntary registration is not. The risk the 
Keeper has to manage is that some property owners who are the subject 
of a voluntary registration campaign (large landowners for instance) may 
opt to do nothing in the knowledge that within a ten-year timeframe their 
property will have to be picked up under KIR. The less interest in voluntary 
registration the greater the scale of the KIR exercise the Keeper will be faced 
with. That of course will place pressure on the ten-year timeframe. 
Linked to the above is the question of land owned by UK public bodies, 
such as the Ministry of Defence. These landholdings are not insignificant: 
the Secretary of State for Defence alone owns an estimated 2% of Scotland’s 
land mass.77 The commitment to register all public land within five years 
was first made against the backdrop of the independence referendum. Had 
the outcome of that referendum reflected Scottish Ministers’ desires for an 
independent Scotland, then at some point in the near future all land owned 
by UK public bodies would have transferred and come within the orbit of 
Scottish Ministers. That is no longer the case and so presents a challenge for 
completion; Scottish Ministers can but encourage their UK counterparts to 
voluntarily register. If they choose not to then the remaining option is KIR. 
(That approach can of course create a tension with Scottish public bodies, 
particularly local authorities, who are being asked to progress registration 
of their landholdings through voluntary registration, which unlike KIR 
attracts a registration fee.) 
The manner in which KIR can deliver completion is an unknown. In the 
same way that a series of policies and work practices were developed by the 
Keeper to support the 1979 Act, a similar approach will be required for KIR. 
The Keeper’s recommendation in the completion consultation document 
that a series of pilot exercises be run to gain greater understanding of the 
range of practical and legal issues to be addressed is an acknowledgment 
of that. Only once the pilots have concluded and been analysed and the 
77  Ministry of Defence, Defence Infrastructure Organisation Estate Information (2014).
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findings and options for progressing KIR shared in a public consultation 
will it be possible to draw any definitive conclusions as to the use of KIR 
and the priority it should be given in delivering completion. It is, however, 
already clear that in offering solutions to some of the most pressing 
challenges the Keeper will encounter, the 2012 Act did envisage that KIR 
titles will not necessarily have the look and feel or the legal equivalence of 
other registered titles. Just how different they may be is yet to be seen but 
in an acceptance of that may lie the answer to completion. 
E.  Conclusion
Completion of the Land Register is now high on the political agenda. The 
continuing focus of the current Scottish Government on land reform matters 
has ensured a greater awareness amongst community groups, public and 
private bodies, professional organisations, land charities and citizens as to 
the information currently available on land ownership in Scotland and the 
central role of the Land Register in providing that information. This focus 
is timely, coming as it does on the heels of the implementation of the 2012 
Act: legislation that has at its heart the completion of the Land Register.
Setting a ten-year target has brought an immediate focus on 
the completion provisions in the 2012 Act. They offer a significant 
improvement on the triggers for registration contained in the 1979 Act 
and compare favourably with the legislative framework for progressing 
completion that HMLR operates with. The 2012 Act provides a strategy: 
progressive closure of the Sasine Register to an increasing range of deeds, 
continued encouragement for voluntary registration, and the rolling 
introduction of KIR as operational counties near completion. The SLC’s 
suggested timeframe for implementation of that strategy was not 10 years: 
they envisaged a longer time-scale.78 Notwithstanding the timescale for 
delivering the strategy has shortened, the strategy that underpins the 2012 
Act remains largely appropriate. 
Achievement of the target will depend, in large part, on continuing 
political will; political support will be necessary if the legal powers in the 
2012 Act are to be used to full effect. If the political desire to see completion 
continues, and signs are positive given the cross-party support for the 
completion provisions in the then Land Registration etc (Scotland) Bill, 
78  Scottish Law Commission, Report on Land Registration (n 11) vol 1 paras 33.65-33.67.
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then year-on-year progress to meeting the target will be evidenced. The 
powers to close the Sasine Register to deed types and those relating to KIR 
will be instrumental in delivering near completion. Further analysis on 
and options for the widespread use of KIR will be forthcoming from the 
Keeper. The Keeper is confident KIR can be used to drive completion but 
assessment of that confidence must await publication of the planned public 
consultation on its use. 
With continuing political support completion will be well advanced 
by 2024 and indeed it may, at a practical level, be considered achieved. 
Inevitably, there will be areas of land for which no title can be readily traced 
and also areas where there is doubt as to where title rests. There may also 
be some registrations, particularly of bodies with extensive and complex 
landholdings where parts of that portfolio are still a work in progress. But 
come 2024 the completion landscape will have changed and the focus will 
have moved from enabling completion to ensuring Scotland maximises the 
social and economic benefits of a complete or near complete Land Register.
17. Primary Clients, Secondary 
Clients, Surrogate Clients 
and Non-Clients – the 
Expanding Duty of Care of 
Scottish Solicitors
Kenneth Swinton
Until the publication by Professor Rennie of his monograph Solicitors’ 
Negligence1 in 1997 there was no coherent treatment of the liability of 
Scottish solicitors for their negligent acts or omissions. Thereafter Professor 
Rennie published a volume of opinions on professional negligence2 and 
has published a stream of articles which relate to the professional practice 
of conveyancing. He has continued to make himself available for opinion 
work as well as appearing as an expert witness in many cases. Law and 
practice has continued to develop over the last two decades and this chapter 
considers how factors have developed which may have expanded the 
duty of care over this period without seeking to provide a comprehensive 
update of Professor Rennie’s work.
1  R Rennie, Solicitors’ Negligence (1997).
2  R Rennie, Opinions on Professional Negligence in Conveyancing – The Opinions of Professor 
Robert Rennie (2004). 
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A.  Introduction
The fundamental duties of a Scottish solicitor have not changed over the 
years. However they have been subject to formal elaboration and expansion 
in Codes of Conduct, Standards of Conduct and Standards of Service. A 
solicitor is expected to place the interests of the client above her own,3 to 
avoid conflicts of interest4 and to respect the confidentiality of a client’s 
business.5 It is trite law that a solicitor owes those duties to a client but does 
not owe duties to third parties, in general. Where a solicitor acts for more 
than one party then she may do so only where there is no conflict or at 
least there is only a potential conflict of interests6 but not an actual conflict.7 
Where confidential information is obtained from one client and it becomes 
of value to another client then a conflict will occur. The dilemma is whether 
to breach confidence and make a disclosure or to maintain the confidence 
and risk a subsequent claim for negligence or negligent misrepresentation.8 
There is only one course of action which is to resign the agency for one or 
both parties.9
The primary duty of a solicitor is to the client and is based on the law 
of agency. While the term professional negligence is commonly used this 
is not based on delictual liability but a breach of contract. Where a claim 
is made by a third party it must be based on delict. This is problematic as 
pure economic loss cannot be recovered in delict although it is available in 
cases based on negligent misstatement.10 
Over the last two decades, a uniform series of basic contractual 
obligations owed by solicitors to lenders has resulted from the introduction 
of the Council of Mortgage Lenders Scottish Solicitors’ Handbook,11 This 
3  Law Society of Scotland Practice Rules 2011, r B1.4.
4  2011 Rules, r B1.7; Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal Profession and 
Code of Conduct for European Lawyers (2008) principle C, Code 3.2.
5  2011 Rules, r B1.6; Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal Profession and 
Code of Conduct for European Lawyers (2008) principle B, Code 2.3.
6  2011 Rules, r B1.7.2.
7  Ibid, r B1.7.1.
8  Bank of East Asia Ltd v Shepherd & Wedderburn 1995 SLT 1074; Frank Houlgate Investment Co 
Ltd v Biggart Baillie LLP [2014] CSIH 79; Marks & Spencer Group Plc v Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer [2004] EWCA Civ 741, [2004] 1 WLR 2331; Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 
2 AC 222; Bristol & West Building Society v Aitken Nairn 1999 SC 678;Clark Boyce v Mouat 
[1994] 1 AC 428; Leeds & Holbeck Building Society v Alex Morrison 2001 SCLR 41.
9  See A Paterson and B Ritchie Law, Practice and Conduct for Solicitors (2006), Ch 7 for a 
discussion.
10  Rennie, Negligence (n 1), para 2.01 and the authorities cited there.
11  Available at http://www.cml.org.uk/cml/handbook/scotland
 Primary Clients, Secondary Clients, Surrogate Clients and Non-Clients 347
covers solicitors acting in the constitution of securities for lenders in relation 
to residential mortgages, both for purchase and re-mortgage purposes as 
well as many buy to let commercial loans. The existence of clear standard 
obligations has led to the growth of situations where solicitors have been 
found wanting in failing to either (a) recognise the existence of an actual 
conflict of interests between a purchaser client and lender client or (b) 
obtain the purchasing client’s authority to make disclosures to the lender. 
Smith and Barton12 writing in 1995 devote a whole chapter to disciplinary 
proceedings relating to conflicts of interest. None of the cases digested 
refer to conflicts between purchaser and lender. The Scottish Solicitors 
Discipline Tribunal has in recent years considered what appears to be 
a steady stream of cases where solicitors appear to have regarded their 
purchasing clients as the primary clients and the disclosure to the lenders 
of surrounding circumstances as of secondary importance.
Furthermore the Money Laundering Regulations 199313 imposed new 
obligations on solicitors to identify their clients. Those duties had not had 
a significant impact on practice when Solicitors’ Negligence was published. 
In the intervening years the obligations in relation to prevention of money 
laundering have expanded considerably,14 imposing increasingly onerous 
duties on solicitors to identify the clients, the source of funds and the 
wealth of the clients from which these funds are obtained. The intention is 
to prevent the legal profession and the financial system becoming conduits 
which assist criminals in concealing or converting the proceeds of their 
unlawful activities. Furthermore solicitors fall within the regulated sector 
and are obliged to make authorised disclosures of suspicious activity to 
the relevant authority under pain of criminal prosecution15 or regulatory 
sanctions.16 This has led to attempts founded on failures in a criminal 
or regulatory sense as evidence of a contractual or delictual failure on 
solicitors acting for private clients with a view to imposing civil liability, 
even where separate agents are instructed by the borrower and lender.17 
12  I Smith and J Barton, Procedures and Decisions of the Scottish Solicitors Discipline Tribunal 
(1995).
13  Money Laundering Regulation 1993, SI 1993/1933.
14  Currently represented by the Money Laundering Regulations 2007, SI 2007/2157 and 
the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, particularly Part 7 Money Laundering.
15  Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s330.
16  Money Laundering Regulations 1993, SI 1993/1933, reg 42. 
17  Cheshire Mortgage Corporation Ltd v Grandison [2012] CSIH 66; 2013 SC 160; Frank Houlgate 
Investment Co Ltd v Biggart Baillie LLP [2014] CSIH 79, where there was a finding against 
the solicitors on other grounds.
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Such a possibility in the context of inadequate professional service claims 
has been recognised by Professor Rennie.18 In this way, the Law Society of 
Scotland investigating conduct complaints or the Scottish Legal Services 
Commission investigating service complaints may in fact operate as a 
surrogate for the client in providing a basis for a negligence claim.
The consolidated Practice Rules19 require that a solicitor should provide 
in writing details of the work to be undertaken at the earliest opportunity.20 
A solicitor should accordingly be aware of who their client is. Such terms 
of engagement will generally not only specify what work is to be done but 
what is not to be done. Thus it should prevent the subsequent expansion 
through leakage into other areas or others who might potentially later 
claim client status. 
B.  The Move to Written Terms of Business
The relationship between solicitor and client is one of agency,21 which 
makes entirely appropriate the term “law agent.”22 As noted, above lenders 
instructing solicitors in residential lending work will impose their terms 
for business through the CML Handbook. It would however be unusual 
for consumers to impose written terms. Writing in 1996, Professor Rennie 
stated:23 
The basic duty of care owed by a solicitor is to his or her client. Similarly any 
specific contractual obligations are, generally speaking, owed to the client 
who instructs the legal task concerned. 
The corollary to this simple truth is that no duty of care is owed to others 
in pursuit of the interests of the client. Professor Rennie noted then that the 
contract between solicitor and client is rarely in writing.24 The converse is 
now the case as a result of the imposition of a practice rule. The terms of 
business on which the client instructs the agent must be set out in writing 
18  Rennie, Negligence (n 1), para 11.03.
19  Law Society of Scotland Practice Rules 2011, r B4.1-4.2.
20  This is subject to certain exceptions which are not discussed here.
21  Rennie, Negligence (n 1), para 3.02.
22  Law Agents (Scotland) Act 1873; J H Begg, A Treatise on the Law of Scotland Relating to 
Law Agents (1873); The Scottish Law Agents Society was incorporated by Royal Charter 
in 1884, all indicating this then universal usage.
23  Rennie, Negligence (n 1), para 4.01.
24  Ibid para 3.02.
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at the earliest practical opportunity.25 There should be no doubt as to 
the identity of the client, therefore, in contemporary practice. Nor should 
there be doubt as to the nature of the work for which the solicitor has been 
instructed. The terms of business should set out the extent of the services to 
be provided and the estimated fees and outlays.26 Setting out the scope of 
the engagement offers comfort to the solicitor which can prevent subsequent 
claims arising out of “mission creep” to other areas which were beyond the 
initial instructions. For example, when instructed in relation to the sale of 
an investment property, a solicitor may undertake the conveyancing work 
and exclude liability for advice in relation to taxation.27 
There might be a temptation to include in the written terms of engagement 
some restriction of liability on the part of the solicitor. Such attempted 
limitations of liability are unlikely to be effective. Firstly, solicitors are 
under the general obligation to act in the best interests of clients and not to 
allow personal interests to affect advice to or actings on behalf of clients.28 
Secondly, under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, any exclusion of 
liability for loss or other damage through negligence can only be given effect 
where it satisfies a reasonableness test.29 In Killick v PricewaterhouseCoopers 
[No1]30 the defendant accountants argued unsuccessfully before Neuberger, 
J (as he then was) that the cap on liability of £10m imposed in their terms 
of business was reasonable. On this basis, it is submitted that exclusions 
or limitations of liability in terms of business are unlikely to meet the 
threshold required to establish reasonableness. Furthermore, where the 
client is a consumer, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 
will apply31 provided the contract is in standard terms – in other words, 
where the consumer has no opportunity to individually negotiate it. If 
an imbalance in parties’ rights and obligations to the detriment of the 
consumer arises from the terms of the contract it is to be regarded as prima 
facie unfair. Where, for example, a term excludes or limits liability in the 
event of total or partial non-performance or inadequate performance of a 
25  Law Society of Scotland Practice Rules 2011. r B4.2.
26  Ibid.
27  In Stevens v Hewats [2013] CSOH 61; 2013 SLT 763 the agents in question had been 
instructed to prepare a gift of heritable property. Had the terms of engagement 
specifically excluded the provision of advice in relation to inheritance tax then, arguably, 
there would have been no basis of action.
28  Law Society of Scotland Practice Rules 2011, r B1.4.1 and B1.4.2.
29  Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, s 2.
30  [2001] PNLR 1.
31  Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999, SI 1999/2083.
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contract for services, this is like to fall within the ambit of unfairness.32 In 
this context, a limitation of liability clause has been held to contravene the 
Regulations.33 Where the client is a commercial entity the economic balance 
may favour the client. The CML Handbook34 adopts the common law 
standard35 in respect of the duty of care owed by the solicitor to the lender 
and then imposes a series of specific and more onerous duties.36 These 
may in turn be supplemented by individual lenders’ own requirements 
and the possibility exists of transaction-specific further instructions issued 
with the loan papers. There is no opportunity for the solicitor to include a 
term which might limit her liability to the lender.
As well as providing clearer guidance to clients through having written 
terms of business the use of such terms should allow solicitors to avoid 
claims where the alleged want of due care and skills relates to a matter 
which is ancillary to the business undertaken – such as advice regarding 
surveys37 or finance38 in relation to a purchase. Of course those terms of 
engagement might seek to restrict liability to third parties. Whether this 
would be effective would depend on whether such a limitation of liability 
was reasonable.39
C.  Identification of the Client
As noted in the previous section, the change brought about through 
professional practice rules requiring written terms of business has brought 
clarity in identifying to whom the legal services are delivered and who 
will be responsible for payment. However that is not quite the same thing 
as identification of the person who provides the instructions. Are the 
instructions those of the person who presents herself as the client to the 
32  1999 Regulations, art 5 and schedule para 1 (b).
33  West v Ian Finlay and Associates [2014] EWCA Civ 316, in relation to the terms of business 
of a firm of architects.
34  CML Handbook (n 11).
35  Ibid para 1.4.
36  For example in terms of para 5.9.1, the solicitor must ask a purchasing client if the 
balance of the price is being provided without resort to other lending and where there 
is other lending to disclose this to the instructing lender. This is the case whether or not 
that loan is to be secured on the property and has no impact of the validity or ranking 
of the security.
37  Rennie, Opinions (n 2), p 436.
38  Ibid p 438.
39  Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, s2; Hedley Byrne v Heller and Partners [1964] AC 465; 
[1963] 1 All ER 575; Caparo Industries v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 1 All ER 568.
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solicitor or who she represents she is? There has been no change in the 
underlying common law in relation to agency. However the imposition 
of duties in relation to anti-money laundering processes has clouded this 
issue. The first Money Laundering Regulations40 in the UK came into force 
on 1st April 1994. Solicitors fell within the regulated sector for the purposes 
of the Regulations and were obliged to identify clients. A major exemption 
permitted solicitors to excuse existing clients from the requirements to 
produce documentary evidence of identity. Given the novelty of the 
obligations and the noted exemption it is unsurprising that Professor 
Rennie did not require to address these issues in 1996. 
The relationship between solicitor and client is one principally governed 
by the law of agency. Where the solicitor is acting for a disclosed principal 
then the solicitor will not, in general, become personally liable to third 
parties.41 The position is less straightforward where the principal turns 
out to be a fraudster, impersonating another. In such a situation there 
is scope to argue for the solicitor to incur personal liability on the basis 
she had no instructions from the appropriate party. Laura Macgregor 
suggests that where the agent has been neither fraudulent nor negligent 
in misrepresenting his authority, the only possible action which the third 
party has against the agent is the contractual action of breach of warranty of 
authority.42 She indicates that the theoretical basis of the action is difficult 
to discover,43 but adopts the approach taken by Gloag,44 who refers to the 
principle as arising out of the contract between the third party and the 
agent. In this context, however, there is no effective contract between the 
agent and the third party. In Scott v J. B. Livingston & Nicol45 Lord Coulsfield 
states that the normal rule is that the agent is liable in delict on the basis 
of breach of warranty of authority.46 This is borne out by the earlier case of 
Anderson v John Croall & Sons Ltd47 which is generally taken as the standard 
authority for this proposition in Scotland. 
40  Money Laundering Regulations 1993, SI 1993/1933.
41  W M Gloag and R C Henderson The Law of Scotland, 13th edn, by H Macqueen et al 
(2012) para 19.27 and the authorities referred to therein.
42  L Macgregor, “Agency,” in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue 
(2002) para 168.
43  Ibid.
44  W M Gloag, Law of Contract, 2nd edn (1929) p 155.
45  1990 SLT 305.
46  Scott (n 45) at 307.
47  (1903) 11 SLT 163; see also Salvesen & Co v Rederi AB Nordstjernan (1903) 6 F 64 9 (which 
was partially reversed in the House of Lords on other grounds (1905) 7 F (HL) 101; 
(1905) 13 SLT 20.
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The point was raised in sharp focus in the recent case of Cheshire Mortgage 
Corporation v Grandison.48 Lenders who were separately represented 
raised actions against firms of solicitors who had acted apparently for the 
owners of properties who raised funds from the pursuers secured over the 
properties. Some time after the recording of the relevant standard securities 
it became apparent that the persons who had instructed the solicitors in 
relation to representing their interests in the constitution of the securities 
had impersonated the true owners of the properties. The securities, based 
on forged signatures and false identities were worthless. The lenders sued 
on the basis of breach of warranty of authority.49
Evidence was led as to the steps taken by the agents in question to 
identify the persons who presented themselves as the clients.50 In neither 
the Outer House nor Inner House judgments is any reference made to the 
purposes for which identification was being sought. The items sought would 
of course be familiar to anyone dealing with the anti-money laundering 
requirements in contemporary practice. A professional operating within 
the regulated sector, such as a solicitor, is obliged to carry out customer 
due diligence.51 This requires sufficient proof of identity on the basis of 
documents obtained from reliable and independent sources.52 The 1993 
Regulations themselves do not specify what these might be. However 
guidance from the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group53 is regarded 
as authoritative54 and requires two forms of check – the first to identify the 
person and the second to tie that person to the address provided. A failure 
by a regulated professional to comply with these requirements is a criminal 
offence.55 Furthermore it is a regulatory requirement for solicitors to 
comply with this regime56 in all cases whether or not the business falls with 
the statutory money laundering definitions. It is surprising that there is no 
mention in the case of basis on which the solicitors in question collected 
48  [2012] CSIH 66; 2013 SC 160.
49  Further claims were made based on the letters of obligation which had been issued by 
the “borrowers” agent. These were disposed of on the basis that a letter of obligation 
was granted as an ancillary obligation to those which were established in the principal 
contract. Where that principal contract had been reduced then the ancillary obligations 
must also fall: Mason v AR Robertson and Black 1993 SLT 773.
50  Cheshire Mortgage Corporation (n 48) at para 11.
51  Money Laundering Regulations 2007, SI 2007/ 2157, reg 7.
52  2007 Regulations, reg 5.
53  Available at http://www.jmlsg.org.uk/industry-guidance/article/guidance 
54  It must now be approved by HM Treasury.
55  2007 Regulations, reg 45.
56  Law Society of Scotland Practice Rules 2011, r B6.23.1.
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these data or whether they met the statutory and regulatory requirements. 
It is submitted that compliance with those standards will satisfy the 
common law requirement of absence of knowledge or lack of negligence 
necessary to make a breach of warranty of authority entirely innocent. In 
order for there to be a successful prosecution then a criminal standard of 
proof would be required. The Scottish Solicitors Discipline Tribunal also 
applies a criminal standard in relation to evidence. In the context of a civil 
action for breach of warranty of authority presumably the agent would 
have to address having taken reasonable steps only. In the instant case it 
is apparent that the identification requirements did comply with the anti-
money laundering regime in place at the time.57 What is equally clear is that 
while the practices of the solicitors in question met the standards in place in 
2004 when the frauds occurred, the need for ongoing monitoring on a risk-
based approach required under the 2007 Regulations ought to have raised 
suspicions about the written requests to transmit funds electronically to 
third parties. Once funds had been transmitted to the agent acting for the 
borrowers they become the property of the borrowers.58 Arguably the 
solicitor would not come any duty to the lender to disclose suspicions at 
this point unless the security was in an “all sums due and to be become 
due” format. However, she must make a suspicious activity to report to the 
National Crime Agency.59 Nonetheless the compliance with the statutory 
and regulatory requirements and the ability of an authorised person to 
rely on identification carried out by another such authorised person60were 
referred to in the Cheshire Mortgage Corporation case.61 It was not accepted 
that there had been any such reliance as the business had already been 
introduced to the lender prior to the involvement of the solicitor for the 
“borrower.”62 As the court noted:63
57  Frank Houlgate Ltd v Biggart Baillie [2009] CSOH 165; 2010 SLT 527. Lord Drummond 
Young’s opinion at para 25 dismissed claims based on the Money Laundering 
Regulations 2003 which have now been replaced by the 2007 Regulations. 
58  R v Preddy [1996] AC 815; [1996] 3 WLR 255; [1996] 3 All ER 481; R v Waya [2012] UKSC 
51; [2013] 1 AC 294; [2012] 3 WLR 1188; [2013] 1 All ER 889.
59  Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 part VII. See n 105 in relation to the timing of the duty.
60  See currently Money Laundering Regulations 2007, SI 2007/ 2157, reg 17.
61  Outer House judgment [2011] CSOH 157; 2012 SLT 672 at para 16 being referred to as 
‘KYC rules.’ See further K Swinton, “The Potential for civil liability arising from failures 
in client identification requirements under the Money Laundering Regulations” (2011) 
79 SLG 97.
62  Nor for that matter had the solicitor confirmed in writing that he consented to his 
identification being relied on as required by the Regulations.
63  Cheshire Mortgage Corporation Ltd v Grandison [2012] CSIH 66; 2013 SC 160 at para 32 per 
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All that the agent is warranting is that he has a client and that client has given 
him authority to act. It would be quite unreasonable and inappropriate to 
extend this to an implied warranty that his client has a certain attribute or 
attributes.
While there may be circumstances where the solicitor does warrant some 
attribute in relation to the client which can be relied on by third parties 
then that will amount to a representation and will bring matters with 
the principle articulated in Hedley Bryne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners64 as 
refined in Caparo Industries v Dickman.65 There may be situations where the 
client’s identity is correctly ascertained by the solicitor but an important 
attribute becomes a matter of contention. In Frank Houlgate v Biggart Baillie66 
solicitors acted for a party who was exactly who he claimed to be. However 
he represented that he owned an estate which was owned by another 
unrelated person with a similar name. The solicitors acted on behalf of the 
fraudster who borrowed money on the security of the property with other 
agents acting for the lenders. The action was framed in part on the basis of 
breach of warranty of authority. For the reasons discussed above it was held 
there was no warranty on the part of the agents for the fraudster that he 
was the registered proprietor of the subjects.67 However the solicitors were 
subsequently found liable on other grounds. After the security had been 
registered the fraud came to light and the fraudster admitted to his solicitor 
that the fraud had been committed. He asked for time to put matters right 
and repay the loan. However the fraudster used the breathing space to top 
up the sums advanced. The solicitor failed to withdraw from acting, advise 
the agents acting for the lender or make a suspicious activity report at this 
point under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.68 It was held that the solicitor 
ought to have resigned the agency and disclosed the fraud to the solicitors 
acting for the lender, the perception in the mind of the solicitor that he 
was bound by client confidentiality being entirely misplaced.69 The policy 
argument on which the decision is based is clear:70
L Clarke, delivering the opinion of the Court.
64  [1964] AC 465; [1963] 1 All ER 575.
65  [1990] 2 AC 605; [1990] 1 All ER 568. See further Rennie, Negligence (n 1), para 4.03 et seq.
66  [2009] CSOH 165; 2010 SLT 527.
67  Frank Houlgate (n 66) at para 28 (opinion of Lord Drummond Young).
68  Frank Houlgate Investment Co Ltd v Biggart Baillie LLP [2014] CSIH 79; 2014 SLT 1001 
paragraph 9.
69  The solicitor in question was censured for his conduct and fined the maximum £10000: 
Mair [2009] SSDT 1463.
70  Frank Houlgate (n 68) at para 34 (opinion of Lord Menzies).
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Society expects high standards from a Scottish solicitor. Perhaps first and 
foremost, a solicitor is expected to have the highest standards of honesty. 
She is an officer of the court, and owes obligations to the client, to the court, 
to fellow members of the profession, and to the general public. 
The legal basis on which to hang that policy provided divided opinions. In 
the Inner House, Lord Menzies held that once the solicitor became aware 
of the fraud and failed to take steps to dissociate himself from it be became 
an accessory to the fraud.71 There was, in effect, a continuing implied 
representation to the solicitor for the lender that he is not aware of any 
fundamental dishonesty or fraud which might make the security transaction 
worthless.72 This line of reasoning is supported by the three Lords Ordinary 
who gave opinions at earlier stages of the proceedings73 and Lord McEwan 
sitting in the Inner House.74 It must be taken as settling the law. Lord 
Malcolm however dissented from this analysis – in his view there was no 
need to invoke the concept of accessory to the fraud. Rather, he held that 
once the fraud became known the solicitor came under a freestanding duty 
to take reasonable care to prevent further foreseeable losses flowing from 
the fraudulent transaction which he had unwittingly facilitated.75 This may 
be sufficient to dispose of the case in question, but had the security granted 
been for a fixed amount rather than ‘all sums due or to become due’, then 
this suggests that no such duty would have arisen. On the other hand if the 
test is accessory to the fraud then in the fixed security example the solicitor 
would still come under a duty of disclosure. It would be odd if the resulting 
obligation on the solicitor depended solely on whether the security covered 
further advances or not. Accordingly the analysis of all the other senators 
who have given opinions is preferable to that of Lord Malcolm.
D.  The Primary Client and the Secondary Client
Where the same solicitor acts for both the lender and the borrower each 
is owed a duty of care by the solicitor. This causes no issues where the 
interests of the lender and borrower coincide – most obviously in ensuring 
71  Ibid at para 45.
72  Ibid at para 43.
73  Frank Houlgate Investment Co Ltd v Biggart Baillie LLP [2009] CSOH 165; 2010 SLT 527 
at para 21 (Lord Drummond Young); 2011 CSOH 160; 2012 SLT 256 at para 33 (Lord 
Glennie); [2013] CSOH 80; 2013 SLT 993 at para 43 (Lord Hodge).
74  Frank Houlgate (n 68) at para 89.
75  Ibid at para 81.
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there is a good and marketable title.76 However the Practice Rules 
distinguish the situation where there is potential for conflict from that 
where there is actual conflict. In the former situation, the rules provide 
a series of limited exceptions.77 However, the primary rule must be 
adhered to where an actual conflict arises. In Midland Bank plc v Cameron, 
Thom, Peterkin & Duncans78 solicitors had made representations to the 
lender as to the borrowing client’s means. This was inaccurate and the 
lenders sought to hold the agents liable. Lord Jauncey in finding for the 
defenders established a four part test: (a) there must be an assumption of 
responsibility; (b) the solicitor must represent to the other party that he 
has the necessary skill in relation to the representation; (c) the other party 
must rely on the representation and; (d) the solicitor must be aware that 
the third party would rely on the representation. This is a straightforward 
restatement of the principle in Hedley Byrne. Lord Jauncey expressed 
the view that where the solicitor is engaged to prepare the security by a 
lender the decision to lend has already been taken and there are no other 
duties incumbent on the solicitor.79 The decision in Midland Bank has been 
followed in the Irish Supreme Court case of Doran v Delaney80 and has never 
been expressly overruled in this jurisdiction, however Rennie doubted it 
would be followed today.81 That must be correct – in the post-Caparo era 
cases such as White v Jones,82 Robertson v Watt & Co83 and Holmes v Bank of 
Scotland,84 step (b) in particular was absent. 
Rennie, in considering the attitudes which prevailed at the time of 
Midland Bank, expressed the view that at the time the solicitor treated the 
purchasing/borrowing client as primary and the lending client was accorded 
a secondary status.85 If that ever was true, the CML Handbook, applying 
to residential transactions, makes explicit the obligations on a solicitor to 
make disclosures. The decision to lend is now subject to revision right up 
until release of funds. Notwithstanding the contractual equal status of 
76  Law Society of Scotland Practice Rules 2011, r B1.7.1 and B2.1.2: “You shall not act for 
two or more parties whose interests conflict.”
77  See 2011 Rules, r B1.2 generally.
78  1988 SLT 611.
79  Midland Bank (n 78) at 618.
80  [1998] IESC 66.
81  Rennie, Negligence (n 1) para 5.01. 
82  [1995] 2 AC 207; [1995] 1 All ER 691.
83  2nd Div, 4 July 1995, unreported.
84  2002 SLT 544.
85  Rennie, Negligence (n 1) para 5.01.
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both borrowing and lending clients it will be seen below that the primary/
secondary approach has not entirely died out. Two issues in the Handbook 
require special attention. Solicitors are obliged to report cash incentives86 
and situations where they will not have control over the whole purchase 
price87 on the one hand and on the other surrounding circumstances such 
as the property having changed hands in the six months prior to the current 
transaction.88 These provisions are designed to prevent lenders becoming 
victims of mortgage fraud by the ramping up of the purchase price and 
circulation of deposits. Some instances have involved a combination of all 
three techniques.
E.  The Regulator as a Surrogate for Client Claims
The Law Society has taken disciplinary action ex proprio motu89 in a number 
of cases where the lender has not raised any complaint. Over the last six 
years, fifteen such surrogate claims have come before the Scottish Solicitors 
Discipline Tribunal. In these cases, with the exception of Baillie, no 
disclosure as required in the CML Handbook was made to the respective 
lenders at the time of making a report on title and requesting the funds. In 
Baillie, disclosures were made in bald terms that the property had not been 
owned by the seller in the present transaction. The Tribunal were critical of 
the solicitor in meeting the literal obligations specified in the Handbook90 
but failing to provide information that the settlement of the current and 
prior transactions were simultaneous, thus failing to meet the common 
law duties which are preserved by the Handbook.91 On the basis of these 
decisions it would appear that there still remain a number of solicitors who 
are prepared to treat the interests of a lending client as secondary to those 
of a private purchaser.
86  CML Handbook (n 11), para 6.4.4.
87  Ibid, 6.4.5.
88  Ibid, 5.1.1.
89  Pervez [No5] 2008 SSDT 1427; Dunbar [No1] 2011 SSDT 1540; Davidson 2011 SSDT 1557; 
Campbell 2012 SSDT 1585; Coogans [No2] 2012 SSDT 1580; Kerr 2012 SSDT 1587; Joss 
2012 SSDT 1603; Lints [No1] 2013 SSDT 1607; Campbell 2013 SSDT 1613; MacDonald 
2013 SSDT 1618; Aikman 2013 1629; Tulips [2013] SSDT 1631; Haywood [2014] SSDT 1645; 
Baillie [2014] SSDT; Muir [2014] SSDT; K Swinton, “Compliance with CML Handbook” 
(2012) 80 SLG 92; K Swinton, “SSDT and CML Handbook Breaches” (2014) 82 SLG 21.
90  CML Handbook (n 11), para 5.1.1.
91  Ibid, para 1.4.
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Where subsequent disclosures were made by the solicitors concerned, 
the funds had already been advanced and the securities registered. It 
was too late for the lenders to reconsider the underwriting of the loans. 
The prompt for the late disclosures appears to have been the Society, 
following on routine Accounts Rules92 inspections of the respective firms. 
By taking these matters to the Tribunal it is argued that the Society has 
become a surrogate client – it appears that the Society has moved away 
from inspections for mere compliance with the Accounts Rules to a quality 
inspection of the work undertaken by solicitors at least in respect of 
secured lending work. Disciplinary penalties sanctioned by the Tribunal 
do not amount to findings of negligence. It may be that lenders involved 
in all the cases which have come before the Tribunal have not experienced 
defaults and have not had cause to call up the respective securities. Even if 
they had, it would only be in the event that they suffered a shortfall on the 
realisation of the security subjects that any claim for negligence would lie 
against the solicitor. Nonetheless it would be a powerful argument should 
such a claim arise that the Tribunal had regarded the solicitor’s conduct to 
amount to a serious and reprehensible breach of the standards required of 
a solicitor.93 The surrogate claimant, the Society, thus paves the way for the 
natural claimant should a loss subsequently be incurred. 
The counter argument is that the Society has not expanded its role at all. 
The original purpose of Accounts Rules inspections was to assure the Society, 
representing the broader profession, that the Guarantee Fund is not put at 
risk.94 The Fund is available to compensate persons who in the opinion of 
the Council suffer pecuniary loss by reason of dishonesty on the part of any 
solicitor.95 However the role of inspection has now broadened to include a 
supervisory remit under the Money Laundering Regulations.96 The typical 
situation where the Guarantee Fund is invoked is that where the solicitor 
has misappropriated funds under her control but it is not restricted to such 
situations. For example where a solicitor conveyed a property not to the 
original purchaser but to an innocent third party by fraudulently altering 
a signed deed in the event of that party suffering loss then the third party 
may have a claim on the Fund97 Similarly, conduct which is contrary to 
92  Law Society of Scotland Practice Rules 2011, r B6.18.2.
93  Sharp v Council of Law Society of Scotland 1984 SC 129, 1984 SLT 313.
94  Law Society of Scotland Practice Rules 2011 B6.18.3.
95  Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980, s43.
96  Law Society of Scotland Practice Rules 2011, r B6.18.3.
97  Pocock’s Trustee v Skene Investments [2012] CSIH 61; Russell Taylor [2004] SSDT 1148.
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the express terms of Practice Rules may give rise to a claim but not where 
the party seeking to found on that conduct was aware of the terms of the 
Rules breach.98 However in the cases before the Tribunal discussed above, 
the lender and purchaser were both represented by the same agent and 
duties are owed to both parties so there is direct representation. In Target 
Holdings Ltd v Redferns99 it was held that the solicitor was under a duty 
in a back to back situation, as occurred in the recent Discipline Tribunal 
cases, at common law to disclose to the lender the nature of the back to 
back transaction.100 In such circumstances lenders typically argue that had 
a partial disclosure or in some cases full disclosure of the facts been made 
then the decision to lend would have been rescinded and therefore but 
for the failure to disclose relevant information no loss would have been 
incurred.101
Quick successive sales of property are a means of inflating the price of 
property which can be used to induce lenders to advance more money on 
property than might otherwise be the case. This is a recognised typology of 
money laundering.102 Of course, if the solicitor is aware of such a situation 
he is obliged under the common law principles103 including accessory to 
fraud to make a disclosure to the lender.104 Furthermore, once the mortgage 
98  See Billig v Council of the Law Society of Scotland [2006] CSOH 148, 2007 SC 32. The 
appellant who had lent money to a client of a solicitor sought to found on personal 
guarantees issued by the solicitor which were prohibited by the Accounts Rules then in 
operation. He was aware as a result of legal advice received that the solicitor was not in 
a position to grant those guarantees but proceeded on the mistaken belief that he might 
successfully look to the Fund to make good the losses as the conduct of the solicitor 
must have been dishonest. It was held that it was reasonable to exercise discretion in 
such circumstances to refuse payment.
99  [1996] AC 421.
100  See Rennie, Negligence (n 1), para 5.04 for a detailed discussion of the decision in the 
Court of Appeal. By the time the case came to be discussed by the House of Lords 
it proceeded on a presumed set of facts where the solicitors were assumed to have 
advanced the funds ahead of obtaining a valid security which was later registered. It 
was held on the basis of breach of trust that this should be calculated on a basis of the 
actual loss attributable directly to the breach.
101  AIB Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors [2014] UKSC 58, reaffirming the decision 
in Target should be narrowly interpreted. As Rennie has noted Negligence (n 1) para 5.05 
English law is rendered more complex by discussions of breach of trust in addition to 
contractual and tortious liability. See also Lord Toulson’s opinion at paragraph 1 in AIB 
Group.
102  Financial Action Task Force, Report on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: 
Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals (June 2013) p 46 Technique: Transferring Value – 
Back to Back or ABC Sales.
103  CML Handbook (n 11), para 1.4.
104  Frank Houlgate Investment Co Ltd v Biggart Baillie LLP [2014] CSIH 79. In Cheshire 
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funds have been received and used in conjunction with any deposit to 
acquire the property, at that point the proceeds of crime are being converted 
into another form which then itself represents the proceeds of crime.105 This 
and only this triggers the requirement to make a suspicious activity report 
to the National Crime Agency.106 Once the transaction is tainted by fraud 
then negligence claims will follow and will be irresistible.107 
F.  Third Party Claims
Begg notes:108 
Law Agents are under no obligation to attend to the interests of any persons 
except their own clients. To third parties they owe no duty but the negative 
one of abstaining from the commission of actual wrong.
Professor Rennie was able to restate this proposition from Begg when 
writing in 1996. The position in Scotland was that a solicitor was not liable 
in negligence to third parties.109 The leading authority, as at the time of 
Begg’s work, was Robertson v Fleming.110 Professor Rennie predicted that 
the position adopted by the House of Lords in Robertson was liable to be 
reversed should the House be called to determine a similar point in the 
future. The House had recently considered matters in England in White v 
Jones111 in relation to the liability of solicitors to disappointed beneficiaries. 
Lord Goff112 referred to dicta in Robertson,113 where the Lord Chancellor had 
stated that an entitlement to claim by disappointed beneficiaries did not 
form part of the law of Scotland nor of England. Lord Goff noted that this 
dicta, strictly speaking, did not form part of the ratio of the case. In Robertson 
the solicitor concerned had failed to create an effective security over a long 
Mortgage Corporation (n 48) the solicitor had no knowledge, suspicion or grounds on 
which to suspect that there was a case of identity fraud.
105  Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 s340. Law Society [of England and Wales] Anti-money 
Laundering Practice Note (October 2013), para 11.4.4 – Lender issues. The SSDT has 
wrongly stated there to be a duty to make a SAR at a much earlier stage in a number of 
the cases cited above, for example, Baillie (n 89) at 58-59. 
106  Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 s330.
107  Frank Houlgate Investment Co Ltd v Biggart Baillie LLP [2014] CSIH 79.
108  Begg, Treatise (n 22), ch 21, para 1. 
109  Rennie, Negligence (n 1), para 4.01.
110  (1861) 23D (HL) 8; (1861) 4 Macq 167.
111  White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207; [1995] 1 All ER 691.
112  White (n 111) at 258.
113  Ibid at 177.
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lease. When the intended security holder died a claim was made by his 
beneficiaries which claim was ultimately unsuccessful. On that basis the 
comments were merely obiter and Lord Goff’s analysis must be correct. The 
House of Lords by a majority of three to two in White held that a solicitor 
assumed a special duty towards potential beneficiaries and if that duty was 
breached then liability would follow. Such a duty could be by omission 
and not only negligent acts of commission.114 The House found that it was 
a case akin to transferred loss,115 where the beneficiary had a loss and no 
claim in contract and the deceased had a claim but no loss, and that it was 
fair just and reasonable in all the circumstances to hold the solicitor liable 
which was an incremental approach.116 
While White may have set a new course in England, Robertson was a 
Scottish case, hence Professor Rennie’s views that this still represented the 
law in Scotland but that it would be unlikely to remain good law should a 
Scottish case be taken to their Lordships’ House. However, their Lordship’s 
intervention did not prove necessary. As recently as 1990, Robertson had 
been seen as binding and determinative of the issue by Lord Weir in Weir v 
J M Hodge & Son.117 However Holmes v Bank of Scotland118 saw Lord Kingarth 
sitting in the Outer House depart from the line of authorities starting 
with Robertson. The reason for so doing was an unremarked upon and 
unreported Inner House decision from 1995119 decided shortly after White 
and therefore binding upon him. For his part, Lord Kingarth saw no reason 
why White should not be followed in Scotland, notwithstanding the strong 
dissents therein from Lord Jauncey and Lord Mustill.120
That the deceased had a claim but no loss and the disappointed 
beneficiaries did is borne out by Matthews v Hunter & Robertson Ltd.121 The 
executor brought a claim against the solicitors alleging that they had failed 
to effectively revoke a survivorship destination. The executor is said to be 
eadam personam cum defuncto and if the deceased had no loss to his estate 
at the moment prior to his death then the estate suffered no loss either. It 
was held by Lord Brodie that the additional Caparo limb of the test, that it 
114  Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; [1963] 2 All ER 575; Henderson 
v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1995] 2 AC 14 5, 182, per Lord Goff. 
115  White (n 111) at 265 (Lord Goff).
116  Ibid at 270 citing Caparo Industies plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (Lord Brown Wilkinson). 
117  1990 SLT 266.
118  2002 SLT 544.
119  Robertson v Watt & Co, 2nd Div, 4 July 1995, unreported.
120  Holmes v Bank of Scotland 2002 SLT 544 para 19.
121  [2008] CSOH 88; 2008 SLT 634.
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was fair, just and reasonable in the circumstances, would not be satisfied in 
this situation. The principle of assumption of duty has been held to extend 
potentially to recipients of lifetime gifts. There is a fine distinction between 
the sort of negligent omission as in White or Holmes and a situation where 
there is advice tendered negligently to a client who then acts on that advice 
and the resulting will or conveyance which in its own terms is perfectly in 
order does not produce the desired effect. In Fraser v McArthur Stewart,122 
which related to the ineffective legacy of a croft based on negligent advice, 
it was held by Lord Brailsfield that White was not directly in point and 
that the facts were distinguishable. As a result the advice and the effects of 
the advice were severable and there was no assumption of duty on which 
the disappointed beneficiaries might found. In Stevens v Hewats123 on the 
other hand the solicitors were instructed to convey a house and associated 
lands by way of gift. The disponer continued to reside in the property 
notwithstanding the gift. Some eight years later it was discovered that the 
conveyance was ineffective and a new conveyance was registered. At this 
time consideration was also given to the gifts with reservation rules for 
inheritance tax and a lease drawn up at market rent whereby the donor 
paid rent to the donee. Unfortunately the donor did not survive the 
necessary seven years. Claims were made both by the executors and the 
donee, in relation to the additional inheritance tax which was payable. The 
registering of a disposition on behalf of the donee has contractual aspects 
of the duty of care, as noted by Lord Tyre124 but the assertion was made by 
the claimants that general tax planning advice was or ought to have been 
provided. Lord Tyre was of the view that a stateable case had been made 
out on the basis of the decision in White but that the issue required proof.125 
In the parallel action by the executors, Lord Tyre held on the same basis 
as Matthews that no claim lay against the solicitors.126 To date Stevens is 
the only example of the White principle being applied in a conveyancing 
context in a reported case in Scotland. It is however clear that Lord Goff’s 
incremental approach to the extension of liability expressed in White is 
exactly that and the application of the principle of assumption of risk is 
capable of adaptation to a number of different situations. The law will 
continue to develop.
122  [2008] CSOH 159; 2009 SLT 31.
123  [2013] CSOH 61; 2013 SLT 763.
124  Stevens (n 123) at para 13.
125  Ibid at 16.
126  Milligan’s Executors v Hewats [2013] CSOH 60; 2013 SLT 758.
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G.  Third Party Claims for Inadequate Professional 
Service
Inadequate professional service is now defined as “professional services 
provided by a practitioner in connection with any matter in which the 
practitioner has been instructed by a client [which] were inadequate.”127 
These provisions replace earlier provisions128 which defined such services 
as not of the quality which could reasonably be expected of a competent 
solicitor. The relationship of inadequate professional service with 
negligence has been a source of uncertainty since the provisions were 
first enacted. Professor Rennie expressed the opinion that inadequate 
professional service is possible without negligence but whether the 
converse is true remains contentious in relation to the earlier provisions.129 
Paterson and Ritchie are of the opinion that the two often overlap.130 In terms 
of section 11 of the 2007 Act the Scottish Legal Complaints Commission 
must, in considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances, 
take into account the law, professional rules standards and guidance and 
any relevant codes of practice. When the provisions were being debated 
before the Scottish Parliament, the minister considered that there would be 
serious problems with requiring the Commission to separate negligence 
aspects from wider aspects of inadequate professional services.131 So 
overlap is the order of the day and there is no comprehensive definition of 
inadequate professional services. Given the compensation levels are up to 
£20,000 and the Commission has a number of other tools such as ordering 
other steps to rectify the inadequate service this is a significant remedy for 
those affected by inadequate professional service.132 Furthermore there is 
no need to prove loss as exists in the law of negligence.133 Such services 
according to the definition must relate to a matter instructed by a client 
there is no requirement for the person affected to be the client.
The test for service complaints is that the Commission must be satisfied 
that the complainer has an interest to enforce. Paterson and Ritchie suggest 
that the category has the potential to be broad and is capable of including 
127  Legal Profession and Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 2007, s2(1)(b).
128  Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980 s65(1).
129  Rennie, Negligence (n 1), para 11.06.
130  Paterson and Ritchie, Law, Practice and Conduct (n 9), para 1.04.
131  SP Committee Official Report, 23rd Meeting (Session 2), September 26, 2006.
132  Legal Profession and Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 2007, s10.
133  Rennie, Negligence (n 1), para 11.05.
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beneficiaries (and presumably disappointed beneficiaries) in an executry, 
opponents in a court case or perhaps where the agent for one side delays 
a conveyancing matter to the prejudice of the other.134 The Commission’s 
ability to accept third party complaints is now circumscribed by the 
decision in Council of the Law Society of Scotland v Scottish Legal Complaints 
Commission.135 A complaint was accepted in relation to a conduct matter but 
the principle is equally applicable to service complaints where the person 
making the complaint had received a letter from a firm of solicitors regarding 
an alleged trespass on their property on the basis of information supplied 
by the client. The Court held that a solicitor had a duty to represent her 
client and was entitled to rely on the information supplied. Furthermore a 
solicitor is not bound to respond to any complaint made by third parties.136 
In Saville-Smith v Scottish Legal Complaints Commission137 the pursuer 
sought to complain against the solicitor acting for his former employer 
on the basis that the solicitor had both revised the letter of dismissal and 
had appeared in the subsequent Tribunal proceedings. This was rejected 
as frivolous – again illustrating a narrow approach to third party claims. 
While these cases may restrict the scope of complaints they do not entirely 
exclude it and a third party complaint by a disappointed beneficiary may 
be admitted with the possibility of compensation being paid to complainer 
in circumstances where negligence need not be proved or where there is no 
incidence between liability and the loss. For example, the fine distinction 
drawn in Fraser in relation to the advice and the subsequent ineffective 
legacy, might not trouble the Commission when considering what is fair 
and reasonable in all the circumstances.
H.  Conclusions
The fundamental tenets of practice – fidelity, confidentiality and the 
avoidance of conflicts of interest – remain the same as they did two decades 
ago. Some measures of regulatory reform such as written terms of business 
134  Ibid para 16.04.
135  [2010] CSIH 79; 2011 SC 94; 2011 SLT 31; for a similar cases see SLCC Annual Report 
2011/12 case 4 letter to third party, SLCC Annual Report 2010/11 case 4 opponent’s 
agent in court action. 
136  Scottish Legal Complaints Commission, Third Party Complaints advice sheet available at 
http://www.scottishlegalcomplaints.org.uk/for-practitioners/guidance-advice/advice- 
and-information.aspx
137  [2012] CSIH 99.
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may clarify the obligations undertaken by solicitors which will tend to 
reduce the scope for negligence and in a few restricted situations may 
permit the limitation of liability. On the other hand the increasing interest 
of the legislature in anti-money laundering measures and the reduction of 
financial crime have imposed duties on solicitors that have fundamentally 
affected practice, undermining the duty of confidentiality, as well as 
requiring regulatory bodies to expand the ambit of the supervision of the 
profession. Inevitably these duties have been seized upon by the victims 
of identity theft in conveyancing matters as enhancing the obligations of 
solicitors to third parties. 
Lenders have organised themselves to require solicitors to act on their 
behalf subject to standard terms which are significantly more explicit 
than the common law standards which are preserved. The result of such 
explicit standards is that a ‘tick-box’ approach can be adopted in regulatory 
inspections to demonstrate compliance or otherwise with those standards 
without the need to explore the perimeters of common law duties which 
can, on occasions, appear hazy.
Finally the creation of a new simplified regime for service complaints 
with significantly increased limits of compensation opens the door to fairly 
sizeable negligence claims being dealt with as inadequate professional 
service claims without the need to prove loss and without the client being 
required to incur the potential costs involved in litigation.
There can be little doubt that the duty of care owed by solicitors to their 
clients and third parties has expanded since Professor Rennie wrote his 
authoritative work.

18. The Court and the 
Conveyancing Expert
Lady Paton
A.  The Changing Landscape
The traditional litigation landscape once familiar to the conveyancing expert 
is undergoing considerable upheaval. The development of automated and 
electronic technologies, a question-mark over immunity from suit, and the 
recommendations in Lord Gill’s Scottish Civil Courts Review Report,1 are 
some of the changes bringing about a new and unfamiliar environment.
B.  Automated and Electronic Technologies
Not every lawyer aspires to an automated and paperless world. John 
Mortimer possibly spoke for many when he observed through his fictional 
character barrister Horace Rumpole (habitué of the Old Bailey and the 
Uxbridge Magistrates Court):2
Things, I regret to have to say it, have not improved since those distant days, 
and many of the faults must be laid at the door of automation. Not only have 
witnesses changed [replaced, for example, by recording devices]. String 
quartets, which were once the pride of the tea room, have now been replaced 
by an abominable form of mechanical music. The toasting fork has given way 
1  Report of the Scottish Civil Courts Review (2009), available at http://www.scotcourts.
gov.uk/about-the-scottish-court-service/the-scottish-civil-courts-reform
2  J C Mortimer, Rumpole for the Defence (1982) 108.
© Lady Paton, CC BY 4.0 http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0056.18
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to an alarming machine that fires singed bread at you like a minute gun. The 
comforting waitress in black bombazine has become a device that contrives 
to shoot a warmish and unidentifiable fluid into a plastic cup and over your 
trousers at the drop of a considerable sum of money. None of these engines 
is an improvement on the human factor, neither are trials made any easier 
by the replacement of the living witness with the electronic device.
Nevertheless there is a current trend in the legal world seeking to achieve 
an automated electronic paperless environment. The Scottish Government 
has published a paper entitled The Digital Strategy for Justice in Scotland,3 
setting out how digital technology will be used to transform the way in which 
justice services are delivered in Scotland. The government envisages fully 
“digitised justice systems” including digital warrants, digital recording of 
evidence, video-conferencing, and the creation of a secure digital platform 
to store all information relevant to a case. Cynics might predict that court 
hearings will soon consist of judges sitting alone surrounded by plasma 
screens, recording devices, and qwerty-keyboards, with a piece of software 
instead of a clerk of court, witnesses’ evidence taking the form of talking 
heads on-screen, productions flashing up on a split screen, and lawyers’ 
submissions being transmitted directly from offices or chambers by means 
of a system such as Skype, phone-conferencing, or Twitter.4
That may be too gloomy a view. The judiciary in the Court of Session 
has expressly welcomed much of the government’s digital initiative. In 
an address at the launch of the Digital Strategy, Lady Dorrian described 
current problems being experienced in the courts, and possible digital 
solutions, pointing out inter alia that:5
Cases are becoming more complex, with a greater array of technical and 
forensic evidence that requires analysis and careful presentation in court. 
Video evidence needs time to be examined thoroughly. Witnesses who 
are cited for court may not turn up on the appointed day. There may be 
issues around the timely disclosure of evidence. All of these factors might 
be mitigated by the application of digital solutions – as evidence can be 
collected and shared electronically, for example, or witnesses reminded of 
their need to attend court by text or e-mail, as now happens. […]
In any modern society, the administration of justice must retain the trust 
and confidence of the people it serves. And it will only do that if it keeps 
3  Scottish Government, The Digital Strategy for Justice in Scotland (2014).
4  Something similar to the future envisaged by the Rt Hon Lord Justice Brooke, “The 
Courts and Judiciary in 2024” in Now and Then, A Celebration of Sweet & Maxwell’s 
Bicentenary (1999) Ch 8.
5  Victoria Quay, Edinburgh, 20 August 2014, available at http://www.scotland-judiciary.
org.uk/26/1301/Speech-by-Lady-Dorrian-at-the-launch-of-The-Digital-Strategy-for-
Justice-in-Scotland
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pace with the times, and remains relevant to the experience of the people and 
organisations it serves. We are now in an era, according to research published 
earlier this month, when Britons spend more time using technology devices 
than they do sleeping. If people and businesses communicate instantly by 
e-mail, Skype, or Facebook, they will expect public services to do likewise. […]
[D]igital innovation will allow greater transparency in proceedings, 
make it easier for people to participate in the system – whether making 
applications, submitting documents, giving or providing evidence, paying 
fines – wherever they are and at a time that suits them. […]
Changes in technology and changes in procedures cannot happen 
in isolation – they must be accompanied by changes in the attitude and 
behaviours of those using the new technology. It is very encouraging that 
the Digital Strategy has been the product of wide-spread collaboration 
across the justice system; this suggests that there is a willingness to embrace 
change in all quarters, at least at the leadership level. It is vital that this 
willingness is spread further, and that is best done by making real – for all 
those involved – the benefits that innovation will bring.
Certainly it must be acknowledged that a wealth of information can be 
stored, transported, and accessed by the use of computers and electronic 
technology. Pen-drives and USB sticks are becoming more common in 
court: thus pleadings, submissions, notes of appeal, notes of argument, 
case reports, statutes, rules of court and productions can be contained in an 
item measuring about 4cm by 2cm, easily portable and easily inserted into 
a computer, giving access at any time and any place to all these materials. 
Text-books, rule-books, bench-books, codes of conduct and other guidance 
can be accessed by a DVD disc, or directly online. Search and cut-and-paste 
facilities available on computers are very helpful to court-users. General 
electronic functions such as email and texting are undeniably useful, for 
everyone, and are currently being used for court work including solicitors’ 
firms enrolling ancillary motions in court cases. Thus the new technology, 
albeit not entirely welcomed by every generation of court-user, is currently 
being actively incorporated into the court system.
The “wide-spread collaboration across the justice system” referred 
to in Lady Dorrian’s address is already taking place in the world of 
conveyancing. For example, in October 2002 the Keeper of the Registers 
of Scotland consulted four conveyancing professors6 in a project which 
resulted in the digital “Automated Registration of Title to Land” (ARTL).7 
6  Professors Stewart Brymer, George Gretton, Roderick Paisley and Robert Rennie 
(Professor Kenneth Reid was not involved because he was at that time a full-time 
commissioner with the Scottish Law Commission). See S Brymer, G Gretton, R Paisley 
and R Rennie, “Automated Registration of Title to Land” (2005) JR 201-50.
7  R Rennie and S Brymer, Conveyancing in the Electronic Age (2008); S Brymer and I Davis, 
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Dispositions may be electronic, as may missives (fax or email and possibly 
text). Electronic signatures are now permitted.8 Since the coming into force 
of the Land Registration etc (Scotland) Act 2012, a title to land may never 
appear as a tangible deed: its provenance may be digital and it may remain 
digital throughout its life. For some lawyers, these developments may give 
rise to anxiety and nostalgia for the traditional working environment of 
documentary missives, parchment-like dispositions, storage in deed-boxes, 
title searches in the Register of Sasines, and face-to-face settlement meetings 
at solicitors’ offices during which deeds and cheques physically changed 
hands. But the new world is here, and the combination of a paperless court 
system and electronic conveyancing may mean that any conveyancing 
expert wishing to assist the court should be IT-literate,9 reasonably skilled 
in computers and electronic devices, familiar with current electronic 
conveyancing practices, and able to give evidence (supported by 
productions) by video-link. Thirty years ago, those skills and qualifications 
were not even contemplated, far less required of a conveyancing expert. 
Some experts might benefit from further training, and may find themselves 
experiencing a steep learning curve. 
C.  A Question-mark over Immunity from Suit
A further upset for conveyancing experts has arisen in the context of 
immunity from suit. For many years it has been a well-established principle 
that an expert witness taking part in court proceedings has civil immunity 
in relation to his evidence. As explained by the Court of Appeal in Stanton 
v Callaghan:10
(i) an expert witness who gives evidence at a trial is immune from suit in 
respect of anything which he says in court, and that immunity will extend 
to the contents of the report which he adopts as, or incorporates in, his 
evidence; (ii) where an expert witness gives evidence at a trial, the immunity 
which he would enjoy in respect of that evidence is not to be circumvented 
by a suit based on the report itself; and (iii) the immunity does not extend to 
“Automated Registration of Title to Land (‘ARTL’)” in R Rennie (ed), The Promised Land: 
Property Law Reform (2008) Ch 9; G L Gretton and K G C Reid, Conveyancing, 4th edn 
(2011) para 8.23-8.25.
8  Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, ss9B(1) and (2), as introduced by the 
Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012, s97(2). For discussion, see R Rennie and S 
Brymer, “A Bold Step Forward” 2012 JLSS 32-33; R Rennie and S Brymer “E-missives: 
What Now?” 2014 JLSS 18-19.
9  J Irving, “Survival in the IT Age” 2000 JLSS 18-19.
10  [2000] QB 75 at 100.
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protect an expert who has been retained to advise as to the merits of a party’s 
claim in litigation from a suit by the party by whom he has been retained in 
respect of that advice, notwithstanding that it was in contemplation at the 
time when the advice was given that the expert would be a witness at the 
trial if that litigation were to proceed.
That was the position in Scotland: the immunity enjoyed by expert witnesses 
was part of a greater immunity enjoyed by those involved in court cases.11
However the law has changed, certainly in England. The Supreme Court 
in Jones v Kaney,12 by means of what might be seen as judicial legislation,13 
decided by a majority of three to two that an expert witness giving evidence 
in court should not be immune to an action for professional negligence.14 
Lord Hope and Lady Hale dissented. Lord Hope saw no principled basis 
for removing immunity from expert witnesses. He relied upon the Scottish 
case Watson v McEwan,15 pointing out that Watson remained binding in 
Scotland, and that witness immunity in Scotland was a devolved matter. 
Thus the accepted view is that the decision in Jones is not binding in Scotland, 
where Watson remains binding until appropriate legislation is enacted by 
the devolved Parliament.16 While some may agree with Lord Phillips, who 
led the majority in the Supreme Court, that experts will not be discouraged 
from giving opinions or evidence if immunity is removed,17 many would 
disagree.18 Accordingly the approach adopted by the majority of the 
11  Stair, Inst 4.1.5.
12  [2011] UKSC 13; [2011] 2 AC 398.
13  R Rennie, S Brymer and D Reid, “The End of Immunity for Expert Witnesses?” 2012 
Scottish Law Gazette 37-40.
14  Thus overruling Stanton v Callaghan (n 10).
15  [1905] AC 480.
16  Rennie et al (n 13).
17  R Jackson and J Powell, Professional Liability (7th ed) by J Powell and R Stewart (2011) 
para 2-110; Rennie et al, “The End of Immunity” (n 13), although the authors went on 
to identify a potential problem as follows: “If … the evidence of the expert for the client 
[is] clearly rejected by the court, the likelihood is that the client will be found liable in 
expenses. One hopes that the removal of immunity (should it ever come to Scotland) 
would not then result in a subsequent claim against the expert on the losing side. If that 
were the case, would we all then be hunting for an elusive super expert able to say that 
no expert of ordinary competence could ever have given that particular opinion?” 
18  Including the Earl of Halsbury LC in Watson v McEwan (n 15); Salmon J in Marrinan 
v Vibart [1963] 1 QB 234 at 237; Lord Wilberforce in Roy v Prior [1971] AC 470 at 480; 
Simon Brown LJ in Silcott v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (1996) 8 Admin LR 
633 at 637; Lord Hoffmann in Taylor v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [1999] 2 AC 177 
at 214; and Lord Hope in Jones (n 12) at para 165: “It is one thing to be liable to a wasted 
costs order at the instance of the court itself, or to proceedings by a professional body 
for professional misconduct. It is quite another to be at risk of worthless but possibly 
embarrassing and time-consuming proceedings by a disgruntled and disaffected 
litigant in person.”
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Supreme Court in Jones v Kaney must bring a frisson of apprehension to 
those in Scotland offering their services as expert witnesses, even although 
the effect of the decision has not hitherto come north of the border.
D.  Case Management and the Conveyancing Expert
Following upon the success of the new rules of court for personal injuries 
actions,19 there has been general recognition that a similar case management 
approach would be beneficial in other types of cases. As is noted in Lord 
Gill’s Report of the Scottish Civil Courts Review:20
We are satisfied that, with the exception of certain specified types of action, 
all actions in the Court of Session and the sheriff court should be subject 
to judicial case management. On the lodging of defences, a case should be 
allocated to the docket of a particular judge or sheriff. A case management 
hearing should be fixed shortly thereafter. This would normally take place 
by means of a telephone conference call. Parties would make submissions 
as to further procedure and any other matters arising, such as disclosure of 
documents. The judge or sheriff would identify the factual and legal issues 
in the case and decide what form of case management is most appropriate. 
In complex cases this may take the form of active judicial case management 
akin to the commercial model ... with further case management hearings as 
the case progresses. In straightforward cases the court might decide that a 
timetable and related orders akin to the case-flow procedure under Chapter 
43 would be appropriate. In that event, no further case management hearings 
would be required. In certain cases a mixture of these techniques would be 
appropriate.
One outcome of increased case management might be the ordering of 
experts to hold discussions, exchange reports and/or prepare a minute of 
admissions or a joint statement.21 Thus the modern conveyancing expert 
should be prepared to participate in such a meeting, treading the fine 
line between fulfilling his duty to the court while protecting his client’s 
interests (a task made more difficult by being in a private consultation 
without the immediate supervision of the presiding judge.)22 As Lord Hope 
commented in Jones v Kaney:23
19  Rules of the Court of Session 1994, Ch 43.
20  Report of the Scottish Civil Courts Review (n 1), Ch 5, para 48.
21  A L Stewart, “Evidence,” in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue 
(2006) para 179; and see the procedure adopted in Jones (n 12).
22  For example, one expert might seek to exert pressure on the other: cf Jones (n 12).
23  Jones (n 12), para 156.
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[I]t is plain that the paid expert owes duties to the client by whom he is being 
paid. If he agrees for a reward to prepare a report and to present himself in 
court to give evidence, he is obliged to do those things and to take reasonable 
care when he is doing so. He must make the necessary investigations and 
preparations for the giving of that evidence. Nevertheless when it comes to 
the content of that evidence his overriding duty is to the court, not to the 
party for whom he appears. His duty is to give his own unbiased opinion on 
matters within his expertise. It is on that basis that he must be assumed to 
have agreed to act for his client. It would be contrary to the public interest 
for him to undertake to confine himself to making points that were in the 
client’s interest only and to refrain from saying anything to the court to 
which his client might take objection. 
E.  The Conveyancing Expert and Alternatives to Court
Lord Gill’s Report of the Scottish Civil Courts Review notes that:24
ADR [alternative dispute resolution] in general provides a valuable way 
in which the burden on the civil courts can be lifted. More importantly, 
it provides an opportunity for dispute resolution in cases where the 
confrontational process of litigation is inappropriate. It is therefore a 
valuable complement to the work of the courts. […]
Mediation may, in some cases, offer advantages over litigation, 
particularly in cases where it is important to preserve relationships. […]
[Quoting, with approval, Dame Hazel Genn] “ADR cannot supplant the 
machinery of justice precisely because, in civil cases, the background threat 
of litigation is necessary to bring people to the negotiating table ... a well-
functioning civil justice system should offer a choice of dispute resolution 
methods.”
Conveyancing disputes concerning boundaries, real burdens, titles, 
servitudes, prescriptive possession and other similar problems, are classic 
examples of disputes which respond well to these flexible, less formal, 
dispute-resolution procedures. The opinion of a respected conveyancer will 
frequently resolve the issues, without the need to go to court. Meetings and 
joint consultations can assist in achieving a mutually acceptable outcome. 
By contrast, formal court proceedings can be protracted, wearing, and 
expensive, as Rennie has pointed out:25
[E]ven if [clients] win, there will be expense involved on an extrajudicial 
basis… If matters go to court [it should be emphasised to clients] that civil 
litigation is for the very rich or very poor and that if they lose they will be 
24  Report of the Scottish Civil Courts Review (n 1), ch 7, para 20-22.
25  R Rennie, “Boundary Ddisputes Rrevisited” 2013 SLT (News) 189-94, at 193.
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liable not only for their own expenses both judicial and extrajudicial but for 
the other side’s judicial expenses.
Thus a valuable ADR service is currently being provided by practising 
conveyancers, professors, and other members of academic staff.26 The 
result is not only the satisfactory resolution of many disputes, but also a 
great saving of resources, both the courts’ and the parties’. In this context, 
the conveyancing expert can be regarded as, in effect, assuming the mantle 
of “the court.” 
F.  In a Changing Landscape, some Classic Principles 
Remain
It is some comfort that, amidst all the changes and upheavals, certain 
well-established principles continue to apply in relation to the role of the 
conveyancing expert in court. 
(1) Assistance for the court
Once in court, the conveyancing expert is not the final arbiter. His role is to 
provide assistance to the judge.27 As Lord Justice-Clerk Cooper emphasised 
in Davie v Magistrates of Edinburgh28 (a case involving scientific evidence):29
Expert witnesses, however skilled or eminent, can give no more than 
evidence. They cannot usurp the functions of the jury or judge sitting as 
26  See, for example, D Cusine, Conveyancing Opinions of JM Halliday (1992); R Rennie, 
Opinions on Professional Negligence in Conveyancing (2004).
27  Even although instructed and paid by one party. See however the reservations 
expressed in F Davidson, Evidence (2007) para 11.27; and the views stated in I Macphail, 
Evidence (1987) at para 17.27: “It is sometimes maintained that the system whereby in 
adversary procedure each party adduces its own expert evidence is objectionable… In 
[certain] countries … the court is permitted to select experts to inform it of their opinion 
based on their own particular knowledge and experience. Recently, in countries whose 
practice is based on an adversary rather than an inquisitorial system, the question 
whether the device of the court expert should be adopted has been widely discussed. It 
is not generally employed in Scotland, where conflicts of opinion between experts are 
adjudicated upon frequently and apparently without embarrassment by both judges 
and juries. (Footnote 90: A rare example, if not a unique case [of a court expert] is Irvine 
v Powrie’s Trs 1915 SC 1006, where the professor of chemistry in Edinburgh University 
was appointed by the court for the limited purpose of supervising the parties’ experts 
while they removed specimens of paper and ink from a registered deed which the 
pursuer sought to reduce on the ground of forgery.)”
28  1953 SC 34.
29  Davie (n 28) at 40.
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a jury, any more than a technical assessor can substitute his advice for the 
judgment of the court…Their duty is to furnish the judge or jury with the 
necessary…criteria for testing the accuracy of their conclusions, so as to 
enable the judge or jury to form their own independent judgment by the 
application of these criteria to the facts proved in evidence. The…opinion 
evidence, if intelligible, convincing and tested, becomes a factor (and often 
an important factor) for consideration along with the whole other evidence 
in the case, but the decision is for the judge or jury. In particular the bare 
ipse dixit of [an expert], however eminent, upon the issue in controversy, will 
normally carry little weight, for it cannot be tested by cross-examination nor 
independently appraised, and the parties have invoked the decision of a 
judicial tribunal and not an oracular pronouncement by an expert. 
The court frequently has to choose between the evidence of two expert 
witnesses.30 But the court is also entitled reject the evidence of both,31 and 
further is not bound to accept the conclusions of one party’s expert witness 
simply because no counter evidence was led by the other party.32 
(2) Standing and experience 
It is essential that the expert’s qualifications and experience are established, 
to enable the court to be satisfied that the witness is truly skilled and 
experienced in the relevant area.33 Davidson explains that:34
It is for the court to be satisfied that a particular individual tendered as an 
expert does have sufficient relevant expertise to assist the court, and if this 
is not established, the evidence of that witness is not admissible, even if the 
opposing party raises no objection.35
30  See, for example, Leeds & Holbeck Building Society v Alex Morison & Co (No 2) 2001 SCLR 
41. The party bearing the onus of proof may fail if a judge is unable to decide between 
conflicting expert accounts: Pickford v Imperial Chemical Industries plc [1998] 1 WLR 1189, 
Lord Hope at page 1200A-B.
31  Assessor for Lothian Region v Wilson 1979 SC 341; Armour v Thyssen Edelstahlwerke AG 
1986 SLT 452, 1989 SLT 182 (IH); Beaton v HM Advocate 1993 JC 35 at pages 39H-40A.
32  Davie (n 28).
33  In the Law Society of Scotland Code of Practice for expert witnesses, available at http://
www.expertwitnessscotland.info/codepract.htm, potential expert witnesses are warned 
inter alia that: “2. Instructions should be accepted only in matters where the expert 
(a) has the knowledge, experience, expertise, qualifications, or professional training 
appropriate for the assignment.” Note however that professional qualifications are not 
always essential: Davidson, Evidence para 11.12.
34  Evidence at para 11.13.
35  For recent examples of expert evidence tendered but ruled inadmissible, see Kennedy 
v Cordia (Services) LLP [2014] CSIH 76 (evidence from a health and safety expert ruled 
inadmissible in a slipping on ice case); Snowden and Jennings v HM Advocate [2014] 
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In some jurisdictions, for example England36 and the USA,37 there is 
procedure whereby the judge operates as a “gatekeeper” in that, during 
some procedure or hearing prior to the proof or trial, he determines inter alia 
whether or not a person who is to be invited to give evidence as an expert 
has the necessary expertise and qualifications and what areas of evidence 
may be addressed. That procedure has not yet reached Scotland. In Scottish 
courts, the exercise of “setting up” an expert is normally carried out during 
the proof (or trial), by the lodging of the witness’s curriculum vitae, and the 
leading of evidence from the witness about his qualifications, experience, 
publications and particular expertise. A recent judicial consideration of 
this practice can be found in Hainey v HM Advocate38 where Lord Clarke 
observed:39
While the trial judge does not act as a gatekeeper ... he has a continuing 
role as referee, or umpire, throughout the trial to ensure that it is conducted 
fairly and that evidence from a person claiming specialist knowledge and 
expertise, who clearly does not have such expertise and knowledge, is 
disregarded by the jury.[…] 
It is to be noted that in England and Wales, the rules of procedure require 
that where there is to be medical evidence led and relied upon it should 
be considered at a pre-trial hearing. ‘The pre-trial process is of particular 
importance. Without robust pre-trial management, the real medical issues 
cannot be identified and, absent such identification, a judge is unlikely to 
be able to prevent experts wandering into unnecessary, complicated and 
confusing details; accordingly, a judge who is to hear a case of this type 
should deal with all pre-trial hearings, save for those in which no issue of 
substance arise. By the time a trial starts, the essential medical issues which 
the jury have to resolve, and the expert evidence, identifying the source on 
which the evidence is based, should all be clear’ (see Archbold, Criminal 
Pleading, Evidence and Practice 2012, at 1380).
It may be that the time has come for some thought to be given to 
providing for such an approach in Scotland in such cases.
While a proof before a single judge concerning a conveyancing matter 
presents a rather different context from a trial before a jury involving 
complex medical and forensic evidence, these dicta emphasise the 
HCJAC 100 at paras 18, 44 and 67 (evidence from a senior lecturer in psychology ruled 
inadmissible in the context of identification).
36  Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r35 (see Davidson, Evidence para 11.31).
37  See, for example, the leading case of Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc (1993) 
509 US 579, discussed in Davidson, Evidence para 11.15-11.17.
38  2014 JC 33.
39  Hainey (n 38) para 49 and 52.
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importance of appropriate qualifications and/or experience, and the 
limiting of the evidence to the relevant area of expertise.40
(3) Presence in court
A conveyancing expert (or indeed any expert) should not be present 
in court during another expert’s evidence. If it is thought that an expert 
would benefit from hearing certain witnesses to fact, a motion should be 
made seeking the judge’s permission for the expert to sit in court during 
that evidence. If it is found that an expert has per incuriam been present in 
court without permission listening to evidence given by others, that may 
seriously undermine his own evidence.41
(4) Duties
Key guidelines for any professional appearing in court to give evidence as 
an expert witness have been usefully summarised by Cresswell J in National 
Justice Compania Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (The Ikarian Reefer) 
(No1)42 as follows (omitting case references):
The duties and responsibilities of expert witnesses in civil cases include the 
following:
(i)  Expert evidence presented to the court should be, and should be seen 
to be, the independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to form 
or content by the exigencies of litigation. […]
(ii)  An expert witness should provide independent assistance to the court 
by way of objective unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his 
expertise.... An expert witness in the High Court should never assume 
the role of an advocate.
(iii)  An expert witness should state the facts or assumption upon which his 
opinion is based. He should not omit to consider material facts which 
could detract from his concluded opinion. […]
40  There may be finely-balance decisions in this context: see, for example, McTear v 
Imperial Tobacco Ltd 2005 2 SC 1, para 5.15-5.18; Main v McAndrew Wormald Ltd 1988 SLT 
141 (medical witnesses held entitled to refer to published papers by epidemiologists, 
although not themselves epidemiologists). 
41  Although there are differing views on this matter: see, for example, Davidson, Evidence, 
para 11.26; A L Stewart, “Evidence,” in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, 
Reissue (2006) para 174.
42  [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 68 at 81.
378 Professional Negligence in Principle and Practice
(iv)  An expert witness should make it clear when a particular question or 
issue falls outside his expertise.
(v)  If an expert’s opinion is not properly researched because he considers 
that insufficient data is available, then this must be stated with an 
indication that the opinion is no more than a provisional one.... In 
cases where an expert witness who has prepared a report could not 
assert that the report contained the truth, the whole truth and nothing 
but the truth without some qualification, that qualification should be 
stated in the report.
(vi)  If, after exchange of reports, an expert witness changes his view on a 
material matter having read the other side’s expert’s report or for any 
other reason, such change of view should be communicated (through 
legal representatives) to the other side without delay, and when 
appropriate to the court.
(vii)  Where expert evidence refers to photographs, plans, calculations, 
analyses, measurements, survey reports, or other similar documents, 
these must be provided to the opposite party at the same time as the 
exchange of reports.
These principles are to a large extent echoed in the Law Society’s Code of 
Practice for expert witnesses,43 which provides inter alia:
Independence
11.  Experts will bear in mind that:
(i)  When giving evidence at court, the role of ... an expert witness, 
is to assist the court and remain independent of the parties.
12.  Experts will disclose to [instructing] solicitors at the start of each 
project any personal or financial or other significant circumstances 
which might influence work for the client in any way not stated or 
implied in the instructions, in particular:
(i)  Any directorship or controlling interest in any business in 
competition with the client;
(ii)  Any financial or other interest in goods or services (including 
software) under dispute;
(iii)  Any personal relationship and/or professional relationship, 
and the nature thereof, with any individual involved in the 
matter;
43  Code of Practice (n 33).
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(iv)  The existence but not the name of any other client of the 
expert with competing interests;
(v)  Whether the expert has worked with the expert instructed by 
the opposing party (if known).
13.  Any actual or potential conflict of interest must be reported to the 
solicitor as soon as it is raised or becomes apparent and the assignment 
must be terminated.
Despite the existence of such guidelines, difficulties can arise. A recent 
action for damages for alleged professional negligence44 illustrates a failure 
fully to comply with principles 12(c) and 13 of the Code of Practice. In that 
case, property consultants and architects/planners gave evidence in court 
concerning the loss which the pursuers alleged they had suffered. Lord 
Woolman felt obliged to make the following observations:45
During cross-examination, Mr A [of Keppies, Glasgow, Architects and 
Planners] disclosed that although there is no formal association, his firm has 
had links with the defenders since 2004. The name “Keppie” appears on the 
main door of the defenders’ offices. Keppie has used rooms within to hold 
meetings. The defenders’ website states that Keppie is able to offer planning 
services.
Individuals must think carefully before accepting instructions to act as 
an expert witness. The court expects them to be scrupulously impartial. In 
this instance, Mr A’s links with the defenders should have been notified at 
a much earlier stage.
Another illustration of a problem (in effect a breach of the third proposition 
of The Ikarian Reefer) was referred to in McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd46 at para 
5.10. An expert witness in a criminal trial47 had made an assumption which 
was neither justified nor disclosed to the court. Lord Justice General Emslie 
stated that, as a result, the witness had been discredited. He observed:48
This was, in our judgment, conduct on the part of an expert witness 
which demonstrated a complete misunderstanding of the role of scientific 
44  Hawthorne v Anderson [2014] CSOH 65; and see too Liverpool Catholic Archdiocese Trs v 
Goldberg (No 3) [2001] 1 WLR 2337 at page 2340, where the court refused to admit the 
evidence of an undoubted expert who was also a long-standing friend of the defendant
45  Hawthorne (n 44) at para 84 and 85.
46  McTear (n 40).
47  Pierce v HM Advocate 1981 SCLR 783.
48  Pierce (n 47), quoted with approval by Lord Caplan in Elf Caledonia Ltd v London Bridge 
Engineering Ltd, 2 September 1997, unreported at 225, referred to by Lord Nimmo Smith 
in McTear (n 40) at 139. 
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witnesses in the courts, and a lack of the essential qualities of accuracy and 
scientific objectivity which are normally to be taken for granted.
G.  Conclusion
In conclusion, much is expected of both the court and the conveyancing 
expert in the twenty-first century. Neither can afford to rely solely upon 
traditional or well-established practices or technology. Each must acquire 
new competences which were not even envisaged in the latter part of 
the twentieth century, yet each must retain and abide by the well-tried 
principles and practices expected of both court and expert when an expert 
witness gives evidence. The result is a challenging but fascinating and ever-
developing area of the law.
19. The Role of the Expert 
Witness in Professional 
Negligence Litigation
Gerald F Hanretty QC
A.  Introduction
Expert or skilled witnesses are objectionable. Needless to say, that 
observation is not directed towards the characters, qualities, learning or 
experience of those not infrequently called to assist parties and the court in 
litigation. Rather, the leading of such evidence necessarily results in material 
being presented to the court which is, by its nature, opinion evidence and 
accordingly objectionable – and, in the absence of justification, therefore 
inadmissible.
Issues in relation to the admissibility and use of opinion evidence 
have long been the subject of debate throughout the English-speaking 
world. Indeed, in the 21st-century it is worthwhile reflecting upon the 
observations of J P Taylor in the third edition of his work A Treatise on the 
Law of Evidence:1
Perhaps the testimony which least deserves credit with the jury is that of 
skilled witnesses. These gentlemen are usually required to speak, not to 
facts but to opinion; and when this is the case, it is often quite surprising 
1  J P Taylor, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence as Administered in England and Ireland, 3rd edn 
(1858) 54.
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to see with what facility, and to what extent, their views can be made to 
correspond with the wishes or the interests of the parties who call them.
It is likely to be the position that such an observation would be thought by 
most to remain valid, at least in part. However, what has not much been 
discussed is the role of the expert in modern dispute resolution other than 
analyses of the principles to be adopted by experts in the conduct of their 
duties with only a little practical guidance for practitioners in relation to 
the choice of experts.
B.  The Conventional Analysis
Although litigation by its nature puts in issue partisanship on the part 
of expert witnesses, in reality, those giving evidence within the realm of 
professional negligence litigation are highly regarded. In a relatively small 
jurisdiction like Scotland, it is unsurprising that professional integrity, 
impartiality and sound judgement are highly prized. Accordingly, 
challenges to skilled witnesses are most often advanced by challenging the 
empirical material upon which opinions are advanced or by denouncing 
the expert opinion as an exercise in usurping the function of the court itself. 
The importance of instructing expert witnesses who command respect 
from within their professions cannot be overemphasised.
Of course, the Court jealously guards the role society calls upon it to 
perform. The classic exposition of the expert’s function might be found 
in the familiar guidance provided by Lord President Cooper in Davie v 
Magistrates of Edinburgh.2
More recently, it appears to have been thought necessary to elaborate 
upon the role of the expert witness. Although discussed within the context 
of a criminal appeal the observations made in Wilson v HM Advocate3 
provide general guidance on the matter. It is worthwhile considering at 
length the court’s opinion in relation to expert evidence in its adoption 
of Lord President Cooper’s dicta and its application in a more modern 
context:4
At this point, in view of the significance of (certain) testimony in this case, 
we should now consider what we believe to be the proper character of 
2  1953 SC 34 at 40.
3  2009 JC 336.
4  Wilson at para 58-63.
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expert evidence, and in particular attempt to describe our understanding 
of its nature and effect on the conclusions we should draw. In general, of 
course, opinion evidence is not admissible in our criminal courts; witnesses 
may only under normal circumstances give evidence about matters within 
their direct knowledge. The evidence of an expert witness is an exception 
to this rule. It is not possible to provide an absolute direction as to what 
constitutes legitimate subject-matter for expert opinion. However, two 
general principles will normally give some guidance. First, the subject-
matter under discussion must be necessary for the proper resolution of the 
dispute, and be such that a judge or jury without instruction or advice in 
the particular area of knowledge or experience would be unable to reach a 
sound conclusion without the help of a witness who had such specialised 
knowledge or experience. Secondly, the subject-matter in question must 
be part of a recognised body of science or experience which is suitably 
acknowledged as being useful and reliable, and properly capable of reaching 
and justifying the opinions offered, and the witness must demonstrate a 
sufficiently authoritative understanding of the theory and practice of the 
subject. The nature and scope of expert opinion evidence cannot at any one 
point in time be exhaustively defined.
The effect of expert opinion evidence can perhaps be described with more 
precision. The role of the expert witness, and his duties and responsibilities, 
have been subject to much judicial comment. In National Justice Campania 
Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (The Ikarion Reefer),5 Cresswell J 
listed a number of such duties and responsibilities, inter alia:
1.  Expert evidence presented to the court should be, and should be seen 
to be, the independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to the 
form or content by the exigencies of litigation.
2.  An expert witness should provide independent assistance to the court 
by way of objective unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his 
expertise.
3.  An expert witness should state the facts or assumptions on which his 
opinion is based. He should not omit to consider material facts which 
could detract from his concluded opinion.
4.  An expert witness should make it clear when a particular question or 
issue falls outside his expertise.
To this might be added a requirement that an expert witness should 
in particular explain why any material relevant to his conclusions is 
5  [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 68; [1993] FSR 563; [1993] 37 EG 158.
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ignored or regarded as unimportant. Although the categories of duty and 
responsibility described by Cresswell J in the Ikarion Reefer case were 
concerned with civil matters, these rules are equally applicable to criminal 
cases.
In addition, particularly in criminal cases, other duties and 
responsibilities have been recognised by the courts. For example, the court 
will expect in a criminal matter that an expert’s report must state the facts 
upon which opinions are based, and if assumptions are made, these must 
be clearly identified. Reasons must be given for conclusions. Whether 
instructed for the prosecution or defence, the principal duty of an expert 
witness is to the court, and this overrides any duty he owes to the party 
which instructed him. Again, explanations should be given for the basis on 
which all relevant material is either accepted or rejected.
It therefore follows that a judge or jury is not bound by the opinion 
evidence tendered by an expert witness. There are clear principles under 
which such evidence is admitted. In Davie v Magistrates of Edinburgh Lord 
President Cooper said (p 40):
Expert witnesses, however skilled or eminent can give no more than 
evidence. They cannot usurp the functions of the jury or the Judge sitting 
as a jury … Their duty is to furnish the Judge or jury with the necessary 
specific scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of their conclusions so as 
to enable the Judge or jury to form their own independent judgment by the 
application of these criteria to the facts proved in evidence. The scientific 
opinion evidence, if intelligible, convincing and tested, becomes a factor 
(and often an important factor) for consideration along with the whole other 
evidence in the case, but the decision is for the Judge or jury. In particular the 
bare ipse dixit of a scientist, however, eminent, upon the issue in controversy, 
will normally carry little weight, for it cannot be tested by cross-examination 
nor independently appraised, and the parties have invoked the decision of a 
judicial tribunal and not an oracular pronouncement by an expert.
Although in modern practice (as in the present case), expert evidence is 
routinely appraised and cross-examined, the position essentially remains 
that an expert witness’s opinion is only a factor (albeit an important one) in 
the decision of a judge or jury.
It is abundantly clear therefore, and has been for many years in our 
courts, that an expert witness is not in the position to provide the court 
with a statement of unqualified conclusions about the question of fact on 
which his opinion bears. If he does so, the effect of his testimony may well 
be much diminished. In this context, it is perhaps worth noting that an 
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expert witness is in a particularly privileged position in our courts. Prior to 
the decision, he is the only person permitted to express an opinion. Other 
witnesses must confine themselves to facts. Further, an expert witness 
will routinely rely on assumptions, hearsay evidence, his impression 
of testimony that he has not heard, and reports, statements and other 
secondary sources of information, all of which might be incompetent in a 
court of law if presented as factual evidence. It is therefore of the utmost 
importance that any expert witness carefully describes the source and 
assesses the worth of all material on which his opinion is based. We refer to 
the case of Gilmour v HM Advocate6 (paras 79, 80).
If the approach taken by the court is a paradigm warning to experts in 
relation to empirical fact lying within the province of the decision-maker, 
more recent guidance has been given reiterating the court’s duty to make 
findings as opposed to simply adopting an expert’s views. In Kennedy v 
Cordia (Services) LLP7 Lord Brodie considered the admissibility of expert 
evidence in a personal injuries action arising out of the pursuer’s fall in icy 
conditions:8
In the present case the dispute that had to be resolved was whether, on the 
basis of the essentially uncontroversial primary facts, as a matter of law, the 
reclaimers [the defender employers] were under a duty to take a particular 
precaution (providing attachments to footwear and ensuring their use) and, 
had they taken that precaution, whether the respondent would have suffered 
injury. That was something that the Lord Ordinary was fully equipped to 
do without any instruction or advice; it was squarely within his province 
as judicial decision-maker. No additional expertise was required. It may be 
that a judge has personally never carried out a risk assessment of any kind. 
That does not mean that, having heard evidence of the nature of the activity 
being assessed and having been provided with a document recording the 
risk assessment, he cannot determine whether or not the assessment was 
“suitable and sufficient” in terms of regulation 3(1) of the [Management of 
Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999]. It is the job of a judge to hear 
evidence about matters with which he may previously have been totally 
unfamiliar and, on the basis of that evidence, come to conclusions of fact and 
then apply the relevant law to these facts. In Midland Bank Trust Company 
Limited v Hett Stubbs & Kemp [1979] 1 Ch 384 (a case of alleged negligence 
on the part of a solicitor engaged to carry out a conveyancing transaction) 
Oliver J was faced with a similar situation to that which faced the Lord 
6  [2007] HCJAC 48; 2007 SLT 893; 2007 SCCR 417.
7  [2014] CSIH 76.
8  Kennedy at para 15.
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Ordinary here. In what has become a much-quoted passage, he said this, at 
p. 402:
‘I must say that I doubt the value, or even the admissibility, of this sort of 
evidence, which seems to be becoming customary in cases of this type. The 
extent of the legal duty in any given situation must, I think, be a question of 
law for the Court. Clearly if there is some practice in a particular profession, 
some accepted standard of conduct which is laid down by a professional 
institute or sanctioned by common usage, evidence of that can and ought 
to be received. But evidence which really amounts to no more than an 
expression of opinion by a particular practitioner of what he thinks that 
he would have done had he been placed, hypothetically and without the 
benefit of hindsight, in the position of the Defendants, is of little assistance 
to the Court whilst evidence of the witness’s view of what, as a matter of 
law, the solicitor’s duty was in the particular circumstances of the case is, I 
should have thought, inadmissible, for that is the very question which it is 
the Court’s function to decide’.
C.  The Realities of Modern Practice
Bearing in mind the foregoing admonitions, what then is the role of the 
expert in professional negligence litigation? Perhaps, notwithstanding the 
quantity of judicial ink addressing the issue, the reality is rather more prosaic. 
Each of the cases mentioned above in reality identifies the professional 
obligations incumbent upon experts. They do not, and are not intended to, 
discuss the pragmatic and practical aspects of the role. Moreover, as society 
has become more complex and more aspects of business and private life are 
thought to lie within the province of one profession or another, the need 
for expert opinion where things are perceived to have “gone wrong” has 
increased exponentially. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to suggest that in a 
developed, economically active society there shall be an increasing need for 
the advice of those who engage in the wide variety of professional activities 
now commonly encountered. The historical categorisation of “professions” 
and “trades” is probably an anachronism which fails to address the societal 
changes wrought by demographic, scientific and clinical advances over the 
last two centuries. Why might a computer programmer not be asked to 
explain her decision to write a particular line of code which thereby exposed 
the computer user to an increased threat from an obscure but identified 
virus? If the decision was a consequence of a judgement weighing the risks, 
advantages and disadvantages of such a piece of code, is such not a matter 
for expert analysis? Of course, such an example demonstrates the need not 
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for one role for the expert witness but rather a multiplicity of roles arising 
in relation to such a scenario.
Experience suggests that there are at least four and possibly five distinct 
roles which the expert might be called upon to perform in the context of 
dispute resolution/litigation. Plainly, much will depend upon the nature 
of the expertise under scrutiny. In addition, especially within the context 
of claims against those who have professional indemnity insurance, the 
professional under challenge will, more often than not, have the benefit of 
experienced insurers and solicitors. As a corollary, those who feel aggrieved 
may well require to instruct solicitors who are less familiar with either the 
profession or professional branch concerned or the constraints of litigation 
in such a context.
(1) The investigator
If the issue truly arises out of the carrying out of some professional skill 
or art the detail of which is a mystery to those unskilled in such it must be 
axiomatic that some investigation will be likely. Obviously, in many cases 
the basic facts will have been fully explored by the legal teams involved. 
For example, the allegedly negligent conveyancer’s file will have been 
recovered and pored over. The client’s precognition will have addressed 
the solicitor’s mandate. The lender’s terms of engagement will have been 
considered.
In reality, the expert will frequently identify issues which require to be 
investigated before any concluded view might be taken in relation to breach 
of duty. Examples might be found of cases where a solicitor’s knowledge of 
his client’s intentions in relation to development of a property may or may 
not be relevant where a material period of time has elapsed during which 
the possibility of development could reasonably be discounted as a matter 
to be drawn to the attention of potential lenders.9 Such knowledge may 
or may not be apparent to the solicitors instructed but might reasonably be 
anticipated to be the sort of issue which an expert might, in an appropriate 
case, bring to the client’s and his solicitor’s attention.
Likewise, it is not uncommon where losses are sought to be recovered 
in relation to claims arising out of events many years previously for experts 
to suggest avenues of attack or defence where law or practice has in the 
meantime changed. Examples can be found in the field of conveyancing 
9  Leeds and Holbeck Building Society v Alex Morrison & Co 2001 SCLR 41.
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relating to letters of obligation, the necessity for site visits and the requisites 
for a competent and sufficiently comprehensive report on title. Practice in 
relation to each of these aspects of day-to-day conveyancing has drastically 
altered over the last ten years. Diverging views in relation for example to 
standard forms of clauses in missives has resulted in the need for creation 
of organisations such as the Standard Missives Joint Working Party of the 
Edinburgh Conveyancers’ Forum. An expert relying on what is perceived 
to be a standard clause in modern practice would in all likelihood be 
providing a pretty poor opinion if he or she were to suggest that the 
Working Party’s suggestions are indicative of practice in earlier years.
It also ought to be borne in mind that experts may be engaged not only 
in relation to whether or not there has been negligence/breach of duty but 
whether any admitted breach has been causative of loss. In many cases, the 
quantum of damages will necessarily demand investigation by experts. The 
input of the forensic accountant exemplifies the role of expert/investigator. 
Invariably, such an expert will be provided with basic documentation in 
relation to the performance of individuals or companies. In the real world 
however such experts frequently advise on the recovery of documents the 
existence of which is beyond the ken of mere lawyers.
For the avoidance of doubt, it is not suggested that the investigator expert 
don a forensic trenchcoat and fedora. Indeed, it is no part of the expert’s 
function to effectively dig about to find material which might support his 
side’s position. Such would, having regard to the dicta mentioned above, 
be anathema. The instructing solicitor must do all within his power to carry 
through such investigations as the expert identifies. Plainly, steps should 
already have been taken to ensure that the information initially provided to 
the expert is as complete as possible. The investigator expert does however 
require to address the issues in the case and in so doing must take steps 
to ensure that his opinion satisfies the proper requirements of the court in 
relation to a presentation of the whole factual matrix necessary for the just 
determination of the cause.
(2) The gatekeeper
The role of the expert as gatekeeper remains to some extent unrecognised. 
However, the importance of this role cannot, it is submitted, be 
underestimated.
Claims of professional negligence have diverse consequences. In the first 
place, the professional reputation of individuals is invariably placed in the 
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public domain for dissection. In the second place, the ability of individuals 
to earn a living may well be adversely affected. In the third place, the costs 
of professional practice may substantially increase in consequence of claims 
or a claims history. The consequences for individuals and firms can be dire. 
It is the first consequence that more often than not has greatest impact 
on people. Professional men and women often consider the making of a 
claim against them as a personal attack. He or she might often think of 
such a claim as being a challenge to his or her raison d’être. The emotional 
consequences might outweigh even a significant pecuniary disadvantage. 
It follows that such claims ought not ordinarily to be advanced unless they 
have some proper foundation.
It has been recognised in Scotland for many years that the proper 
conduct of professional negligence litigation demands that no such claim 
be advanced before the court unless there is available to the pursuer and 
his advisers suitably qualified expert opinion that supports the existence of 
certain professional practices or duties and that same have been breached to 
the pursuer’s detriment. The point has been made forcefully in a number of 
decisions relating to vexatious litigants. In Lord Advocate v McNamara10 the 
opinion of the court was delivered by Lord Reed. He made the following 
remarks in relation to the advancing of claims against professionals in the 
absence of appropriate opinion evidence:11
As we have explained, these proceedings were based on allegations of 
professional negligence which were unsupported by the opinion of anyone 
qualified to express an opinion on that issue. It is not suggested that they 
were instituted in the expectation that such support could be obtained; 
nor does there appear to have been any attempt to obtain such support. 
In those circumstances, we consider that we are entitled to conclude that 
the proceedings were instituted without any reasonable ground and were 
vexatious.
More recently, Lord Woolman had cause to discuss the requirements for an 
expert witness to support a claim in relation to a counter-claim arising out 
of alleged professional negligence in the related case of Tods Murray WS v 
Arakin.12 He stated:13
10  [2009] CSIH 45; 2009 SC 598.
11  McNamara at para 54.
12  2010 CSOH 90.
13  Arakin at 90-93.
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The pursuers emphasised the vital importance of a party being in possession 
of an appropriate expert before making allegations of professional negligence. 
They contended that in the absence of such a report, it is an abuse of process 
to institute and persist in such proceedings. 
In response, Mr McNamara argued that in respect of some of the 
allegations, no expert was required. This was most clearly put in the defenders’ 
Note of Argument, which stated “sometimes matters of misconduct are just 
so blatant they require no experts’ view to demonstrate that this is the case.”
I reject that approach. In my view, allegations of professional negligence 
require to have a proper foundation. Without such underpinning, the court 
is not in a position to make a finding in favour of the defenders (Walkers 
Evidence, third edition para. 16.3). As a solicitor must always exercise a 
measure of judgement in fulfilling his duties, it is not enough to say that 
he has failed to implement his instructions. The allegation must always be 
buttressed by a report from an appropriate witness, which states that the 
course taken was one that no solicitor exercising ordinary skill and care 
would have taken.
In the absence of such a rule, it would be open to a party to make 
whatever assertions he or she chose, however spurious or mistaken. In my 
view, that is just what has happened here.
Lest it be thought that the rules in Scotland in relation to the stringency 
inherent in requiring the production of an expert report are to any extent 
inconsistent with Midland Bank Trust Company Limited,14 it should be 
noticed that in England and Wales a not dissimilar approach in relation 
to the need for expert support is adopted in modern practice.15 However, 
for completeness’ sake, it should be noticed that an exception is made 
in that jurisdiction in relation to some claims arising out of negligent 
conveyancing16 although same is probably explicable by reference to 
technical differences in conveyancing practice.
The requirement for an expert report supporting a claim necessarily 
creates the role of gatekeeper expert. It probably goes without saying that 
those with a sceptical approach might consider that the necessity for such a 
role to be borne in mind by the expert witness is indicative of protectionism 
or cronyism. On the other hand, it is submitted that the views provided by 
both Lord Reed and by Lord Woolman amply demonstrate the necessity of 
such a role if the court is to exercise its jurisdiction equitably and efficiently.
14  Midland Bank Trust Company Limited v Hett Stubbs & Kemp [1979] 1 Ch 384.
15  Pantelli Associates Ltd v Corporate City Developments Number Two Limited [2010] EWHC 
3189.
16  Brown v Gould & Swayne [1996] EWCA Civ J0124-3.
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(3) The mediator
Within the context of disputes relating to professional liability it is, by the 
nature of things, by no means unusual for experts also to be engaged in 
mediation practice. However, the individuals concerned will be at pains to 
recognise the very distinctive role of the mediator in a mediation process 
from other aspects of their professional practices including the provision 
of expert opinion.
It is perhaps interesting to observe that the overlap in areas of expertise 
between mediators and expert witnesses is sometimes thought to be a 
necessary subject for analysis.17
For present purposes the mediator expert remains principally a witness. 
What has changed in the course of the last 20 years is an increasing reliance 
by the court upon experts to reduce the scope of dispute. In particular, since 
the introduction to the Court of Session of commercial actions the court has 
made demands upon parties to narrow the scope of any controversy and, 
where appropriate, to demonstrate that steps have been taken towards 
agreeing evidence.
Rule 47.12 of the Rules of the Court of Session 1994 makes provision for 
Procedural Hearings in commercial causes. Rule 47.12(2)(h) provides that 
the court may direct:
that skilled persons should meet with a view to reaching agreement and 
identifying areas of disagreement, and may order them thereafter to produce 
a joint note, to be lodged in process by one of the parties, identifying areas of 
agreement and disagreement, and the basis of any disagreement.
Needless to say, in many professional negligence claims there will be 
substantial areas of agreement. However, inasmuch as such disputes 
not infrequently require to be resolved by reference to the exercise of a 
professional judgement there will always remain scope for disagreement. 
This rule nonetheless requires a meeting. Such meetings will, no doubt, be 
approached in a positive fashion. Experience suggests that such meetings 
effectively operate as a form of informal mediation. That may well be 
desirable.
An understandable desire to reduce the scope of disagreement is 
bolstered somewhat by the provisions of Rule 47.12(2)(i) which provides 
that the court:
17  See for example C Haselgrove-Spurin, “The role of the mediator," available at http://
www.nadr.co.uk/articles/published/mediation/RoleOfTheMediator.pdf
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may appoint an expert to examine, on behalf of the court, any reports of 
skilled persons or other evidence submitted and to report to the court.
The position in the Sheriff Court is arguably even more demanding in as 
much as rule 40.12(3)(m) of the Ordinary Cause Rules 1993 empowers the 
sheriff to make any order which the sheriff thinks “will result in a speedy 
resolution” of the case!
What ought to be borne in mind by expert witnesses is that they cannot 
indulge in advocacy. To do so would plainly run counter to the whole 
ethos of the expert witness.
Mention was made above of the significance of professional judgement 
on the part of those whose actions are being criticised. Inasmuch as 
professional judgement necessarily connotes the possibility of a range of 
different actions/advice on the part of the individual concerned it must at 
least be possible for expert witnesses to effectively mediate in a way which 
reduces the breadth of the professional judgement challenged. Such a 
form of “mediation” has the significant advantage of narrowing the issues 
in dispute to the point where, if appropriate, certain evidence might be 
agreed or, where possible, compromise arrived at.
A necessary caveat must be stated. It is no part of the expert witness 
role to indulge in negotiation. She cannot enjoy any such mandate. More 
importantly, notwithstanding the professional obligations upon the expert 
to assist the court as outlined above, any such expert will nonetheless still 
require to answer to his client. There will be occasions where the expert 
witness risks professional embarrassment by failing to observe the limits 
imposed upon her to confine opinions advanced to the four walls of the 
litigation concerned and the factual matrix under consideration.
(4) The quantifier
When discussing the role of expert witnesses in professional negligence 
cases it is inevitable that the focus will be on the merits of the claim. In 
reality, many litigations focus as much upon the question of causation and 
the quantum of damages as upon primary liability.
The quantifier expert will be required to opine on the pursuer’s 
position but for the negligence/breach of duty complained of. In many 
cases, as suggested earlier, the nature of the breach of duty dictates that 
the quantifier expert shall be one and the same person who speaks to the 
merits. That will not always be the case. Frequently, within the context 
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for example of clinical negligence claims, a number of areas of expertise 
arise for consideration. The birth of a baby born with cerebral palsy may 
well focus upon the action or inaction of an obstetrician. The prognosis for 
the child, damaged and undamaged, will be addressed by others such as 
neonatal paediatricians and paediatric neurologists.
Lest it be thought that the quantifier expert’s role is in some way lesser 
than that of those providing opinions on the merits of a claim, the position 
in the real world is far more demanding. It is frequently the case that at the 
point in time at which the disgruntled client asserts that the professional’s 
negligence occurred many alternative ways forward might have been in 
contemplation. It is certainly not uncommon for example for developers 
of land to consider a number of different possibilities for development 
when acquiring a site. An error in relation to the extent of the title obtained 
may require the consideration of a series of different hypotheses as to how 
the land would otherwise have been developed. For example, planning 
considerations may have impacted upon the number of plots which might 
have been marketed. Such might plainly have impacted upon the profit to 
be generated by the development. Equally, planning conditions may have 
rendered an otherwise profitable part of a developer’s land bank of no 
worth whatsoever.
Indeed, in certain respects the quantifier expert’s function is particularly 
difficult. The discussion above in relation to the development value of land 
is an obvious example. The developer will invariably suggest that he would 
have adopted whatever scheme would have maximised the profit to be 
generated. The obligation on the expert however will necessarily require 
him to test that proposition. To fail to do so would be a dereliction of his 
obligations to the court as well as to his client. But in fulfilling his obligations 
he will necessarily risk being perceived as taking views adverse to those of 
his client. Moreover, the quantifier expert will almost invariably also be 
an investigator expert. It is not always the position that the client assists in 
providing information which might have a consequence of reducing the 
value of the claim being advanced. Of course, the preceding observations 
arise within the context of the expert witness retained on behalf of the 
claimant. Similar considerations will arise nonetheless for those instructed 
and retained in respect of the defence of such claims.
Another complicating factor for the quantifier expert arises from the 
need to consider the quite distinct issue of mitigation of damages. It is trite 
to observe that the onus of proof in relation to a failure to mitigate damages 
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rests upon the defender. Although issues in relation to mitigation might 
have been identified by defenders in appropriate cases it will frequently 
be the quantifier expert who is charged with forming a view on the steps 
which might properly have been taken by the claimant when presented 
with the breach of duty hypothetically conceded to have taken place.
(5) The communicator
It is implicit throughout the foregoing that expert witnesses are reasonably 
anticipated to be well-respected, vastly experienced and of obvious 
integrity. All of those attributes however are, within the confines of dispute 
resolution, almost valueless in the absence of an ability to relay complex 
factual material, explain sometimes ethereal concepts and address all 
manner of hypotheses which might be advanced in discussion with the 
decision-maker.
Of particular worth in the expert witness is a demeanour which is 
empathetic to the role of the decision-maker. Equally, he or she should 
be capable of communication in a fashion which is neither arrogant nor 
submissive.
D.  The Choice of an Expert Witness in the Real World
It will be apparent that the demands made upon expert witnesses are many 
and varied. The scepticism which is sometimes applied to expert evidence 
is, for the most part, balanced by the need to repose confidence in those 
witnesses skilled in the multiplicity of professional roles found in modern 
society.
This discussion is intended to broaden issues surrounding the instruction 
of expert witnesses in professional negligence claims. It highlights the 
diverse skill set which ought to be found in the well instructed expert’s 
toolbox. It may assist experts in recognising the different roles that they 
perform at a subconscious level.
Inevitably, professional negligence litigation is testing of all those 
involved in whatever role and at whatever level. What is most important is 
that such litigations are conducted in a way which reflects the nature of the 
issue at hand. Professionalism, propriety, integrity and diligence require to 
be deployed throughout.
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